



*Governments and Politics of the
Middle East
in the Twentieth Century*

by **H. B. SHARABI**

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
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 "With the relative decline of its strategic significance in a military sense, the Middle East's political importance has increased. It is one of the most open areas in the world, belonging as perhaps no other area to more than one 'world' at the same time—the Afro-Asian and the Muslim, the Mediterranean and the Arab. Physically and politically as well as culturally, the area acts upon these worlds and reacts to them, simultaneously playing the role of the mediator, partner and forerunner."

—from the opening chapter

PROFESSOR SHARABI brings into focus the distinctive features and tendencies characterizing the contemporary Middle East. Rather than following a strictly chronological sequence, he emphasizes patterns of growth and development, describing within each country three main lines of development—governmental structures and institutions, political organization and behavior, and regional and international relations. The Middle East is treated as a single unit only in the introductory and concluding sections where broad generalizations, pertaining to the area and the people as a whole, are developed.

Underlying geographic or political unities also are brought out, as, for example, through background material relevant to peculiar institutions and policies of states comprising the Arabian peninsula, or in

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
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


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TO
ISSAM MAHAYRI



Preface

This book is intended as a summary and a guide to the structure and functioning of the governments and politics of the contemporary Middle East. It presents three main lines of development in the individual states of the region: governmental structures and institutions, political organization and behavior, and regional and international relations. The Middle East is treated as a single unit only in Parts One and Seven, where basic generalizations can be legitimately made regarding the area and the people as a whole.

In my approach I have attempted to emphasize patterns of development and growth rather than a strict chronological sequence of events. The treatment varies slightly from country to country. For the states and principalities of the Arabian peninsula, for example, it seemed best to provide background material relevant to the peculiar institutional structures and political developments of these countries; while for other areas, such as Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, attention was concentrated mostly on those aspects which have exerted direct influence on institutional change and political evolution. In all cases, the selection and arrangement of facts aims at bringing into focus distinctive features and tendencies, which define and as clearly as possible summarize political development in the Middle Eastern states during the last fifty or sixty years.*

I should like to direct the reader's attention to the documentary texts—constitutions, electoral laws, treaties, agreements, official declarations, etc.—to which most of the footnotes refer. For any serious study the following six references are essential: J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East*, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956); Helen Davies, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*, 2nd. ed. (Durham,

* The last additions and corrections to the manuscript were made in August 1961. It became impractical to include analyses of subsequent political developments, particularly of the dissolution of the Syrian-Egyptian union in September 1961, and the Turkish elections of October 1961. The main lines underlying these developments, however, are to be found already treated in the chapters dealing with Turkey, Syria and Egypt.

N.C.: Duke University Press, 1953); Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs* [1920—] and *Documents on International Affairs* [1928—] (London: Oxford University Press); *Middle East Journal* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1947—); and *Oriente Moderno* (Rome: Institute per l'Oriente, 1921—).

My indebtedness to the scholarship and insight of leading writers in the field—H. A. R. Gibb, Jacques Berque, A. H. Hourani, Majid Khadduri, George Kirk, H. St. John Philby—is too great to acknowledge with any precision; specific references to their works will serve as partial acknowledgment and a valuable guide to the serious reader for further readings on particular topics.

I am obliged to many friends and colleagues who have read parts or all of the manuscript and given me useful advice. To the late Mrs. W. H. Brubeck and to Miss Hilda Kirby I am grateful for valuable editorial and technical services. I wish to thank Mr. Raja B. Barood of Beirut, Lebanon, for providing me with various facilities while I was working on the manuscript in the Middle East. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Georgetown University and the Georgetown Alumni Association for the award of two research grants, which enabled me to travel to the Middle East and to take the necessary time off from academic duties to complete this book. I should like in particular to express my appreciation to the Reverend Brian A. McGrath, S.J., Academic Vice President, Reverend James B. Horigan, S.J., Dean, the Graduate School, Dr. Howard R. Penniman, Chairman, Department of Government, and to Dr. Donald R. Penn, Chairman, Department of History, all of Georgetown University, for their encouragement and for many kindnesses.

H. B. S.

Washington, D.C.
January 1962

NOTE ON SPELLING

Rather than adhering to an exact system of transliterating Arabic, Turkish, and Persian terms, I have followed a pattern of phonetic rendering, using only two diacritical marks to represent the glottal stop sound (e.g., *na'ib*) and the guttural 'ayn sound (as in *shari'a*). Inasmuch as possible I have used such spelling as is most common in the nonspecialized works on the Middle East.



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PART ONE:

Political Framework 



The Middle East in the Twentieth Century

*"Violence is the midwife of every old society
pregnant with a new one."* Marx, Capital

POLITICAL PATTERNS

In the twentieth century three major types of government have prevailed in the Middle East: the traditionalist, the parliamentary, and the welfare-authoritarian. The traditionalist type of government, though on the decline since the First World War, still exists in Sa'udi Arabia, Yemen, and the Arabian dependencies. The parliamentary type of government, first introduced in the first decade of the century into Iran and then into Turkey, flourished in the interwar period but began to disintegrate shortly after the end of the Second World War. The concept of the welfare state prevailed in the postwar era, which also saw the ascendancy of military power and the subordination of parliamentary forms to authoritarian rule.

What has characterized this transformation is a dual process of disintegration of old structures and forms and adjustment to new ideas and influences. In some countries this process went farther and became more securely established than in others; in Turkey, for example, the Kemalist revolution was already consummated by the late 1920's, while in Yemen and Sa'udi Arabia rigid traditionalism still successfully warded off the forces of revolution and change in the early 1960's. But everywhere in the Middle East the forces at work have been fundamentally the same.

In order to understand the underlying factors of this political transformation it is important to keep in mind certain fundamental principles peculiar to the institutional background and political experience of the Muslim Middle East. In this respect it must be remembered that what has been called the "passing of traditional society"¹ in the Middle East has resulted not only in the "dislocation" of traditional political and cultural life but also in the collapse of traditional *authority*, which in all Muslim societies represented

the final source of validity and the center of all legality in the state. To replace established tradition and age-long usage in political life, there is no rational system sanctioned by authority and based on unequivocally accepted principles of legitimation. The pattern which traditional authorities bestowed upon public life in a Muslim society—on all levels of political conduct and on all individuals and groups, between ruler and ruled—was replaced by the contingency of factual power which lacked inherent validity for the society. This is perhaps the fundamental cause for the failure of the parliamentary constitutional system of government and the persistence of *de facto* authoritarian rule in the Middle East. Parliamentary forms that were products of an alien political process became instruments for the imposition of preconceived plans of social and economic reforms; democratic structures, instead of developing into a working system of political pluralism capable of withstanding the stress of free discussion, succumbed to the principle of “guided democracy” and to the ideal of the centralized welfare state.

While the traditional Islamic society contained within itself, even during the period of its decline, the elements of stability and permanence, the contemporary Middle Eastern society surrendered to the exigencies of centralized political power and the hazards of violent change. The *coup d'état* of 1908 in Turkey changed the status of the army in the Middle East; formerly the tool of national defence, the army now became the agent of social and political dynamism. Thus the success of force to depose the center of authority and the failure of the parliamentary system to serve as an effective agency of discussion invested individuals or groups strong enough to seize power in the state not only with political domination but also with ideological control in all matters relating to social and political innovation and reform. Disagreement and opposition on any level of social, political or intellectual endeavor were not only temporarily suspended but also unconditionally relegated to the indefinite future, and political leadership was exercised as a new version of the Islamic Sultanate and usurped the theoretical attributes of the Caliphate.

In the political life of the Middle East the antithetical relationship represented by Turkey on the one hand and Yemen on the other illustrates the scale of limiting conditions which underlies the crisis of government and politics in the contemporary Middle East. The traditionalist authoritarianism in Yemen cannot hope to withstand for long the forces of modernism and reform, while the westernized

parliamentarianism in Turkey is unable to sustain the weight of a dual-party democracy. In the final analysis it would seem that the governing principle dominating political life in the Middle East is not primarily that resulting from the conflict between democracy and authoritarianism but a principle of efficacy determined simply by the measure of success and the capacity to endure. The internal dialectic of Middle Eastern political life has produced a situation in which the trend toward modernization and the pull of traditionalism seem to have reached a synthesis in the form of the postwar welfare state. With the passing of traditional society the old values have lost their identity, and the lack of compensatory bases, which only a genuine cultural creativeness could provide, has been most clearly apparent in the downfall of recent political structures and forms.

BASIC DEFINITIONS

The term "Middle East" is an arbitrary and often misleading one. The area it designates is composed of the Arab East (the Nile Valley, the Fertile Crescent, and the Arabian Peninsula), Turkey and Iran.² It belongs geographically as well as culturally more to the Mediterranean world than to the Eastern or oriental world. Only during the Second World War, with the establishment of the British Middle East Command, did the Middle East designation begin to gain current usage. Like the term "Near East," used for convenience by orientologists to distinguish between the ancient cultures of Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, and Persia, and those of China and Japan in the Far East, Middle East is used not for its exactness but because it is convenient.

The Middle East region is composed of ten independent and sovereign states and of thirteen dependent political entities on the Persian Gulf and in South Arabia under varying degrees of British control. There are four monarchies, two of which are constitutional (Iran and Jordan) and two absolute (Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen); six republics (the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, and Turkey); and along the Persian Gulf and in South Arabia nine Sheikdoms (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujaira), one sultanate (the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman), one protectorate (the Aden Protectorate), and one colony (the Crown Colony of Aden).

Iran and Jordan are limited monarchies only in theory; in both countries the monarch wields powers far exceeding those prescribed by the constitution. Of the six republics only Israel had a civilian

chief of state in 1960; all the rest—the U.A.R., Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey—were headed by military men. Between 1948 and 1960 all the independent states except Israel have experienced *coups d'état* or attempts at *coups d'état*, or a civil war (as Yemen in 1948 and Lebanon in 1958). All the Arabian dependencies, except the Aden Colony, consist of Muslim patriarchies with an essentially medieval structure of government.

With the relative decline of its strategic significance in a military sense, the political importance of the Middle East has increased. It is one of the most open areas in the world, belonging as perhaps no other area to more than one "world" at the same time—the Afro-Asian and the Muslim, the Mediterranean and the Arab. Physically and politically as well as culturally the area acts upon these worlds and reacts to them, simultaneously playing the role of mediator, partner and forerunner. It is only recently that the importance of the Middle East in this respect has been realized. Contiguous with the Soviet Union, Europe, and the Afro-Asian world, it can play a major, and in some respects a decisive, part in the East-West struggle. Hence a Middle East free from direct or indirect Communist domination, politically stable and economically developed is an important asset to the West.

Except for its oil, the Middle East is one of the poorest regions in the world. Less than 6 per cent of its total area is under cultivation, and the vast majority of its inhabitants still live on a subsistence level. Of its 100 million people, about 75 per cent, and in some areas over 90 per cent, depend on agriculture for a living. Although tribal existence has considerably declined in the last twenty or thirty years, an estimated 5 to 10 per cent of the population still lead nomadic or seminomadic lives. Since the Second World War such urban centers as Cairo, Alexandria, Beirut, Baghdad, and Teheran have increased tremendously in size, giving rise to a new Middle Eastern proletariat. In spite of the high death rate the increase in population is one of the highest in the world; overpopulation is already posing serious problems to Egypt. Illiteracy for the region as a whole is between 85 and 90 per cent.

Most generalizations about the Middle East are misleading, and most misleading are those in regard to Islam. While it is true, for example, that the great majority of Middle Easterners are Muslims, Islam cannot for this reason be taken as the major unifying factor in the area. In fact, from a certain standpoint Islam represents an aspect

of diversity in the Middle East; for Muslims, like Christians, do not belong to one "church." The state religion of Iran is the Ja'fari (Shi'i); Yemen's is Zaidism; that of Oman is 'Ibadi; and that of Sa'udi Arabia Wahhabi. Sunni (Orthodox) Islam, the predominant sect, which is the faith of the majority in the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Iran, and Turkey, is that of the minority in Iran and Lebanon; in Iraq the Shi'is are almost equal to the Sunnis in number, and in Lebanon they constitute a minority in the total Muslim population. Muslim Turkey, formerly the seat of the Caliphate and leader of the Muslim world, makes a clear-cut distinction between state and church and gives no place to Islam in state affairs.

As to Christians, they are in a minority everywhere in the Middle East, except perhaps in Lebanon. All Christian denominations, however, both Eastern and Western, are represented in the Middle East. Besides the Western (Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant) and Greek Orthodox Churches in the Middle East, the following "Eastern" churches are represented: Maronite, Coptic, Jacobite, Nestorian, and Georgian. In addition to the Jews, who are now concentrated in Israel, the Middle East is also the home of the Zoroastrians and Baha'is (Iran); the Yazidis and Mandaeans (Iraq); the Nusairis (Syria); the Druzes (Syria and Lebanon); and the Samaritans (Jordan). In the Persian Gulf Hinduism and some primitive African beliefs are also represented.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

National and civil loyalty in the modern Middle East are novel and somewhat artificial sentiments which have no root in the social and political heritage of the region. Family, tribal, sectarian and local loyalties do not disappear by the mere transformation of the system of government. Indeed, the Ottoman *millet* system, which Toynbee has described as the finest contribution of Turkish administrative genius, based the entire governmental, political and social structure on the principle of ethnic and religious multiplicity. It was only the collapse by the end of the Second World War of the closed-in traditional community and its value patterns which gave rise to postwar political and social upheaval; this loss and resulting vacuum expressed itself in nationalist and ideological abstractions that had no basis in the traditional society or its moral and political values. For until the outbreak of the Second World War the process of social and cultural disintegration reflected itself only in the small body of

Western-educated élite and nationalist groups, leaving the masses of the people practically untouched. The new generation that came of age after 1945 was confronted by a new world: the process of collapse of traditional society had now turned full circle, and for the first time in Middle Eastern history the common man was awake. If on the economical level we describe as revolutionary the discovery of Arab oil in the postwar period, an equivalent and eventually far more revolutionary factor on the social level was the rise of mass society in the area during that period. An understanding of this crucial phenomenon is essential to any understanding of the political and social development in the Middle East after 1945.

Any realistic analysis of the structure of the governments and politics in the modern Middle East must also comprehend a frame of reference that delves more deeply beyond the strictly empirical sphere of investigation. Western techniques of analysis and interpretation are often inadequate and sometimes misleading when applied to the Middle East situation without qualification.

Middle Eastern society is not a young society; it has roots that go back to the most ancient sources of man's cultural history. The concept and the reality of the modern nation state in the Middle East are half a century old—yet here such states seem to lack the newness and freshness which characterize other emerging nations of Africa and Asia.

At the core of political life in the Middle East there is an attitude of profound cynicism, born perhaps of too long experience with political power and its abuses. Governments, even the most "representative," are viewed with suspicion; citizens respect the law more because of fear than of willing cooperation; administrative machinery is looked upon not as a means of public service but as an instrument of influence, bribery and endless red tape.

Political action is therefore characterized by a deep sense of sterility. Based on abstractions, all doctrinal political parties in the Middle East have in the end succumbed to the conflicting realities of political power. Despite instances of the overthrow of absolute rule and the establishment of a parliamentary government, no political party has ever seized and retained power in any Middle Eastern state. Coercive power, which exists only in the army, has proved itself in every instance the final arbiter of political action.

Since the establishment of parliamentary institutions and the introduction of democratic systems of administration (circa the first

decade of this century), the state in the Middle East has been subjected to a continuous process of "experimentation" which has stunted the gradual and normal growth of democratic procedures and institutions. In the last half century neither democracy nor dictatorship in a precise sense has been established in the Middle East—rather, *parliamentary structures based on personal rule*.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE ARMY

In the final analysis it will be found that political life in the Middle East has two bases: personal power and military supremacy.³ Unlike the West, where, as Max Weber pointed out, this phenomenon manifests itself from within the rational-legal structure of the state, in the Middle East it expresses itself in "charismatic" and "traditional leadership"—in Mustafa Kemal and 'Abdul Nasser, in Ibn Sa'ud and Imam Ahmad. Control of the state means control of the army; leadership has to be both civil and military. Turkey and Lebanon, the most Westernized countries of the Middle East, experienced sufficient stability to make possible the growth of certain parliamentary patterns and procedures; but the Lebanese civil war of 1958 and the Turkish military *coup d'état* of 1960 destroyed the former balance and reestablished the personal leader-army pattern, which first entered the political life of the Middle East in 1908 when the Young Turks effected their successful *coup d'état* against Sultan Abdul Hamid.

Ideas and institutions in Middle Eastern politics are, as Jacques Berque said,⁴ merely symbols expressing hopes and interests that cannot be translated into formulas but only interpreted against the background of specific instances. Just as in the sphere of political action a movement or an act always meets its opposite, so on the level of ideological or political debate every idea has its contrary. In political life what is necessary is not always inevitable, and what is logical is not necessarily valid.

Political realism, however, is the determinant of political action in the Middle East. To a greater degree perhaps than in other societies, ideas are *means* not ends in political action. Programs and doctrines, as 'Abdul Nasser put it, are "to serve, not to be served by life." One adheres to a political philosophy up to the point of possessing political power, which then imposes its own pragmatic course of action and provides its own theoretical justification. Pareto's analytical scheme of nonrational action is of particular relevance to

this aspect of Middle Eastern politics. The rational and psychological grounds of political behavior and thought, however, are to be sought in Muslim political theory as it developed from its early origins to the beginning of the twentieth century.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958).
2. The third non-Arab country is Israel, which is in the Fertile Crescent.
3. See Chap. Twenty, below.
4. *Les Arabes d'hier à demain* (Paris, 1960), pp. 37-38.

The Development of Islamic Political Thought

"It is much safer to obey, than to govern."
Thomas à Kempis, Imitatio Christi

THE SHARI'A

Strictly speaking, there is no independent political theory in Islam, for everything related to government and the state falls within the religious domain; a distinction between secular and religious does not exist. The Muslim, who professes belief in God and in the Message of his Prophet Muhammad, is a member of the Muslim community, not on the basis of kinship, language, or race, but solely on that of religion. Politically, the Muslim community or state may be characterized by four main features: ¹ (1) its sole head is God, and his Word, as revealed to Muhammad in the Koran, is its law and constitution; (2) God's Word is the only source of the law, and the community cannot enact its own law; (3) the function, form, and constitution of the state are eternal and cannot be changed regardless of time or place; and (4) the purpose of the state is to uphold the faith and to maintain and enforce the Word of God.

From this it is clearly obvious that the *shari'a*, the "totality of Allah's commandments," is no law in the modern sense of the word; it is, rather, an "infallible doctrine of ethics" prescribing the rules of conduct for the Muslim's entire life—religious, political, social, domestic and private. According to the Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiya (d. 1328), on whose theology the Wahhabi movement of Arabia was built in the eighteenth century, government and administration are "the most important requirements of religion [without which] religion cannot endure." To hold public office is "to further the religion and the worldly affairs of man," and to wield authority is "a religious function."

In its theoretical formulation, the *shari'a* pays little attention to the individual as such. Its main emphasis is on the individual's external relation to Allah and to his fellow men; it ignores man's inner

consciousness and is mainly concerned with his fulfillment of the prescribed rules and outward forms of conduct. The three leading philosophers of Islam, al-Farabi (d. 950), Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198)—strongly influenced by Plato and Aristotle—maintained that the *shari'a* represents the ideal constitution for the ideal state, the only state where man's highest perfection and greatest happiness are possible. The fact remains, however, that in Islamic theory the state assigns no clearly defined function or place to the individual, except "as taxpayer and submissive subject [with] no scope for his moral development."²

Muslim jurists and theologians, in the course of two or three centuries following Muhammad's death (632), elaborated upon the *shari'a* until it became a complete legal system. Its four principal roots were: (1) the Koran, the fundamental legislative source; (2) the *Sunna* or *Traditions* (the life and sayings of the Prophet), which corroborate and supplement the meaning and intention of the Koran; (3) the *ijma'*, or consensus, which provides the basis for taking "legal decisions" according to the principles laid down by the Koran and the *Sunna*; and (4) the *qiyas*, or analogy, which enables jurists to make "legal decisions" through "reasoning by analogy" (e.g., wine drinking is clearly prohibited because it inebriates; by analogy, if whisky inebriates it is also prohibited).

The first major decision made according to *ijma'* occurred upon the death of Muhammad when, lacking the guidance of a clear provision in the Koran and the *Traditions*, the community elected a successor (*khalifa*, caliph) to Muhammad, designating him as *imam* or "head of the community." This step, more than anything else, helped to concentrate Muslim political thought on the question of the Caliphate, the central Islamic institution which lasted until 1924 when it was abolished by nationalist Turkey.³

THE CALIPHATE

In the Koran God says to Muhammad: "Those who swear allegiance to thee swear allegiance to Allah." And in the Traditions Muhammad is reported to have declared that "he who obeys me obeys Allah, and he who disobeys me disobeys Allah." Therefore Muhammad's successor, the caliph, received the Prophet's absolute authority and demanded the total allegiance of his subjects. Being the "successor of the Apostle of God," the caliph derived his authority not from the community but from God; and, in turn, the

community's allegiance to him was based not on his political or military position but solely on its religious duty in answer to the commandment of God. As head of the state, the caliph was charged with the protection of the faith and the enforcement of the Word of God. By obeying the caliph and living according to the prescribed rules of God's Word, man fulfills his destiny and attains happiness in this world and the hereafter. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), the greatest political thinker of Islam, formulated this relationship as follows:

This world alone is not man's aim, for it is altogether useless and vain, seeing that its end is death and destruction. . . . Man's aim is religion which leads him to happiness in the hereafter, as the way to God who owns everything in heaven and earth [Koran, XLIII, 53]. . . . The intention of the lawgiver is the welfare of man in the hereafter, and it is necessary, in accordance with the religious laws, to bind the people to the ordinances of the *shari'a* in the affairs of their life in this world and in the hereafter. This authority is in the hands of the lawgivers, the prophets, and their successors, that is to say, the caliphs. . . . The caliphate is in essence the vice-regency of the lawgiver in order to defend the faith and to govern the world with its help.

To the leading jurists and theologians of medieval Islam, Islamic unity was one of the most important objectives of government, for on this unity depended not only the welfare of the faithful but the future of the faith as well. To allow within the state a division between spiritual and temporal power meant to weaken seriously the unity of Islam. Since the focal point of this unity was the Caliphate, Muslim thinkers held fast to the theory based on the *Traditions* that "religion and [temporal] power are twins" and that "religion is the foundation and [temporal] power is the guardian" of the state. Al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), the chief reconciler of reason and faith in Islam, went so far as to maintain that the Caliphate is "not required by reason" but by God's will and that rebellion against the person of the caliph is contrary to the will of God, even if the caliph is tyrannical and unjust; authority, no matter how despotic, was held to be always preferable to civil war and anarchy. This attitude rendered inevitable the insistence on the theoretical absolutism of the caliph and the unquestioning allegiance due him by the true believer. The muslim jurist Ibn Jama'a (d. 1333) expressed the extreme position on this matter:

If the office of imam is vacant . . . and there aspires to it one who does not possess the qualifications for it, but who imposes himself on the people by his might and his armies without any *bay'a* [oath of allegiance] or nomination by his predecessor, then his *bay'a* is lawfully contracted and obedience to him is compulsory.

SCHISMATIC VIEWS OF THE CALIPHATE

The original schism within Islam over the question of the Caliphate took place in the first Muslim century (seventh century A.D.) when a part of the Muslim community held Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law, to be the sole rightful successor of the Prophet. From this conflict emerged Shi'i Islam (*shi'a*, or "party," of Ali) which in time separated from the Sunni (orthodox) body of Islam and formed three similar but internally differentiated sects or schools: (1) The Imamis, or "twelvers," who constitute the majority of all the Shi'i Muslims, are concentrated in Iran and southern Iraq. They believe that the twelfth imam (i.e., the caliph) disappeared in the year 873/4 and will return as the *Mahdi* ("Messiah") "to fill the earth with justice after it has been filled with iniquity." Article 2 of the constitution of present-day Iran states that the National Assembly is "established by the favor and assistance of His Holiness the Imam of the Age, may God hasten his glad Advent," and stipulates that an "ecclesiastical committee" shall "discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Law of Islam," with the provision that "this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Imam of the Age, may God hasten his glad Advent." (2) The Isma'ilis, or "seveners," most of whom live in Pakistan and East Africa, believe that the imam cannot completely disappear, since if he did, "the earth would perish with all its inhabitants." The "western" Isma'ilis believe that the imam is living and leads the normal life of a human being but that he is hidden from the sight of ordinary men. The "eastern" Isma'ilis maintain that the imam is not only present (in the person of the Agha Khan), but as imam he is placed higher than the Prophet, whom God sent only as the imam's mouthpiece. (3) The Zaidis, who are concentrated chiefly in Yemen, combine Shi'i and Sunni doctrine and do not claim for their imam anything more than "right guidance." The Zaidi imam is neither hidden nor absent but is elected by the community from

among the *sayyids* of Yemen, the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima.

At the time of the Shi'i revolt, another group refused to accept the orthodox principle of succession. The Kharijites, or "renegades," maintained that the Caliphate as such is not a matter of religious obligation and that the community can fulfill the demands of the *shari'a* within the framework of civil administration without recourse to a caliph. They claimed that it is up to the people to elect a caliph, if they believe they need one, and that they can depose him or even put him to death if he proves tyrannical or unjust. They upheld the principle that to be eligible for the office of caliph, one need not belong to the Prophet's family or to his tribe of Quarish; any Muslim, whether an Arab, non-Arab, or even a slave, could be elected to that office. The Kharijites' egalitarian philosophy and the fanatical methods they employed to enforce their views led to their total suppression by the orthodox defenders of the faith and contributed greatly to the latter's wholehearted adoption of the principle that rebellion in all its forms is not permissible and contrary to God's will.

THE SULTANATE

The institution of the Sultanate (temporal rule) made its appearance in the middle of the tenth century with the rise throughout the Abbasside empire of independent principalities under the *de facto* control of local military commanders who owed only theoretical allegiance to the caliph. The caliph's actual jurisdiction was limited to progressively decreasing areas until finally it included only the palace area in Baghdad where eventually the caliph himself became merely a figurehead. Muslim jurists and theologians, always more concerned with preserving the theoretical consistency of the law than with the contradictions inherent in the existing state of affairs, sought to justify the usurpation of actual power by the military commanders and at the same time tried to protect the caliph's position as the source of all authority and power in the community. According to what may be called the "theory of usurpation of power," legitimacy was effected by the caliph's conferring on the temporal princes the official title of sultan; they, in turn, swore allegiance to the caliph, thus maintaining outward conformation to the prescribed rules. Unlike the pragmatic reconciliation achieved in medieval Europe between Pope and Emperor, the reconciliation between caliph and

sultan was entirely a theoretical one, achieving, instead of a solution, a complete surrender of power on the part of the caliph and official recognition of the principle of usurpation of power by military force. Hence, as al-Ghazzali put it:

An evil-doing and barbarous sultan, so long as he is supported by military force, so that he can only with difficulty be deposed, and such an attempt to depose him would create unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left in possession, and obedience must be rendered him.

This principle of political quietism has reasserted itself in the modern Middle East with only minor variations: military autocracies, instead of employing the *bay'a* and the caliphal bestowal of Sultanate, utilize the modern source of legitimacy—the plebiscite and the popularly approved constitution.

The Abbasside empire came to an end in 1258 when the Mongol hordes reduced Baghdad to ruins. Until that time, temporal princes from Syria to Yemen and from Morocco to the Caspian Sea sought from the caliph the titles and certificates of appointment that conferred legitimacy on their positions. In Cairo, where the Caliphate had been re-established in the person of a member of the Abbasside dynasty, the caliph led a shadowy existence in complete dependence on the Mamluk sultan. Yet for a century and a half, each new sultan was ceremoniously installed by the caliph, who wielded no power whatsoever. With the Ottoman occupation of Egypt in 1517, the Caliphate passed to the Ottoman dynasty where it remained until its abolition in 1924.⁴

OTTOMAN DECLINE

One may say the remaining vitality in Islamic intellectual activity faded in the sixteenth century with the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the center, defender, and guardian of orthodox Islam. Under the Ottomans, *ijtihad*, the “door to independent reasoning” on problems of the *shari'a*, was definitely closed, and *taqlid*, reasoning according to established precedents and interpretations, became the basic principle of legal procedure. This intellectual rigidity continued unrelieved until the nineteenth century when the impact of Western ideas and institutions put into motion the process of “Westernization” that engulfed the entire Middle East and transformed, by the

mid-twentieth century, the very basis of its social, economic, and political life.

Independently of Western influence, however, there had arisen under the Ottomans a twofold legal practice, which, though molded in traditional concepts and terms, introduced new distinctions between the established prescriptions of the *shari'a* and governmental ordinances and decrees (*qanun*). The *qanun* (pl. *qawanin*) addressed itself to facts and situations within the empire not specifically covered by the *shari'a* and was expressed in enactments introduced by the state and executed by its functionaries. These decrees and ordinances developed into an independent body of law, which, although never explicitly running counter to the spirit of the *shari'a*, never received the latter's religious sanction and never was regarded as having the same validity. In most of the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish *qanun*, especially in the administrative field, is still in operation to this day.

Under external and internal pressures, the Ottoman sultan-caliph was obliged in the second quarter of the nineteenth century to introduce the *tanzimat*, the reforms which were first aimed at winning the goodwill of the European powers and the backing of liberal opinion in the Ottoman Empire, but which eventually led to the complete collapse of the old order. The two most important reform prescripts, the *hatt-i-sherif* of Gulhane ⁵ (November 3, 1839) and the *hatt-i-humayun* ⁶ (February 18, 1856), introduced the first voluntary limitations ever set on the authority of the Muslim head of state. All Ottoman citizens, Muslims as well as non-Muslims, were declared equal before the law, "their lives, their honor, and their fortunes [were] secured to them by the sacred text of the law"; new systems for assessing and levying taxes and for military service were established, and new courts, including "mixed tribunals" to deal with cases between Muslims and foreigners, were set up. In 1840 a penal code was enacted, and in 1850 a commercial code was promulgated, followed three years later by a code of commercial procedure and, in 1863, by a code of maritime commerce, all based on European models. In 1876 a full-fledged constitution embodying the basic ideas of European liberalism and a limited form of parliamentary government was drawn up, but the parliament was suspended after its first session by Sultan Abdul Hamid and was not reconvened until 1908, when the first military *coup d'état* of the modern Middle East was successfully carried out.

These innovations were revolutionary in nature, for they were the first basic reforms ever introduced into the political and administrative system of Islamic society. Though the phraseology and arrangement of the new laws still followed traditional lines, it is evident that they infringed upon the *shari'a* and its provisions. That these innovations merely provided necessary regulations in fields not contemplated by the sacred law could not be accepted as sufficient justification by the ulema and the large body of conservatives who, with considerable success, did all they could to block the application and hamper the realization of the new reforms.

THE REFORM MOVEMENT

The reform movement in the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim countries of the Middle East during the second half of the nineteenth century originated in two main groups, the ulema and the new generation of Westernized nationalists. The first represented only a small fraction of the ulema, who recognized the necessity of change in order to preserve Islam, and who were willing to attempt a reformulation of Islamic doctrine along lines that could meet the new needs of the age. The second group consisted of liberal nationalists who viewed Islam more as a national heritage than as an unchangeable order of society and the state, and who set their faith in a representative government and a liberal democracy patterned after the European model.

In the course of the last seventy-five years, the movement of Islamic modernization, despite partial success in some fields, has failed to attain its primary objective of a reformulated Islamic doctrine. All the major issues it raised were not resolved by the middle of the twentieth century. The nationalist movement, on the other hand, evading full and real confrontation with these issues, gradually veered toward preoccupation with strictly political problems. By the middle of this century, a new era had begun in which the modernist movement no longer presented itself, outside the Muslim Brothers,⁷ as the valid answer to the problems of the time, and a new wave of nationalist resurgence, based almost wholly on the secular ideas of national unity and the welfare state, dominated the political and social scene.

The father of the movement to modernize Islam was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), who believed that the foundations of Islam were still sound and capable of withstanding the stress and strain of the

modern world. He maintained that a reform of Islam was possible through the introduction of mass education and the upholding of reason as the arbiter of truth. Although not a profound thinker, Jamal al-Din played a major role in launching the movement of Islamic modernization, and he was also instrumental in bringing about the first nationalist uprisings in the modern Middle East, the 'Arabi uprising in Egypt in 1881-1882,⁸ and the Persian revolution of 1905-1906.⁹ His disciple, the Egyptian Muhammad Abdu (d. 905), the "noblest mind" of modern Islam, exercised wider influence, especially in Egypt and the Arab countries. His chief contribution consisted in "restating the rights of reason in religious thought" and in restoring "some measure of flexibility to what had become a rigid and apparently petrified system and [allowing] the possibility of reformulating doctrine in modern instead of medieval terms."¹⁰ Abdu emphasized the distinction between political action and religious reform, thus greatly influencing the development of the movements of Egyptian nationalism and Islamic modernization. His basic teachings were adopted by the revivalist party, al-Salafiyya, "the upholders of the tradition of the Fathers of the Muslim community," which won a wide following in the Muslim world and found political expression in the movement of the Muslim Brothers.

NATIONAL ASCENDANCY

The last tenuous links binding orthodox Islam were finally broken with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the caliphate after the First World War. But the disintegration of Islamic unity had set in before the outbreak of war—the war only helped to speed the process. For a short time the caliphate had experienced a sudden resurgence of vitality under Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), who, after suspending the constitution of 1876, embarked on a Pan-Islamic policy that embraced the entire Islamic world from North Africa to the Malay Archipelago. But the Young Turk *coup d'état* in 1908 and the reinstatement of the constitution reduced the caliph's position to that of a mere figurehead, so that, when he proclaimed the *jihad* (holy war) against the infidel Allies in 1915, not only did tens of thousands of Indian Muslims volunteer anyway in the British army, but the Arab Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire also seized the opportunity to proclaim the Arab revolt and to fight on the side of the Allies in pursuit of Arab national independence. The nationalist spirit had already penetrated the core of the Muslim com-

munity, and nationalist loyalty had replaced allegiance to the caliphate.

Thus the stage was set at the end of the war for the passing away of the Islamic state and the establishment in its place of the contemporary nation states of the Middle East. Everywhere, except in Arabia, secular national governments were set up, independently in Turkey and Iran and with the help of the French and British in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt. Turkey alone made a clean break with Islam. In the Fertile Crescent, Iran, and Egypt secularization was carried out in all matters relating to administration and government, but everything concerning "personal status" was left to the *shari'a*. In Sa'udi Arabia, Yemen, and the Arabian principalities, the *shari'a* remained supreme in private as well as in public life.

The countries which followed the "middle way," i.e., Egypt, Iran, and the countries of the Fertile Crescent, preserved the inner contradiction between theory and practice that had persisted in medieval Islam. By paying lip service to Islam as the official religion of the state and refraining from overthrowing the *shari'a* altogether, these countries evaded the confrontation which Kemalist Turkey had successfully accomplished. Instead they adopted a compromise formula¹¹ which generally proceeded to: (1) adopt Western law in fields not covered by the *shari'a*; (2) adopt Western law where it conformed with the *shari'a*; (3) adopt Western law to replace those *shari'a* rules that were no longer applicable in modern life; (4) emphasize the distinction between the strictly devotional provisions of the *shari'a* and those concerned with social and political matters.

The problem implicit in this duality was solved, not in adjusting theory to the demands of the nation state, as Turkey did, but in accommodating the legal structure to the requirements of practical affairs, avoiding the *shari'a* as much as possible. The break with religious law, and therefore with God's commandments, had actually been accomplished through the transfer of sovereignty from the viceroy of the Prophet to the nationally elected parliament of the people. The mere fact that the community now undertook to frame its own laws violated the fundamental Islamic principle proclaiming God as the sole legislator. Aside from Turkey and the Arabian patriarchies, only the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has in the middle of the twentieth century attempted to give an answer to the modern Islamic dilemma born of the contradiction between the demands of the *shari'a* and those of the secular nation state.

Thus in the course of the first half of the twentieth century, Islamic society gradually drifted away from its traditional religious beliefs and practices into the Westernized world of secular concepts and manners in practically everything pertaining to political, economic, and social organization. The Muslim's final appeal was to the dubious principle maintaining that a Muslim "does not become an infidel by breaking the law, but only by doubting its eternal validity;" within these limits the most glaring violations became justifiable. The Muslim state, viewed as the God-centered community by the *shari'a*, now became the Westernized type of secularized nation state.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. See H. A. R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," in *Law in the Middle East*, ed. Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny (Washington, 1955), vol. 1, p. 3.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
3. See Chap. Four, pp. 39-41, below.
4. On the Ottomans' claim to the Caliphate, see T. W. Arnold, "*Khalifa*," *Encyclopedia of Islam* (1st ed.), pp. 883-884.
5. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East*, (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. I, Doc. 48.
6. Text in *Ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 65.
7. See Chap. Fifteen, p. 204-205, below.
8. See Chap. Fifteen, pp. 193-194, below.
9. See Chap. Seven, p. 75, below.
10. H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohamedanism* (Oxford, 1949), p. 177.
11. Majid Khadduri, "From Religious to National Law," in *Mid-East: World-Center*, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York, 1956), p. 232.

Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Peace Settlement

*La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure.
La Fontaine, Le Loup et l'Agneau*

DISINTEGRATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

In 1918 the Ottoman Empire was defeated and the last Turkish troops withdrew beyond the same Syrian-Turkish frontiers which, almost exactly four hundred years earlier, Selim I had crossed on his way to conquer the Arab world. Turkey's collapse marked the definitive surrender of Islam to Christian Europe. The war of 1914-1918 was the last to be waged as a *jihad* proclaimed by the Caliph of all Muslims and the last military campaign undertaken by Islam against the Christian powers. Although less than three decades later the Muslim Middle East was to reemerge independent of European domination, its reemergence was to be in the form of separate political units loosely bound by the sentiment of Islamic brotherhood. Islam was not to be embodied in a united community headed by the successor of the Prophet and governed by God's ordinances.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire began as early as the second half of the sixteenth century, shortly after the death of Sulaiman the Magnificent, the greatest of all Ottoman sultans. Its actual disintegration, which continued until its final collapse in 1918, began in the late seventeenth century and was marked first by the treaty of Carlowitz (1699) and seventy-five years later by the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774),¹ which acknowledged Russia's supremacy in the Black Sea (hitherto a "Turkish lake") and allowed her a measure of interference in Turkey's internal affairs. The first serious blow against the internal unity of the empire was dealt by the Wahhabis of Arabia, whose conquest of Mecca and the Holy Places in 1806 was the first Arab rebellion in modern times against the Ottoman Caliphate. "The time is approaching," said a Wahhabi Arab to the

French Consul in Baghdad then, "when we shall see an Arab seated on the throne of the Caliphs; we have languished too long under the yoke of a usurper." ² Muhammad (Mehmet) Ali (1805-1841) not only detached Egypt from the Ottoman Empire but also waged two successful wars (1831 and 1839) against Constantinople which almost brought down the house of Othman. Throughout the nineteenth century revolutions shook the Balkan possessions of the caliph, and by 1878 they were reduced to a small area west of Constantinople. Only British intervention and the repeated promises of reform saved the empire from total collapse before the turn of the twentieth century.

Western-inspired reform, however, was not only a difficult task to accomplish but constituted, in fact, as Mustafa Kemal later found out, a contradiction in terms. To carry the legal, administrative, and constitutional reforms adopted between 1839 and 1876 literally to their logical conclusion would have amounted to undermining the very foundations of the Ottoman state. This was instinctively realized by Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), the last great sultan-caliph of the Ottoman Empire, who not only suspended the newly adopted constitution immediately upon succeeding to the throne but also embarked on a conservative Pan-Islamic policy aimed at reviving the power and prestige of the Caliphate and shutting off all European political and social influences. Pan-Islamism—in a multinational Empire and, moreover, during an age of national awakening and constitutional government—was outdated, however. Even the Arabs, though Muslims, would not submit to Turkey's unconditional domination solely on the basis of Islam, much less would the Greeks, Armenians, and Maronites do so.

The 1908 revolt of the Young Turks, which restored the Constitution of 1876 and took as its symbol "liberty, justice, equality," was therefore received with jubilation by all Ottoman *millet*s. Elections took place within a few months, and the new parliament, which convened in December, 1908, was composed of 245 deputies, of whom 143 were Turks and 70 were Arabs. The non-Turkish nationals, however, sought to achieve not only political representation but also a measure of national autonomy based on some type of decentralization. To this the Young Turks were adamantly opposed. They believed that the strength and unity of the Empire depended on the principle of centralization, and that it was founded on the "Ottomanization" of all the peoples of the Empire. Telaat, Minister

of the Interior and member of the ruling triumvirate, said in 1910: "There can be no question of equality until we have succeeded in our task of Ottomanizing the Empire." The last decade of the Ottoman Empire was dominated by the policy of Ottomanism which, like Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamism, was unacceptable to the majority of the Empire's non-Turkish, and especially non-Muslim, subjects. Turkey entered the war in 1914 a weak, divided country.

A major factor responsible for preserving the Empire's independence and territorial integrity until 1914, at least in Asia, was Britain's century-old policy based on the conviction that the best protection of her Indian empire and its communications lay in preventing the fall of the Ottoman Empire or its partition among the powers. During the hundred years from the Congress of Vienna to the outbreak of the First World War, British supremacy was firmly established: Malta (occupied in 1800) was formally acquired at Vienna in 1815, Aden was occupied in 1839; the Persian Gulf was pacified by 1853; Cyprus was taken at the Congress of Berlin in 1878; Egypt and the Suez canal were occupied in 1882, and the Sudan conquered in 1898. Though the rise of Germany as a Middle Eastern power in the last decade of the nineteenth century caused important shifts in Britain's policy and induced her to come to an understanding with France in 1904³ and with Russia in 1907,⁴ her basic policy regarding the territorial integrity of Turkey remained unchanged until the First World War. "The only policy," said Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey in 1913, "to which we can become a party is one directed to avoid collapse and partition of Asiatic Turkey . . ." In fact, until the outbreak of hostilities, Britain still hoped that Turkey would not become allied with the Central Powers but would remain neutral. The ruling triumvirate, however, mainly under the influence of Enver Pasha, Minister of War, had already decided to enter the war on the side of Germany,⁵ and on October 29, 1914, Turkish vessels attacked the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. "Turkey," wrote *The Times* on November 3, "has betrayed the interests of Islam by making wanton war on the Allies, and has thereby pronounced her own death sentence." The partition of the Ottoman Empire was now accepted by Britain as an inevitable result of Allied victory.

PARTITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

During the war, between 1915 and 1917, the partition of the Ottoman Empire was planned by Britain, France, Russia, and Italy

in four sets of secret agreements: the Constantinople Agreement (March 4-April 10, 1915); the London Agreement (April 26, 1915); the Sykes-Picot Agreement (April 26-October 23, 1916); and the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement (April 19-September 26, 1917).⁶ The entire region was to be put under direct or indirect rule of the powers, with certain areas to remain autonomous but within the sphere of influence of one or another of these powers.

The Arabian peninsula was to remain a British preserve. "In the interest of Islam" Britain was to establish "an independent Moslem political unit" with its center in the Holy Places to replace the Ottoman Empire as a seat of the Caliphate.⁷

The Fertile Crescent was to be divided between Britain and France into three zones, one under direct administration, another as spheres of influence, and a third under international administration. French direct administration was to extend over the coastal and northern areas from Acre to northern Mesopotamia; Britain's was to include the Bay of Acre and Haifa and the southern half of Mesopotamia, including Baghdad. The zone of French "influence" was to consist of all of Syria (and Lebanon) and northern Iraq; that of Britain, the region stretching from the Mediterranean south of Gaza to the Persian frontiers; in this zone "an Arab State or Confederation of Arab States" was to be established under French and British "protection." The third zone of international administration was to consist of the Holy Places and most of Palestine.

Anatolian Turkey was to be divided into five areas: Russia was to get the Straits, including Constantinople, together with eastern Anatolia from Trebizond to Iraq; France, Cilicia and southeastern Anatolia; Italy, all of southwestern Anatolia; and the remaining northwestern part of Anatolia was assigned to the "Turkish State."

The story of the Paris Peace Conference and the actual postwar settlement has been told in detail;⁸ it is sufficient here briefly to outline the final outcome and the main consequences.

It should be noted that the countries of the Middle East, except for Hejaz, were not represented at the Peace Conference and took no part in the final settlement. Turkey, as a defeated belligerent, and Egypt, as a dependent country, were not allowed to send representatives to the conference; the Persian delegation was refused recognition in Paris on the grounds that Persia was a nonbelligerent during the war; the Arabs of Syria and Iraq were unofficially represented by Amir Faisal, who appeared at the conference as the representative

of Hejaz. Only the Zionist and Armenian delegations were given full and sympathetic hearing at the conference in Paris.

The final settlement was based neither on the secret wartime agreements nor on the Wilsonian principles of "open covenants openly arrived at" and "national self-determination" but on a combination of compromises and agreements made among the powers in 1919 and 1920. In Turkey Mustafa Kemal refused to submit to any agreements which did not respect Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity and went to war to secure these conditions: Turkey became the only country in the Middle East to secure a final settlement based on her own terms. Persia, reduced to virtual dependence on Britain by the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919, experienced a *coup d'état* under Reza Khan in 1921 who renounced the treaty and restored the country to complete independence. In Arabia Ibn Sa'ud drove the Hashimites out of Hejaz and established the largest Arabian kingdom since Muhammad in 1925; and Yemen, which was autonomous under the Turks, declared itself an independent monarchy under Imam Yahya. Turkey, Persia, Sa'udi Arabia, and Yemen were thus the four Middle Eastern countries to emerge completely independent after the First World War. The Persian Gulf, South Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan remained as they were before the war, under British control.

The most complex, and in the long run the most inadequate, settlement was imposed on the Fertile Crescent. Here five political entities were created along lines having little or nothing to do with the social, political, or economic structure of the region—or with the British wartime promises to the Arabs. The disposition came closest to the secret Anglo-French agreements of 1915-1917, but instead of establishing direct administration and spheres of influence, the settlement placed the area under the mandate system, with Britain and France as mandatories: Syria (and Lebanon) went to France, Palestine and Iraq to Britain.

The mandate system, originally suggested by General Smuts, received President Wilson's enthusiastic support and was adopted by the League of Nations as a "sacred trust of civilization." The mandatory regime called, in theory at least, for the gradual development of the mandated countries into self-governing democracies. In Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq political, legal, and administrative institutions were to be introduced to facilitate their growth into sovereign and independent states. For Palestine, promised to the Zionists by Britain in 1917 as a "national home" for the Jews,⁹ a separate mandate pro-

vided for the encouragement, "so far as circumstances [permitted]," of "local autonomy." Britain was given wide freedom of action in Palestine with "full powers of legislation and of administration." The area east of the Jordan River (Transjordan) was closed to Jewish immigration¹⁰ and an autonomous amirate under mandatory supervision was established in 1923.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

For the first time since the Crusades, Christian Europe, represented by Britain and France, was firmly established in the Middle East. In the four independent countries of the Middle East this gave rise to two types of response, a "Zealot" response in Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen and a "Herodian" response in Turkey and Iran. The first was expressed by the resurgence of the primitive institution of the imamate in Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen, "an archaism evoked by foreign pressure;" the second by the rise of a Western-type secular dictatorship, which was "a form of cosmopolitanism evoked by the self-same external agency."¹¹ Seen in retrospect, both responses led, despite their opposition, to the same personalization of political power, the same closed-in structure of society, and the same stifling of creative energy. Even Turkey, the exemplary Westernized state in the Middle East, had failed by 1960 to realize the total transformation which it had set out to achieve four decades earlier.

In the mandates of the Fertile Crescent and the disguised protectorate of Egypt the response was negative. Institutional and administrative Westernization was accompanied by constant resistance to Britain and France. Nationalism became the strongest single uniting factor, assuming a violent and extremist character. Before the First World War Arab nationalism was liberal in spirit, nourished by the confident hope that independence and representative government were to be the solution of all the social and political ills that plagued the Muslim East. During the war British promises and Wilson's invocation of a world "made safe for democracy" confirmed the Arabs in the equity of their cause and justified their rebellion against the Caliphate. The power politics of the postwar period and the frustration of the Arabs' hopes of independence and constitutional government destroyed the old liberalism and optimistic trust in the European democracies and brought into the nationalist movement elements of irrationalism and hate. By the early 1920's the first phase of the Arab national movement was over, and a new phase set in

which lasted until the decade of revolution and *coups d'état* between 1949 and 1958.

Against this background it is not surprising that efforts made by France in Syria and Lebanon and by Britain in Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt to introduce new structures of government and administration met with sullen mistrust and active resistance. Despite considerable progress in the fields of education, economic development, and basic administration, both Britain and France failed in their mission of political tutelage. In retrospect it is obvious that the parliamentary regimes established in these countries during the interwar period proved complete failures when judged by even the crudest Western standards.

In the 1930's the attempt at replacing direct control by special treaty alliances was a result of persistent opposition to the tutelage of France and Britain and a practical measure to safeguard French and British interests. Both powers strove at this time to cultivate a class of politicians in these countries who were willing to protect the interests of Britain and France both then and when independence would finally be achieved. Sectarian, tribal, and family interests were strengthened and the divisive forces inherent in Middle Eastern society were openly encouraged by the mandatory powers. "Democratic" representation during this period was mostly based on the exploitation of these family interests, much the same as during the last phase of Ottoman rule. The term "moderate element" originates from this period of Anglo-French education in self-government; it is much equivalent in nationalist eyes to the term "collaborator" as it was used in Europe during the Nazi occupation.

In the interwar period political leadership was divided into moderates and nationalists. The former were realists who out of personal interests or submission to the *fait accompli* chose to cooperate with the foreigner, the latter patriots who preferred to oppose foreign control and fought to lead the nationalist movement. But the distinction between the two groups, especially after 1930, became progressively less clear-cut as some of the patriots showed increasing willingness to become realistic while remaining patriotic. With the establishment of five semi-autonomous governments in the Fertile Crescent, lucrative official positions were plentiful; for these, the most eligible choices were the leaders who under the Turks had been the standard-bearers of national resistance. It is hardly surprising that after independence had been achieved and Britain and

France were no longer able to impose their will, none of the artificial boundaries between Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Transjordan were torn down: the entrenchment of local political interests and intra-regional rivalries by the end of the Second World War proved stronger than the call to national unity.

Perhaps the most drastic result of the "Balkanization" of the Middle East at the Peace Conference was the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, where in 1918 about 90 per cent of the population was Arab. Since Arab resistance to the Palestine mandate kept the country in constant turmoil between 1920 and 1940, it was practically impossible for Britain to establish self-governing, autonomous institutions in Palestine. It was also natural that the British policy in Palestine should inevitably end in failure, with disastrous results not only for Palestine but for the entire Middle East. The exodus of a million Arabs from Palestine in 1948-1949 and the creation of the state of Israel resulted in perhaps the most intricate and so far the most insoluble problem of the postwar Middle East. From the political standpoint, the new Arab diaspora and the existence of Israel have constituted an obstacle to normal political development in the Arab countries and have been a principle factor in the upheavals and convulsions of every Arab country between 1949 and 1958. Just as Arab resentment against Britain and France led the Arabs in the interwar period to turn toward Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, so their grievance against the role of the Western powers in the Palestine tragedy led them in the 1950's to turn toward Soviet Russia.

All the principal problems of the Middle East after the Second World War have their origin in the peace settlement of 1919-1920. This is especially true of the Fertile Crescent, the truly Balkanized area of the Middle East. It is perhaps not going too far to say that upon the solution of this area's problems will depend the future stability and progress of the entire Middle East.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

1. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. I, Doc. 21.
2. Jean Raymond, *Mémoire sur l'origine des Wahabys, sur la naissance et sur l'influence dont ils jouissent comme une nation*, 1806 (Cairo, 1925), p. 34.
3. Text in Hurewitz, vol. I, Doc. 104.
4. Text in *ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 105.
5. See "Secret Treaty of Alliance: Germany and the Ottoman Empire, August 2, 1914," in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. I.
6. See texts in *ibid.*, vol. II, Docs. 5, 6, 10, 12.

7. Great Britain, *Mesopotamia Commission, 1916* (London, 1917), p. 12.

8. See especially George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938); Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921* (London, 1956); Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey* (Norman, Okla., 1930); Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925* (London, 1927); H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1924), vol. VI.

9. See the "Balfour Declaration," in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 13.

10. According to Article 25 of the Mandate, Britain was entitled "to postpone or withhold application of such provisions . . . as [she] may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions" east of the Jordan River.

11. See Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial* (London, 1946), pp. 184-212.



PART TWO:

Turkey ❁



The Kemalist Revolution

“Oui, cela était autrefois ainsi, mais nous avons changé tout cela.”

Molière, Le Médecin malgré lui

THE WAR OF LIBERATION

By October, 1918, Turkey was defeated on all fronts. When the armistice was signed on board the H.M.S. “Agamemnon” at Mudros on October 30, the Ottoman Empire was reduced to a “cowed, inanimate thing, with no thought of resistance and with no hope save [that] the punishment, whatever form it might take, would come quickly.”¹ Had the Allies been able and willing to conclude a peace treaty with Turkey immediately after the armistice, sultan Mehmet VI would most probably have accepted any terms imposed on him, and the partition of the Ottoman Empire would have been accomplished. But as the Peace Conference got under way in January, 1919, it became evident that the Allies had no clear agreement regarding a final settlement of the age-long Near Eastern question. With Russia outside the Allied ranks, it now devolved on Great Britain, France, and the United States to devise a settlement acceptable to each of them as well as to their associated allies, Italy and Greece. During the war it was agreed that France would get Syria in the Arab part of the Ottoman Empire and Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia, and Italy was assured control over Adana and the region east of Cilicia. Greece was later promised a part of “Turkish territory in Asia Minor,” presumably southwestern Anatolia around Smyrna. When in May, 1919, the Italians left the Peace Conference in protest over Fiume, the Big Three decided to let the Greeks occupy Smyrna in order to prevent possible Italian expansion into western Anatolia; the Greek landing took place, with Allied support, on May 15, 1919.

Nothing could have been better calculated to shock the Turks out of their numbed surrender and to reawaken in them the will to fight than the invasion of their country by a former subject people. If after May 15 some Turkish leaders still believed in the possibility of saving

Turkey through a negotiated peace, the majority of the Turkish nationalists and army officers now felt that any hope for national survival lay not in continued reliance on the Sultan's government but in national resistance.

The resistance movement which began in May, 1919, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was nothing less than open rebellion against the government of the Sultan. From the beginning, Mustafa Kemal saw that "one solution alone was possible, namely, to create a New Turkish State."²

But before the new state could be established, Kemal and his nationalists had to wage three major battles on three different fronts: politically, against the Sultan's government to gain control of Turkey; militarily, against foreign forces occupying Turkish territory (the Greeks in Smyrna and southwestern Anatolia, the French in Cilicia, and the Italians in Aydin); diplomatically, against all the hostile powers to secure recognition of Turkey's independence and territorial integrity.

The demands of the revolutionary movement were formulated at the nationalist conferences at Erzurum (July 23, 1919) and Sivas (September 4, 1919) and were then submitted to the Sultan at Constantinople. The terms stipulated that (1) no part of Turkey should be surrendered to Greece or the Armenians; (2) all foreign powers should be withdrawn from Turkey; and (3) elections for a new parliament should be held immediately. The Sultan's government was in favor of the immediate suppression of the rebellion by military force, but the Allies declined to extend their backing on the grounds that the nationalists did not pose any serious threat to the government. The Sultan consequently allowed the elections to be held in December, 1919, which resulted, as was expected, in a parliament dominated by the nationalists. On January 28, 1920, the new parliament passed the National Pact (*Misak-i-Milli*) which reaffirmed the resolutions taken at Erzurum and Sivas and defined the basic principles for all future negotiations between the nationalists and the Allies:

. . . It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.

For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in judicial, political, financial, and other matters.³

Although the new parliament now obviously expressed the will of the majority of Turks and enjoyed nationwide support, the Allies were still in no mood to make concessions. On March 16, Constantinople was declared under military occupation, and many nationalist leaders were arrested and sent into exile on Malta. In the meantime the Sultan dissolved parliament, and in his capacity as Caliph he pronounced the nationalist movement contrary to the teachings and dogma of Islam. Mustafa Kemal summoned a new parliament which convened in Ankara on April 23, 1920, and declared the Sultan and his government captive of the Allies and therefore without real authority. Turkey's government was henceforth to rest in the Grand National Assembly—as the new parliament named itself—with all executive powers in the hands of an executive council headed by Mustafa Kemal.

The Allies, mostly under the influence of Lloyd George, persisted in ignoring the nationalist Assembly and in August, 1920, concluded with the Sultan's government the peace treaty known as the Treaty of Sèvres which surrendered major territories in Turkey to France, Italy, and Greece, acknowledged an independent state of Armenia in eastern Anatolia, granted autonomy to the Kurds, imposed international control over the Straits, reestablished the capitulatory privileges of the European powers, and reimposed traditional minority rights on a humiliating, nonreciprocal basis.⁴ The treaty was never ratified or put into operation. Its only practical effect was to stiffen nationalist resistance to compromise and to throw into Kemal's arms the remaining Turkish elements still wavering between him and the Sultan.

The Allies, who still believed that the Kemalist movement represented a minor though an increasingly embarrassing force, now decided to take action against it. On June 22, the Greek army started a total offensive with the objective of capturing the nationalist capital of Ankara and of occupying the entire western part of Anatolia. To the Turks, the Greco-Turkish war which now began was a war for national survival; to the Greeks, it symbolized the resurrection of an empire. Two years later it ended in the complete victory of the Turks and in the total collapse of Greek control in Asia Minor.

The war was fought in three major campaigns. The first began

with the June offensive, which secured the Greek army's occupation of eastern Thrace and the western edge of Anatolia as far as Usak on the Baghdad railroad, and closed with the battle of İnönü near Eskisehir, where the Turks won their first victory (January, 1921). The second campaign opened in March, 1921, with another Greek offensive in the direction of Ankara and ended in September with another Turkish victory along the Sakarya river, southwest of Ankara. The third and final campaign began on August 28, 1922, with a Turkish offensive that pushed the Greeks out of Anatolia and ended with Mustafa Kemal's entry into Smyrna on September 9, 1922.

When the Greek offensive opened in June, 1920, the Turkish nationalists were still isolated from the outside world, and the Sultan's government at Constantinople was still recognized by other countries as the legal government of Turkey. The first country to give recognition to the nationalist government was Soviet Russia, who was herself in the throes of revolution and war. Diplomatic relations between the two revolutionary governments were established in August, 1920, with badly needed military and financial aid extended to Mustafa Kemal by the Russians. On March 16, 1921, the Treaty of Moscow was signed, consolidating Turko-Russian friendship and re-establishing Turkish sovereignty over the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan which had been annexed by the Czarist government in 1878.

The position of the nationalists was strengthened even more when, in the winter of 1921, they were invited to go to London with the Sultan's representatives for the purpose of discussing with the Allies a possible modification of the Treaty of Sèvres. The conference (February 27-March 12, 1921) ended in failure because of Ankara's insistence upon using the National Pact as the basis for all negotiations. The nationalist representatives, however, were able to score important diplomatic gains by exploiting the jealousies and disagreements that existed between the Allies. Separate agreements were concluded in London with Italy and France which, although they failed to be ratified, paved the way for other bilateral agreements between them and Ankara. All of this served gradually to isolate Britain in Turkey and to bring about eventually the Allies' abandonment of the Greeks in Anatolia. Italy withdrew the last of her troops from southern Anatolia early in July, 1921, and France decided, after Kemal's victory at Sakarya in September, to pull out altogether from Cilicia. The Franklin-Bouillon Agreement,⁵ concluded between France and the nationalists at Ankara on October 20, 1921, was a

major diplomatic victory for Mustafa Kemal, for it represented nothing less than actual surrender on the part of a major Allied Power to the nationalists. Ankara now received *de facto* recognition from France and the Anglo-French rift over Allied policy in Turkey became manifest. Moreover, with the release of more than 80,000 nationalist troops from the French and Italian fronts and the acquisition of sizeable amounts of war materiel abandoned by the French in Cilicia, Mustafa Kemal was ready to face the Greeks on equal terms and to secure the victory which brought the Turkish war of liberation to a close.

The final phase of the war of liberation ended when Mustafa Kemal confronted the British. After occupying Smyrna, the nationalist army began to move toward Eastern Thrace, the last Turkish territory still held by the Greeks. Both sides of the Straits were in Allied hands. As Kemal advanced, France and Italy withdrew their troops from the Asiatic side, leaving the British under General Harington to face the Turks alone. A serious crisis developed. Lloyd George appealed to the British Dominions for support in case of war with Turkey. Public opinion in England and the Dominions, however, was against the renewal of hostilities, and France and Italy made clear their intention not to intervene. Lloyd George was forced to admit his defeat and, through the mediation of Franklin-Bouillon, agreed to open negotiations with Mustafa Kemal. An armistice was signed at Mudanya on October 11, 1922, and the Greeks evacuated Eastern Thrace.

THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE

“From Sèvres to Mudanya,” wrote Lloyd George fifteen years later, “was a retreat. From Mudanya to Lausanne was a rout.”⁶ Indeed, Mudanya symbolized the triumph of the Turkish nationalist movement in the field of battle; Lausanne, on the other hand, represented “probably the greatest diplomatic victory in history,” as Joseph Grew, the American observer at the conference, described it.⁷

The treaty was signed on July 24, 1923, after long and arduous negotiations during which the Turkish representatives proved themselves unexcelled masters of the art of diplomacy. The treaty was not only the one peace settlement of the First World War to be freely negotiated between victor and vanquished, but it was based on terms which the nationalist rebel government had defined in the National Pact as early as 1920.

The Treaty of Lausanne (and its subsidiary instruments)⁸ is important in that it officially marks the end of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of modern Turkey as we know it today. In the treaty all claims to the non-Turkish territories of the Ottoman Empire (the Asiatic Arab provinces, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Cyprus, the Dodecanese Islands, and the Aegean Islands—with the exception of Imroz and Tenedos) were renounced by the nationalist government. Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia, Constantinople, and Eastern Thrace was fully recognized. For the Straits, a special convention was signed, whereby Turkish sovereignty was somewhat restricted by the establishment of a special regime supervised by an international commission and by the removal of all capitulatory privileges. The problem of minorities was solved by an agreement with Greece (January 30, 1923) to transfer the Greeks living in Turkey (except those in Constantinople) to Greece and the Turkish citizens living in Greek territory to Turkey. Only two problems were left unsettled: Turkey's claim to the sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay) and the Turko-Iraqi boundary in the oil-rich vilayet of Mosul.

The treaty is also important in that it was the first major political settlement to be negotiated between a sovereign Middle Eastern state and the West during the interwar period. As such, it had considerable influence on the formulation of the principles and "style" which other Middle Eastern nationalist states later adopted in their dealings with the Western powers. The question of sovereignty and the insistence upon territorial integrity and complete independence were first formulated in diplomatic terms and established as the bases of all agreements with foreign powers by the nationalist Turks, principally and most elaborately at Lausanne. It was also during these negotiations that the Western powers experienced a foretaste of that intangible element which was later to dominate the logic and attitude of all Middle Eastern negotiators: their "implicit assumption not only that [they] as a nation [were] the equal of other nations, but also that in many phases of their development [they were] already on an intellectual par with the West."⁹ Certainly the nationalists' success at Lausanne was far-reaching, providing both the political and the psychological framework of Turkey's diplomacy which, in turn, deeply influenced that of other Middle Eastern countries when their independence was achieved.

ABOLITION OF THE SULTANATE

The true Kemalist revolution in Turkey really began after the "War of Liberation" ended. The revolution sought to accomplish three tasks which within a decade were actually achieved: (1) the destruction of the last vestiges of Ottoman institutions and traditions; (2) the dethronement of Islam as the principal social force in Turkey; and (3) the rebuilding of society on secular and Western foundations.

The first blow was directed against the Sultanate. On November 1, 1922, less than three weeks after the armistice of Mudanya, Mustafa Kemal induced the Grand National Assembly to pass a law separating the powers of the Caliphate from those of the Sultanate and abolishing the latter altogether. The law stated that the sovereignty of the Turkish people resided in the Grand National Assembly and not in the personality of the Sultan; the Caliphate, on the other hand, possessed only spiritual powers. The caliph was to be elected from the house of Othman by the Grand National Assembly and was to be subject to the directives of the Turkish state.

Mustafa Kemal did not resort to much political theory in justifying this momentous step which ran counter to the central idea of the Muslim state:

Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power, and by violence. It was by violence that the sons of Osman acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and to maintain their rule for more than six centuries. It is now the nation that revolts against these usurpers, puts them in their right place, and actually carries on their sovereignty.¹⁰

On November 4, the organs and administrative centers of the government at Constantinople were seized by the nationalists, and Ottoman administration came to an end. Sultan Mehmet VI, fearing for his personal safety and that of his family, sought asylum with the British who conveyed him on board the battleship "Malaya" to Malta. Two weeks later the Grand National Assembly elected Abdul Mejid, Mehmet's cousin, caliph.

THE REPUBLIC AND THE ABOLITION OF THE CALIPHATE

The abolition of the Sultanate did not lead directly to the establishment of a republic in Turkey. Most Turks felt at the time that the revolution had achieved its goals and that further radical changes

were unnecessary; on the whole, they were in favor of maintaining the Caliphate within the constitutional framework of the Grand National Assembly. This trend was further strengthened by a resurgence of the Young Turk ideal of a liberal monarchy, based on the tradition and prestige of the Caliphate, which still enjoyed the full support of the religious orders and the tacit backing of the conservative elements.

These opinions created the first serious rift within the nationalist movement in the summer of 1923. The moderates reflected popular sentiment favoring no further radical reform; the radicals insisted that the New State could not be built on compromise and that reform should be carried out to its logical conclusion. Only Mustafa Kemal's firm leadership prevented possible deterioration of the crisis into violence and secured the radicals' victory by a succession of clever political moves in the Grand National Assembly that culminated in the proclamation, on October 29, 1923, of the Turkish Republic with himself as its first president. This step marks Turkey's final break with the past and the beginning of Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship that lasted until his death in 1938, fifteen years later.

The political ambivalence that had prevailed since early in 1920, when the Grand National Assembly proclaimed itself the rightful government of Turkey, now disappeared. The Sultanate was dead, the legislative and executive powers in the state were separated, and only the Caliphate remained. As usual, Mustafa Kemal refused to accept the unclear situation of compromise: "There is just one solution, the Khalifate has to be abolished altogether."¹¹

The abolition of the Khalifate [he said a few weeks before the actual decree was passed] is a part of a general scheme to end every vestige of theocracy in our public affairs. Our laws and education will be free from religious domination. We shall be able to do new things because we think in a new way, and because scientific intelligence requires it. We shall no longer act this way or that merely because ancient rules and ignorant "authorities" order it. Education and justice in Turkey will simultaneously become free to follow the requirements of changing times.¹²

Accordingly, on March 3, 1924, less than four months after the establishment of the Republic, the Grand National Assembly passed a law abolishing the Caliphate forthwith and banishing the Ottoman imperial family from the territories of the Republic of Turkey. The

crisis which this step provoked in the Muslim world has not yet fully subsided and the highest office in Islam still remains vacant.

SECULARIZATION AND WESTERNIZATION

Mustafa Kemal visualized the new Turkey as both *secular* and *westernized*. By secular he meant a Turkey free from Islam and the East; by westernized a Turkey that is part of Europe and the West. It is possible in retrospect to judge Kemal's philosophy of social reform as too radical in its negation of Islam and somewhat naïve in its total adherence to Europe and Western civilization. In the years that followed, Islam proved itself too deeply rooted in the hearts of the people to be eradicated by mere legislation, and the ideal of Western culture was too subtle and complex to be transplanted into Turkish soil without profound modification. Yet the fact remains that after more than thirty years of political and social development, no Muslim country has experienced so total and comprehensive a change as did Turkey under Kemalism; nor have the movements of secularization and westernization been so thoroughly and systematically carried out in the non-Western world (apart from Japan) as they have been in Turkey since the founding of the Republic.

It took no more than five years, 1923 to 1928, for Islam to be officially disestablished in Turkey and for the secularization of the state to be legally completed. Among the many reforms introduced during this period, no measure taken against Islam was more devastating than that which abolished the *shari'a* and replaced it with civil, penal, and commercial codes borrowed wholesale from Swiss, Italian, and German models. By a series of complimentary decrees, the last remnants of Muslim institutions in society were either completely destroyed or rendered totally ineffective: all Pious Foundations (*evqaf*) were incorporated into the state; all religious orders and ecclesiastical establishments were abolished; all Muslim schools (*medressehs* and *mektebs*) which were endowed by the Pious Foundations and administered by the ulemas were closed. "From rendering unto God the things that were Caesar's, as in the Ottoman Empire days, [Mustafa Kemal] now rendered unto Caesar the things that were God's." ¹³

A far-reaching change resulting from the disestablishment of Islam was the emancipation of women. Polygamy was prohibited, and civil marriage was made compulsory; the veil, although not abolished by law, quickly fell out of fashion: complete legal and political equality

was achieved by Turkish women before it was gained by women in any other Middle Eastern country.

Westernization went side by side with secularization. Kemal's view of westernization was based on the simple precept that in order to be a "civilized nation" Turkey had not only to renounce its Islamic and Ottoman past but had also to become European by emulating the Western nations in every respect. A number of decrees transformed the outward appearance of Turkey almost overnight. The *fez*, the uniform headgear of all Ottoman subjects and psychologically the symbol of the past, was abolished in 1925 and replaced by the European hat. With the hat came uniform adoption by both men and women of European dress. Free social intercourse between the sexes was encouraged (coeducation was made compulsory), and European habits of social behaviour were set up as models of civilized deportment. It is interesting to note that the increase in demand for European goods in the late twenties was not confined to such items as dresses, cosmetics, and hats (the European hat manufacturing industry enjoyed a big boom in 1925-1926), but also included alcoholic beverages and European recorded music, both popular and classical.

Perhaps the most revolutionary westernizing reform undertaken by Mustafa Kemal was his replacement in November, 1928, of the Arabic script, in which Turkish had hitherto been written, by a slightly modified Latin alphabet. Turkish became easier to learn and illiteracy a far less formidable obstacle to overcome. It also became possible to liberate the language from a vast body of Arabic and Persian words and to replace them with words of Turkish origin or with derivatives borrowed from European languages. In less than a decade, the rigid and ceremonious language of the Ottomans was transformed into an efficient vehicle of communication to serve a modern, scientifically minded society.

KEMALISM

When one of the last reform laws was passed in 1934, requiring every Turk to assume a family name, the Grand National Assembly bestowed on Mustafa Kemal the surname "Atatürk" ("father of the Turks") as a tribute to all he had done for the Turkish nation. At the time of his death in 1938, he had already become, throughout the Middle East, a great, even symbolic, leader. Every aspiring leader, from Reza Khan in the early 1920's to Gamal 'Abdul Nasser in the mid-1950's, has seen himself as another Atatürk, but so far no Middle

Eastern leader has had the profound influence on the fate of his country that Atatürk has had on Turkey and its people.

Kemalism has been subjected to a great deal of analysis and interpretation by many authorities on Turkey and the Middle East. As a program of social and political action it is simply the record of Kemal's achievement over a period of almost thirty years when he was the paramount force in Turkey. If Kemalism is a philosophy, it is so only when considered in retrospect, since the Kemalist achievement was based more on pragmatic experiment than on definite ideology or a coherent set of principles. Perhaps it may best be summarized in terms of the six predicates in Article 2 of the Constitution which describe the spirit of the New Turkey: "republican, national-ist, populist, étatist, secular, and reformist."¹⁴

In this sense, Kemalism is the final phase of the process of Turkish transformation that had its beginnings in sultan Selim's New Order in the last decade of the eighteenth century. To understand the Kemalist achievement properly as such, Kemal Atatürk should be viewed as the last in the tradition of great Turkish reformers that began with Selim III and included Mahmud II, Midhat, Gökalg, and the leaders of the Young Turk movement. More than a discursive analysis of Kemalism, the following quotation¹⁵ may perhaps throw light on a side of Kemal Atatürk that has usually been obscured in formal portrayals of him:

In my youth, I was curious about what philosophers thought of life. Some were gloomy, and said, "Our temporary existence on earth has no place for gaiety and happiness." I read other books by more sensible men. They said, "The end is nothingness, so let us be happy while we live." I side with these more sensible men, but with the following qualifications:

Any human being who believes that the destinies of other human beings depend wholly upon him personally is a petty man. . . . Every man is doomed to perish physically. The only way to stay happy while we live is to work, not for ourselves, but for those to come. . . . "Will the coming generation know that I have worked for them?" . . . The man raising flowers does not expect any gratitude or allegiance from his flowers. The leader raising men should expect none from the men he raises. . . . It is folly for any man to imagine that his nation will cease to develop and progress as soon as he passes away.

Atatürk's dictatorship is generally justified as a "necessary phase of transition" during which the Republic was firmly established and

the Turkish nation slowly learned the ways of democracy. The contradiction of a dictatorship leading to democracy is of course resolved only historically, when the dictatorship actually gives way to democracy. With Atatürk it was clear from the very beginning that the democratic form of government was the true goal of his political striving. During the thirties he was often compared with Lenin and Mussolini, with whom he shared many qualities. But it must be remembered that while fascism and communism set up dictatorships in the name of new doctrines frankly averse to liberal democracy as a political and social system, Atatürk's dictatorship was not founded on a systematic doctrine nor was it antagonistic to traditional European liberalism. This can be seen in the liberal, democratic Constitution drawn up in 1924 and in the important role played by the Grand National Assembly throughout the period of dictatorship. It is also evident in the absence of any constitutional or legal provision for the permanent control of the state by a dictatorship or for the continued existence of the single-party system as the political basis of the regime.¹⁶

It should be emphasized, moreover, that Atatürk did not establish in Turkey a "new order" in the fascist or communist fashion. He showed no real lust for power and seems to have been sincerely motivated by the single ideal of creating a new Turkey that would one day be considered a genuine member of the European community of nations. His real genius lay, in Count Sforza's words, in having made at the start "two rare decisions which are the opposite of what all dictators have always done and still do . . . not to seek a policy of show and vain prestige . . . and to adopt a courageous line of renunciation at the beginning of his domination."¹⁷

Yet like all successful revolutionaries, Atatürk was possessed by two conflicting and often contradictory forces: an idealism riveted in belief in the future and a cynicism born of the incompleteness of the present. Atatürk did not hesitate to employ violence to protect the accomplishments of the revolution or to secure the execution of its demands. He was often forced to violate the very principles which he advocated as the basis of his political and social reforms. But neither in his cynical resort to violence nor in his devotion to the ideal of a New Turkey did he succumb to either extreme. Political liberty was severely restricted during his reign, and serious opposition was never really tolerated, but on the other hand, a police state was never established. Kemalism did not produce a totalitarian regime in the con-

temporary Italian, German, or Russian sense but rather a benevolent despotism which was closer perhaps to the classical Greek or Renaissance model. Indeed, Atatürk's seventeen-year control of Turkey constitutes a phase of transitional tutelage in which the products of dictatorial reforms became embodied in institutional structures that no longer required a dictator to safeguard their existence and growth after his death.

Finally, one should remember that over 85 per cent of Turkey's population was rural and illiterate when Atatürk came to power and that to the majority of the Turkish people the most elementary principles of democracy were wholly foreign. Under the circumstances, it was to Atatürk's credit that he chose not to work through a rigid military dictatorship but to establish after the liberation the Republican People's party to serve as a vehicle for his political and social reforms, thus proving himself a signal exception to the pattern of military dictatorships that prevailed in the Middle East after the Second World War.

THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

As early as December, 1922, Atatürk made public his intention of forming a political party "on a democratic basis under the name of the 'People's Party.'" ¹⁸ The party was not actually organized until the following summer (August, 1923), shortly before the elections of the Grand National Assembly. The party program was drawn up with the "help and cooperation [of Turkish] patriots and men of Art and Science" to whom Atatürk had appealed,¹⁹ and it consisted of a number of general principles ²⁰ having three major aims:

1. To serve as a guide to the people in the exercise of national sovereignty by the people and for the people
2. To make efforts to modernize the state
3. To achieve recognition of the supremacy of law in Turkey ²¹

The absence of an explicit ideology and the vague character of the program caused widespread criticism in nationalist circles and among the intellectuals who saw no significant change in the new party from the old Union for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia which was founded late in 1919. But it was Atatürk's specific intention to establish the new organization on general basic principles rather than on a tightly-knit and detailed ideological doctrine. "We could have written a book in which to develop certain impracticable

ideas [but] we have not done so. In the reconstitution and material and moral development of the nation we preferred to make acts precede words and theories.”²²

The prevailing ideology of the new Turkish generation owes more to the social and political ideas of the Turkish sociologist Zia Gökalp (Tekin Alp) and to the historical theories of the French writer Léon Cahun than to the “principles” of the Republican People’s party (as it was renamed after the establishment of the Republic). Gökalp was a prominent Turkish nationalist, bitterly opposed to Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism and passionately devoted to the ideal of a westernized Turkish nationalism freed from all Islamic and Ottoman ties. Cahun, in his book *Introduction à l’histoire d’Asie* (published in the 1920’s), strengthened the sentiments of Turkish nationalism by emphasizing the importance of the early nomadic origins of Turkish society and by extolling the virtues of the Turkish people whose decline he attributed mostly to the impact of Islam and to Arab and Persian influences. In 1931, a four-volume history of the world, published by the government-sponsored “Committee on the History of the Turks,” sought to give a Turkish interpretation of the early history of the Turks and to trace the influence of Turkish civilization on world culture. According to this theory, which was incorporated in all Turkish history textbooks, early Turkish tribes brought a highly developed civilization to the primitive regions of western Asia and the eastern Mediterranean to which they migrated; the best in all subsequent civilizations in these regions was attributed to the Turks.²³ It should be noted that similar nationalistic interpretations of history were made by the Persians, Syrians, and Egyptians, especially during the 1930’s when European ideas of national superiority in terms of race, language, and culture were becoming popular with the interwar generation in the Middle East.

The Republican People’s party was instrumental in spreading the ideology of Turkish nationalism mainly through the *Türk Ojaks* or Turkish Hearths, social clubs founded in 1912 in practically all the cities and towns of Turkey. By taking over these clubs and renaming them “People’s Houses,” the party acquired an important means of mass education, but it also inherited the ideology with which these clubs were associated.²⁴

According to a leading analyst of political parties,²⁵ the Republican People’s party represents one of the most successful experiments in the political evolution of a non-Western country. At a time when

liberal democracy was on the defensive and the totalitarian ideologies of fascism and communism were embodied in successful regimes that offered themselves as models to be imitated, the Kemalist party did not renounce its democratic ideal but insisted instead that the democracy for which it strove was not another "new" or "popular" or "social" democracy but simply "traditional political democracy." As such, the Republican People's regime "was not based upon the doctrine of a single party. It gave no official recognition to the monopoly, made no attempts to justify it by the existence of a classless society or the desire to do away with parliamentary strife and liberal democracy. It was always embarrassed by and almost ashamed of the monopoly." ²⁶

In fact, Atatürk made two attempts to end his party's political monopoly by allowing the rise of an opposition party. The Progressive party was founded in 1924 by General Kazım Karabekir, together with several nationalist leaders who were genuinely opposed to certain aspects of the new regime, but the attempt failed in 1925, mostly because of the Kurdish revolt and the prohibition of all opposition in the country. In 1930 the Republican Liberal party was founded by Fethi Bey, former president of the Assembly and former Prime Minister, but again the attempt failed when it became evident that the new organization served only as a strong rallying point for the conservative elements and the reactionaries who were more interested in attacking the Kemalist regime than in forming an organized parliamentary opposition.

As a political organization, the party was loosely constructed, more in the manner of the liberal parties of nineteenth-century Europe than in that of contemporary fascist and communist parties, with their disciplined membership, their political mysticism, and their faith in violence. Differences within the party ranks did not constitute heresy, and internal opposition was not eliminated by purges and liquidations. It is essentially the genuine democratic structure of the party that eventually made possible in 1946 the emergence of the Democratic party which became the authentic opposition that Atatürk had striven for.²⁷

It is true, however, that while it was not totalitarian, the Kemalist regime was nevertheless nondemocratic. All government posts, for instance, were held by members of the single party, and only candidates nominated by the party stood for elections. Yet in little more than twenty-five years Turkish political life underwent a radical trans-

formation. The old merchant-landlord oligarchy, the religious leaders, and the old reactionaries were thrust out of political life, and a new ruling class, together with a new electorate which, if not fully versed in the principles of true democracy, was at least familiar with its workings and techniques, did finally emerge to vindicate the Turkish saying that Mustafa Kemal was a dictator in order that there might never again be a dictator in Turkey. In Duverger's words, "the post-1923 evolution of Turkey that ended in the 1950 elections with the peaceful triumph of the opposition . . . demonstrates that the technique of the single party, applied with discernment . . . makes it possible to establish at some date [an] authentic democracy."²⁸

NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

1. Sir Harry Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New* (London, 1955), p. 158.
2. Mustafa Kemal, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, October 1927* (Leipzig, 1929), p. 17. For the best analysis in English of the rise of the modern Turkish state, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961).
3. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 28.
4. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 31.
5. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 35.
6. David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), vol. II, p. 1361.
7. Joseph Clark Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years* (New York, 1952), vol. I, p. 551.
8. Abridged text in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 41.
9. Roderic H. Davison, "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After," *MEJ* (Summer, 1953), p. 335.
10. Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, p. 578.
11. Quoted by Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1956), p. 137.
12. Quoted by Yalman, *ibid.*, p. 140-141.
13. M. Philips Price, *A History of Turkey* (London, 1956), p. 136.
14. See analysis by Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 163-172.
15. This was taken down by Yalman (*op. cit.*, p. 168-169) at an Ankara night club a few months before Atatürk's death.
16. See Chap. Twenty-six below.
17. Count Carlo Sforza, *Makers of Modern Europe* (New York, 1930), p. 371.
18. Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, p. 598.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 598.
20. For the text of the party's platform, see Webster, *op. cit.*, Appendix E.
21. Cited by T. L. Jarman, *Turkey* (Bristol, 1935), p. 101.
22. Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, p. 599.
23. Cf. A. Adnan, "Ten Years of Republic in Turkey," *The Political Quarterly* (April-June, 1935), p. 246.
24. They were closed down by the Democrat administration.

25. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, trans. Barbara and Robert North (London, 1955), p. 276-280.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
27. See Chap. Five below.
28. Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

The Political Transformation of Turkey

“But men generally decide upon a middle course, which is most hazardous; for they know neither how to be entirely good or entirely bad.”

Machiavelli, Discourses

THE İNÖNÜ REGIME, 1938-1950

For twelve years after the death of Atatürk, the Republican People's party continued to exercise complete control over the political life of Turkey. On the day following the death of Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, his right-hand man and former prime minister, became president of the Republic and leader of the RPP. The transition was accomplished without mishap, and the problem of succession, which had been weighing heavily on the minds of leading party members, was successfully solved.

Turkey's political life between 1939 and 1950 was dominated by the years of war and the postwar settlement. During the war, the Republican People's party sought to accomplish two essentials: to preserve the Kemalist achievement and to keep Turkey out of the war. In the postwar period all effort was directed toward normalizing Turkey's position in the changed international situation and of reorganizing the strained political and economic conditions in the country.

The democratic regime which Atatürk had envisaged as the ultimate goal of the New Turkey was not established during these years. With the end of Atatürk's benevolent dictatorship, a new phase of collective dictatorship began under the RPP, for which the uncertainties and pressures of the war were in part responsible. In 1940 general mobilization and a state of emergency were proclaimed; all political opposition was prohibited, freedom of the press was suspended, and close police control was imposed throughout the country. From the start, the country experienced severe economic hardships; production

sharply decreased, imports were reduced to a mere trickle, and prices soared.

But Turkey during these years was practically the only country in the Middle East to be spared the ravages of war and to remain independent and free of foreign occupation. The fact that a virtual police state was established during the war years, and that the people were subjected to acute privations and almost total restriction of liberty, could not with justice be attributed to a deliberate desire on the part of the RPP to rule despotically.

During the war, identification between state and party was even more fully realized than it had been under Atatürk. An intricate bureaucratic system was developed that had no equal anywhere in the Middle East. In political as well as economic matters, all initiative rested with the government bureaucracy and the party, and the principle of étatism was carried to its extreme limit. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that government red tape, together with economic hardship and political repression, should produce at the end of the war a widespread feeling of resentment and hostility toward the İnönü regime, fostering a serious split within the party and organized opposition outside it.

Mounting opposition to the Republican regime, which in 1950 was to be responsible for the party's removal from power, centered on four main groups, which in the postwar years radically changed the balance of political forces in Turkey. The first group was the commercial middle class, consisting of the small urban industrialists, merchants, and entrepreneurs who desired the loosening of state control and the opening up of opportunities for free enterprise. Secondly, there was the growing body of workers and laborers who, because of wartime inflation and the decline in their standard of living, wanted a change in government and demanded the right to organize and to go on strike. The third group consisted of the conservative Muslim elements, the peasants and the poorer classes of the cities and towns who had been only superficially touched by the secularization movement of Atatürk and who were opposed to the government's anticlerical policies, favoring a return to Muslim principles and practices. Finally, there was the growing body of liberals, mostly of the new, educated generation, especially within the ranks of the RPP, who had become dissatisfied with the party's oppressive monopoly of power and wished to see the democratic ideals of the Kemalist revolution concretely expressed in the country's political life. To

these groups may be added the non-Muslim minorities who had been subjected during the war to harsh discriminatory measures, especially to the so-called "capital tax" of 1942 which resulted in flagrant injustices and persecution of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews.

In addition to these internal pressures, the defeat of the fascist states in Europe had by 1945 caused a profound change in the political atmosphere of the Middle East. The authoritarian philosophy of fascism, which had enjoyed considerable sympathy before the war, was discredited, and democracy, both as a political philosophy and as a form of government, gained new meaning and esteem. Turkey, now a member of the United Nations and closely aligned with the Western democracies, found the RPP's monopoly of power increasingly embarrassing and political opposition to the regime more and more justifiable. As a vocal Turkish critic put it, by the end of the war the RPP's

. . . source of power was no longer the will and consent of the people, but the authority of the government passing orders down a hierarchial line. By honorary titles, Ataturk, the first president of the Republic and the Party, had become its "eternal chief", and Ismet Inonu, the second president, its "unchangeable chief." Any opposition to the party's will had become "sacrilege, directed against the survival of the Republic and the Nation."¹

The internal crisis was to reach its climax within the RPP itself in the summer of 1945 when a move to force the government to restore constitutional liberties caused a split in the party's ranks which resulted in the resignation of four leading members—Adnan Menderes, Mehmed Fuad Köprulu, Refik Koraltan, and Çelal Bayar. This gave rise on January 7, 1946, to the formation of the Democrat party, the first genuine opposition party in Turkey.

The creation of the Democratic party from within the ranks of the People's Republican party rather than from the outside opposition may be considered as the major factor contributing to the evolution of a working parliamentary system in Turkey.² From the start there was a common understanding as to the rules and procedures of political behavior and a tacit agreement as to the grounds and limits beyond which opposition should not go. At first the differences between the two parties appeared radical, but it soon became obvious that there was substantial agreement on fundamentals. There is little doubt that the RPP sought to bolster its position in the country by

making liberal concessions to the opposition, while at the same time trying to limit the latter's influence and strength. In the 1946 elections, although the Democrats competed for over half of the 465 seats of the Assembly, they won only 62. The RPP not only saw to it that all facilities that could be denied its rival were actually denied it but also did all it could to intimidate voters and to manipulate the final results of the elections.

The years between 1946 and 1950 were for both parties years of adjustment to the changed pattern of forces in the political life of the country. The Democrats concentrated their efforts on organizing nationwide party control and assimilating the various elements of opposition. The Republicans in turn sought to accommodate themselves to the new climate of opinion by consolidating their power in those regions where their influence was weakest and by eliminating some of the major sources of grievance and complaint. In 1948 the government lifted the state of emergency and removed many of the economic restrictions introduced during the war; it also reopened the training schools for the lesser clergy and agreed to make Islam an optional subject in elementary schools. As a gesture of reconciliation toward conservative opinion, a divinity school was added to the University at Ankara in 1949.

By 1950 the RPP had come to realize that it could not hope to cling to power simply by rigging elections. With the formation of organized opposition, the more flagrant practices of the past could no longer be employed with impunity; public opinion had become active and informed and the voter alert to the power of the collective vote; the age-old habit of regarding an "act of government in much the same light as an act of God" had by now been replaced by a somewhat conscious self-assertive will.

In February, 1950, shortly before the eighth national elections were to take place, the Republican People's party made a crucial concession. It allowed the general assembly to pass a new electoral law which provided for three things that the opposition had been persistently demanding: a secret ballot, public counting of votes, and the supervision of elections by the judiciary. This concession made possible the first genuinely democratic elections in the history of Turkey and, perhaps, of the entire Middle East.

Turkey went to the polls on May 14, 1950. The result was total victory for the Democrat party. Average participation of registered voters was about 75 per cent. The Democrats won 408 seats, or 84 per

cent of the total number of seats, while the Republicans won 69 seats and the conservative Nation party (founded in 1948) won only one seat.

Turkey, following the elections, was incredulous:

In Ankara a preacher in the Taj ed-Din mosque gave thanks to God in the Khutbe for having freed Turkey from the government of C.H.P. [RPP]. Near Bursa some peasants began to divide up the big estates, and when asked what they were doing, replied: "Now we have democracy." In Istanbul taxi-drivers cocked the Turkish equivalent of a snook at policemen, and refused to obey their orders—and even the policemen themselves seemed a little uncertain as to what powers they still retained. Bright-colored patches of wallpaper appeared on countless walls, where once the portrait of Inonu had rested.³

On May 22 the transfer of power was accomplished with calm and dignity. Çelal Bayar, the head of the Democrat party, was elected president of the Republic, and Adnan Menderes, his right-hand man, became the first Democrat prime minister. The Republican People's party, after being in power for over a quarter of a century, became overnight the party of the opposition.

DEMOCRAT DOMESTIC POLICY

Characteristic of Turkey's two-party system is the basic unity of views, despite the more obvious differences in emphasis and detail, between the two major parties regarding the chief problems of domestic and foreign policies. As to the two basic internal issues, economic state control and religious revival, the views of the two parties, instead of diverging after 1950, moved closer together. At the RPP congress held in Ankara in 1953, the party re-emphasized its adherence to the principle of public ownership of large industries and of economic planning by the state, but declared itself in favor of free enterprise and of private and foreign investment in Turkey. On the other hand, the Democrats, who had insistently attacked étatism in the name of economic freedom, showed little inclination after coming to power of handing over existing state industries or of giving up control over large-scale economic planning. Moreover, while the RPP still regarded itself as the guardian of Atatürk's secularizing philosophy, it was they, during the last years of their administration, who made the major concessions in favor of greater religious freedom

and revival of Islam. The dissolution of the ultraconservative Nation party, licensed by the RPP government in 1948, was undertaken by the Democrats in 1954 on the grounds that its religious character ran counter to the spirit of the Kemalist constitution. It is to İnönü's credit that he refused to turn this issue to political advantage by holding to the position that the Republican People's party "cannot attack from the rear another progressive party while it, too, is fighting reaction." ⁴ The fact is that both parties remained loyal to the basic teachings of Kemalism, despite minor changes and adjustments which each introduced to meet specific situations. With regard to the basic religious issue, both were in favor of a certain measure of religious freedom but stood with equal firmness against the restoration of Islam to its former dominant position in society. With regard to the economic problem, both were in agreement on the general principle that a combination of economic control by the state and a certain amount of free private enterprise was essential to the material well-being and economic progress of the country. As to foreign policy (which we shall discuss in the next chapter), their views were almost completely identical, and the problem of Turkey's foreign relations was never seriously raised as a political issue.

The smoothness and ease with which Turkey crossed the bridge from single-party control to the two-party system must to a large degree be attributed to Turkey's social and economic structure, which is in many respects basically different from that of the other countries of the Middle East. In Turkey no real opposition exists between town and countryside, or between the urban population and the peasants. Turkey's rural population was the first in the Middle East to enjoy the serious attention of the central government; it received economic aid and financial subsidies long before the lot of the peasant in the other Middle Eastern countries became the joint concern of governments and their people. Moreover, class feeling is little known, and social and political power and prestige are not the necessary outcome of economic stratification. This has been conducive to the natural concentration of political leadership in the hands of the educated members of the urban bourgeoisie which is largely responsible for the stability of Turkey's limited but effective parliamentary democracy.

DEMOCRAT ECONOMIC POLICY

The main achievement of the Democrat regime in the domestic field was the wide-scale economic development of Turkey, especially in agriculture and communications. Industrialization was also set on a new basis, but the main industries continued to be financed and administered by the state with only partial success. Loans, mostly from the United States, made economic expansion possible, although some doubt has been cast in recent years on the advisability of the speed and scale of this expansion. Private firms were encouraged, and foreign investors given guarantees for the transfer of capital and profit out of Turkey in the event of liquidation.

Despite gains in practically every field of economic endeavor, economic stability was not fully achieved under Democrat leadership, a major factor being the heavy expenditure for national defense which amounted to 40 per cent of the yearly national budget. Imports exceeded exports, the value of the Turkish lira dropped, and despite continued financial assistance from abroad inflation increased and prices continued to rise. The situation was aggravated by a succession of poor harvests in the 1950's, which seriously reduced Turkey's agricultural production, especially wheat, a major export item. Those who were most affected were the low-income groups, especially government employees and other fixed-income groups. The farmers, exempt from the old direct taxes and receiving financial assistance from the government, were least affected.

ELECTION POLITICS

As we have seen, the emergence of the two-party system was the major contributing factor to the rise of a limited but highly stable parliamentary system in Turkey. The Democrats, however, behaved in power very much as the Republicans had behaved before 1950. Like the Republicans, the Democrats at election time employed all the resources available to them, including those of the state, to strengthen their position and further their political aims. In December, 1953, they dealt the Republican opposition a crushing blow by passing a bill in the assembly ordering the confiscation of RPP property on the grounds that it was illegally acquired during the party's rule before 1950. The fact that most Democrats had been Republicans during that period and thus equally responsible did not prevent the Democrat government from actually implementing the

law and confiscating all Republican assets, including the premises and plant of the leading opposition paper, *Ulus*. In March, 1954, a press law was passed, setting the maximum penalty of three years for libel or inaccurate information "calculated to endanger the political and economic stability of the country." After their victory in the election of 1954, the Democrats took further steps to strengthen this law and to adopt new measures which restricted coalition candidature, thus weakening the Republicans' capacity to maneuver and preparing for their own third victory in 1957. These and similar practices incited a revolt in 1955 within the Democratic ranks, which culminated in the dismissal or resignation of nineteen prominent party members who joined together to form the Freedom party, under circumstances and in the name of principles very much like those that had led a decade earlier to the founding of the Democrat party.

The 1954 elections resulted in an even greater Democrat victory than had the elections of 1950. Again the peasant and conservative votes proved decisive. Apart from the two big parties, three other political organizations contested the elections: the Republican Nation party (the old, reorganized Nation party), the Democratic Workers' party, and the Peasants' party. The first received 480,249 votes and won five seats in the new assembly; the other two, with 50,935 and 910 votes, respectively, failed to win any seats; only two independents, for whom 56,293 votes were cast, were elected. The Democrats received 58 per cent of the total vote, and the Republicans 35 per cent; of the 546 seats, the Democrats won 503, and the Republicans 31.

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE G.N.A.

	1950	1954	1957
Republican People's party	69	31	178
Democrat party	408	503	424
(Republican) National party	1	5	4
Freedom party	—	—	4
Independents	9	2	—

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST

	1950	1954	1957
Republican People's party	43	35	41
Democrat party	55	58	48

In the elections of 1957, which took place a year earlier than scheduled, the Democrats again emerged victorious. And, as in 1950 and

1954, the decisive votes were those cast by the peasants and the conservative elements to which both parties now directed the greater part of their attention. But the Democrat victory of 1957 was not unqualified, for although the party secured the majority of seats in the new assembly, its majority was smaller than that secured three years earlier. Of 611 seats, 424 went to the Democrats and 178 to the Republicans (146 more than in the previous assembly). Of greater significance, perhaps, is the fact that the Democrat majority was achieved only by a marginal difference in the total number of votes received—4,427,368 as against 3,742,861 by the Republicans, or only 48 per cent as against 41 per cent of the total vote. This, of course, continued to endanger Democrat predominance as long as the Turkish electoral system rested on the list system,⁵ and Republican recuperation continued.⁶

Accusations hurled at the Republicans before 1950 could justifiably be directed at the Democrat administration. The following incident graphically illustrates the fundamental shortcomings of Turkey's democratic system, and shows the extent to which the Democrat party was willing to go in order to obstruct the efforts of its rival.

In April, 1959, Ismet İnönü, now seventy-four years old, was touring the Aegean provinces to campaign for twenty-one vacant seats in the assembly.

On his departure from Ankara, police refused to let any of İnönü's supporters into the railway station. When he tried to speak from the train to a crowd of Republicans at Eskisehir, a city of 125,000, engine whistles blasted throughout his speech, and a freight train was backed on the main line between İnönü and the crowd.

Reaching Usak, where he had scored his 1922 triumph, İnönü saw police scatter the welcoming crowd with tear gas, made his way with difficulty to the house of Republican Deputy Riza Salci. It was instantly surrounded by gendarmes, and during the night a fire started mysteriously and had to be put out by the Usak fire brigade . . . By morning Usak was jammed with Democratic toughs rushed into the city by truck from neighboring towns. They rioted through the streets, beating up newsmen and breaking photographers' cameras. On his way to the railroad station İnönü found the street blocked by a solid wall of opposition Democratic toughs. He insisted on walking through them, and as he approached, Turkey's old hero shouted: "Aren't you ashamed?" The answer was a barrage of stones.

Struck on the head, İnönü was knocked down but, struggling bloodily to his feet, grimly continued his march through the hostile crowd to the station. The incident was watched passively by 250 gendarmes.⁷

The party in power not only tolerated little criticism but showed itself willing to use any means short of the direct use of violence to maintain itself in power. It must be admitted that rights and liberties of the constitution were still not viewed or taken too literally by either the government or the opposition.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Turkish constitution of 1924 is the first truly liberal constitution to be adopted by any Middle Eastern country; it represented the formal break with Islam and the adoption of the Western principle of the secular state. In this respect, it was the most revolutionary constitution of the Muslim Middle East. Until its drastic modification in 1961, it was subjected to only few and minor amendments.

Like other constitutions later adopted by most Middle Eastern countries, the Turkish constitution was copied almost word for word from Western European constitutions, chiefly the French and the Belgian. But unlike most other fundamental laws of the Middle East, the Turkish constitution was carefully adjusted to avoid placing too much power in the executive branch of the government and concentrating real authority in the national assembly. This was perhaps due to Atatürk's realization that, in order to safeguard the permanence of the nationalist state, which was created primarily by the formal transfer of sovereignty from the caliph to the nation, the nationally elected assembly must be made the repository of all authority and power.

[The Grand National Assembly] is the sole rightful representative of the nation and exercises the right of sovereignty in its name . . . [it] exercises its legislative authority directly [and] its executive authority through the person of the President of the Republic elected by it, and through a Council of Ministers chosen by the President . . . [it] may at any time scrutinize the acts of the Government and overthrow it (Articles 4, 6, 7).

The assembly's power was in this sense absolute, for it could be dissolved neither by the president nor by an act of the executive cabinet. The functions which it exercised directly were:

. . . enacting, amending, interpreting, and abrogating laws; concluding conventions, pacts, and treaties of peace; declaring war; examining and approving definitive laws relating to the general budget and the general accounts of the state; coining money; approving or annulling contracts and concessions involving monopolies or financial obligations; proclaiming general or special amnesty, reducing or modifying penalties, deferring legal investigations and punishments, and executing definitive death sentences pronounced by the courts (Article 26).

In structure, the assembly was a unicameral body elected for four years by universal franchise and secret ballot. Elections were carried out according to the list system. All deputies elected belonged to the party list whose candidates had obtained a simple majority. Lists were drawn up for each of the sixty-seven provinces (*vilayets*), the number of candidates in each province being determined by the size of its population—one candidate for every 40,000 voters. The minimum voting age was twenty-two, with no literacy bar and with both men and women enjoying equal electoral rights. Any Turkish citizen over thirty years of age could run for election, provided that he or she could read and write and was in full possession of his or her civil rights.

The president's powers were very clearly limited. As we have seen,⁸ Atatürk's real power rested not on his constitutional prerogatives as president of the Republic but on his leadership of the Republican People's party, which controlled the assembly. He often overstepped the limits set upon him by the constitution, but he never tried to revise these to suit his practical needs. He held firmly to the principle that, to be sound, Turkey's evolution must follow the course of gradually adapting to the democratic ideals embodied in the constitution rather than of adjusting the constitution to the existing state of affairs. Accordingly, the president's constitutional powers were limited:

[He] may, on ceremonial occasions, preside over the Assembly, and may preside over the Council of Ministers whenever he deems it necessary, [but he] may not participate in the debates and deliberations of the Assembly, nor may he vote, throughout his term of office (Article 32).

But the president was also the supreme commander of the armed forces; and the chief of the general staff, who wielded considerable

power, was until 1943 directly responsible to him. As chief executive, the president exercised his real power by choosing the prime minister, who in turn appointed the members of his cabinet from among the members of the assembly. But the prime minister and his cabinet were responsible not to the president but to the assembly.

It is evident that the relation of the executive to the legislative branch of government was similar in certain respects to that of the American system and in others to that of the British and the French under the fourth republic. In practice, however, the domination of the assembly by one party led to the exercise of virtual dictatorship by the party's leadership, which was centered in the president of the Republic. As already shown, in his capacity as president of the RPP, Atatürk was in fact the leader of the assembly, although in theory he had no direct power over it at all. This dual power was also exercised by İnönü after 1938.

The Democrats adhered to this principle but with this difference: the center of power within the Democrat party tended to shift from Çelal Bayar, the president of the party and of the Republic, to Adnan Menderes, the prime minister. Under Atatürk this practice would have proved not to be without its advantages. Unlike other dictators, he delegated considerable power to his prime minister and, through him, to the other members of the cabinet. The prime minister was the second in command in both the government and the party; as such, he was regarded as the natural successor to leadership of the party and, therefore, to the presidency of the Republic. In Turkey, this contributed to solving the major problem which all dictatorial regimes face when the dictator dies—the problem of nonviolent transference of power. In Egypt and Iraq, for example, this problem remains the single most dangerous factor threatening the permanence of the two regimes.

THE "SECOND REPUBLIC"

The breakdown of the two-party system in 1960 occurred mainly because the party in power, by holding exclusive control of both the legislative and the executive branches of government, was free to take any administrative or legislative action it wished in order to strengthen and perpetuate its position, contrary to the principles of the Republic and its increasingly disaffected citizens. In the absence of a genuine system of checks and balances, the full liberal spirit of the constitution was violated, and as long as no practical means ex-

isted to separate the legislative from the executive, the two-party system had become in reality indistinguishable from a single-party regime whose concentration of control bestowed dictatorial powers on the leadership of the majority party. The phase of two-party democracy in Turkey had apparently spent its effectiveness and the country was ready to undergo a new phase of political development.

The military *coup d'état* of May 27, 1960, which ushered in the "second republic" (*ikinci chumhuriyet*) of Turkey, appeared different from those which took place in other countries of the Middle East, in that it was the product of a genuine crisis of government rather than an attempt on the part of the army to install itself in political control. Its aim, which was achieved in a relatively short period of time, was to remove those conditions which made possible the dictatorship of the single party and to provide for political opposition and an equitable distribution of power.

The most important changes introduced by the army under the leadership of General Çemal Gursel and the ruling National Unity Committee (*milli birlik komitesi*)⁹ were (1) to destroy both the Democrats' monopoly of power and the two-party system by dissolving the Democratic party and allowing the formation of several political parties; (2) to amend the constitution to make separate the legislative and executive power of government, and to allow for a separate and independent judiciary; and (3) to amend the electoral law in favor of proportional rather than majority representation based on the list system, thus making possible the election of candidates both independent and representing smaller parties to a multi-party parliament.

It is noteworthy that, unlike the other revolutionary juntas of the Middle East, the N.U.C. did not immediately put to the vote and pass the revised constitution and electoral law,¹⁰ but followed a more truly democratic course by convening a constituent assembly (composed of the N.U.C., the executive cabinet, representatives of political parties, and various professional organizations and provincial representatives¹¹) in order to discuss and approve these amendments before they were submitted to a national referendum. Moreover, the fact that the N.U.C. was automatically dissolved when the constituent assembly convened and its powers were transferred to the new legislative body also indicated the desire of the revolutionary leadership to give up political control and permit resumption of parliamentary life.

In 1961 the most important party to reemerge was the Republican People's party which seemed still to enjoy the greatest popular backing in Turkey. Though its old leadership was discouraged from reentering political life in order to enable the new and younger elements to take up political responsibility, the basic principles and goals of Atatürk's party were retained. Another important political grouping was the union of the conservative Nation party (*Millet Partisi*) and the Peasant party (*Köylü Partisi*) into the Republican Peasant National party (*Chumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*). Two new influential parties, incorporating the ideas and hopes of the *coup d'état*, the New Turkey (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*) and the Justice party (*Adalet Partisi*), were formed in 1961, the first by Ekrem Alican, former minister of finance in the revolutionary cabinet, and second by General Ragip Gümüspala, former member of the revolutionary junta. All these parties sought to attract the four million followers of the former Democrat party. Other smaller parties which entered the political arena included the Turkish Socialist party (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*), the Democratic Labor party (*Demokrat İşçi Partisi*), and the Muslim Democratic party (*İslam Demokrat Partisi*), all of which had been founded before the *coup d'état*.

While it can be said that Turkey's democratic structure has been strengthened and preserved within the new parliamentary framework, based on the multiparty system and on a clear division between the executive and the legislative branches of government, it remained to be seen, however, whether in practice the new machinery of government would prove effective in establishing workable democratic practices and procedures. For in the final analysis it is one thing to decree democratic rights and liberties and another to provide the conditions for their proper exercise.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

1. Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1956), p. 224.
2. The best work in English on this subject is by Kamal H. Karapat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1959).
3. Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey," *International Affairs* (July, 1951), p. 326.
4. Quoted by Yalman, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
5. See p. 60 below.
6. In 1958 the Freedom party dissolved itself in order to join with the RPP.
7. *Time* (May 11, 1959), p. 40.

8. See Chap. Three above.

9. Established under a provisional constitution promulgated on June 12, 1960. See text in *Oriente Moderno* (July-August, 1960), pp. 425-428.

10. In its recommendations, the committee which drafted the amendments of the constitution and electoral law, described as "nondemocratic" a direct referendum without prior discussion and approval by a national constituent assembly. See *Ayasa Tasarisi ve Seçim Sistemi Habimdeki Görüşü* [Draft Constitution and Views on the Electoral System] (Ankara, 1960), p. 4.

11. Complete list published in *Resmî Gazete* [Official Gazette] (December 16, 1960), Law No. 157, Article 4.

Turkey's Foreign Policy

The Turks are the most valiant soldiers of the Middle East and also its most seasoned diplomats. For, both in its days of expansion and vigor and during the period of weakness and decline, the Ottoman Empire lived by war and by diplomacy; and since its inception forty years ago, the Republic—first by its soldiers, then by its diplomats—has carried on the tradition that sustained the empire and managed to give life to a new Turkey.

After Lausanne Turkey emerged independent and sovereign but no longer an empire. In the last forty years the only war she has waged was the War of Liberation (1919-1922); and although since that time she has maintained the strongest army in the Middle East, her survival and growth have been safeguarded not so much by her military might as by her diplomatic skill.

NEUTRALITY

Atatürk set forth the policy of neutrality as the basis of Turkey's dealings with all foreign powers, but this policy was not designed as a fixed and permanent principle. Before the end of the interwar period Turkey was ready to abandon her neutrality to a degree and enter into defense alliances which did not involve total commitment. Basically, however, neutrality remained the keystone of the Turkish Republic's policy for almost twenty-five years. After the end of the First World War and until 1945 Turkey had three areas in which to conduct her relations: with the European powers, particularly those with interests in the eastern Mediterranean; with her next-door neighbors, the Balkan and Middle Eastern states; and with Soviet Russia. In all these fields Atatürk's policy was strictly followed until shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. Correct and friendly relations were maintained with Britain, Italy, and France, with which Turkey concluded various commercial agreements. In the Balkans, a defensive alliance with Rumania, Greece, and Yugoslavia was concluded in 1934 to ensure the region's security

and preserve friendly relations between the Balkan states. A regional pact (*Sa'dabad*) was created in the Middle East in 1937 between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, calling for nonintervention and the amicable settlement of disputes.¹ With Russia a treaty of "friendship and neutrality" was signed in 1925² (elaborated in 1929 and 1931 and renewed for ten years in 1935), which called for nonintervention, neutrality, and nonaggression.

It was Italy's attack on Abyssinia in 1935 and Mussolini's increasingly aggressive attitude in the eastern Mediterranean that led Turkey in the late 1930's to assume a more vigorous foreign policy. At the Montreux Conference in 1936, Turkey asked for revision of the 1923 convention relating to the Straits and for the right to remilitarize the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Turkey's demands were met, and she assumed the protection of the Straits with the right of controlling the passage of warships when she was at war or when "threatened with the imminent danger of war."³

In 1939, with the mounting crisis in Europe and the formation of the Axis alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, Turkey took the first step toward abandoning her neutralist policy by agreeing to conclude a defensive alliance with Britain and France. This was done after France consented to cede to Turkey the Sanjaq of Alexandretta in northwestern Syria, which became part of Turkish territory.⁴ The tripartite treaty of "mutual assistance"⁵ provided for French and British aid to Turkey "in the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European power" and for Turkish assistance to Britain and France, jointly and separately, in the event of "war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom were involved."

After the outbreak of the Second World War Turkey was subjected to constant pressure by both the Axis powers and the Allies to enter the war on their side. In spite of her agreement with Britain and France, Turkey abstained from involvement in the war, which now extended to the "Mediterranean area." In 1941, with Germany in complete possession of Europe and pushing its way into Egypt toward the Suez Canal, Turkey agreed to sign a Turco-German treaty of friendship and nonaggression.⁶ Turkey, however, refused to break with Britain and kept the British Ambassador fully informed of her conversations with Germany. The agreement was made subject to "the already existing engagements of each party," which in Turkey's case preserved her engagement to Russia under the 1935 treaty and

to Britain under the 1939 tripartite treaty. This balance was maintained by Turkey throughout the remaining years of the war, even during the final phase in which she was subjected to harsh pressure by the Soviet Union. Only one week before the date which the Allies set (March 1, 1945) for the neutral states to declare war on Germany as condition to joining the conference in San Francisco did Turkey finally declare war on Germany and thus become eligible to membership in the United Nations.

TOTAL COMMITMENT

With the end of the war Turkey's foreign policy underwent a complete reversal, from one of careful neutrality and noninvolvement to one of complete and total commitment. Turkey's pro-Western, anti-Communist policy since 1945 has been one of the most thorough and consistent policies within the Western alliance. Unlike most anti-Communist countries, Turkey's opposition to Soviet Russia was not limited to the sphere of ideological conflict but was grounded in long and bitter experience of Russian aggressiveness against Turkey. Turkish hatred of Russia is second perhaps only to that of the Poles.

For two years after the end of the war, from 1945 to 1947, Turkey had to cope almost alone with the Soviet Union's claims on the Turkish Straits and eastern Anatolia, the traditional goals of Russian imperialism. Russia had claimed, in 1915 and again in 1940, both Constantinople (Istanbul) and eastern Anatolia.⁷ Stalin now sought to attain these objectives as part of the general postwar settlement, through pressure and restricted negotiations. In March, 1945, the Soviets denounced the Turco-Soviet agreement of 1935, and in June they demanded the cession of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Anatolia; on August 7 of the following year they demanded the revision of the Straits Convention of 1936 and Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits.⁸

President Truman's decision in 1947 to withstand Soviet pressure in the eastern Mediterranean led the United States to take responsibilities formerly assumed by Britain in the area and to come to the rescue of Turkey and Greece. The "Truman Doctrine," which symbolizes America's first major political commitment in the Middle East, postulated a principle of American policy in the region which has not changed since 1947: "The integrity [of Turkey] is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East."⁹

In 1947 Turkey was relieved of her long isolation and plunged

wholeheartedly into her new role as America's ally. In taking this position Turkey had nothing to lose and everything to gain; moreover, she had no real alternative. Alliance with the West served essentially the same goals as her former neutralist policy, and there was, in addition, the promise of vast economic aid and full acceptance as a member of the Western family of nations. In 1949 Turkey became a founder member of the Council of Europe, and in 1952 she was admitted into NATO. Europe's frontiers now extended to the limits of Turkey's Asian territory, and the Western powers pledged themselves to go to war to defend Turkey's frontiers. The headquarters of NATO's Southeast European Command, for the east Mediterranean and Turkey, were established in July, 1952, in Izmir. By the mid-1950's Turkey's army became one of the most powerful in all of Europe outside the Iron Curtain.

REGIONAL POLICY

After firmly establishing her position within the framework of the Western alliance, Turkey turned to strengthen her flanks in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. With Greece, already a fellow member of NATO, agreement was easy to reach. The two powers jointly approached Yugoslavia in 1953 and succeeded in concluding a tripartite agreement which later in the same year was strengthened by the signing of a formal military alliance.

In 1951 Turkey had participated as a founder member, with the United States, Britain, and France, in attempting to create a scheme of regional defense in the Middle East to be based in Egypt and the Suez Canal.¹⁰ This plan was motivated by American concern to protect Western interests in the area and to prevent Soviet aggression on the Korean pattern. The Allied Middle East Command, as the regional defense system was called, was to include Egypt as a founder member, other such countries of the Middle East as were "able and willing to contribute to the defense of the area," and Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. The defense organization was to be connected with NATO in a "relationship . . . to be worked out in consultation between all the powers concerned." Egypt's opposition to the proposed scheme was so complete that its collapse was inevitable.

Turkey was primarily responsible for acceptance of an alternative system proposed by Secretary of State Dulles in June, 1953.¹¹ The plan, which for a while was to be called The Baghdad Pact, was

based on Dulles' realization that the Arab countries would not commit themselves to any military alliance with the West and that a Western-controlled defense organization therefore was a "future rather than an immediate possibility." It was his belief that since in the "northern tier of nations"—in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran—there was more awareness of the danger of Soviet and Communist penetration than in "many Arab League countries," a system of collective defense could be established in that area to which Arab countries could later adhere. Dulles made it clear that such a system could not be "imposed from without" but "should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger." It is due to Turkey's efforts that Dulles' northern-tier concept finally took concrete form on February 25, 1955,¹² in the Turco-Iraqi pact of mutual cooperation to which Pakistan, Iran, and Britain also acceded in the course of that year.

The Baghdad Pact (CENTO) called for military and economic cooperation among its members and for the establishment of a permanent council at ministerial level to take such measures as were agreed upon by the member states. Membership was open to "any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace" in the region. The last phrase was designed to make possible the inclusion of Britain and the United States. Israel was implicitly barred from joining the pact since to participate a country had to be "fully recognized" by both Turkey and Iraq.

Turkey's efforts in the Balkans and in the Middle East proved by the end of the decade not altogether successful. Turco-Greek disagreement over the Cyprus question, which in 1957 resulted in violent anti-Turkish demonstrations in Greece and bloody anti-Greek riots in Turkey, together with Tito's partial rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1956-1957, greatly reduced the strength of the Balkan entente. In the Middle East the failure to bring Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon into the Baghdad Pact, following Egypt's successful campaign against it, restricted the power of the Pact and isolated Iraq in the Arab world. The Iraqi *coup d'état* of July, 1958, and Iraq's withdrawal from the Pact a few months later almost wrecked the defense organization and did, in fact, confine it to a position of immobility.

The most characteristic feature of Turkey's foreign policy after the end of the Second World War was its stubborn pro-Western, anti-

Soviet attitude. Though the Republican party regime gave way to that of the Democrats in 1950 and the latter to a military government in 1960, Turkey's position never changed. This militant foreign policy, however, was accompanied by other developments in Turkey's political life during the last decade, of which the most important perhaps was the gradual ascension of the executive over the National Assembly, the restriction of democratic liberties, and the curtailment of freedom of expression. Popular resentment toward Premier Menderes' regime which led to the army *coup d'état* of 1960 also seemed directed in part toward the Western allies, especially toward the United States, which was regarded as the principal ally of the Menderes regime. Indeed, under Menderes the revolutionary spirit of Kemalism appeared to have been suppressed by a rigid authoritarianism which showed itself not only internally but also in external policy. In the Middle East Menderes posed as Nasser's chief opponent, advocating the principle of the *status quo* and branding all movements of revolution and change in the area as Communist- and Soviet-inspired. In 1955 and in 1957 Turkey almost invaded Syria because she regarded Syria's close adherence to Egypt and to Nasser's policies as directly opposed to her own interests. In 1958 Turkey strongly favored Chamoun's pro-Western government in Lebanon against the rebelling pro-Nasser forces. Indeed throughout this period Turkey's allies in the Middle East were the autocratic monarchies, the Hashimites of Jordan and Iraq, and the Shah of Persia; her enemies, the revolutionary and nationalist regimes. Turkey's role of leadership, which she assumed with the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, began to deteriorate following the Pact's early failure in the Arab world and the spread of Nasser's brand of positive neutralism after 1957. Further irritants between Turkey and the Arab States were the problem of Alexandretta¹³ and Turkey's relations with Israel.¹⁴ The military *coup d'état* of 1960 opened a new decade in which were mingled serious doubts as to Turkey's continued democratic structure and the strength of her internal political stability, and the hope that with the end of the reactionary regime the new revolutionary movement may be the beginning of a new phase of progress and reform.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX


1. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 63.

2. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 45.

3. Articles 20 and 21 of the "Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits"; text in *ibid.*, II, 60.
4. See Chap. Ten, pp. 125-126, below.
5. Text in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 60.
6. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 68.
7. See the "Constantinople Agreement," "London Agreement," and "Russo-German Negotiations for a Projected Soviet Sphere of Influence in the Near and Middle East," in *ibid.*, vol. II, Docs. 5, 6 and 67; also cf. Chap. Three, above.
8. See "Exchange of Notes on the Turkish Straits," in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 83.
9. "The Truman Doctrine: March 12, 1947"; text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 85.
10. See "Four-Power Proposals for a Middle East Command," in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 97.
11. See "Report on the Near and Middle East by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles," in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 100.
12. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 107; for a full analysis, see John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East* (rev. ed.; New York, 1960), pp. 49-62.
13. See Chap. Ten, pp. 125-126, below.
14. Turkey recognized the state of Israel on March 28, 1949, the first Muslim state to do so. Israel later received *de facto* recognition from Iran and Malaya, both of them officially Muslim states.



PART THREE:

Iran 



Iran: Government and Politics

"To will change is not the same as to change will." St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica

THE PERSIAN CONSTITUTION

Modern Iran ¹ has had the longest experience of parliamentary government in the Middle East, yet it has also experienced the most severe type of dictatorship and the most unstable political life. During the two World Wars it was invaded despite its neutrality and subjected to foreign occupation.

Iran was the first country in the Middle East to acquire a liberal, Western-type constitution,² and the Persian revolution of 1906 was the only revolution staged in the modern Middle East with the definite goal of putting an end to absolute rule and establishing a constitutional, parliamentary government. Moreover, Iran is the only Middle Eastern country to have preserved its original constitution (promulgated in 1906 and 1907) without any drastic revision or change.³

The Persian Constitution is a liberal document composed of two sets of laws, The Fundamental Laws of December 30, 1906, and The Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 7, 1907.⁴ The Fundamental Laws are devoted to the structure, functions, and rights of the National Assembly and consist of fifty-one articles. The Supplementary Fundamental Laws, which are the more elaborate part of the Constitution, are composed of 107 articles divided into ten sections: General Dispositions (Articles 1-7); Rights of the Persian Nation (Articles 8-25); Powers of the Realm (Articles 26-29); Rights of Members of the Assembly (Articles 30-34); Rights of the Persian Throne (Articles 35-37); Concerning the Ministers (Articles 58-70); Powers of the Tribunals of Justice (Articles 71-89); Provincial and Departmental Councils (Articles 90-93); Concerning Finances (Articles 94-103); and The Army (Articles 104-107). It is worth noting that with

the exception of eleven articles (1, 2, 14, 35, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, and 74) the Supplementary Fundamental Laws consist of an almost literal translation of the Belgian Constitution of 1831 as amended in 1893. Both the Egyptian Constitution of 1924 and the Iraqi Constitution of 1925 bear striking resemblance to the Persian Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 1907.

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the Persian Constitution, which differentiates it from subsequent Constitutions of Muslim states, is embodied in Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws. It not only prohibits the enactment of any law which is "at variance with the sacred rules of Islam or the laws established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind [Muhammad]" but makes the important provision that "there shall at all times exist a committee composed of not less than five *mujtahids* or other devout theologians . . . [to] discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part" any such proposal which is contrary to the Qur'an or the *shari'a*. It is also decreed that this article "shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age [Mahdi], may God hasten his glad Advent!"

The form of government is declared to be a constitutional representative monarchy (Supplementary Fundamental Laws, Article 26). Sovereignty is derived from the people, and it is defined as "a trust confided as a divine gift by the people to the person of the King [Shah]" (Supplementary Fundamental Laws, Article 35).

The Supplementary Fundamental Laws emphasize the division of power in the state, which "shall ever remain distinct and separate from one another" (Article 28). *Legislative* power derives from the Shah, the Majlis (National Consultative Assembly), and the Senate; financial matters are exclusively assigned to the Majlis. *Executive* power is vested in the Shah, "that is to say, the laws and ordinances are carried out by the Ministers and State officials in the august name of His Imperial Majesty in such manner as the Law defines" (Article 27). *Judicial* power belongs to the ecclesiastical tribunals in matters connected with religious law and to the civil tribunals in matters connected with ordinary law.

The Shah is a hereditary monarch. He is supreme commander of all military and naval forces (Article 50); appoints and dismisses all ministers (Article 46); introduces and approves bills (Articles 27 and 45), and, by a constitutional amendment in 1949 of Article 48 of the Fundamental Laws, convokes and dissolves parliament. As the

head of state he is exempt from responsibility, which is assumed by his ministers (Article 44). Although the royal prerogatives and powers are explicitly defined in the Constitution (Article 57), he remains the dominant center of power in the state, since command of the armed forces, the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, and the right to dissolve parliament give him considerable control over both the legislative and executive branches of government.

According to the Fundamental Laws of 1906, parliament consists of two houses, the Majlis, the lower house, and the Senate, the upper house. Except for a few years during and immediately after the First World War (1915-1920), the Majlis has been in existence since 1906, with the twentieth Majlis convening in 1960. To Iranians it is the true symbol of the Constitution. The Senate was not convened until 1950; the nature of its composition and the relatively short period of its existence make it less important than the Majlis, toward which it acts primarily as a curbing influence.

Until 1957 the Majlis was composed of 136 deputies, representing seventy-eight constituencies and three religious minorities (one deputy for the Jewish community, one for the Zoroastrians, and two for the Armenians). According to the electoral law of 1911 (modified in 1925, 1927, 1934, and 1943), the Majlis is elected by universal male suffrage for a period of two years. In 1957 the number of deputies was increased to 200 to be elected for a four-year period.

The Majlis and the Senate⁵ jointly possess the following powers: (1) to initiate legislation; (2) to ratify treaties and authorize certain negotiations contracted by the government (e.g., state loans, construction of railroads, exploitation of natural resources); (3) to control the actions of the government; (4) to question the ministers separately and as a cabinet; and (5) to receive the Shah's oath of office. The Majlis has exclusive power over four matters: (1) all the financial affairs of the state (the budget, taxes, appropriations); (2) nomination of members of the committee of accounts (i.e., supervision of the treasury); (3) interpretation of the laws; and (4) designation of the crown prince and the regent. Since its establishment the Majlis has represented the interests of the landed aristocracy, the merchants, the religious groups, and the Shah. In 1944 leftist elements, including seven members of the Tudeh Party, were for the first time elected to the Majlis. Since Premier Musaddiq's fall in 1953 conservative elements have regained control of the Majlis, but with growing representation of the professional and intellectual groups. The Senate, half

of whose members are nominated by the Shah, is composed of retired generals, former ministers, and high officials loyal to the crown, and represents an essentially conservative force supporting the *status quo*.

The judicial system maintains, according to the Supplementary Fundamental Laws, the duality between civil and religious law that exists in most Middle Eastern countries. Because of the primacy of *ijtihad* in Shi'i legal tradition and as a result of the reforms of Reza Shah between 1925 and 1935, the civil aspect of the judicial system predominates, however; and though the civil code is derived mainly from the *shari'a*, the rules and procedures are largely French in origin. Religious courts fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and their mandate is in large part limited to matters of personal status. As in most Middle Eastern countries, the civil courts are of four types: district courts, courts of first instance, provincial courts of appeal, and the court of cassation in the capital.

ADMINISTRATION

Since 1925 the centralization of government and administration introduced by Reza Shah has made Iran one of the most centralized states of the Middle East. Local government is practically unknown and all regional administrative functions are directly controlled by the various ministries in Teheran. The destruction of the spirit of local autonomy that existed before 1925, though conducive to peace and stability, is held to be a major factor in the country's economic decline.⁶ All efforts at partial decentralization, first attempted under Premier Razmara in 1950, have failed to produce any significant change, largely because of strong opposition in the Majlis.

Iran's bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape is notorious throughout the Middle East. The bureaucracy, based on the French model, is hampered by a lack of individual initiative and responsibility on all levels; in addition, the complete absence of cooperation between the various departments contributes to considerable waste of money and human energy. Nepotism, bribery, and political favoritism are accepted as normal features of the administrative system. It was estimated that in the late 1950's over 200,000 persons, or about 10 per cent of the male urban population of Iran, were employed by the government; 50 per cent of these were superfluous appointments made on the basis of political interest rather than on administrative requirement. Moreover, about 30 per cent of the bureaucracy was considered illiterate. Although nearly 70 per cent of the national

budget (excluding military appropriations) was allotted to payment of salaries, the average employee received less than \$100 a month. Many attempts were made in 1950 and again after the fall of Musaddiq to reform the administrative system, but no significant progress has been made.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF REZA SHAH

Iran's tragic history in the twentieth century is a continuation of the suffering and misfortune of many centuries. It is true that during the twenty-year rule (1921-1941) of Reza Shah ⁷ peace and stability were restored to Iran, but even this interlude was full of economic hardships and political oppression. Before the *coup d'état* of 1921 Iran had just emerged from a period of near chaos during which the central government had practically lost control over the provinces, and famine had ravaged many areas. After Reza Shah's reign ended in 1941 and until Musaddiq fell from power in 1953, another phase of severe economic difficulties and chronic political instability brought Iran to the verge of collapse. It was only in the mid-1950's that a still precarious stability emerged and a measure of economic balance was introduced. This was in large part due to the United States' economic and political support of the established regime and not to any real solution of Iran's political and economic problems.

It must be remembered that Reza Shah's dictatorship was not established on the remains of a functioning and growing parliamentary democracy. Indeed, from the very beginning representative government in Iran had been doomed to failure. Efficient rule and both economic and political stability seem in Iran, as in almost every other Middle Eastern country, to depend on strong personal government. A Western-type liberal constitution such as that which Iran adopted in 1906-1907 could not be introduced overnight into a politically backward and economically underdeveloped country with any hope of its functioning for many years. For over twenty centuries the structure of the state in Iran had been based on absolute personal rule supported by a hereditary feudal system. The circumstances which brought about the constitutional revolution in 1906, uniting the merchant and religious groups with the tribes and the Western-educated liberals, soon disappeared. Muhammad Ali Shah, on ascending the throne in 1907, promptly strove to dissolve the Majlis and suspend the Constitution. He would probably have succeeded in putting an end to constitutional life in Iran just as sultan Abdul

Hamid had done in Turkey forty years earlier, had it not been for Britain's political intervention and support of the Bakhtiari rebellion against the Shah. Moreover, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907⁸ dividing Iran into spheres of influence, and the discovery of oil at Masjid-i-Sulayman in 1908 consolidated the pattern of Anglo-Russian interference in Iran's internal affairs and rendered almost impossible the normal development and growth of parliamentary life. With the deposition of Muhammad Ali Shah in 1909 and the ascension to the throne of his sickly thirteen-year-old son Ahmad, instability increased as a result of the struggle over the regency and the consequent disintegration of the power of the central government.

At the outbreak of the First World War, Iran, like Belgium, declared itself neutral; but, also like Belgium, its neutrality was violated with disastrous effects. Turkish, British, and Russian troops invaded the country from west, south, and north, and German agents incited the tribes to rebellion. The Majlis was divided, and in 1915 a group of pro-German deputies took refuge in Qum and declared their rebellion against the Shah's government. All semblance of law and order disappeared in Iran. At the end of the war Britain found herself in virtual control of the country: her former ally Russia had collapsed in 1917 and her Turkish enemy surrendered in 1918. Except for the emergence of Reza Shah, Iran would have most probably fallen under British suzerainty, as did Iraq and Egypt.

What Reza Shah did for Iran in the course of his twenty-year rule bears considerable resemblance to Mustafa Kemal's achievement in Turkey during the same interwar period. The pattern of achievement, however, and the nature of the reforms introduced by the two leaders were far from identical.

At the beginning Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal faced similar political and economic problems. To reassert the authority of the central government, to establish order and security in the country, and to regain for the nation a sense of unity and purpose were the first goals of both men. Just as the Turkish leader first destroyed the Armenian republic in eastern Anatolia and then drove the Greeks from western Anatolia and eastern Thrace (1920-1922); Reza Shah's first concern was to pull down the Soviet Republic of Gilan in north-western Iran and then to subdue the tribes in the northwest, west, and south (1921-1924). Once internal stability was achieved, consolidation of power was the next step. In both countries this meant putting an end to the ruling dynasty and introducing new structures



İsmet İnönü on election tour.


James Burke—Time, Inc.

Wide World Photos



General Çemal Gursel beside a bust of Kemal Atatürk.

Dr. Mussadiq in retirement.



Wide World Photos



Wide World Photos

The Shah of Iran.

Girl Scouts on parade in Damascus, Syria.

Arab Information Center



of government and administration. In Turkey the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished and Mustafa Kemal became President of the Turkish Republic; in Iran Ahmad Shah, the last of the Qajars, was deposed, and Reza Khan, after briefly considering the idea of a republic, became Shah. Each country then undertook to strengthen its army, organize a new centralized administration, and build a new police system. In their foreign relations, both Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah sought to achieve recognition based on complete independence and absolute sovereignty. All forms of interference in internal affairs by the great powers were ended, and all the special privileges enjoyed by foreign nationals abolished.

In economic policy Reza Shah followed in Kemal's footsteps, emphasizing state capitalism based on industrialization and state monopoly of trade and commerce. Foreign loans were no longer welcome, and both countries advocated national capital for economic development. (An example in Iran was the Trans-Iranian Railway, Reza Shah's biggest and costliest project, which took ten years to complete at the cost of \$120 million raised from taxes on sugar and tea.) Social reform and modernization also took the same direction in Iran as in Turkey: the clergy lost most of its control, religious law was confined to matters of personal status, civil marriage and divorce registers were established, the veil was removed, Western dress made obligatory, civil and criminal codes based on Western models were adopted, and primary and secondary education was made obligatory.

But despite the general aspects of resemblance the reform movements in Iran and Turkey showed significant divergencies, which deeply influenced the social and political developments of the two countries. Perhaps the most important single difference lies in the fact that while Kemal's edicts were embodied in institutional structures that gradually became capable of independent operation, Reza Shah's reforms were made on a personal basis so that when he himself was no longer in power a large part of his accomplishment collapsed. Moreover, Kemal had from the beginning based his reform movement on a political organization, the Republican People's party, which he established in 1923, while Reza Shah failed to create even a corps of lieutenants to help him in his task and to carry on his work.

Parliament during the six assemblies of Reza Shah's reign was a dead assembly of subservient merchants and landlords whose only function was to pass unanimously every decree presented by the Shah. Elections were not even "exercises" in the external forms of demo-

cratic procedures, since they functioned merely to ratify the nominations of the Shah. Unlike Kemal, Reza Shah could not delegate responsibility and for twenty years almost singlehandedly administered the Iranian state. It is not surprising if the interwar generation that grew up in his shadow was lacking in training, direction, and solidarity, without the will to face up to public responsibility.

Working alone, Reza Shah had no clear vision of the final objectives of his reforms. Kemal, on the other hand, knew full well what he wanted to achieve—to dethrone Islam and westernize Turkey. Reza Shah did not completely dislodge Islam nor did he carry the movement of modernization far enough to achieve a genuine transformation of society and the state. Although he reduced the power of the clergy in Iran, the clergy were still able to prevent the change from monarchy to republic; they were also able to apply pressure to preserve the Islamic character of the Constitution and to put a limit to the degree and extent of modernization. Perhaps due to Iran's physical remoteness from the West and its consciousness of its own great cultural heritage, the process of modernization was only partially modeled after the West and included anti-Western trends (illustrated, for example, by the removal of Western words from the Persian vocabulary) as well as a tendency to emphasize its pre-Islamic past (e.g., the reintroduction of ancient Persian architecture). Moreover, Iran did not attempt to modify its cumbersome Arabic script or replace it by the Latin alphabet, as Turkey did in 1928.

It must be remembered that Reza Shah was a self-made man with little education and hardly any contact with the outside world. Mustafa Kemal, on the other hand, was born in European Turkey and was intimately familiar with European ideas and ways. And while Kemal had a genuine admiration for the democratic form of government and sincerely strove to establish it in Turkey, Reza Shah treated the already existing parliamentary system with disdain and cynically used it as a means to his own ends without giving it an opportunity to grow and become an effective body.

Solitary power drove Reza Shah to extremes. In his last years he became excessively despotic and morbidly cruel. He shunned society and in the gloom of his seclusion developed a taste for personal wealth, which he acquired by dubious means. On his abdication he was a rich and a disillusioned old man, feared but not much loved by his subjects.

Reza Shah's achievement has yet to be objectively studied and

assessed. Sources of material on the man and his epoch are few and inadequate. Some observers consider Reza Shah as one of the greatest figures of Persian history; others, as an adventurer not to be compared to Mustafa Kemal. Whatever the final verdict, Iran entered the modern world under Reza Shah and was irrevocably changed because of him.

CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY RE-ESTABLISHED

With Reza Shah's abdication a new "democratic" phase began in 1941 under his son Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. The Second World War, like the first, had brought to Iran another ordeal of foreign occupation, economic distress, and political chaos. But now restrictions on the freedom of the press were lifted and the formation of political parties was allowed. Almost overnight numerous parties, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, were organized, and many daily and weekly newspapers appeared, representing the various factions and groups. The clergy regained its power and the tribes again emerged as a political force in the country.

For over a decade (1941-1953), Iran drifted from one crisis to another. Against a background of general confusion one fact stood out: parliamentary democracy in Iran had again failed to function properly. The following considerations may throw some light on the nature and causes of this failure.

In the first place, the plight of the common man in Iran is such that he is unable to play a positive role in the political life of the country. Iran, with eighty-eight per cent of its territory composed of wasteland and desert, has a population estimated at a little over twenty million, of which about fifteen million are illiterate peasants and tribesmen, living under economic and social conditions that have changed little since the Middle Ages. In the semifeudal structure of rural and tribal society the right to vote has become another instrument of consolidating the power of the landed aristocracy and the tribal chiefs. As during Reza Shah's reign, elections are carried out under the control of local officials and the police who follow instructions from their employers and leaders in the capital. The vicious chain of command is not broken except at the top, where disagreements among the rich and powerful result in the formation of blocs that struggle to influence or gain control over the machinery of government. The peasant and the tribesman vote only as they are told.

In the urban centers the worker, the artisan, the peddler, and the unemployed play a more active role in political life, since together they form the core of the city mob which, especially in the capital and in times of crisis, can influence political decisions. With the creation of the Tudeh Party in the fall of 1941 a number of trade unions were formed, which for the first time organized the industrial workers and enabled them to act as a group.

Another important factor disrupting the normal development of parliamentary government can be attributed to the constant interference of Britain and Russia in Iran's internal affairs. With the rise of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the mid-nineteenth century, Iran ceased to have control of her own internal political life and became an arena where the two powers competed. The 1906 constitutional movement itself was born of this strife, and the early years of Iran's parliamentary life were completely dominated by the shifting relations between Great Britain and Russia. In 1907 and again in 1942, when Iran made her two great efforts to cast off absolute rule and achieve democracy, Great Britain and Russia divided the country and dominated its internal political life.⁹ No political leader or party could keep out of the Anglo-Russian conflict or remain outside one camp or the other. In the period from 1907 to 1911 Russia controlled the Shah and his court, Great Britain the leaders of the Majlis and the tribal chiefs; from 1942 to 1946 Russia's interests were represented by the Tudeh Party, Great Britain's by Zia ad-Din and his National Will Party. No country in the Middle East suffered as much foreign interference in her internal affairs as did Iran. It should not be surprising therefore that Iran's political morality was warped and that patterns of political behavior have developed which to the outsider seem almost incomprehensible.

Until 1946, when the evacuation of all foreign troops was finally effected, the Allied Command represented the real center of power in the country. The Shah was practically powerless. The Majlis, however, became increasingly important as the center of political debate. It was, of course, not representative of the people in any democratic fashion, but it did exercise considerable influence in withstanding the direct Anglo-Russian pressure on the administration of Iran. Nationalist opposition to foreign interference indirectly expressed itself through the Majlis and there developed into a full-fledged movement, which in 1951 finally emerged as a national rebellion under Musaddiq's leadership.

POLITICAL PARTIES

From 1941 to 1953 four major groups struggled to gain political ascendancy: the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, Zia ad-Din's conservative National Will Party, Qawam as-Sultanah's middle-way Democrats of Iran Party, and Muhammad Musaddiq's National Front.¹⁰

The Tudeh Party is the only genuine mass movement to emerge in Iran and one of very few mass parties to appear in the modern Middle East. Of all the parties founded after 1941, it was the only one based on a clear-cut doctrine and a highly organized structure. Its founders, though jailed in 1937 by Reza Shah as Communists, were in fact a group of leftist intellectuals who did not at first identify themselves with communism. Most of them belonged to the educated professional class. Dr. Rida Radmanesh, later secretary-general of the party, was professor of economics at the University of Teheran, Dr. Murtaza Yazdi and Dr. Firaydun Kishavars were physicians, and Iratsh Iskandari, a *Mirza* (Prince), belonged to the landed aristocracy.

The party adopted the Communist pattern of organization and tactics, based on the cell structure and the front organization. At its inception it called for social and economic reforms rather than for radical transformation of the social and political structure of the state. It contributed greatly to directing attention to the necessity for social and economic justice, and it brought new hope and purpose to a generation long the victim of political cynicism and economic exploitation. This positive aspect of the Tudeh's early activities was, however, soon to disappear in its struggle for political power. To attain its objectives, the party violated its own most cherished ideals, actively sabotaging the social and economic programs it had called for and doing all it could to increase the political and economic instability of the country. By 1944, when the elections of the fourteenth Majlis were held, the extreme left had already gained control of the party's leadership, which now became an organ of Communist penetration and an instrument of Soviet propaganda.¹¹ Though it was comparatively small in terms of card-carrying members, the party was able to send eight members to the Majlis that year, the first time that Communists were elected to a Middle Eastern parliament.¹²

The party's most militant role during the war period was played in the Russian-occupied provinces, especially in Azarbaijan, where the Tudeh "dissolved" itself in September, 1945, reformed itself as the Azarbaijan Democratic Party under the leadership of Ja'far Pish-

avari (a leader in the Soviet Republic of Gilan in 1920), and called for Azarbaijani autonomy. The Soviet Republic of Azarbaijan came into existence in December, 1945,¹³ and agitation for similar action spread to neighboring Gilan and Mazandaran. By March, 1946, Tudeh power reached its zenith. It assumed the leadership of a strong coalition of various political elements and gained complete control of the Teheran mob. In August, after mammoth demonstrations in the capital and other cities, three Tudeh leaders¹⁴ were taken into the cabinet of Qawam as-Sultanah. A seizure of power in Iran by the Tudeh Party in the summer of 1946 would have been possible, but unexplained circumstances prevented the party from taking action. Qawam declared that he had reached an understanding with the Soviets over evacuation and an agreement to establish a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company. In October Qawam reshuffled his cabinet, ousted the Tudeh members, and took direct action against the rebels in Azarbaijan.¹⁵ The Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Iranian territory leaving the local Communists to their own fate. The Soviet Republics of Azarbaijan and Mahabad fell without resistance. In December many leading members of the Tudeh were put in jail, and when elections took place in January, 1947, the party, "broken and defeated, refused to take part."¹⁶

The Azarbaijan affair cost the Tudeh a great deal of support and good will among the Iranian nationalists, who had supported the Tudeh as the movement which best represented social and economic change and strove for the realization of complete national independence. Its subservience to Soviet Russia to the extent of supporting the secession of Azarbaijan from Iran was viewed as treasonable. Never again would the Tudeh win wholehearted popular support, although its strength would increase again for a while during the Musaddiq period.

The party was officially banned on February 5, 1949, after an attempt was made by a Tudeh journalist to assassinate the Shah at a ceremony in the University of Teheran. Forced underground, the party resumed its activity clandestinely and began a systematic infiltration of the army. When Musaddiq assumed power in 1951, it reappeared in full strength. In August, 1953, during the chaotic days following Musaddiq's defiance of the Shah's decree deposing him as prime minister, the Tudeh dominated the streets and again had a real chance of executing a *coup d'état*. The party was largely responsible for the slogan that resounded throughout Teheran, "Down with the

Shah and long live the Iranian Republic," and for the violent riots that occurred until the army under General Zahidi took control. The return of the Shah and the restoration of the *status quo* exposed the party to the most thorough suppression since its foundation in 1941. A total of 434 army and police officers were arrested and convicted of belonging to a "Communist espionage organization"; twenty-six of them were executed and the rest given lengthy prison terms. Some of the leaders were able to escape to Russia, notably Radmanesh, who was last seen in 1960 in Iraq. Although by September, 1954, the Tudeh was destroyed as a cohesive political organization, it did not cease to exist. It was prosecuted in Iran under a bill passed in 1954, prohibiting all organizations advocating the Communist doctrine, upholding principles contrary to Islam or constitutional monarchy, or connected with such political parties as had been declared illegal. As late as 1960, however, wide arrests were made in the army, where vigorous Tudeh infiltration was discovered.

Zia ad-Din Tabataba'i, briefly prime minister in 1921 and in exile since that time, returned to Iran in 1943 and formed the largest political movement to oppose the Tudeh Party until 1946. The National Will Party, as this movement was later called, consisted of conservative and rightist elements that stood in opposition to Soviet influence and to any form of radical social or economic change. For a while it enjoyed considerable popular backing, and until the end of the war maintained a strong front in Parliament. It published a widely read newspaper and controlled many other publications. Its organization, however, was weak, lacking the disciplined and closely knit structure of the Tudeh Party. Backed by British money and prestige, the National Will Party was able to show vigorous resistance to Soviet pressure and to fight Tudeh activities, especially in Teheran. The role which this party played, however, was essentially negative in character. The sterility of its activity during its three-year existence illustrates that type of Iranian political organization which, starting with wide mass appeal because of favorable circumstances, suddenly disappears when circumstances change or cease to be favorable.

In 1946 Premier Qawam as-Sultanah ordered the arrest of Zia ad-Din, thus destroying the National Will Party, and himself made a bid for total power by establishing his Democrats of Iran Party, which gained wide support among various political groups and for a while appeared to fulfill the hope for a moderate majority party that could

steer a middle path between the extreme left and the extreme right and at the same time maintain a strong hold of the Majlis. In 1947, backed by the financial and political support of the government, which Qawam was still heading, the Democrats were able to secure a comfortable majority in the fifteenth Majlis. But no sooner had the Majlis convened than the party deputies began to drift apart. Lacking in genuine doctrinal content and based on weak organizational structure, the Democratic Party could not long survive Qawam's resignation as premier in December 1947. Like the National Will Party, the Democrats of Iran soon vanished from the political scene leaving hardly a trace behind.

A handful of deputies, opposing Qawam, had united in 1947 under the leadership of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, a landowning politician long known for his honesty and extreme nationalism. It was Musaddiq who in 1944 had spearheaded the law prohibiting the grant of oil concessions to any foreign power before the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran. After the war his position was considerably strengthened by his adherence to the simple principle that all foreign influence, whether political or economic, was to be totally eliminated in Iran. He further developed this principle into a comprehensive activist stand which gained followers and took as its crusade the oil problem and the necessity of complete nationalization of Iranian oil industry.

The National Front headed by Musaddiq was not, strictly speaking, a political party with organized membership and a clear-cut political doctrine, but rather a loose coalition of various political groups and parties (including the Tudeh) which supported the principle of nationalization and implicitly accepted Musaddiq's leadership. During Musaddiq's premiership (April 28, 1951-August 20, 1953) it became a nationalist movement around which virtually the entire nation rallied. Though it ended in failure, the movement created a national solidarity which no other party was ever able to achieve in the modern history of Iran. This is the reason why the Musaddiq period, despite all its wrongs and excesses, is still viewed by Iranian nationalists as a period of resurgence and triumph in which the foreigner was finally defied and the sense of national pride restored.

Musaddiq's brief rule provides a clear illustration of what a small nation in the postwar world could do against vast odds if driven to extremes of nationalist fervor. In the West Musaddiq was looked upon "as an appalling caricature of a statesman," but in Iran and

throughout the Middle East he was regarded as a hero and a symbol of national pride. In retrospect Musaddiq's fall seems inevitable, not only because of the fundamentally negative course of action which he took, but also, and primarily, because it was impossible to preserve national unity for a cause that had no hope of complete fulfillment and under a leadership whose power was necessarily precarious. Musaddiq had to satisfy his followers in the Majlis and at the same time keep the mob's emotions at a high pitch. His stand could not allow any kind of compromise. To keep the situation under control he was compelled to increase his power. On July 13, 1952, he demanded and received dictatorial powers for six months, and in January the following year he had them extended another twelve months. His strange tactics and maneuvers—taking to bed when the Majlis showed reluctance to accede to his wishes, resigning as prime minister (July 1952) in order to be reappointed to that post as well as that of minister of defense, his use of martial law, of arbitrarily dismissing and appointing government officials and army officers—were all directed toward one goal: to increase and concentrate power in his own hands.

The severe economic crisis and the Western powers' adamant stand on the problem of oil finally led to the crumbling of the National Front. Kashani, the speaker of the house and an influential religious leader, the Tudeh Party, and other powerful political elements both inside and outside the Majlis began to attack him, first secretly, then openly. But the final collapse was the outcome of the struggle between Musaddiq and the Shah, who represented the only remaining center of resistance. Backed by the army, the British, and the Americans, the Shah signed on August 13, 1953, a decree dismissing Musaddiq and appointed General Zahidi as premier. Instead of complying, Musaddiq ordered the officer carrying the dismissal decree arrested. Days of complete chaos ensued in which the Tudeh took to the streets and called for the deposition of the Shah and the establishment of the republic of Iran. But suddenly and unexpectedly events reversed themselves; mobs appeared denouncing Musaddiq and cheering the Shah, and soon these were joined by police and army units. Zahidi, who was in hiding, took over control and ordered the arrest of Musaddiq. On August 22 the government radio announced the fall of Musaddiq's regime and the assumption of control by the legal government. The Shah, who had fled the country with his

queen a few days earlier, returned triumphantly to Teheran, and the *status quo* was reestablished.

Thus ended what many Iranians still refer to as the "nationalist revolution." The forces of the *status quo*, with the Shah as their rallying point and the army as their protecting arm, not only reinstated themselves firmly in Iran but also for the first time since the abdication of Reza Shah were able to exercise complete control of the country. The inevitable purge of the army and administration followed, and a new regime began. This time it would be neither "democratic," in which parties and groups would freely struggle for political domination, nor dictatorial in the sense of complete absolutism as under Reza Shah, but a combination of both: a docile Majlis, conservative parties lacking in mass backing, and a strong army loyal to the throne, with the Shah exercising direct control of the state. The fervor, the excitement, the efforts, and the hopes of Iran's political life during the 1940's and 1950's were thus spent, and the Iranians reverted to their century-old resignation in the face of the inevitable. If at the beginning of the 1960's democracy did not exist in Iran, neither did a vigorous and efficient dictatorship.

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE OLD AND THE NEW MAJLIS, 1960-1961

<i>Departments</i>	<i>Old</i>	<i>New</i>
Eastern Azarbaijan	16	21
Western Azarbaijan	4	9
Isfahan	10	16
Baluchistan and Sistan	2	4
Teheran	21	28
Khurasan	14	20
Khuzistan	10	20
Fars	13	16
Kurdistan	5	5
Kirman	7	8
Kirmanshah	8	14
Gilan	11	16
Mazandaran	11	16
Persian Gulf Islands	0	2
Religious Minorities	4	5
Total	136	200

The two major parties, Milliyoun and Mardoum, which were formed in 1957 to give an aspect of order and legality to Iran's parliamentary life were both "moderate" and subservient to the regime; they represented the interests of the landed aristocracy, the big city

merchants, and the higher bourgeoisie. The National Front, consisting of Musaddiq's former followers and various liberal and leftist elements, remained forced underground. Through SAVAK, the 50,000 strong secret police, the country was kept under tight control. But the repercussions of the military *coup d'état* in Iraq in 1958 and the students' demonstrations and consequent fall of the Menderes government in Turkey in 1960 dealt a severe blow to the continued stability of Iran. Unable to read the writing on the wall, the ruling groups persisted in their short-sighted course; the elections in the summer of 1960, though carried out under a revised electoral system, were again manipulated and brought into parliament all the traditional elements representing reaction and vested interests and excluding the growing progressive elements of opposition. The dissolution of the Majlis in September, 1960 and the carrying out of new elections under a new electoral law (passed on January 17, 1961) failed to bring about any perceptible change in the structure of parliament and consequently in the tense political situation. In May, 1961, mass demonstrations broke out, headed by students and teachers and backed by the National Front. Resorting to drastic measures, the Shah dissolved parliament and appointed a reform cabinet with wide powers under Ali Amini, a former cabinet minister and a big landowner. Though the immediate crisis was surmounted, the basic ills of misgovernment, inefficiency, and corruption could not easily be remedied. Economically, although the revenues from oil were on the increase, the country headed toward bankruptcy; more money was spent on the armed forces than on economic development, land reforms remained limited, and the vast mass of the population continued to live on the verge of starvation. The dual problem of political stability and social-economic reform had no ready or speedy solution. Only the peaceful transition of power to the National Front, the limitation of monarchical power, and continued political and financial support of the United States could perhaps prevent Iran's internal disintegration and ultimate collapse.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN

1. The names Iran and Persia may be used interchangeably; the country officially adopted the name Iran (home of the Aryans) in 1935; in recent years its former designation as Persia, which is Greek in origin, has again come into official use.

2. Turkey's constitution of 1876, suspended shortly after its promulgation, was not actually put into effect until the *coup d'état* of 1908.

3. Amendments were made in 1925, 1949, and 1957.
4. English translation in Helen M. Davies, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East* (Durham, N.C., 1947), pp. 69-90. For an excellent analysis, see Djamchid Tavallali, *Le Parlement iranien* (Lausanne, 1954).
5. The Fundamental Laws of December 30, 1906, are exclusively devoted to the structure and functions of the Majlis and Senate.
6. Cf. Donald N. Wilber, *Iran Past and Present* (3rd ed.; Princeton, N.J., 1958), p. 87.
7. Formally proclaimed Shah in 1926.
8. See Chap. Eight, pp. 94, 98, below.
9. See Chap. Eight, pp. 8-9, below.
10. For a brief survey of political parties during this period, see L. P. Ellwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran: 1941-1948," *MEJ* (January, 1949), pp. 45-62.
11. Cf. George Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran," *MEJ* (January, 1947), p. 29.
12. On Russia's interference in the elections, see George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1949), p. 198.
13. Demands were made by the Democratic Party of Azarbaijan that the Azarbaijani people should be represented by one-third instead of one-sixth of the total membership of the Majlis. See Edwin Muller, "Behind the Scenes in Azarbaijan," *The American Mercury* (June, 1946), p. 700.
14. Iratsh Iskandari, minister of commerce and industry, Dr. Firaydun Kishavars, minister of education, and Dr. Murtaza Yazdi, minister of health.
15. Including the Kurdish Soviet Republic of Mahabad. See Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," *MEJ* (July, 1947), pp. 247-269.
16. For further details, see L. P. Ellwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London, 1955), p. 116.

Iran and the Great Powers

Because of her oil and her strategic position, Iran throughout the twentieth century has been the object of contention among the great powers. Until 1921 and again during the Second World War, Great Britain and Russia struggled for supremacy in Iran. In the interwar period Germany entered the scene, and since the end of the Second World War the United States has played the role of "third power." While Russia and Great Britain had always forced themselves upon Iran and were viewed by the Iranians as aggressors, Germany and the United States were looked upon as friendly powers whose interests in Iran did not constitute a threat to her sovereignty and territorial integrity. Whatever their attitude or interest in Iran and however they were viewed by Iranians, the great powers have determined the economic and political fate of modern Iran. But of all the powers Russia has exercised the most continuous and the most profound influence.

RUSSIAN POLICY IN IRAN

No country in the Middle East has had as much experience of Russia as Iran. And of all Middle Eastern countries Iran is the only one to have experienced repeated Russian invasion and occupation of its territory. Since the turn of the century the Russians have invaded and occupied Iranian territory three times, from 1909 to 1911, 1914 to 1918, and 1941 to 1946. Twice after the Communists took power in 1917 a Soviet republic was established on Iranian soil under Russian protection: in Gilan in 1920 and in Azarbaijan in 1945. To Russia Iran represented not only a physical barrier that separated her from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean but also the country bordering on the longest and most exposed stretch of Russia's "soft belly."

Until 1917 Russia's policy in Iran had for a century been one of direct expansionism and economic exploitation. Iran's greatest territorial loss occurred in the early part of the nineteenth century. By the treaties of Gulistan¹ (1813) and Turkmanchay² (1828) Russia

acquired Georgia, Erivan, and Nakhichevan down to the Araxes River and procured the first extraterritorial privileges for foreign nationals in Iran.³ The Russians also acquired commercial and financial concessions in Iran which by the end of the nineteenth century enabled her to exercise considerable political control over the country. Anglo-British rivalry in Iran, both economic and political, received formal accommodation by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.⁴

The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought about a complete reversal of Russian policy in Iran. First Kerensky, then Trotsky, denounced all treaties and concessions imposed on Iran by the Tsarist government. The abrogation of all treaties, privileges, and concessions (excluding fishing rights in the Caspian Sea) was embodied in a note sent by Foreign Minister Checherin to the Persian Government in June, 1918.⁵ Relations between Iran and the new regime in Russia were not formally normalized until 1921, when a treaty of friendship was signed on February 26, 1921.⁶ This treaty presented a sharp contrast with the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919,⁷ and won great prestige in Iran and the neighboring countries for the Bolsheviks.

The treaty made formal Russia's pledge to render null and void "the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist government [or] third parties in respect of Persia . . ." (Article I). According to Article VI, Russia reserved the right to protect herself in case a third party used Iran "as a base of operations against [her]." This important article reads as follows:

If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

The Russian diplomatic representative in Teheran, clarifying his government's intention in a letter to the Iranian Foreign Minister, stated that this article was intended primarily to safeguard Russia against a possible attack by the "counter-revolutionary forces" as-

sisted by the "enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republics." The letter pointed out that this was to apply only in case

preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her, by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown or by its supporters among those foreign powers which are in a position to assist the enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republics and at the same time to possess themselves, by force or by underhand methods, of part of the Persian territory, thereby establishing a base of operations for any attacks made either directly or through the counter-revolutionary forces—which they might mediate against Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her. . . .⁸

For twenty years (1921-1941) Russian policy lay dormant, but Russian designs on Iran never changed; only the goals grew more ambitious and the methods of reaching them more varied. Writing as early as 1918, the Communist writer Konstantin Troyanovsky expressed new Russia's dreams as follows:

The Persian [Communist] revolution may become the key to the revolution of the whole Orient, just as Egypt and the Suez Canal are the key to English domination in the Orient. Persia is the "Suez Canal" of the revolution. By shifting the political center of the revolution to Persia, the entire strategic value of the Suez Canal is lost. . . . The political conquest of Persia, thanks to its peculiar geopolitical situation and significance for the liberation movement in the East, is what we must accomplish first of all. This precious key to all other revolutions in the Orient must be in our hands, come what may. Persia must be ours! Persia must belong to the revolution! ⁹

More than twenty years later the Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran in 1941 began a seemingly new phase in Russo-Iranian relations, putting into action Troyanovsky's thesis. Iran was viewed as the gateway to the Middle East and Africa. Following the direct tactics of absorption which they practiced in eastern Europe toward the end of the war, the Russians occupied northern Iran not as allies but as conquerors. The northern provinces were completely cut off from the rest of the country, and a Soviet administration was set up. The establishment of the Soviet Republics of Azarbaijan and Mahabad in 1945 were not isolated incidents but the first steps toward the establish-

ment of similar regimes stretching from the Afghan-Soviet frontiers in the east to the Iraqi-Turkish border in the west. A take-over of the Iranian Government by the Tudeh party in Teheran would have completed a scheme that most probably would have brought Iran completely into the Soviet orbit by the end of 1946. In March, 1946, when all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Iranian territory, the Russians were pouring reinforcements into Iran. About fifteen Soviet armoured brigades and five hundred tanks entered Iran. On March 6, Marshal Ivan Bagramian, then the commander of the Soviet First Baltic Army, arrived in Tabriz and assumed command of the new forces.

It was at this time that the United States began to realize the seriousness of the situation in Iran and the extent of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. As an American analyst described it ten years later:

It was suddenly necessary to revise the estimate of Soviet intentions. It had appeared that the seizure of Iranian Azarbaijan and Northern Kurdistan and the extraction of various concessions from Iran were primary Soviet goals. Now it seemed clear that they were only subordinate means toward a far larger end—the reduction of Turkey, the main bastion against Soviet advance into the entire Middle East.¹⁰

The main cause for the subsequent shift in Soviet policy in Iran and Stalin's decision to put an end to direct Soviet expansion in Iran (1946) and in Turkey (1947) must be attributed to the firm stand taken by the United States during those crucial years. This first face-to-face encounter between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East resulted in America's commitment to a Middle Eastern policy and her emergence for the next decade as the dominant power in the Middle East. It is noteworthy that the United States' first acts of policy in the Middle East met with greater success than perhaps any American action in the area was to meet in the years that followed.

The year 1946 marked the highest point of Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Soviet policy toward Iran after that date followed a pattern of blandishments and threats rather than direct aggression. Iran, on her part, broke away from her historical tradition of non-alignment and committed herself to a pro-Western policy, first by concluding military agreements with the United States, then by join-

ing the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and by signing a bilateral mutual defense treaty with the United States in 1959. Russia's most immediate political objective in Iran in 1960 was to separate the country from the Western alliance and bring her back to a neutral position.

BRITISH POLICY IN IRAN

British policy in Iran, since the beginning of the twentieth century, has aimed at two things, to prevent Russia from reaching the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and to safeguard the flow of oil from her own Persian oil fields. Until 1921 and again in the early 1940's Britain shared with Russia a dominant position in Iran. But with the end of the Second World War her power in the Middle East began to decline, and her position of supremacy in the area was gradually assumed by the United States. By 1951, when Musaddiq nationalized the oil industry and assumed power in Iran, Britain's remaining power in Iran came to an end and her role was reduced to equal partnership in the Baghdad Pact. Her primary objective was no longer the exclusive possession of Persian oil, but rather the preservation of Persian Gulf oil resources—in Iran and Iraq, but especially in Kuwait—within the sphere of Western control.

From a historical standpoint Britain's policy in Iran until 1951 represents perhaps the best illustration of "nineteenth century diplomacy" in the area. Starting in the early part of the nineteenth century, Great Britain had assumed the role of knowing what was best for Iran and determined it on the basis of Britain's best interests. The chief means used in realizing these interests were the use or threat of force and of bribery. The threat to use force was an ever-present weapon. When it was last used in 1951, it ended in failure and with it ended Britain's supremacy in Iran. Force was also used during the First World War and in 1941. Bribery, an easier and less costly practice, was the method most employed.

In this resort British representatives acted under the assumption that everyone could be bought, including the Shah. The scandal attending the manner in which the Persian government was made to sign the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 is a case in point. The Prime Minister and the Shah were paid 130,000 pounds sterling (\$520,000)¹¹ to sign the agreement, which the Majlis later refused to ratify.

Between 1907 and 1942 four major international agreements involving Iran were made to which Great Britain was party; in all four

Iran was either not consulted at all or forced to negotiate from a position of weakness in which she had no choice but to accept the terms imposed on her.

In the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907¹² Iran was not consulted when her territory was divided into spheres of influence in which Britain and Russia agreed to respect mutual rights and privileges at Persian expense. In the secret agreement made between the Allies in 1915,¹³ in which Iran did not participate, Britain was to incorporate into her sphere of influence that part of Iran which was left as a neutral zone in 1907. After the First World War, with Russia out of the picture, Britain was in virtual occupation of Iran. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919¹⁴ placed Iran under British tutelage. Its abrogation was possible only because a strong central government came into being after Reza Khan's *coup d'état* in 1921. Finally, like the 1907 Convention, the 1942 Treaty of Alliance¹⁵ between Britain, the Soviet Union, and Iran divided the country into *de facto* zones of Russian and British influence. Iran's consent to the terms of the treaty was a foregone conclusion inasmuch as British and Russian troops were already in occupation of their respective zones at the time when the treaty was signed.

In Curzon's words the cornerstones of British policy in Persia were "a peaceful Persia, a stable Persia, a friendly Persia, and an independent Persia." Peaceful, stable, and independent under Reza Shah, Persia, however, was not friendly in the sense intended by Curzon. For to the extent that true peace and stability were established by the central government, true independence from foreign influence became possible and, with it, the formation and execution of independent policies. It took the firm leadership of two strong men, Reza Shah in 1932 and Musaddiq in 1951, who, knowing that they were in control of Iran, defied Britain in what was her most vital interest in Iran—oil.

Reza Shah unilaterally denounced the oil agreement granted to W. K. D'Arcy in 1901¹⁶ (acquired in 1909 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in which the British Government later possessed a controlling interest) and demanded more favorable terms for Iran. The new agreement signed on April 30, 1933,¹⁷ increased Iran's royalties and reduced the concession area to 100,000 square miles in the south and southwest. The Iranian Government agreed to extend the agreement for another sixty years (until 1993) and to submit to arbitration

any future dispute which the parties failed to settle between themselves.

Less than twenty years later, this agreement was not only unilaterally abrogated but the entire oil industry was confiscated by the Iranian Government under the Nationalization Law of May, 1951. Musaddiq sought to establish Iran's complete sovereignty and to eliminate that last vestige of British control. Although Musaddiq was ultimately defeated in Iran, the blow he dealt to British political influence in the country proved fatal. In the settlement which was reached in September, 1954,¹⁸ part of Britain's interest in Iran's oil was maintained, but Britain was no longer in exclusive control of the oil industry. Control of exploration, production, refining, and distribution was given to an international consortium in which the British Petroleum Company (the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) held 40 per cent interest, and the remaining shares were held by a group of fourteen American companies (40 per cent), the Royal Dutch-Shell Company (14 per cent), and the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (6 per cent). The financial agreement divided the profits equally between the Consortium and Iran (Iran's total revenue from oil amounted to \$285 in 1960) and the Iranian Government agreed to pay \$70 million in ten-year installments as compensation to the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The area entrusted to the Consortium remained practically the same as that defined in the 1933 agreement. The Consortium undertook to train Iranian experts and engineers to replace foreigners in staff positions and to place Iranian personnel in half of the top positions of the organization. The agreement was to be valid for twenty-five years (until 1979), renewable for another fifteen years.

THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN

By 1947 the United States had assumed its role of "third power" in Iran, with the result that the influence of both Russia and Great Britain was reduced, and Iran gained a measure of independence which she had lacked since 1941. The United States' firm stand on Soviet withdrawal from Azarbaijan in 1946 and her decision a few months later to extend substantial military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine,¹⁹ thus replacing Britain in the eastern Mediterranean, committed her to the first irrevocable steps of an American policy in the Middle East whose primary goal in the area was the containment of the Soviet Union

and the preservation of the political *status quo*. On October 6, 1947, about two weeks before Iran rejected the oil agreement with the Soviet Union,²⁰ a military agreement was concluded between the United States and Iran.²¹ The following year American arms valued at about \$40 million were sold to Iran. Technical advice and economic aid were granted under the Point Four program and a seven years' plan for economic development was instituted. On March 21, 1949, the Voice of America broadcasts were relayed by the government radio at Teheran, and on November 16 of that year the Shah arrived in Washington on a state visit.

Iran, however, was subsequently disappointed with the extent of American aid, which fell considerably short of Iranian hopes. Despite the fact that in the 1950's American economic and military aid to Iran (in grants, loans, assistance, etc.) amounted to almost one billion dollars, Iran's attitude was never completely free from suspicion, impatience, and even hostility. It must be remembered that the decade opened with the disastrous fall of Nationalist China, despite America's vast aid to the Nationalists, and the outbreak of the Korean war, which showed the Soviet Union willing to risk even war in pursuit of a tough expansionist policy. The hesitation, uncertainty, and delay which had marked American policy in Palestine (1947-1949) now appeared to color her policy in the entire region, including Iran.

Though the Musaddiq crisis infused new determination to prevent a Communist coup in Iran, the new Republican administration brought little fundamental change to the American approach after 1953. Dulles' Northern Tier concept,²² which carried the policy of containment one step further by extending the system of regional defense, remained nevertheless based on the preservation of the *status quo* and made little or no provision for the factors of revolution and change. While Russia harped on the theme of neutrality and non-alignment in promoting friendship with Iran and other countries of the Middle East, the United States sought to stop the spread of India's concept of positive neutrality and to make commitment to the West's anti-Soviet stand the price of American friendship with these countries. Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact²³ in 1955 must therefore be viewed as an important success of Dulles' Middle Eastern policy, although the United States herself refrained from joining the Pact, which included Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain. The Baghdad Pact, like the Sa'dabad Treaty of Nonaggression between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey²⁴ concluded in 1937,

sought to ensure collective security against external aggression and internal subversion. The withdrawal of Iraq, the only Arab member of the Pact, after its military *coup d'état* of 1958, was a severe blow to the organization. Renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), it proved incapable of further expansion and growth, and its function was reduced to cooperation in combating subversive activities and to exchanging views on matters of mutual military and economic interest.

At the beginning of the 1960's, the United States policy in Iran consisted of a holding operation based on a bilateral defense treaty signed in 1959, which aimed at maintaining the Shah in power and thereby keeping Iran within the Western camp.²⁵ Iran, however, was still a liability: economic development under the new seven-year plan was slow and administrative reform ineffective; the tribes, Musaddiq's supporters, and the leftist elements were unaffected; and poverty, inefficiency, and corruption contributed to an instability that was apparent on all levels. In Iran there was a feeling of too much dependence on America accompanied by a "polite but quite evident disenchantment with America."²⁶ Making the best of this situation, the Soviets persisted in effective propaganda campaigns which denounced the Shah's corrupt regime and upheld the cause of the disaffected elements of the population. Iran was urged to adopt a neutralist policy on the Egyptian model—to receive aid from both sides and bind itself to neither.

As in most Middle Eastern countries, the decisive factor in Iran was the army: the fate of the regime rested with it. Hence the Shah's preoccupation with building up the armed forces and keeping the officer caste satisfied. For the United States, support of the Shah therefore meant supplying Iran not with aid based on actual tactical needs but aid primarily used to bolster the *status quo* and to ensure the stability of the regime. Walter Lippmann summarized the situation as follows:

In Iran, [American] military aid is really directed not outward but inward. It is not strategic and tactical but political and domestic. I am not particularly squeamish about this. If that is the best way to help Iran, well and good. The question which this country will have to examine is whether it is going to be in the future the best way, or indeed how long it can be expected to work . . .

If [America's] present policy of aligning Iran against its big neighbor breaks down, there are two possibilities. Iran can become a satel-


lite of the Soviet Union. Or it can become an uncommitted and unaligned state in which, as in Egypt and as in India, economic and technical aid is taken both from the West and from the Soviet Union.²⁷

NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. I, Doc. 33.
2. Text in *ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 38.
3. By a commercial treaty signed on the same day as the treaty of Turkman-chay.
4. Text in Hurewitz, vol. I, Doc. 105.
5. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 17.
6. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 33.
7. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 26.
8. See "Exchange of Notes, 12 December 1921," *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 33.
9. Cited by Ivar Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World* (Seattle, Wash., 1956), p. 47.
10. Robert Rossow, Jr., "The Battle of Azarbaijan, 1946," *MEJ* (Winter, 1956), p. 21.
11. See *The London Times*, July 10, 1922.
12. Text in Hurewitz, vol. I, Doc. 105.
13. The so-called Constantinople Agreement; see text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 5.
14. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 26.
15. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 70.
16. Text in *ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 102.
17. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 58.
18. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 104.
19. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 85.
20. For the law passed by the Majlis on October 22, see *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 87.
21. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 86.
22. See Dulles' report on the Near and Middle East in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 100.
23. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 107.
24. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 63.
25. United States, Department of State, *United States Treaties and other Agreements* (Washington, 1959), vol. X, p. 314.
26. As observed by Walter Lippmann during a visit to Iran in December, 1959, and reported in the *Washington Post and Times Herald*, December 14 and 15, 1959.
27. *Ibid.*, December 14, 1959.



PART FOUR:

The Fertile Crescent 



The First Bid for Independence

“Man propounds negotiations, man accepts the compromise.

Very rarely will he squarely push the logic of a fact

To its ultimate conclusion in unmitigated act.”
Kipling, The Female of the Species

IMPACT OF OTTOMAN RULE

The Fertile Crescent, stretching from the head of the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and bordered by Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and Arabia, is geographically and politically as well as culturally the heart of the Middle East. All the major problems of the Middle East since the First World War have been directly or indirectly connected with it. Unlike the surrounding areas, the Fertile Crescent has never formed a single political unit or state. Since the peace settlement following the First World War it has been divided into the states of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan; after the Palestine war of 1948-1949, Palestine and Transjordan became Israel and Jordan.

The population of the Fertile Crescent is the most heterogeneous of the Middle East, for it is the home of most of the religious, linguistic, and national minorities of the area. Exposed to constant influences from within and abroad, it has always existed in a state of tension—political, social, and cultural. Mirrored in the individual soul and in society, this tension has expressed itself most sharply in the opposition between the desert and the sea, between Islam and the West.¹

Under the Ottomans the Fertile Crescent was the most important of Turkey's Arab possessions, and because of its geographic position it was the most closely controlled. Ottoman administration and its social and economic structures have had lasting effects, perceptible

even now, on the organization of government and society of the Fertile Crescent states.

Before 1914 the Fertile Crescent was divided administratively into eight major divisions: Mesopotamia was divided into the *villayets* of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra and the *mutasarrifiyyah* (governship) of Dair al-Zur; Syria into the *villayets* of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut and also into the *mutasarrifiyyahs* of Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon.

Of these administrative units Lebanon enjoyed the greatest privileges and freedom because of the special regulations introduced under an international protocol in 1861 and 1864 after the Maronite-Druze massacres of 1860.² This gave the predominantly Christian population of Mount Lebanon (*Jabal Lubnan*) partial autonomy under a Christian governor who was appointed by the Porte and assisted by a locally nominated central administrative council. Feudal (*iqta'*) privileges were abolished and all individuals declared equal before the law. Representation in all matters was established on a sectarian basis: the administrative council consisted of four Maronites, three Druzes, two Orthodox Christians, one Melkite, one Shi'i Muslim, and one Sunni Muslim. This form of regime remained in force for fifty-four years until its abolition by the Turks in 1915; its basic foundations, however, continued practically intact and to this day dominate the administrative and political structure of the Lebanese republic.³


The *millet* (sectarian) system constituted the basis of administration not only in Lebanon but in all the other administrative units of the Fertile Crescent. The feudal structure was an essential aspect of the social organization, and the majority of the population lived under socio-economic conditions that had originated in the Middle Ages. In Syria and Iraq, where this system had been deeply rooted, feudalism persisted in some form or another until the late 1950's, when it was destroyed by the Iraqi revolution and by the union of Syria with Egypt. In Jordan and Lebanon remnants of feudal organization still play an important role in political and social life.

For centuries the tribal problem was one of the most important problems in the Fertile Crescent, especially in those areas adjoining the Syrian and Arabian deserts. Up to 1908 only partial attempts had been made to settle the tribes by granting them land and enacting special laws for their protection. The Young Turks sought to solve the problem by direct means—by intimidation, imprisonment of the

tribal sheikhs, and bribery. In most areas, however, the tribes remained free from government control, leading a wild and lawless life with damaging effects on public security and economy. Until recent years the tribal element constituted a separate and independent factor in the political life of Syria and Iraq; and in 1960 it was still the political bulwark of the Hashimite regime in Jordan.

Ottoman administration, though many times "reformed" during the nineteenth century and after 1908 by the Young Turks, was one of the most corrupt and inefficient regimes in history. Following the French model, it was completely centralized. The *villayet*, roughly equivalent to the French *canton*, was the largest administrative unit and had a *vali* appointed directly by Constantinople, as chief administrator. The *villayet* was divided into *sanjaqs* (which were sometimes established as independent administrative units) headed by a *mutasarrif* responsible to the *vali*, and into *qadhas* (districts) administered by a *qa'immaqam*, and *nahiyas* (counties) headed by a *mudir*. These administrative divisions have been retained with only minor changes by all the states of the Fertile Crescent except Israel.

Every member of the administrative hierarchy—from the *vali* to the smallest *katib* (clerk)—looked upon his job as a means of personal profit and advancement with no regard to the interest of the public or the security and well-being of the state. An authentic report⁴ cites a *mutasarrif* in Syria boasting publicly that his budget never showed any expenditure, only revenue! All officials from himself downward drew no pay but lived on the taxes and bribes paid them in their official capacities; repairs, maintenance, and public works, etc., were simply disregarded. The government, as represented by its officials, was viewed as a persecutor of the public, not as its protector or servant. Those who suffered most were naturally the peasants and the common people who, without means of influence or protection, were the principal victims upon whom the accumulated burden of injustice and abuse finally rested. If in the present governments of the Fertile Crescent states the inefficiency and corruption of the former Ottoman administration have in large part been eliminated, Ottoman administrative psychology together with the common man's instinctive mistrust of government have persisted down to the present day.



FERTILE CRESCENT

THE ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT

The story of the rise and development of Arab nationalism has been fully and brilliantly told by George Antonius in his classic, *The Arab Awakening*,⁵ and we need not go into it here. It is necessary, however, to dwell briefly upon those developments of the movement which have exercised lasting and direct influence upon Arab nationalism in the Fertile Crescent and, by the middle of the twentieth century, in the entire Arabic-speaking world.

It should be remembered that even today neither the idea of Arab nationalism nor the actual fact of the Arabs' consciousness of themselves as a nation can be reduced to any simple definition or postulate that would be universally acceptable to all Arabs. In its early phases—that is, before the disillusionments of the peace settlement after the First World War and before the frustrating experiences of newly acquired power and political independence—Arab nationalism was an idealistic movement limited in its goals and aspirations to administrative reform and political progress within the Ottoman empire. Far from being a mass movement, it was confined to a small élite of

patriots and intellectuals who sought to "revive Arab glory" and to establish in the Arab provinces that kind of free and liberal political existence to which they attributed all the progress, stability, and economic well-being of Europe. The early nationalists—students, journalists, and army officers—had no clear concept as to what Arab nationalism was in any profound philosophical or historical sense, nor did they formulate its final goals or objectives in any concrete political terms. In their demand for reform they usually thought in vague and general terms of liberty, equality, progress, and constitutional government, with little or no attention to specific social or economic problems. Protected from the sobering realities of political responsibility, they were able to maintain idealism and confidence in parliamentary democracy, which in the following decades were scornfully rejected as sentiments of naïve and inexperienced visionaries.

Arab nationalism was born in the Fertile Crescent—in Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, Basra, and Baghdad. Until the Young Turk revolution of 1908 it was an uncoordinated movement aimed at bringing an end to Abdul Hamid's despotism and establishing a constitutional government under which the Arabs could live in freedom. The Young Turks and the Young Arabs cooperated and fraternized during this early period in their common opposition to oppression and in their desire for parliamentary rule; there was little thought among the Arab nationalists of complete political independence from the Ottoman empire, and it was not until shortly before the outbreak of the First World War that the first secret societies were formed, establishing political independence as an objective of nationalist striving. It is probable that if the Young Turks after 1908 had not reverted to a dictatorial rule even more severe than Abdul Hamid's and adopted an Ottomanization policy which suppressed all non-Turkish nationalities, Arab nationalism would have continued in its predominantly cultural course, and political action in favor of total independence might have been averted or at least postponed until after the war. This continued despotism caused a drastic reorientation of the Arab movement during the years immediately preceding the First World War, forcing upon it methods of underground action and infusing it with a militant and conspiratorial spirit alien to its early cultural protagonists.

The restoration of the 1876 constitution in 1908 had been, from the Ottoman standpoint, the empire's last chance of salvation. Though outmoded and hardly adequate to meet the requirements of

that time, the constitution represented nevertheless the promise of a new era of equality, freedom, and progress. But disillusionment set in soon after the first parliamentary elections: through open pressure and intervention the government secured a predominantly Turkish parliament, with 143 Turks as against 70 Arabs; and in the Senate, which was appointed, only three out of forty seats were allotted to Arabs. Arab-Turkish hostility took a definite form when, after quelling Abdul Hamid's counterrevolution in 1909, the Young Turks set up their openly dictatorial regime and pushed parliament to the background. All non-Turkish societies and clubs in the empire were dissolved and rigid political conformity was enforced. Secret societies now began to form in Constantinople, Beirut, Cairo, and Paris, stressing the desire for autonomy and eventual independence rather than mere internal reform. With the foundation of the Young Arab Society (*al-jam'iyya al-'arabiyya al-fatah*) by Syrian and Iraqi students in Paris and of the Covenant Society (*al-'ahd*) in 1913 by young Arab officers in the Ottoman army, the Arab national movement may be said to have taken its first steps toward the overthrow of Turkish rule in the Arab countries and toward the establishment of an independent Arab state in Asia. With the coming of war, hundreds of Arab nationalists were arrested and many were hanged in 1915 and 1916, and the Arab revolt against Turkey was declared in 1916: Arab nationalism had entered its period of baptism. When it emerged victorious under Faisal's leadership in 1918, though still lacking in doctrinal content and theoretical formulation, it had become fully seasoned by the experience of violence, suffering, and the first victories.

HASHIMITE LEADERSHIP AND THE ARAB REVOLT, 1916-1918

It was not inevitable, nor even very likely at first, that the Arab revolt should break out in the Hejaz under the leadership of the Hashimite family. The fact that it did, however, was crucial not only to the Hashimites themselves but to the Arab national movement as a whole and to the Fertile Crescent in particular.

At the outbreak of the war the nationalists both at home and in exile were reluctant to take direct action against the Ottoman empire for fear that Turkish rule might be replaced by European control. The leaders of *al-fatah*, which was now installed in Damascus with hundreds of members in Syria and Iraq, declared that while their demand was still for complete independence they felt "bound to

work on the side of Turkey in order to resist foreign penetration of whatever kind or form.”⁶ The ‘*ahd*’ leaders were also reluctant to take hostile action against Turkey lest a Turkish defeat lead to European colonization of the Arab world. In the autumn of 1914 while Abdullah, Sharif Husain’s son, was seeking Britain’s support for a Hashimite rebellion against Turkey, the British were negotiating with exiled Arab nationalists in Cairo “concerning the possibility of starting an Arab revolt” in Syria. The nationalists would not commit themselves to any such action before receiving firm guarantees of complete independence after the war.⁷

Sharif Husain at this time appeared willing to cooperate with Britain, the nationalists, and the Turks; while seeking agreement with the British in Egypt, he was also negotiating with the Turks in Constantinople and with the Arab nationalists in Damascus. To the Turks he seems to have made a final offer early in 1915, whereby he promised to remain loyal to Turkey if he were given independence in Hejaz and if the persecution of Arab nationalists in Syria and Iraq were stopped.

If you want me to remain quiet you must recognize my independence in the whole of the Hejaz—from Tebbuk to Mecca—and create me hereditary prince there. You must also drop the prosecution of the guilty Arabs and proclaim a general amnesty for Syria and Iraq.⁸

In 1915 he sent his son Faisal to Constantinople to make a final effort to reach an understanding with the Turks, but with no result. On his way home Faisal met with the nationalists in Damascus and became a member of *al-fatah*.

Until this time the nationalists never seriously considered Sharif Husain or any of his sons as leader of the Arab national movement. Husain, however, seems to have entertained such ambitions as early as in 1911 when a group of Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament had promised to recognize his rule “over Mecca” and to acknowledge his “spiritual authority” in the Arab world if he gave his full support to the nationalist movement.

We, the Arab deputies in the national assembly, undertake to recognize Husain Pasha in [his] rule over Mecca, and to acknowledge on behalf of the countries which we represent his spiritual authority in the Arab countries; and that we shall make this *bay’a* [oath of allegiance] known when circumstances allow it.⁹

The British saw in Husain a valuable asset to employ in their war with Turkey. The call for the *jihad*, if formally rejected by Husain as guardian of the Holy Places and descendant of the Prophet, would lose much of its effectiveness among the Ottoman Arabs and the Muslims of Egypt and India; the military value of an Arab revolt in Hejaz and Syria was viewed as well worth Britain's promises concerning Arab emancipation and independence after the war.

At any rate, by the spring of 1916 Husain and his sons had reached a point where they had no choice but to take sides with Britain and declare open rebellion against Turkey. As Yale has put it, the Hashimites now "were so deeply embroiled with Britain . . . that a break with the Turks became imperative for their own safety, no matter how unsatisfactory were the nebulous promises of the British as contained in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence."¹⁰ While talks with the British had reached a mutually acceptable arrangement as to the military and financial aspects of the prospective revolt, political negotiations were more difficult to conclude. Indeed, when the Arab revolt was proclaimed on June 5, 1916, the famous Husain-McMahon exchange¹¹ had not ended conclusively and no formal agreement between the British government and Husain had been signed.

The response to the Hashimite revolt in the Arab world was neither immediate nor at any time unanimous. Imam Yahya of Yemen remained faithful to the Turks as did Ibn Rashid of Ha'il in north Arabia. Ibn Sa'ud of Najd, though well disposed toward Great Britain, took a hostile attitude toward the revolt; when Husain formally proclaimed himself "king of the Arabs," Sa'ud entered into negotiations with his rival, Sharif Ali Haidar, appointed guardian of the Holy Places to replace Husain, and offered his services to quell the Hashimite revolt.

The family of Husain [Ibn Sa'ud wrote to Ali Haidar] produced nothing but injury and discord by their rebellion . . . [Husain] desires independence at any cost and, for this, will indulge in every kind of intrigue among the peoples of Arabia, inciting them against each other to serve his interests. . . . Today, I am prepared to do anything you desire, but we require further supplies of ammunition. The position of Hussein is now weak, and we can easily defeat him if further supplies are made available. The Arab tribes are gathering—this is the best moment to attack.¹²



Walker—Time Inc.

Foreign Minister Charles Malik in Lebanon's Parliament.



Walker—Time Inc.

President Fu'ad Shihab of Lebanon.

Arab Information Center

Former King Faisal II of Iraq introduced to Lebanese dignitaries by former President Cham'oun of Lebanon.





Wide World Photos

General 'Abdul-Karim Qasim of Iraq at a press conference in Baghdad.



Arab Information Center

Military parade in Baghdad before 1958 *coup d'état*.

Husain's rebellion was in fact weak at the start. It eventually gathered momentum and succeeded, not because it inspired wide national support but because of massive British political and financial backing and because of Amir Faisal's success in winning the leadership of the nationalist movement, which had lost most of its leading figures in the arrests and executions conducted by Jamal Pasha in 1915-1916.

The Arab revolt, it must be emphasized, was not at any time a national uprising, but rather a military campaign conducted nominally under Faisal, who was officially a military commander under General Allenby's command. The Arab forces were composed mostly of tribal elements who followed Faisal not in allegiance to a national cause but because of personal loyalty to him and to the Prophet's family which he represented—and also in the hope of material gain. Only a small group of Syrians and Iraqis, mainly deserters from the Ottoman army and members of *al-fatah* and *al-'ahd*, fought with Faisal in the name of Arab nationalism, and they were largely responsible for giving the Hashimite rebellion the character of a nationalist Arab revolt.

It was during this period that Arab nationalism, thanks to the Hashimites' assumption of leadership of the nationalist movement, acquired an unmistakable Islamic character. The new Arab rebirth not only emanated from the heart of Arabia bringing back memories of the first Arab conquests, but it was now led by the direct descendants of the Prophet. It was inescapable therefore that when Faisal entered Damascus on October 1, 1918, he was hailed not only as the leader of triumphant Arab nationalism but also as the symbol of resurgent Islam.

ARAB INDEPENDENCE: DAMASCUS, 1918-1920

What the modern Arab historians nostalgically refer to as the "Arab kingdom" of Damascus was, from the legal as well as the historical standpoint, neither a kingdom nor even in the strict sense a state.¹³ Faisal's *de facto* government was no more than a provisional administration established in "occupied enemy territory" under General Allenby. The Arab kingdom proclaimed on March 8, 1920, received no international recognition and exercised no control over most of the territory it claimed. Faisal's Arab government during his fateful twenty months' rule in Damascus should be viewed more

as a beachhead from which an independent Arab state *could* have been developed than as an established state able to defend itself and endure. That such a state did not in fact come into being is to be attributed less to Britain's "betrayal" than to the Arabs' own incapacity to seize their opportunity and build their independent state. In contrast to the nationalist Turks, the Arabs' fatal mistake was to rely wholly on their right to independent existence and on their faith in the powers' eventual recognition of that right. Nearly ten of the twenty months of his rule in Syria Faisal spent in Paris and London trying to secure that recognition, but all his efforts ended in failure.

Of all the Hashimites Faisal is still the most revered in the Arab world. He was undoubtedly a man of integrity and great personal charm; but he was a poor statesman and a weak leader. When he appeared before the Supreme Allied Council in Paris on February 6, 1919, he read a prepared memorandum ¹⁴ in which he ineffectually begged the powers to grant the Arabs their independence. Although he spoke as the official delegate of Hejaz, Faisal made it clear that he also represented all the "Arabs of Asia [from] Alexandretta to the Indian Ocean." To the astonishment of the nationalists, Faisal failed to make an unqualified demand for the full and complete independence of the Arabs in their homeland. Instead, he made the recommendation that the powers should pursue different courses of action in dealing with the various Arab provinces, stating that "Syria, Irak, Hedjaz, Nejd, Yemen . . . are very different economically and socially, and it is impossible to constrain them into one frame of government." For Syria, the center of Arab nationalism and the seat of his own government, he recommended what appears to be no more than internal autonomy: "We believe that Syria . . . is sufficiently advanced politically to manage her own internal affairs." He requested "foreign advice and help" which he said would be remunerated in cash. As for Palestine ("southern Syria"), his remarks were general and broad but clearly in contradiction with the nationalists' demand for Syrian unity and independence.

In Palestine the majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one . . . [but we] would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country.

In Yemen and Nejd he advised the preservation of the *status quo*; and for the Jazirah and Iraq the establishment on "the selective rather than the elective principle" of an Arab government whose main duty would be "to oversee the educational processes which are to advance the tribes to the moral level of the towns [!]"

In April, 1919, Faisal returned to Syria empty-handed. "Independence," he tearfully told the welcoming crowd in a speech that has since become famous in the Arab world, "is taken, never given." But instead of attending to those measures that would ensure the "taking" of independence, he set about preparing for the King-Crane commission, boycotted by Britain and France and thus doomed to failure from the beginning.¹⁵ By the time the King-Crane commission had left the country hopes were raised, but internal tension and instability were also increased. The only positive result of the commission was to cause the formation of the Syrian Congress in June, 1919, which became the center of nationalist resistance to Faisal's policy of compromise and the bulwark of the extremists in the Arab nationalist movement.

In a manner very similar to that of the Turkish national assembly, the Syrian Congress on July 2, 1919, took a series of resolutions in which it set forth the formal demands of the nationalist movement:

- 1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria. . . .
- 2. We ask that the government of this Syrian country should be a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy. . . .
-
- 6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French government in any part whatever of our Syrian country. . . .
- 7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine. [We] consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. . . .
-
- 9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that there should be no economical barriers between the two countries.¹⁶

The Congress also rejected any mandate over Syria, stating that if, however, Syria should be obliged to accept foreign "economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independ-

ence," the United States should be the provider of such assistance or, as second choice, Great Britain, but under no circumstances France.

Faisal's government in Damascus left many things to be desired. Nepotism, inefficiency, and disorder were rampant. Writing in October, 1919, Gertrude Bell described the people as

. . . tired of a Government which is perceptibly worse than that of the Turks. Under the Arab regime there is less public security; the law courts are a trifle more venal, the high officials no less corrupt than their predecessors. . . .¹⁷

The Arab army, entrusted with the security and defense of the emerging country, was in an equally bad state.

There is no punishment for desertion. The troops are paid about 3 £ a month, and it is not unusual for men to desert in handfuls, whole villages at a time, after every pay day. No one supposes that the Arab army would face regular troops; it is not even believed that the Damascene garrison, 3000 strong, would stand up to the Bedouins if they were to come in after [the British forces] withdraw. . . .¹⁸

Autumn 1919 brought disillusionment and dissatisfaction caused by Faisal's fruitless negotiations with the powers, the increasing state of instability and turmoil within the country, and the violent enmities and disagreements among various factions and nationalist groups. These conditions and their reactions produced a serious split in the nationalist movement: there arose two groups, two attitudes—one extremist, violently opposed to the Hashimites and their policy of compromise and to any form of reliance on foreign support, and the other moderate, pro-Hashimite and in favor of cooperation with the foreign powers in pursuit of limited political goals. The extremists held to the principle of *unconditional* independence and *total* sovereignty, which during the following forty years remained the basic tenet of militant Arab nationalism and was as adamantly opposed to any collaboration with the foreigner as to foreign domination. In the tumultuous period following the Second World War, it was by upholding this rigid principle of nationalist intransigence that Gamal Abdul Nasser was able to capture the whole-hearted support of the post-war Arab generation as no other Arab leader had done since Faisal's early years. It must be remembered that it was the young

Arab officers who formed the basis of Faisal's government in Damascus and who exercised the strongest influence in the Syrian Congress; they were in this respect the forerunners of the revolutionary "free officers" of the middle of the century: nationalists versed in clandestine action and steeped in the conspiratorial tradition of army secret societies. This psychological link between the early military nationalists and the mid-century "free officers" explains many aspects of Arab nationalism which have been obscured by too much emphasis on the movement's political character and on the actions and words of its various self-appointed spokesmen. The fact is often forgotten that though Faisal has always remained the symbol of the first Arab revolt and its early triumphs, popular support for Hashimite leadership actually came to an end before Faisal's retreat from Damascus in 1920; from that time until the rise of Nasser the movement lost its organic unity and remained without recognized central leadership for over three decades.

Hashimite decline in Syria began with Faisal's second departure to Europe in September, 1919, shortly after the French, in agreement with Great Britain, had replaced British troops in Syria. It now became clear that the British government would not stand by her wartime commitments nor uphold the Arab position against France. Under Lloyd George, Anglo-French understanding moved closer; despite initial difficulties created by Clemenceau's refusal to recognize France's responsibility regarding the pledges made to the Arabs and his insistence on setting the Sykes-Picot agreement as the basis for settlement in the Fertile Crescent,¹⁹ the broad lines of agreement between the two powers were reached early in 1920. Faisal's position was now hopeless. In October, 1919, he had stated that he was willing "to accept any solution that the United States imposes on me;"²⁰ but the United States, after the failure of the Inter-Allied commission, took little interest in Arab affairs and left the final settlement to be made by the two powers concerned. So when Faisal again returned to Syria in January, 1920, aboard a French battleship, he was already a defeated man. Britain had left him to settle his problems with France, and the most that the French were willing to offer was partial autonomy under French patronage in the region already under his control—the "Arab area" of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo.

To the nationalists this was absolutely unacceptable; and on March 8, 1920, in an atmosphere of bluster and agitation, the Syrian Congress defiantly proclaimed Faisal king of all Syria. Britain and France

promptly denounced the action and proceeded (San Remo, April, 1920) to put the final touches on the Anglo-French division of the Fertile Crescent. France took Lebanon and Syria, Britain took Palestine (including Trans-Jordan) and Iraq; the last obstacle to be smoothed out was concerning the Mosul area, which Britain now received in return for granting France an interest in Iraqi oil.

In defying Britain and France, the Syrian Congress was again following the example of the now victorious Turkish national assembly in the north. But the Arab nationalists, while possessing fervent nationalism and the fiery oratory of the Turkish nationalists, lacked all the other qualities which made Turkish victory possible: the military discipline, the national unity, the determined leadership. Arab defeat came at about the same time that the Turks were gaining their first decisive battles. In July, 1920, General Gouraud, France's High Commissioner in Syria and Commander-in-chief of the French forces in the Levant, presented Faisal with an ultimatum which amounted to a demand for complete surrender; and Faisal, after some equivocation, accepted the ultimatum. In a last gesture of impotent defiance, the nationalists of the Syrian Congress proclaimed:

The Syrian Congress . . . considers its historic three-article decision—(1) complete independence and unity and opposition to Zionist immigration, (2) constitutional monarchy under Faisal, and (3) continued supervision by the Congress of the actions of the government, which is held responsible to it until the convocation of an elected parliament—as a single and indivisible decision . . .

The Syrian Congress, in the name of the Syrian nation, shall not recognize any treaty, agreement or protocol concerning the destiny of Syria until it has been passed by the Congress.²¹

In accepting Gouraud's ultimatum Faisal had, in the eyes of the extremists, abdicated the leadership of the nationalist movement. What he accepted now in contrast to what his father had demanded only a few years earlier—an Arab kingdom from "Alexandretta to the Indian Ocean"—was indeed modest. The last few days of Arab independence saw Faisal's authority crumble: Yusuf al-'Azma, the Minister of War, defying the king's orders, gathered together the remnants of the regular army and with an additional few hundred volunteers took a stand against the advancing armored columns of General Gouraud at Khan Maisalun, about twenty miles west of Damascus. This was the only military action undertaken by the Arab army dur-

ing the twenty months of independence. Al-'Azma fell in battle and his small force was crushed, but the event is celebrated annually in Syria as a national holiday. The French army entered Damascus unopposed, and Faisal left Syria on July 25, 1920, never to return.

What was the cause of this total collapse of the Arabs' first bid for independence? It was not only the utter cynicism with which the great powers treated the Arabs, and apportioned Arab territory between themselves. Compared with the Turks who were subjected to even harsher treatment, the Arabs also had themselves to blame. Mazzini's words, written after the failure of the Italian revolution of 1848, are particularly relevant here:

. . . the cause is in ourselves; in our want of organization . . . in our careless distrust, in our miserable little vanities, in our absolute want of that spirit of discipline which alone can achieve great results; in the scattering and dispersing of our forces in a multitude of small centers and sects . . . The fatal idea of aggrandizement of the House of Savoy destroyed the Italian Revolution.²²

NOTES FOR CHAPTER NINE

1. A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1946), p. 13.
2. Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925* (London, 1927), p. 354.
3. See below, Chap. Eleven.
4. Cited by Philip W. Ireland, *Iraq* (New York, 1938), p. 77.
5. See also Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut, 1958).
6. Cited by George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East* (5th ed.; New York, 1959), p. 124.
7. See *ibid.*, p. 125.
8. Text in George Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia: The Emir Shereef Ali Haidar* (London, 1948), p. 159.
9. Arabic text in Sulaiman Faydi, *Memoirs* (Baghdad, 1952), p. 88.
10. William Yale, *The Near East: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1958), p. 258.
11. Text in George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (3d ed.; London, 1955), Appendix A.
12. Text in Stitt, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
13. For a detailed survey, see Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence* (Beirut, 1960).
14. Text of Faisal's memorandum in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 19.
15. For selections from the King-Crane report, see *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 27.
16. Text in *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 25.
17. *Syria in October, 1919* (unpublished report); see Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (London, 1956), p. 159.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

19. See "Summary Record of a Secret Meeting of the Supreme Council at Paris to Consider the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 20 March, 1920," in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 22.

20. *Yale Papers*, II (unpublished), cited by Kedourie, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

21. Arabic text in Amin Rihani, *Kings of the Arabs* (3rd ed.; Beirut, 1951), II, 355-356.

22. Preface to "Faith and the Future," in *Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini* (London, 1905), II, 76-77.

Syria

“I can't explain myself, I'm afraid, Sir,' said Alice, 'because I'm not myself.'”

Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

Syria, the homeland of the Arabs' national awakening and the standard-bearer of national unity, was the first country in the Arab world to be subjected to the double humiliation of both occupation and partition by a foreign power. After the fall of the Kingdom of Damascus in 1920, “Syria” no longer referred to the historical entity that embraced the area along the eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Egypt but to that small region vaguely defined in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1915 as the “predominantly Arab area” in the northwest.

In reaction against this violation of both its territorial unity and its aspiration to a sovereign existence, Syria between 1920 and 1958 was dominated by the struggle to retrieve political independence and to reestablish territorial integrity. Damascus, capital of the first independent Arab state in modern times and seat of the first nationalist parliament, became a symbol of nationalist resistance and the center of nationalist leadership.

Syria ceaselessly challenged the political *status quo* established after 1920, not only during the struggle for independence under the mandate (1920-1943), but also after independence had been achieved (1943-1958). The nationalists in Damascus had dreamt in 1918-1920 of a new Arab resurrection sweeping over the entire Arabic-speaking world and of Syria as the leader of the movement of liberation. Instead, under the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement, Syria was divided and its divisions placed under foreign control: the greatly reduced “Syria” under the French; the Lebanon, enlarged and declared a state, also under the French; the Amirate of Jordan was created, and Palestine became a separate entity. This imposition of political partition constituted a shock from which Syrian political life could not recover. Internal stability and normal political growth during this period were impossible, for the internal political life of

dismembered Syria was deeply involved with the problems and vicissitudes of the neighboring countries. The contradiction between Syria's conception of its leading role in the Arab world and the reality of its truncated, dependent position also served to exert an undefinable yet potent force not only in Syrian but in all Arab politics. For nearly forty years Syria was both the sick man in the Arab world and the symbol of Arab nationalist leadership. The Palestine problem was above all else a Syrian problem; "Greater Syria" and the "Fertile Crescent" were schemes of unity hinging around Syria's position; and the entire balance between the Hashimites and the Sa'uds, between Iraq and Egypt, depended on Syria's attitude. Even Lebanon's continued political independence was contingent upon Syria's acceptance of the political *status quo*. Both positively and negatively Syria could not but act as a catalyst in Arab political life, and its surrender of sovereignty to Egypt in 1958 must be viewed as another phase in its volatile political existence and probably not the end of it.

SOCIAL DIVERSITY

The very unity which smaller Syria aspired to bestow upon the Arab world, it lacked internally itself. From the ethnic standpoint Syrian society suffered from a diversity similar to Lebanon's sectarian fragmentation. The two largest and most important minorities in Syria are the Druzes and the 'Alawis (Nusairiyya), who because of their geographic distribution (the former in the southeast, Jabal al-Druze, and the latter in the northwest, Jabal 'al-'Alawiyyin) led a separate, almost isolated existence yet exerted considerable influence in political life. During the mandate the French exploited their separatist tendencies by creating the autonomous government of Jabal al-Druze and the state of Latakia ('Alawiyyin), which until 1936 were as "independent" as the state of Lebanon. Within the Syrian republic, by which they were finally "absorbed," they still constituted separate administrative units (*muhafadha*). Nearly eight per cent of the total population of Syria are members of these two communities which still maintain their distinct and separate character.

Racial and linguistic minorities are also to be found in Syria, especially in the north and northwest. These include Armenians, Circassians, Kurds, Assyrians, and Turks. Most of the Syrian Jews who lived in Aleppo and Damascus have emigrated to Lebanon and Israel. The Christian Greek Orthodox element, which is about twelve per cent

of the total population, constitutes an important minority and plays a significant role in social and political life. Most Syrian Christians inhabit the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and the coastal region around Tartus.

The Sunni Muslims who form the bulk of Syria's population differentiate widely in the urban and rural communities as well as on social and economic grounds. The seminomadic tribes of the Syrian desert and the Jazirah, perhaps about five per cent of the population, constitute a separate social and economic group. The Syrian peasantry, the largest group in Syria, have only recently begun to live on a tolerable level of existence, after having for centuries lived under harsh semifeudal conditions. In the cities the gap between the rich minority and the poor majority still exists—between the landowners, the merchants, the industrialists and the small shopkeepers, the artisans, the workers, and the chronically unemployed. Yet another division, resulting mostly from economic interests and long-standing political rivalry still exists between the north (Aleppo and the surrounding region), and the center and south (Damascus, Homs, and Hama).

Political leadership, as well as the positions of economic wealth and social prestige, lay almost exclusively in the hands of the urban Sunni aristocracy. To this group the social and economic problems of the country were practically alien. They derived their power from their early participation in the nationalist movement and from their social and economic standing. Under the mandate their struggle for independence was rooted in the negative and fairly clear-cut aim of destroying France's rule in Syria. With the attainment of independence their leadership proved to lack positive content and was unable to cope with the host of problems that unfettered political responsibility brought. In the early years of independence (1946-1949) this group, though still enjoying the support of the masses, was challenged by the new political parties formed by the younger generation—the Syrian Social National party, the Arab Resurrection (Ba'ath) party, the Communist party, and the Muslim Brothers. The Arab defeat in Palestine (1947-1949) brought about simultaneously the end of this traditionalist hegemony, the involvement of the army in politics, and the entry of doctrinal parties into the national struggle.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MANDATE

When the period of "political tutelage" had ended and Syria's political independence was finally achieved, it was evident that neither Syria nor France had profited much. Apart from limited progress in administration, fiscal policy, and communication, this period saw little economic or political development. Land reform, which was at the root of Syria's major social and economic ills, was hardly attempted by France; the general standard of living, extremely low by European standards, fell below the level prevailing in Ottoman times; by 1937 real wages in Syria had dropped to nearly half what they had been in 1913.¹

According to the terms of the mandate, within three years of its establishment, the mandatory power was to introduce such institutional and political reforms as would set the country on the path of self-government. Again, though certain efforts were made in this direction, these reforms fell far short of effectiveness. French rule in Syria was on the whole based on the colonial African pattern. All major administrative and political measures were primarily designed to strengthen France's grip over Syria. The stabilization by 1925 of the fourfold division of the mandated territory into the State of Greater Lebanon (later the Republic of Lebanon), the State of Syria (later the Republic of Syria), the State of Latakia, and the Government of Jabal al-Druze facilitated France's political control and strengthened its position in the Eastern Mediterranean. In its dealings with the nationalists, France vacillated between sudden concession and harsh repression. During the mandate hundreds of nationalists were imprisoned or exiled; during the Druze revolt (1925-1926) hundreds were killed, and Damascus was bombarded twice; before evacuation of the French in 1945 and the attainment of Syrian independence, Damascus was bombarded a third time. The most important concessions were made by France's Popular Front government which came to power in 1936: Latakia and Jabal al-Druze were "annexed" to Syria and a liberal Franco-Syrian treaty was signed.²

Constitutional development was slow and limited in scope. In the entire mandate period only three assemblies were elected: in 1928, 1932, and 1936. The elections were not free, and in each case the elected chamber was suspended by the French High Commissioner before completing its term. In 1928 the constituent assembly

drafted a liberal constitution patterned after the French model, with legislative power vested in a unicameral chamber and executive power in a president and a responsible ministry. Article 2 of the constitution proclaimed Syria, including Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, an "indivisible political entity" unaffected by the political divisions created after the end of the First World War. Articles 73, 74, 75, and 112 gave the president the power to conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad, grant pardons, and proclaim martial law. These provisions naturally proved unacceptable to the mandatory, and the assembly, refusing to revise them according to the High Commissioner's demands, was suspended, and the draft constitution abolished. In 1930 the High Commissioner drafted a new constitution in which the controversial articles were revised and all provisions declared conditional upon France's "obligations toward the League of Nations" and her "international obligations."³

In all three assemblies elected during the mandate a nationalist minority was able to dominate parliament and prevent its subjugation to the will of the mandatory, a fact which accounts for the repeated suspension of parliament. This nationalist bloc (*kutlah*) formed itself in 1928 into a political group, later known as the National Bloc (*al-kutlah al-wataniyyah*) which included such leading political figures as Hashim al-Atasi, Shukri al-Quwwatli, Jamil Mardam, Faris al-Khouri, and others, and which dominated Syrian politics until 1949. It was during the ascendancy of the *kutlah* in 1936 that the Popular Front government of Léon Blum negotiated the Franco-Syrian treaty,⁴ which granted Syria its independence while preserving France's economic, cultural, and military interests in the country. The treaty, patterned after the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 and coolly received in Syria, was nevertheless considered an important step toward complete independence and as such was ratified by the Syrian parliament. It was, however, never ratified by the French parliament and therefore never put into effect.

Perhaps one of the most damaging and certainly one of the most lasting effects of the French mandate in Syria was the cession of the *sanjaq* of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939.⁵ In its political impact the loss of Alexandretta, which to the nationalists was an integral part of Syria, is in many ways comparable to the loss of Palestine a decade later. In 1938-1939 demonstrations against the *kutlah* government and against France took place, and an attempt was made on the life of Jamil Mardam, the *kutlah* prime minister.

Alexandretta, it should be remembered, was part of the Syrian mandate. It was given a separate administration⁶ as part of the State of Syria. After the signing of the Franco-Syrian agreement of 1936, Turkey obtained from France a separate regime for the *sanjaq* which made it a distinct political entity. Though only 39 per cent of the population was Turkish (according to the League of Nations statistics), France in 1938 allowed Turkish troops to enter the *sanjaq* to help "maintain order" during the elections which were scheduled to take place under the supervision of the League. The electoral lists now gave the Turks 63 per cent of the total number of the electors, and consequently 22 of the 40 seats of the legislative assembly elected in September 1938 went to Turkish nationals. Negotiations between France and Turkey to conclude a treaty of "mutual assistance"⁷ proceeded speedily; and shortly after the successful conclusion of these negotiations (June, 1939) France evacuated Alexandretta, and Turkey annexed it as the sixty-third *villayet* of the Turkish republic. In a movement that was a grim prelude to Palestine after the establishment of a Jewish state ten years thence, thousands of Syrian and Armenian refugees left the *sanjaq* and settled in Syria and Lebanon.⁸

The British defeat of Vichy France in Syria and Lebanon in 1941 brought about the end of the mandate, but for two more years the Free French under General de Gaulle tried to maintain France's hegemony in the two countries. Puppet governments were set up in the two "independent" republics, and through them French control was reestablished. In 1943, however, elections were allowed to take place, which resulted in the defeat of the French-supported candidates and in nationalist victories in both Syria and Lebanon. In 1944 the French reluctantly turned over most of the government services to the new national regimes, and in 1945-1946, after vain efforts to conclude a preferential treaty with them, France evacuated Syria and Lebanon, thus ending twenty-five years of a futile mandate.⁹

The old nationalist leaders, the once frustrated young men of the Syrian Congress of 1919-1920, now gained full control of independent Syria. But, no longer the young revolutionaries of former days, they now represented the forces of conservatism and reaction in the country. The world had changed and failing to change with it, they were able to maintain their leadership for no more than three years. In 1947 Syria had its first independent election, which was rigged, however. The final disillusionment was the Palestine defeat, which shocked the entire Arab world and seemed to the Syrians to signalize

the bankruptcy of the old leadership. The army *coup d'état* of March 1949 overthrew the old nationalists and ushered in an era which began, as in 1918-1920, with new leadership and new hope in Syria's capacity to lead the movement of Arab resurrection.

THE MILITARY *Coups d'état*

Syria's political disintegration in the decade following the first army *coup d'état* may be attributed to one determining factor: the army's incapacity either to rule or to disengage itself from politics. Unlike Egypt and other countries of the Middle East in which the military *coups d'état* have succeeded not only in destroying the old order but also in establishing a new one, Syria was unable to find a political balance that either would maintain military supremacy, and thus ensure the development of a new regime, or would allow civilian authority to attain sufficient control to establish an orderly and stable machinery of government. After the first *coup d'état* the center of power was lost, and every new leadership brought with it a new opposition. The army, whose power remained preeminent, was henceforth always divided against itself and free of civilian control. While in the other countries of the Middle East the internal struggle that followed every *coup d'état* resulted in the emergence of a strong leadership that commanded the complete control of the army and hence of political power in the state, in Syria no military leader was able to win for long the allegiance of all the elements of the army nor to break the power of all the political groups in the country. These groups, consisting mainly of the militant doctrinal parties of the younger generation, infiltrated the army after 1949 and established within it the same pattern of political rivalry that existed outside it.

From 1949 until the union with Egypt in 1958, at least five forces, five attitudes, were engaged in the deadly struggle for political ascendancy in Syria; all of them manifested themselves through, or in collaboration with, the military establishment which throughout this period was inextricably involved in the struggle.

First, there was the Syrian Social National party, perhaps numerically the largest party, which aimed at the unity of the Fertile Crescent and the establishment of a pro-Western, centralized socialist state; its power in Syria greatly increased after 1949 with the transfer of its main headquarters from Beirut to Damascus. Secondly, there was the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'th) party, founded in 1943 by the Christian Arab intellectual, Michael 'Aflaq, and amalgamated

in 1953 with Akram Hourani's Arab Socialist party; it derived its strength from its insistence on Arab nationalism and its call to establish a single Arab state comprising all the "Arab nations" from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. Thirdly, there was the Syrian Communist party, small but well organized, whose real strength was in the able and dedicated leadership of Khalid Bakdash, a Moscow-trained Arab Kurd from Damascus. Fourthly, there were the conservative elements, concentrated mostly in the relatively more traditionalist parties, the Sha'b (Peoples' party) and the Watani (National party) which had split from the old Kutlah party. And, fifthly, there were those elements, mostly in the army officers corps, that sought power for its own sake and collaborated with whatever group furthered their interests.

To this last group belonged Colonel Husni al-Za'im, leader of the first *coup d'état*, who lasted in power less than five months. His successor, Colonel Hinnawi, who carried out a second *coup d'état* in August, 1949, was the tool of the conservative elements, mainly of the Sha'b party. Under Hinnawi an attempt was made to reinstate parliamentary life, but in the elections of November, 1949, the Sha'b failed to secure a majority of the 114 parliamentary seats. During this period pro-Hashimite tendencies were strengthened, and Syria's union with Iraq and Jordan was for the first time seriously discussed. An anti-Hashimite faction in parliament, composed of independents headed by the Socialist leader Akram Hourani and supported by army circles, opposed these schemes; and on December 19, 1949, a third *coup d'état* took place under the leadership of another army officer, Colonel Adib Shishakli.

Shishakli lasted in power from December, 1949, to February, 1954. It was during this period that Syria won her chance to reestablish political stability and order and to find her proper place in the Middle East. At first Shishakli sincerely tried to pull the army out of politics and to allow the newly elected parliament to reestablish a civilian regime. A new constitution was drafted in 1950,¹⁰ but when party rivalries continued and political stability seemed out of reach, Shishakli carried out his second *coup d'état* (December, 1951) and himself took over power. He suspended parliament, dissolved all political parties and enacted a new constitution patterned after the American presidential system. In July, 1953, he ran unopposed for president and was promptly elected. His newly organized party, the Arab Liberation Movement, won seventy-two of eighty-two seats of

the new parliament. But his bid for complete control failed when in February, 1954, dissident elements in the army revolted in the north and demanded his immediate resignation. In order to avoid civil war, which appeared inevitable, Shishakli resigned and went into exile.

Shishakli was a member of the Syrian Social National party and during the first year of his ascendancy worked closely with the party. But partly because of its unwillingness to compromise on certain issues and partly because of its new inefficient leadership, the party drove Shishakli to collaborate with its rivals, the Ba'th and Socialists led by 'Aflaq and Hourani, with whom he was soon equally disappointed. His decision to establish his own dictatorship must be attributed, at least in part, to the stubborn shortsightedness of both the Syrian Nationalists and the Arab Socialists. After Shishakli, both of these groups were destined to failure.

POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION, 1954-1958

The end of the Shishakli dictatorship reestablished the parliamentary system but did not put a stop to army interference in political life nor to the political disintegration of the state. Outwardly the clock was put back: the parliament of 1949 was reconvened, the constitution of 1950 was reinstated, the old traditionalist political figures came back, and the army ostensibly returned to its barracks.

The real struggle, however, continued to be waged within the army, between the chief protagonists, the Ba'th and the Syrian Social Nationalists, who had completely infiltrated the army. The issues involved were now both national and international. The Ba'th stood for cooperation with Egypt and Sa'udi Arabia against the Hashimites, and for a strict neutralist policy and resistance to Western influence; it violently opposed the Baghdad Pact and gradually leaned toward acceptance of aid from the Soviet bloc. The Syrian Social National party, on the other hand, though not antagonistic to Egypt, favored cooperation among the Fertile Crescent states, and looked upon Iraq as the bulwark of Fertile Crescent unity. The SSNP was adamantly anti-Communist and favored cooperation with the West as long as Syrian sovereignty was not jeopardized; despite its basic reservations regarding the Western powers, stemming from the problems of Palestine and Algeria, its attitude toward the Baghdad Pact was positive.

The issue between these two forces was joined in April 1955, when

an army sergeant, a member of the SSNP, shot and killed Colonel Adnan Malki, Deputy Chief of Staff and a leading supporter of the Ba'ath. The SSNP was accused of attempting a *coup d'état* and of conspiring with a "foreign power." Almost overnight all leading party members who had not escaped to neighboring Lebanon, including hundreds of army officers, were arrested and brought to trial. The SSNP was dissolved and the Ba'ath, now alone in the field, gained the ascendancy.

A major factor contributing to the fall and liquidation of the SSNP were the Communists, who since 1953 had collaborated closely with the Ba'ath. They now shared in the Ba'ath's triumph; and Bakdash, already a member of parliament, having been elected in September 1954, emerged as a leading political figure.

The political atmosphere of Syria now assumed a pathological character. Under the direction of Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, chief of military intelligence, treason trials, arrests, plots, and counterplots became the normal order of the day. Conspiracy hunts, long-term imprisonments without formal charges, and the use of torture to obtain confessions became ordinary procedures of security. Hundreds of political refugees flocked to Lebanon and neighboring countries. In July 1956 the Ba'ath gained representation in the government, and shortly after, when Akram Hourani became the speaker of the house, dominated parliament.

In her external relations Syria threw in her lot with the Egyptians and in 1955 joined her forces with those of Egypt and Sa'udi Arabia under an Egyptian unified command. Following Egypt's example, Syria sought aid from the Soviet bloc and in November 1956 recognized Red China. During 1956 Syria received Soviet war matériel, including tanks and airplanes, estimated to be worth \$60 million; and in the same year, during the Suez crisis, Shukri al-Quwwatly, again president of the republic since August 1955, paid a state visit to Moscow, the first Arab head of state to make an official visit to the Soviet Union. In 1957 Khalid al-'Azm, acting minister of defense and one of Syria's leading capitalists, visited Moscow and signed a long-range loan and economic aid agreement amounting to many millions of dollars. The drift toward the left reached its peak in 1957 with the dismissal of the army chief of staff and his replacement by General 'Afif al-Bizri, a well-known Communist. In the fall of 1957 a severe crisis developed; tensions, complications, and disorder increased as three members of the United States embassy at Damascus,

alleged to be plotting against the Syrian government, were expelled, and a war-scare developed following troop concentrations on the Turco-Syrian borders.

It was at this point of widespread deterioration that the Ba'th leaders realized that to allow the situation to drift further would inevitably lead to chaos and probably civil war; they also realized that it was now impossible for them to gain exclusive control of political power and that the only beneficiary of such disruptive conditions were the Communists who already wielded a vast influence in the state. Syria had now reached the breaking point; as a Syrian political refugee put it, "From the air Syria looks like a desert. It isn't, it's a jungle."¹¹

Talk of unity with Egypt had started in 1956 already, and a parliamentary commission was set up to study the project and submit recommendations for its implementation. The scheme at first aimed at "federating" the two countries, so that their respective autonomies would be maintained. While the Ba'th and the conservative nationalists were in favor of an immediate federation, President Nasser and his advisers were reluctant to take this additional responsibility. The Ba'th was confident that this step toward unity would inevitably start a chain reaction, with one Arab state after another joining the federation.

In Syria the drive to unity was always strongest when the central power was weak and political instability constituted a threat to the survival of the state. This was always the case immediately preceding and immediately following a *coup d'état*. The inclination to maintain the sovereignty and independence of Syria was strongest, on the other hand, when power was firmly centralized and political opposition silenced, as especially under Shishakli. It was the internal dissolution of central power in Syria, the ascendancy of the unitary Ba'th, and Syria's precarious international position, which finally drove the Ba'th leaders with the backing of the old nationalist politicians to relinquish the sovereignty of Syria to Egypt. When the union was proclaimed in February, 1958, it was not a federation but complete amalgamation which, in its practical consequences, actually amounted to Syria's unconditional surrender to Egyptian hegemony.

UNION WITH EGYPT

Although a separate administrative system was set up in Syria, based on that existing before the union, there was no question as to

where effective control now lay. The president of the United Arab Republic, as the new state was called, became Gamal 'Abdul Nasser. A twenty-man cabinet, composed of Syrians and Egyptians, was formed. Cairo was declared the capital city of the new state. Hourani, Bitar, Sarraj, and many others who were instrumental in bringing about the union were given high positions, but effective power was mostly concentrated in Egyptian hands. An outstanding exception was Abdul Hamid Sarraj, who remained the most powerful individual in Syria. His sincere devotion to Nasser and his agility in disentangling himself from embarrassing political associations enabled him to maintain his power long after most of his former collaborators had fallen from Egyptian favor and to become in September, 1960, the chairman of the executive council of the Syrian region and in 1961 one of the seven vice-presidents of the republic. Political stability, now that the burden of power had been removed from Syrian hands, returned, though a host of problems—political, social, and economic—remained and in certain instances were augmented by the new union.¹²

Communism was driven underground, and Bakdash, who did not disguise his opposition to the union, took refuge behind the Iron Curtain. The Ba'th stood in the forefront of the new regime, and through its minister of agricultural reform it began putting into practice its socialistic theories of land reform. The main target of these reforms was the landed aristocracy in the north, many of whom were the Ba'th's political opponents. It was the utilization of land reform as an instrument to settle old political grudges that was partially responsible for the failure of agrarian reforms in many parts of Syria. Another drawback was the indiscriminate application of Egyptian principles and methods without due regard to the social and economic situation in Syria. Drought and unfavorable weather conditions were other factors contributing to the crisis which followed the union. In addition, during 1958 and the early part of 1959, it is estimated that over \$120 million of Syrian capital was illegally transferred to Lebanese and European banks. But the most severe blow came with the socialization decrees of July 1961 which threatened to undermine the entire social and economic structure of Syria.¹³

To Nasser the Ba'th was initially an instrument to govern Syria, but it gradually became a source of political embarrassment. Friction between Egyptian officials and their Syrian colleagues, on personal as well as on ideological grounds, led to administrative crises which

seriously disrupted the functioning of government. All political parties were disbanded, including the Ba'ath, and new and more stringent administrative measures were introduced, with increasing control by Egyptian officials. Many of the early leading proponents of union with Egypt were dismissed from their posts and some were arrested; others took refuge in Lebanon. In July, 1959, when elections were held for the National Union, the single party in the U.A.R., the results dealt a crushing blow to the prestige of the Ba'ath, which won less than three per cent of the total vote in the Syrian region. By 1960, with the resignation of Hourani from the government, it became evident that the Ba'ath had ceased to have any role in the new regime; in September, 1960, some of the leading figures of the Ba'ath took refuge in Lebanon. Ironically, the situation in Syria had again become what it had been under Shishakli in 1953. Most of Syria's leading political figures were in exile and all its political parties dissolved; to the Ba'athists Nasser was no longer the symbol of Arab nationalism and the leader of Arab unity but another hope which was not fulfilled. Thus Syria in perhaps its biggest gamble since 1920 had lost another bid for Arab leadership, and its politicians were again reduced to underground conspiracy and ideological dissension.

But the political atmosphere in the early 1960's was different from that of the 1920's in that Syria was now united to another Arab country and not subjected to foreign occupation. The strength of unified defiance and the hope that comes with knowing a common enemy were no longer present to sustain the spirits of those inside and out of Syria, who were antagonistic to the new regime. Cynicism and indifference among the former leaders and opportunism and apathy among the masses replaced the vigor and vitality which for forty years had characterized Syrian political life. For Syria to regain its political health it was necessary either that the union with Egypt should become advantageous or that a new formula for a Syrian revolt should be devised. Iraq, the only hope for injecting new life into the Syrian scene, was itself passing through experiences which no Syrian would have liked to share.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER TEN

1. See Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, 1940), p. 151 n.
2. See below, p. 126.
3. A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1946), pp. 192-194.
4. See text in *ibid.*, Appendix A, No. 2.

5. Article 4 of the mandate stipulated that "the mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the diplomatic and consular protection of the mandatory."

6. In accordance with the Franklin-Bouillon agreement of 1921 between Nationalist Turkey and France; text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 35.

7. See Chap. Six, p. 66, above.

8. For pertinent documents, see Hourani, *op. cit.*, Appendix A, Nos. 7, 8, and 9; also see Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1941), vol. I, pp. 479-492.

9. This phase is exhaustively treated by George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Middle East in the War* (London, 1952), pp. 78-128, and *Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East, 1945-1950* (London, 1954), pp. 106-115.

10. See text in *Middle East Journal* (Autumn, 1953), pp. 520-538.

11. Quoted by Charles F. Gallagher, "The United Arab Republic: Part IV, The Syrian Region," *South West Asia Series*, vol. VIII, No. 3 (American Universities Field Staff), p. 2.

12. See "Syria Under Nasser," *The Economist* (October 15, 1960; October 22, 1960).

13. See below, Chap. Sixteen, p. 212.

Lebanon

"The wounds of civil war are deeply felt."
Lucan, *De Bello Civili*

Though economically one of the most prosperous countries of the middle East, Lebanon is perhaps the poorest in natural resources. The Lebanese in fact have "no natural resources except their talents."¹ As in Phoenecian times Lebanon still thrives on business and commerce, acting as entrepreneur and clearing house for the surrounding areas. More recently it has become the favorite summer resort and amusement ground in the eastern Mediterranean. To the economic experts who have studied Lebanon's economy, the country seems to constitute an "economic impossibility!"

Lebanon has been the subject of many excellent studies, two of which are outstanding—Albert Hourani's *Syria and Lebanon* and S. H. Longrigg's *Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate*.² We need not here go into the historical background but shall concentrate on those aspects that underlie the structure and development of Lebanon's government and politics.

THE SECTARIAN-FEUDAL BASIS OF POLITICAL LIFE

To the outside observer the basis of political life in Lebanon appears as impossible as its economic structure. Always the object of some scheme of annexation by the neighboring Arab countries, and threatened from within by Lebanese who call for Arab or Syrian unity, Lebanon has lived since its independence in a state of constant insecurity. Internally, its political and administrative structures have since their inception been based on a precarious balance between the various religious blocs which constitute its 1.6 million population. The largest group, the Maronite Christians, who occupy the leading positions in government and administration, view themselves as the *genuine, original* Lebanese and stand adamantly for unconditional independence and against the inclusion of Lebanon in any Arab or Syrian federation or union. The Sunni Muslims, the second largest

minority, constitute the "Arabist" element which leans toward fuller participation in Arab political life and is not adverse to some kind of federation with Arab countries. The Greek Orthodox Christians, the Druzes, and the Shi'i Muslims, the other three important minorities in Lebanon, hold to a middle position, favoring a politically independent Lebanon but in closer cooperation with the surrounding Arab countries. The smaller minorities, the Greek Catholics, the Armenians, and the Protestants, tend to regard any amalgamation of Lebanon in a larger Arab Muslim entity as a threat to their rights and religious liberties.

As we have seen,³ Lebanon's sectarian administrative structure was formally established in 1861 by the creation of the autonomous *sanjaq* of Mount Lebanon, which was abolished by the Turks during the First World War. The French after the war revived the former Administrative Council and reestablished the entire governmental and administrative structure on the same sectarian-feudal basis. During the mandate this "confessional" structure was deliberately strengthened and enhanced as the best means of political control by the mandatory power. The jurisdiction of sectarian courts, for example, was recognized, and though certain matters were transferred to civil courts, all matters relating to personal status were maintained within the province of the sectarian courts. In 1936 and 1938 these courts were reorganized, and their statutes were given the legal validity of state laws. A direct result of these measures was the strengthening of the position of the religious leaders, who now gained additional authority not only in spiritual matters but also in the social and political affairs of the country.

The French officials in Lebanon, like the Turks, followed the practice of dealing with the religious authorities on matters relating not only to religion but also to public life in general. Religious heads were politically allied with the leading feudal families, and the coalitions brought about social and political monopolies in the country. Among the Maronites the position of the Patriarch was supreme; he was not only the chief spokesman of the Maronite community but, since his community was the largest in Lebanon, also the central political figure in the entire country. His stand in elections or during a national crisis had a decisive effect on the course of events. Maronite politicians had to maintain close contact with the Patriarch and assure themselves of his support in order to succeed. Among the Muslims, on the other hand, religious leadership was less centralized

and therefore its position comparatively less powerful; but it nevertheless exercised considerable influence on political life.

It is true that, after independence was attained in 1943, religious bigotry and intercommunal hostility greatly abated in Lebanon; but this has hardly affected the structure of government and administration, which have remained sectarian in character. Article 95 of the constitution, which stipulated that "the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the cabinet," was not abrogated in 1943 when the first independent parliament amended the constitution. The office of the president of the republic remained reserved to the Maronites, that of the prime minister to the Sunni Muslims, that of the Speaker of the House to the Muslim Shi'is, and parliamentary representation remained based on sectarian distribution.

There has been much talk in recent years of abolishing the sectarian basis of political life altogether, but in practically every instance in which this suggestion was made, whether in parliament or in the press, it was no more than lip service paid to a principle which no one in power wished to see realized. For it is obvious that to eliminate the sectarian division would lead to a loss of power for the ruling political groups of the various sects, and no matter how divided these groups may be on all other issues they have always maintained united opposition to this.

Although intersectarian hostility has decreased, it has been mostly on the individual level and collectively there still exists a profound cleavage between the Lebanese Christians and the Muslims. The Christians, especially the Maronites, feel that the rising tide of Arab nationalism and its persistent call for Arab unity constitute a direct threat to Lebanon as a political and a cultural entity. To be absorbed, as many Lebanese Muslims desire, into the surrounding Muslim Arab world would inevitably lead, in the Christians' view, to effacing Lebanon's character and surrendering all those qualities that have given Lebanon a special position in the Middle East. The spokesmen of these Lebanese Christians—Charles Malik, Pierre Gmayyil, Sa'id Aql, Fu'ad Bustani—though in disagreement on many issues, all feel that Lebanon has an important role to play as the point of contact between the Muslim Arab East and the Christian West, and that in order to play this role Lebanese political independence must be preserved at all costs. Some of the extremists are willing to go so far as relinquishing the Muslim regions of Lebanon in order to pre-

serve the integrity and independence of a Christian Lebanon confined to the area of Mount Lebanon of the Ottoman days. The moderate Christians, on the other hand, hold that Lebanon's best interests will be served not by the narrow views of a fanatical Lebanese nationalism hostile to Arabism and Islam but by Lebanon's capacity to accommodate itself with the Muslim Arabs and with Arab nationalism both within Lebanon and in the surrounding countries.

In 1943, when actual independence was achieved, a Muslim-Christian accommodation was effected by the so-called National Pact,⁴ which emphasized Lebanon's political independence within its existing boundaries and proclaimed the "brotherhood" of all Lebanese of whatever sect. The Christians acknowledged Lebanon's "Arab face" and dropped their allegiance to France, the Maronites' "compassionate mother" and traditional protector; and on their part the Muslims agreed to stand firmly behind Lebanese independence and to give up all demands to unite Lebanon with Syria or any other Arab country. The "pact," of course, has no legal basis and was binding only as long as the two parties agreed to abide by it. It introduced no change into the internal political framework; it emphasized, rather, the communal basis of the republic. It is important to note that by agreeing to equate their political status with a communal compromise, the Lebanese have freely endorsed the sectarian principle by which the Ottomans and the French had ruled Lebanon.

PARLIAMENT AND THE PRESIDENT

Except for the sectarian element parliamentary democracy in Lebanon might have developed into the most democratic government in the Middle East. The impact of Ottoman and French rule together with the inherent fragmentation of Lebanese society have instead given rise to a peculiar political structure, in which are combined the most politically primitive institutions and practices together with a high degree of political sophistication.

The constitution, which is the oldest existing constitution in the Arab world, is liberal and progressive. Its shortcomings and weaknesses are due to the manner in which it was drafted and the goals which it was designated to serve. The constitution was drafted in 1925 by a special French commission which took as its prototype the French constitution of the Third Republic (1875). Such modifications as were made in it were mostly the result of consultations with

Lebanese notables and religious leaders; and since no constituent assembly was charged with drawing the final draft, all major modifications were made in the light of sectarian rather than national interests. When it was promulgated on July 24, 1926, it defined the political structure and set up the legal foundation of the Lebanese republic as it exists today.

Since the constitution was first amended in 1927, it has undergone many amendments, the most important of which took place in November, 1943, when the first independent parliament convened; although 71 of the 102 articles were amended or revoked during this period, the basic character of the constitution remained fundamentally the same. All the articles referring to the mandate or the mandatory power were revoked (Articles 90, 91, 92, 94) or amended (Articles 1, 11, 52, 95, 102) on November 5, 1943.⁵

A main feature of the constitution, and also one of its major weaknesses, is the imbalance it creates between the power of the president of the republic and that of the legislative body. The powers given to the president (Chapter 4, "Executives Powers") were the product of modifications made on the French constitution of 1875 to adapt it to the Lebanese situation. The emphasis on executive power was intended by the mandatory power to give complete control of government and administration to the French High Commissioner, who exercised much of his power indirectly through the president. With the end of the mandatory regime and the abolition of its restrictions, the president became the center of real authority in the state.

By the provisions of the constitution the president has been able to wield complete control of the cabinet, for he has the power of appointing and dismissing the ministers, including the prime minister (Article 53); he exercises considerable influence over parliament by his power to dissolve it (Article 55); and while the cabinet is responsible to parliament (Article 66), the president is not held accountable to it (Article 60). Moreover, under certain circumstances the president can override parliament and pass legislation (Article 58); and, "in the interest and safety of the state," he has the power to negotiate and ratify treaties without the approval of parliament.

The president's term of office is six years and may not be extended consecutively (although a president could be re-elected after an interval of six years, as stated in Article 49). During the first fifteen years of independence (1943-1958) the first two presidents sought to amend this article in order to extend their term of office beyond the stipu-

lated period. The first president, Bishara al-Khourī, succeeded in having a docile parliament pass such an amendment in 1948; in 1952, however, he was forced to resign before his second term expired by a movement of popular opposition which almost led to civil war. His successor, Camille Cham'oun, who upon assuming office caused the amendment to be revoked, himself reverted to the same course when his term was about to end in 1958. The uprising which took place in the summer of 1958 was partly due to Cham'oun's intention to remain in office, and he was forced to step down when his term ended. The third president, General Shihab, broke precedent by submitting his resignation in 1960, four years before the expiration of his term; but he was persuaded to withdraw the resignation and continue in office.

The Lebanese parliament has always been weak and ineffective because of the dominant position of the French High Commissioner and later of the president of the republic and also because of its sectarian structure. During the mandate one-third of its members were appointed; after 1943 it became evident that the president could influence elections in such a way as to have a compliant parliament elected—as happened particularly in 1947 under President Khourī and in 1957 under President Cham'oun. In such circumstances interests of personal, sectarian, or group character became so intermingled that genuine parliamentary procedures were practically impossible. Because of such circumstances one can say that Lebanon has never really enjoyed a responsible and properly functioning parliamentary system. But this should be partly attributed to the mandatory power which never really contributed to making parliamentary government in Lebanon effective. Between 1926 and 1943 the constitution was suspended twice for a total period of seven years, and the country was governed longer without the constitution than with it. Even when it was allowed to function, its duties were more those of an ineffective debating society than of a responsible legislative body. Indeed, all legislative and executive control during the mandatory period remained in the hands of French military and civil administrators.⁶ Habits of corruption, bribery, and nepotism developed as part of the system and continued into the period of independence as an accepted and acknowledged feature of parliamentary life.

Elections during the mandate were neither honest nor free; results could almost always be predicted. Since the independence six

national elections have taken place: in 1943, 1947, 1951, 1953, 1957, and 1960. In the first two the electoral law of 1934 was applied, allowing for direct universal male suffrage on the basis of sectarian representation. The electoral law was modified in 1950, 1952, 1957, and 1960, with the result that smaller constituencies were gradually established, women were given the vote, and the number of representatives increased to 99 by 1960.

Parliament has always been composed of a Christian majority; the last three parliaments, for example, were composed in the following proportions: in 1953, 24 Christians to 20 Muslims and Druzes; in 1957, 36 Christians to 30 Muslims and Druzes; and in 1960, 54 Christians to 45 Muslims and Druzes.

SECTARIAN COMPOSITION OF PARLIAMENT SINCE 1929

	<i>M</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>GO</i>	<i>Sh</i>	<i>GC</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>AO</i>	<i>AC</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Total</i>
1929-32	15	9	6	8	3	3	1	—	—	—	45*
Constitution Suspended 1932-34											
1934-37	7	5	3	4	2	2	—	—	—	—	25**
1937-39	20	13	7	11	4	4	2	2	—	—	63***
Constitution Suspended 1939-43											
1943-47	18	11	6	10	3	4	1	2	—	—	55
1947-51	18	11	6	10	3	4	1	2	—	—	55
1951-53	23	16	8	14	5	5	1	3	1	1	77
1953-57	13	9	5	8	3	3	1	1	1	—	44
1957-60	20	14	7	12	4	4	1	3	1	—	66
1960-	30	20	11	19	6	6	1	4	1	1	99

M—Maronite; *S*—Sunni; *GO*—Greek Orthodox; *Sh*—Shi'î; *GC*—Greek Catholic; *D*—Druze; *Min*—Minorities; *AO*—Armenian Orthodox; *AC*—Armenian Catholic; *P*—Protestant.

* Thirty elected and fifteen appointed.

** Eighteen elected and seven appointed.

*** Forty-two elected and twenty-one appointed.

Source: Nicola A. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960," *Middle East Journal* (Autumn, 1960), pp. 367-369.

In the elections the list system has always been used, providing the basis for powerful sectarian and feudal coalitions and blocking the way for independent candidates.⁷ Actual voting takes place on successive Sundays in the various administrative areas—North Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, South Lebanon, and the Bekaa' Valley. The army and police are alerted, but fights and vote-buying usually occur.

The elections of 1960, the first after the civil war of 1958, were perhaps the freest in Lebanon's parliamentary experience. Though most of the old feudal and sectarian blocs were returned to parliament, some new elements from the younger generation made their appearance. In the new parliament, whose term ends in 1964, the cleavage between Muslims and Christians remains as strong as ever. The Muslims still demand a more equitable distribution of positions and posts and claim that the Muslims in Lebanon now constitute a majority of the population. Most probably this claim would prove correct if a census were taken (the last complete census was in 1942), and Christian ascendancy would be undermined. The Christians have been opposing a new census for, under the present system of sectarian distribution, its findings might well result in bringing a Muslim to the presidency of the republic and a Muslim majority to parliament.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Under the mandate political freedom was greatly restricted, and no political organizations were allowed to function. It was not until 1943 that these restrictions were lifted and free political activity was permitted. Most Lebanese political parties,⁸ however, were formed before the independence, and although they did not function legally, they played an important role in the political life of the country, both before and after the independence.

With the exception of three parties—the Constitutional Bloc, the National Bloc, and the National Liberals, which are the traditionalist bloc parties—all Lebanese parties are doctrinal and ideological in character—the Phalanges (Kata'ib) party, the Najjadah party, the League of National Action, the National Appeal party, the Syrian Social National party, the Progressive Socialist party, and the Communist party. Until 1960 the feudal-sectarian coalitions had made it practically impossible for any of these doctrinal parties to gain more than token representation in parliament, a fact which in part accounts for the bitterness and frustration which have dominated the political attitudes of the younger generation. In 1960, it is true, the leader of the Maronite Phalanges (Kata'ib) and the leader of the Sunni Muslim Najjadah together with six or seven members of the Phalanges were able to win seats in parliament; but they were elected not as representatives of doctrinal parties but as Maronites and Sunnis in an atmosphere of intense Muslim-Christian rivalry. Of

Lebanon's doctrinal parties, the Phalanges still represents the extremist position among the Maronites, while the Najjadah represent the Muslim extremists.

Of the other five doctrinal parties in Lebanon two, the League of National Action and the National Appeal party, adhere to the principle of Arab nationalism; but both accept Lebanon's political independence and do not identify themselves (though they are both predominantly Muslim in membership) with a sectarian position. These parties have very limited following and are wholly ineffective politically.

The Progressive Socialist party, which was founded in 1949 by the Druze feudal lord, Kemal Jumblat, has equally limited following, consisting mostly of Druzes; it would probably have disappeared long ago as an organized party except for the prestige of Jumblat who is a leading chief in his community and one of the dominant political figures of Lebanon.

The only doctrinal parties in the true sense are the Lebanese Communist party and the Syrian Social National party, the two oldest parties in Lebanon. The Communist party,⁹ though founded in the early 1920's, has never succeeded in gaining a large following; it reached its zenith between 1943 and 1946. Its real strength consists in its capacity for organized negative action—initiating or infiltrating strikes and demonstrations, subversive propaganda, limited acts of violence. The leadership of the party has on the whole been weak and inefficient, as compared to that of Syria's Communist party. Since the end of the last war, with Lebanon's increasing industrialization and the growth of the working class, party membership has probably increased, but its influence among the educated classes and the fast-growing middle class has remained limited. Though never legalized and still functioning underground, the party is well disciplined and capable of effective action in times of crisis. Its future is closely linked to that of sister Communist parties in Syria and Iraq with which intimate contact has always been maintained.

The Syrian Social National party is of importance for two reasons: first, because it was the first *indigenous* doctrinal party to be formed in the Fertile Crescent, and it became the prototype of all similar parties founded in the region since 1932; and, secondly, because its founding marked the end of the first phase of the nationalist movement of the older generation and the beginning of organized political participation on the part of the younger generation. Perhaps the

greatest contribution of this party was that it redefined the goals of social and political action and introduced totally new concepts to the field of social and political thinking. Since the party emerged into the open after its discovery by the French authorities in 1935, its ideology and pattern of organization have been emulated by new parties throughout the Arab world. Terms such as "nation" (*umma*), "society" (*mujtama'*), "fatherland" (*watan*), "state" (*dawala*), etc., have since gained a new meaning in the Arabs' political vocabulary. Though one of the largest and most militant doctrinal parties of the Middle East, the Syrian Social National party has thus far failed to seize a position of power in any of the Fertile Crescent states where it has functioning branches. In the name of a single Syrian nation it has called for the unity or federation of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan under a socialist welfare regime, where sectarianism and feudalism would be completely eliminated. After almost thirty years of existence the party is still the object of persecution in Syria and Iraq, and in Lebanon it is actively opposed by the religious groups (both Muslim and Christian), the feudal lords, the Communists, the pan-Arabists, and the Lebanese nationalists. Its strength was derived mostly from the inspired leadership of its founder, Antun Sa'adeh; the execution of Sa'adeh in 1949 was a loss from which the party has never fully recovered.

Actual political domination still belongs to the traditionalist blocs who control parliament and occupy the positions of power in the state. Three of these blocs are organized as parties and have substantial representation in parliament: the Constitutional Bloc and the National Bloc, founded in 1934 by the two Maronite contestants for the presidency, Emile Edde and Bishara al-Khoury, and the National Liberals, founded in 1958 by former president Camille Cham'oun.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT, 1960

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Members</i>	<i>Supporters</i>	<i>Total</i>
Phalanges (Kata'ib)	7	—	7
National Bloc	5	—	5
National Liberals	5	—	5
Constitutional Bloc	4	4	8
Progressive Socialists	4	—	4
Najjadah	1	1	2
Total	26	5	31

Source: Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960," *Syria and Lebanon* (New York, 1957), p. 378.

All three parties are no more than followings of political leaders representing various sects and maneuvering to win seats in parliament and positions in the government. They differ from one another not in doctrine or political program but in sectarian rivalries; they agree in their adherence to the traditional sectarian-feudal system, all striving for the same limited interests and goals.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Lebanon's relations with the outside world are largely a function of the internal political balance between Muslim and Christian. The "national pact" of 1943 implied a principle of foreign policy as well as a system of domestic accommodation. It was understood that in its foreign relations Lebanon was to maintain strict neutrality; neither would the Muslims seek help from the Muslim Arab hinterland nor would the Christians ask for aid from France or other Western powers.

The first years of independence witnessed a close adherence to this policy. In 1944 and 1945, when the Arab League was being formed, it was Lebanon's Muslim prime minister who won formal recognition from the other Arab states of Lebanon's special status within the Arab community. Lebanon's "independence and sovereignty . . . within its present frontiers" were pledged by all the participating Arab states.¹⁰ In like manner the Christians of Lebanon accepted full and active participation in the Arab League. In 1948 Lebanon joined the other Arab states in aiding the Palestinian Arabs in their war against the Jews. And in 1950 Lebanon signed the Arab security pact and took part in all the cultural and commercial activities of the League. With the Western powers Lebanon pursued a policy of friendship but of nonalignment; and when in 1955 the Baghdad Pact was concluded between Turkey and Iraq, Lebanon did not join the pact, but also refused to identify itself with Egypt's vituperative attack on Iraq.

The Lebanese crisis of 1958, which led to American intervention and the landing of American troops in Beirut, was the result of a gradual change in Lebanon's internal political balance and a shift in its foreign policy. Muslim dissatisfaction with the Cham'oun regime began in 1956 during the Suez crisis, when Lebanon failed to give active support to Egypt and the government refused to sever diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France. Early in 1957 Cham'oun's government endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine, thus for-

mally aligning Lebanon with the United States; except for Iraq, Lebanon was the only Arab League member to take this position. The elections which took place a few months later became a test of strength between the pro-Western Cham'oun group, which enjoyed predominantly Christian backing, and the neutralist pro-Nasser group, which had mostly Muslim backing. Intervention and pressure applied by the government resulted in a sweeping victory for Cham'oun and the exclusion from parliament of most of the leaders of the opposition.

Muslim disgruntlement led to the formation of underground resistance and, with the establishment of the Syrian-Egyptian union in February, 1958, to a movement of rebellion. Civil disobedience broke out in May, 1958, and spread from the Basta quarter of Beirut to Tripoli, Saidon, and other areas with Muslim majorities. Cham'oun became the target of the rebels, who accused him of seeking to extend his term of office for another six years by amending the constitution. The uprising would have been easily crushed if the army had obeyed the president's orders to take vigorous action against the insurgents. But General Fu'ad Shihab, the commander in chief (and later president of the republic), refused to risk bloodshed and confined the army's activity to preventing the spread of the rebellion and stabilizing the situation. The rebels enjoyed all public facilities—water, electricity, and telephone service; they set up their own administrative organization and acted as if they belonged to a separate state. The Maronite Patriarch, like General Shihab, withheld his support from the Cham'oun government and insisted that the only solution lay in a negotiated settlement with the insurgents.

In June the government's case was taken to the United Nations, where the foreign minister, Dr. Charles Malik, formally accused the United Arab Republic of "massive infiltration" and intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Though the United Nations observers sent to the scene could not corroborate these charges, President Cham'oun on July 14 invoked Article 52 of the United Nations Charter by requesting aid from the United States. It now appears doubtful that the United States would have complied with Cham'oun's request, if the situation had not seemed more complicated on July 14 by the military coup in Iraq which overthrew the pro-Western government of Iraq, thus threatening the Western position in the Middle East. Though the landing of American Marines in Lebanon did not bring about a solution of the crisis, it nevertheless helped to

end hostilities and to create an atmosphere in which a political compromise was finally effected. Cham'oun stepped down from the presidency when his term ended in September, and General Shihab, the only candidate acceptable to both Muslims and Christians, became president. Karameh, one of the moderate leaders of the rebellion, was nominated prime minister and a cabinet was formed in which Christian and Muslim representation was carefully balanced. The 1943 "pact" was reinstated and its stipulations regarding Lebanon's internal political balance and its neutral position in relation to the Arab world and the West were reaffirmed. The cost of the three-month rebellion was about two thousand Lebanese killed or wounded and many millions of dollars in damage.

In less than two years Lebanon was able to accomplish complete economic recovery. Politically, however, the sectarian system became more firmly rooted as a result of the experiences of 1958. The army, though excluded from direct political control, has come to exercise more political influence than it ever did before. The younger generation's sense of frustration and futility has persisted and with it the realization that Lebanon's real crisis was not ended. Viewed on its deepest level, Lebanon's fundamental crisis remained what it had been before: a deep-rooted schism between a genuine yearning to be part of the tradition of Western civilization by maintaining vital contact with the West and a profound desire to free itself of the paralyzing effect of a political existence based on sectarian and feudal principles.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ELEVEN

1. James Morris, *Islam Inflamed* (New York, 1957), p. 108.
2. For a general survey, see also Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Syria and Lebanon* (New York, 1957); for the period 1939-1946, during which Lebanon won its independence, see George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Middle East in the War* (London, 1952), pp. 78-128, 272-305.
3. See Chap. Nine, p. 106, above.
4. Sponsored by Bishara al-Khoury, the Maronite president of the republic, and Riyadh al-Sulh, Sunni prime minister, and embodied in the ministerial program presented to parliament in 1943.
5. Text in Helen Davies, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East* (Durham, N.C., 1953), pp. 291-305. This action was followed by the arrest of the president of the republic, the prime minister, and members of the cabinet by the Free French authorities, which resulted in a national uprising that culminated in the release of the imprisoned leaders and the formal declaration of Lebanese independence on November 22.
6. Who were, as Hourani observed, "too often corrupt, avaricious and arbi-

trary. . . ." *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1946), p. 176; see also Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate* (London, 1958), p. 363.

7. See Chap. Twenty, pp. 273-274, below.

8. For a general survey, see Zaideh, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-200.

9. The only detailed study of the Communist party in Syria and Lebanon is in Arabic, S. Ayoub, *The Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon* (Beirut, 1959).

10. "The Alexandria Protocol," *Basic Documents of the League of Arab States* (Arab Information Center, New York, 1955), Article 4.

Iraq

“Némésis veille, déesse de la mesure, non de la vengeance.”

Camus, L'exile d'Hélène

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

Before 1920 Iraq had never existed as a separate and independent political entity; like Syria and Lebanon, it came into being as a result of the postwar settlement based on the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1915 and the Anglo-French compromise reached at San Remo in April, 1920. As a state Iraq does not constitute a harmonious national unity but is divided along racial, linguistic, religious, and sectarian lines, which have deeply influenced its political development.

The sectarian division of Iraq into Sunni Muslims and Shi'í Muslims has produced a schism, which in its political implications is similar to that between Maronites and Sunni Muslims in Lebanon. The Shi'ís feel that despite their superior number they have been placed by the Sunnis in an inferior position, politically as well as economically, and demand a larger share of power and wealth. Shi'ís live in central Iraq, in Baghdad and the holy cities of Karbala, Najaf, and Samarra, and in the rural region to the south.

Perhaps the single most important racial and linguistic minority in Iraq are the Kurds, who constitute about one-fifth of the country's six million inhabitants. Though the Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims, they are not Arabs; and though a large number of Kurds can speak Arabic, their mother tongue is Kurdish, which belongs to the Indo-European family of languages. Living in the northern highlands bordering on Turkey and Iran, the Kurds have more in common with their fellow Kurds inhabiting those two countries than with their Iraqi Arab fellow citizens. The majority of Kurds live under tribal organization and have a sense of Kurdish nationality. Encouraged by strong Soviet propaganda since the end of the Second World War, they aspire, like the Armenians, to establish their own state.¹

Iraqi Christians number about 150,000 and live mostly in Mosul

and Baghdad. The smaller minorities—the Armenians, Jews, Assyrians, Yazidis, Turkmen, Lurs, and Mandaeans—live in Baghdad, Mosul, and the northern region and constitute about eight per cent of the total population. The Iraqi Jews, who numbered about 150,000 until 1950, have all emigrated to Israel except for a small group which still lives in Baghdad.

The social polarity between townsmen and the inhabitants of the countryside and desert prevails in Iraq with special intensity, due to the ethnic diversity that cuts through this polarity. The tribes, Arab as well as Kurdish, include about 300,000 people who lead a pastoral, seminomadic existence; the peasant population constitutes about eighty per cent of the total population; and the urban population is concentrated in Baghdad, the capital and largest city of Iraq, and in Basra, and Mosul.

Despite Iraq's natural wealth, especially in oil, the level of existence for the majority of its people is extremely low. Illiteracy and disease prevail throughout the countryside and among the urban masses. Until the revolution of 1958, a small feudal minority consisting of perhaps not more than three dozen families, together with the tribal chiefs, controlled the bulk of the country's wealth. A small commercial and professional middle class is just emerging, but its social and political impact has not yet been fully felt.

The military *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958, both in its avowed purpose and by virtue of the social and political reforms it has already introduced, aimed not only at doing away with the former monarchical regime but also at introducing a radical revolution on all levels of Iraqi life. The 1958 *coup* was the last important upheaval to take place during the postwar decade of revolution in the Arab world as well as the beginning of a new era in Iraq. To many Iraqis it was but the belated conclusion of the national revolution of 1920 for complete independence of any form of foreign political control; in their eyes the nearly forty years of Hashimite rule had represented indirect subjugation to Great Britain and a period of national humiliation, in which all attempts at establishing a truly free and liberal form of government had failed.

In order to understand the structure of government and politics of modern Iraq and the basis on which the revolutionary regime has come to establish itself, it is necessary to analyze briefly those special features of Iraq's political experience during the Hashimite monarchy (1921-1958) and the institutions that have shaped its character

and political life.² This period is divided into three major phases: the first, from the proclamation of Faisal I as king of Iraq in 1921 until his death in 1933; the second, from 1933 until 1941, during which the monarchy declined and the army gained political ascendancy; and thirdly, from 1941 when British military action ousted the last army-controlled regime, the pro-Axis government of Rashid Ali al-Gailani, and reinstated the monarchy until 1958, when the Hashimites were overthrown by a military *coup d'état*, and a republican government was established. This period, throughout its three phases, was characterized by three main factors: the inefficiency of the parliamentary system of government, the role of the Hashimite "palace" in institutional development and political events, and the persistent influence of Britain on Iraq's internal affairs and foreign policy.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

The first Iraqi parliament was convened on July 16, 1925, ushering in the first experiment in democratic government in the country's history. By the time the 1958 *coup d'état* took place, the parliamentary system had been utterly discredited and democracy found impractical as a system of government.

In over thirty years (1925-1958) of parliamentary life fifteen chambers were elected, of which only one ever completed its four-year term (1939-1943). All other chambers were dissolved either to satisfy the executive's desire for more amenable parliament or in order to further the ambitions of a disgruntled segment of the ruling oligarchy. A prime minister could often terminate the life of the chamber, but parliament could never once force a cabinet to resign by a vote of nonconfidence.

The upper house of parliament (*majlis al-shuyukh* or Senate) was appointed by the king and represented the conservative, wealthy upper layer of society; the lower house (*majlis al-nuwwab* or house of representatives), was elected, until 1953, by indirect universal male suffrage. The amendment of the electoral law and the introduction of the direct ballot in 1953 effected hardly any change in the manner or usual outcome of elections, which always resulted in a chamber dominated by the professional politicians, the landlords, and the tribal chiefs. The urban professional and commercial groups and the rising educated middle class never received adequate representation. The one occasion when free elections of a more representative parlia-

ment might have been possible occurred in 1937 following the first army *coup d'état*; but disagreement between the army leaders and their young reformist supporters of the *Ahali* group³ resulted in strict military control and the formation of another manipulated chamber.

Until his sudden death in 1933, Faisal sincerely tried to give substance to parliamentary procedures and to create a sense of responsibility among the members of the parliament. But the very nature of the chamber's composition and the knowledge that all real power existed outside of it frustrated these efforts, and parliamentary life could not rid itself of its ineffectualness and artificiality.

The constitution was repeatedly violated in letter as well as in spirit but never suspended until its revocation in 1958. Promulgated on March 21, 1925, it was amended three times, the third and most important amendment being the result of the Iraqi-Jordanian federation in 1958.⁴ Like every other constitution introduced into the Middle East after the First World War, the Iraqi constitution was a model framework for a democratic parliamentary government. But it was in theory and in practice alien to the country's political background and its religious and social traditions.

Throughout the Hashimite regime party organization was confined to the traditionalist bloc type of party.⁵ Doctrinal parties were not tolerated by the regime. The Communist party, the best organized and most effective of all Iraqi doctrinal movements, was in 1938 declared illegal and membership in it punishable by special law. After the Second World War it was subjected to severe repression, and in 1949 four of its leading figures were executed.⁶ Its emergence after the *coup d'état* in 1958 as the strongest mass movement in Iraq was partly due to its superior organization, but it may also be attributed to the sympathy its persecution had evoked and to the new government's desire to repudiate the former regime.

Bloc parliamentary parties were first formed in the early 1920's, but they disappeared soon after Iraq attained its "independence" in 1932 and became a member of the League of Nations. For a short period after the Second World War five parties were allowed to function; three of them quickly disbanded, but the other two, the Independence (*Istiqlal*) party and the National Democratic (*al-Watani al-Dimuqrati*) party, remained active until the dissolution of all political parties in 1954. Both parties enjoyed some popular backing, especially among the professional and educated urban groups, but

never attained the status of mass movements. The Democratic party, led by Kamil al-Chadirchi, for a while aroused hope that it might provide effective reformist opposition to the regime, but the 1954 ruling suspended its activity until it reemerged after the *coup d'état* in 1958.

THE HASHIMITE MONARCHY

A major factor in the development of modern Iraq was the British government's installment of the Hashimites in Baghdad in 1921. Between 1921 and 1958 three Hashimite kings sat on the throne of Iraq: Faisal I (August 23, 1921-September 8, 1933), Ghazi I (September 8, 1933-April 4, 1939) and Faisal II (April 4, 1939-July 14, 1958). Until Faisal II reached his majority in 1953, his uncle, Prince Abdul Ilah, reigned as regent and even afterwards remained the dominant Hashimite figure until his violent death in 1958.

The Hashimites were strangers to Iraq. Before the Hashimite Sharif Husain of Mecca proclaimed the Arab revolt in 1916, few Iraqis had ever heard of Husain, Faisal, or 'Abdullah. After the war and the San Remo agreement which gave Britain the mandate over Iraq, armed rebellion erupted in Iraq and was suppressed by the British. The decision to create a Hashimite monarchy in Iraq was taken at the Cairo conference (March 12-14, 1921) in which Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, took the leading part. Husain's son Faisal was not the only candidate for the throne; among those the British considered were Abdul Rahman al-Gailani, Ibn Sa'ud, and the Agha Khan. Faisal, who had just gained and lost a throne in Damascus, was chosen partly because of his family's prestige in Arabia and partly in fulfillment of Britain's indebtedness to Husain for siding with her against the Ottomans. Upon his return to England, Churchill declared in the House of Commons (June 14, 1921) that His Majesty's government was fully in favor of the election of Faisal as king of Iraq. Faisal landed in Basrah on June 23 and was received far less warmly than had been expected. On July 11 the Iraqi provisional government, which had been formed by the British the year before, passed a decision proclaiming that the form of government in Iraq was to be a "constitutional, representative, and democratic" monarchy; on the same day the Council of State, the advisory body also appointed the year before by the British authorities, passed a resolution declaring Faisal King of Iraq. On the advice of Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner, a referendum was

held at which Faisal was given the *bay'a* (oath of allegiance) by an assembly of the country's notables, politicians, religious heads, and tribal chiefs; and on August 23, 1921, Faisal was officially proclaimed king. The constitution, which was not promulgated until four years later, confirmed the monarchical system and the Hashimite dynasty: "Sovereignty belongs to the nation, and is entrusted by the people to King Faisal, son of Husayn, and after him to his heirs." ⁷

Under Faisal the monarchy was an effective center of unity, particularly during the first turbulent years of the mandate, in which the state was divided and the threat of internal conflict still existed. But, from the day of its establishment, the Hashimite monarchy signified to Iraq the reality of British influence, which was to last until the dynasty's overthrow thirty-seven years later. After the difficult lesson in Damascus, Faisal had learned that to take the "extremist" nationalist position against the mandatory power was to court disaster, and that it was far more profitable in the long run to cooperate with the mandatory power, despite the restrictions and limitations that this implied, than to go against it. He formulated a policy based on the formula, "take, then ask for more" (*khudh wa talib*), which became the basis of his relationship with the British as well as with the Iraqi nationalists. But with the Hashimites, who started by "taking" an entire kingdom, the demand for "more" was naturally limited by their relationship with the power which made the gift. To the "extreme" nationalists, who gained little by the establishment of the Hashimite monarchy and who set their allegiance to the national cause and complete independence before their loyalty to the throne, this Hashimite policy was not acceptable as a basis for dealing with the "imperialist." A gulf that was never bridged was thereby created between the nationalist movement and the Hashimite monarchy. Around the throne a "palace" political force was formed like the one which arose in Egypt after the establishment of the monarchy in 1922; following a policy of close cooperation with Great Britain and one of conservative repression at home, it was able to dominate political life in Iraq (except for a brief eclipse in 1941) until the revolution of 1958.

The Hashimite regime became truly reactionary and authoritarian after 1941 under the able but short-sighted leadership of Nuri al-Sa'id, who until his terrible death in the streets of Baghdad in 1958 was Iraq's strong man and the symbol of the Hashimite regime. With little regard for the demands of the new nationalist generation, which

he probably did not fully understand, and with utter contempt for mass public opinion, he carried out ruthless policies to bolster the Hashimite regime and increase its power in the Arab world. He aroused nationalist opposition by his rivalry with Gamal Abdul Nasser, his pro-Western and particularly pro-British policies, and his extravagant, repressive measures at home. Though his regime created a Development Board for the efficient administration of the increasing income from oil (Iraqi revenue after the new "fifty-fifty" oil agreement in 1952 rose to \$90 million annually and continued to increase thereafter), and though most of the oil income was put into vast development projects, the standard of living of the bulk of the population was hardly affected.

In the decade of revolutionary nationalism that swept the Arab world after the Arab defeat in Palestine (1948), the Hashimites and the ruling class in Iraq lost genuine contact with the people. Hashimite leadership reached a position from which it could not retreat without risking collapse of the entire regime, and it could not advance except in the direction of more control and more repression. The press was muzzled, any form of political association was prohibited, and a stringent police system was established. Under the guise of fighting communism, the government filled the jails with all those suspected of opposing the established order. Unable to confront criticism except by violence, the government succeeded in creating a brotherhood of the persecuted which united the Communist and the nationalist, the Arab and the Kurd, the Sunni and the Shi'i in intense hatred for the Hashimite regime and the system on which it was based. Too rigid to introduce gradual reform and to tolerate political opposition, the ruling oligarchy sought to bolster its power by forming regional alliances and committing itself unconditionally to the Western camp. Starting with the Turkish-Iraqi treaty of 1947, this policy reached its zenith with the signing of the Turco-Iraqi treaty of 1955 which, in effect, joined Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Great Britain in a pact of regional defense and mutual assistance against internal subversion. In February 1958, when the two Hashimite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan joined in the Arab Federation, the regime appeared from the outside stronger and more stable than ever. This is perhaps the reason why the *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958, though long expected by some observers, came as a surprise.

THE ROLE OF GREAT BRITAIN

Until the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 Britain's position in Iraq was similar in its formal aspect to her status in Egypt before the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954,⁸ i.e., a position of power based on rights and privileges conferred by a preferential treaty of alliance. But while in Egypt the British constituted one of three political forces in the country and were able to play the other two forces (the Wafd and the Palace⁹) against each other (until she was opposed by both after the Second World War), in Iraq Britain remained the single most powerful center of political influence, since all her power was concentrated in supporting the throne of the Hashimites, with whom she was never seriously at odds. Moreover, in Iraq, unlike in Egypt, Britain's position was further served by a succession of exceptionally capable representatives—St. John Philby, Gertrude Bell, Percy Cox, Gilbert Clayton, Kinahan Cornwallis—who, by their intimate knowledge and experience of Iraqi and Arab affairs and their personal dedication to their mission, greatly contributed not only to strengthening the smooth and unobtrusive influence of Great Britain but also to the growth and development of the institutional structures and administrative system of the Iraqi state.

Anglo-Iraqi relations were formally governed until 1958 by three instruments: the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1922, including its subsequent modifications (1922-1932); the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, which came into effect in 1932 (1932-1955); and the Baghdad Pact (1955-1958).

The treaty of 1922,¹⁰ envisaged at the Cairo Conference in 1921, replaced direct British control by indirect control, which was financially less burdensome and politically more practical for the British government. It was ratified in 1924, in spite of violent popular opposition in Iraq. Although it contained provisions permitting the eventual elimination of the mandate, the treaty did not differ much from the draft mandate put before the Council of the League of Nations in 1921 and ratified by Faisal, again in the face of nationalist opposition, the previous year. Its most important stipulations lay in four subsidiary agreements¹¹ relating to the employment of British advisers at all the higher levels of administration, to military assistance and training, and to judicial and financial supervision. Continued agitation against the treaty, which led to serious instability

in the country, caused its modification in 1923 and its revision in 1926 and 1927. With the coming to power of the British Labor Party, new negotiations were begun in 1929 which resulted in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of Preferential Alliance, signed on June 30, 1930.¹² This treaty, which became the model for the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1936 and for France's agreements with Syria and Lebanon in 1936, terminated the mandate and pledged the support of Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932. According to the treaty, Britain was given considerable control over Iraq's foreign relations as well as the right to station forces on Iraqi soil and to use all the country's means of communications in the event of war. It was to be valid for twenty-five years (1957). Accompanying notes stipulated that the British ambassador to Iraq was to have precedence over all other diplomatic representatives, British subjects were to have preference over other nationals in employment where foreign experts were needed, and a British advisory military mission was to train and equip the Iraqi armed forces. On January 28, 1932, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations, and the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 went into effect.

Though it enabled Iraq to take its place among the sovereign nations of the world and to enjoy a certain measure of independence, the treaty of 1930 did not fulfill the demands of the nationalists and was viewed as another instrument of perpetuating British control over the country. The only Iraqi government to refuse to comply with the treaty and actually to take up arms against Great Britain was the army-backed government of Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani, which in 1941 forced the regent, Prince Abdul Ilah, and Nuri al-Sa'id to flee the country and engaged in a four-week war with Great Britain. Attacked from the south by British Indian forces landed at Basra and from the east by Amir Abdullah's Transjordan Arab Legion, the Rashid 'Ali regime, which enjoyed perhaps the strongest popular support of any government since the establishment of Iraq, collapsed and Hashimite power was restored.

In 1947 new Anglo-Iraqi negotiations to revise the 1930 treaty produced the "Portsmouth treaty," which, though more liberal than that of 1930, still awarded Britain the right to station forces in Iraq and to exercise considerable influence on her foreign policy. Riots and demonstrations swept the country in January, 1948, forcing the cabinet to submit its resignation. The treaty was never ratified.

Similar riots took place in November, 1952, in protest against a

new oil agreement and were also put down with extreme violence. The British-dominated Iraq Petroleum Company¹³ had been exploiting Iraqi oil in return for a royalty of four shillings per ton of crude oil until 1950, when a new agreement increased the royalties to six shillings. After the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran in 1951, the oil company signed a new agreement with the Iraqi government (February, 1952), which discarded the royalty payments altogether and based the new relationship on the equal sharing of profits (before taxes) between the company and Iraq. Though this agreement more than tripled Iraq's revenue from oil (\$206 in 1955, \$275 in 1960), it was viewed by the nationalists as another surrender to British "imperialist exploitation."

Anglo-Iraqi relations remained formally subject to the treaty of 1930 until the signing of the "special agreement" between Iraq and Great Britain on April 4, 1955,¹⁴ whereby the latter became a partner in the Baghdad Pact. This agreement, in many respects similar to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, ended the Anglo-Iraqi "Preferential Alliance" and set the relations between the two powers on an equal basis. Britain agreed to withdraw her forces from the two bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba, to come to Iraq's aid in the event of war, and to extend to her such aid in training and equipment as her military forces required. British military presence in Iraq thus came to an end, and British participation in Iraqi affairs became limited to the extent that the Iraqi government was willing to accept it.

THE ARMY

The Iraqi army was the first in the Arab world to become involved in politics (1936-1941) and the last in the postwar revolutionary decade to reenter the political struggle.

The nucleus of the army was created early in 1921, with the formation of the general staff under General Tahsin al-'Askari, former officer in the Ottoman army and leader of Faisal's Arab army during the Arab revolt. The first modern military establishment to be created in the Arab world after the First World War, the Iraqi army developed a strong *esprit de corps*. Though trained and equipped by Britain, the army's officer corps always remained anti-British in attitude and became the center of nationalist sentiment. The introduction of obligatory military service (in the early 1930's) and the creation of *al-futuwwa*, the only government-sponsored paramilitary youth organization formed in the Arab world, greatly strengthened

the army's influence and paved the way for its entry into political life.

The young army officers as well as the younger nationalists, who were antagonistic to the 1930 treaty and contemptuous of the ineffectual parliamentary system, were enthusiastic admirers of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and of Reza Shah in Iran and deeply impressed by the resurgence of Germany and Italy. During the 1930's the merits of centralized military leadership were openly discussed and contrasted with the weaknesses of parliamentary democracy as it existed in Iraq. The Iraqi nationalists, lacking the political organization which in Egypt was provided by the Wafd party and other political movements, looked upon the army as the only effective means of realizing the goals and aspirations of the national movement. Faisal's death in 1933 had created a political vacuum which none of the subsequent weak cabinets could fill and which finally brought about army intervention in 1936.

The successful *coup d'état* of General Bakr Sidqi on October 29, 1936, was warmly received by the Iraqi people and applauded throughout the Arab world as a triumph of Arab nationalism. Iraq was now portrayed as the "Prussia of the Arab world" and the new leader of Arab liberation. But hopes were soon frustrated, for the army proved incapable of establishing firm and progressive leadership or of delivering the country from the internal political quarrels from which it suffered. The *ahali* reformist group which had participated in Sidqi's *coup* and provided the reform program and nationalist ideology of the movement, was alienated from the new leadership and deprived of any real power in the new regime, which now succumbed to political intrigue. In 1937 parliament was dissolved, but the new elections resulted in much the same type of traditionalist parliament, in which the younger nationalist elements had only meager representation. On August 11, 1937, Bakr Sidqi was assassinated by a rival army group, and a new *coup d'état* took place. As in Syria after Husni al-Za'im's *coup d'état* in 1949, political life in Iraq during the following four years was dominated by successive *coups d'état*, in which various factions in the army supported by different political groups sought to seize political power.

The last *coup*, which brought Rashid 'Ali to power in 1941, rekindled new hope by its open hostility to the regent and the British. In defying British power, Rashid 'Ali called on the Axis powers for aid, but this was given too late and his government was forced to flee the country. The return of the regent marked the end of nearly five

years of military hegemony in Iraq and the beginning of Nuri al-Sa'id's dominance. The army was subjected to a sweeping purge in which most of the nationalist officers were dismissed, jailed or executed. The army was again put under British control and reduced to the role of preserving internal security. Its humiliation after the end of the Second World War was later to be doubled by its incapacity to act in the Palestine war, where its operations were restricted by government decisions which, based on political considerations motivated by Hashimite interests in Baghdad and Amman, were contrary to the military exigencies of the campaign.

Though a new generation of officers had emerged in the postwar decade, free of the burden of errors and associations of 1936-1941, the grip of Nuri's regime was so tight as to render practically impossible any participation of the army in the country's political affairs. The frustration and resentment within army circles were further enhanced by the distasteful role the army had to play in suppressing the riots of January, 1948, and November, 1952, and in taking up positions against Syria in 1957 and in early 1958.

The opportunity for the army *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958, was provided when general troop movements were ordered in Iraq during the crisis in Lebanon and Syria and an unknown officer, Brigadier 'Abdul-Karim Qasim, commanding troops supposed to pass through Baghdad, acted with lightning swiftness on reaching the capital and used his troops to accomplish a surprise *coup*, which successfully overthrew the government. The king, Prince Abdul Ilah and Nuri al-Sa'id were killed, and all the leading members of the Hashimite regime were arrested. By morning the entire country was under Brigadier Qasim's control, and the Republic of Iraq was proclaimed. On July 26, 1958, a provisional constitution¹⁵ was promulgated and the presidency of the republic entrusted to a "Council of Sovereignty" composed of a Sunni, a Shi'i, and a Kurd. Executive power was given to the "Council of Ministers," as well as the right to pass laws with the approval of the Council of Sovereignty. Brigadier Qasim became prime minister and Colonel Abdul Salam 'Arif, his partner in the *coup d'état*, deputy prime minister. The new government declared a period of transition, to be devoted to carrying out the necessary reforms and followed by the resumption of normal political life.

Within a few days after the *coup d'état* the new regime was firmly established. Its strongest backing came from the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. As Rashid 'Ali had sought Axis aid in defying

Great Britain, so Qasim sought Communist support against possible intervention by the West and the Baghdad Pact powers. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which had been severed in 1955, were resumed and Red China was recognized. An agreement providing Iraq with \$137 million in economic and military aid was signed with the Soviet Union within a few months. The first countries, along with the UAR and Yemen, to recognize the new regime were the Communist countries of eastern Europe, with whom Iraq soon entered into close relations. Though the membership in the Baghdad Pact was not immediately withdrawn, Qasim's intention of doing so was made clear. A policy of "friendship with all nations" was declared, which amounted to saying that Iraq was no longer committed to the West and would adhere to a policy of neutrality. Although Britain and the United States, and soon thereafter the other Western powers, extended recognition to the new regime, Iraq continued to lean heavily toward the Communist bloc. United States military aid under the 1954 agreement was not immediately discontinued, however, and Britain maintained a position of friendliness and cooperation with the new regime.

Holding power soon proved much more difficult than seizing it. The new leadership, though enjoying wide and enthusiastic support, had to confront the deep and complex problems of Iraqi politics. While liberation from Hashimite oppression united Iraq in the hope of a new future, it also brought to the surface the deep ethnic, religious, and political divisions which after the first flush of enthusiasm began to exert a pernicious influence on the conduct and development of the new regime. On the national level there was no dominant group or movement to provide a unified, harmonious base for the military government or to bestow political and doctrinal consistency on its actions. At one extreme there were the Communists, at the other the nationalists and, in between, the smaller groups—the National Democrats, the Istiqlal, the Kurdish Democrats, and others.

What Qasim aimed at, and at first achieved, was a "balance of forces" in which the various factions and groups were united under his leadership. Adhering to no clear doctrine or political program, Qasim was by necessity pragmatic and conciliatory in his approach. Tension between the largest forces supporting the revolution, the Communists and the nationalists, gradually led to the disruption of the initial balance. The nationalists looked to Nasser as the champion of Arab nationalism and wished to see Iraq move toward some

kind of union with the United Arab Republic. Heading this movement and giving it tremendous strength at the start was Colonel 'Arif, Qasim's right-hand man. The Communists, and backing them the Kurds, tended in the opposite direction—for any type of Arab unity meant their submersion as minority groups—and upheld the principle of an independent, sovereign Iraq under the “unique leadership” of Qasim.

Supported by Arab nationalists in Syria and elsewhere, the nationalists in Iraq moved to an irreconcilable position in which opposition to Qasim became the only alternative to giving up their demand for Arab unity. By September, 1958, Qasim had decided to check the nationalist movement, and began by deposing Colonel 'Arif from his position and banishing him by appointing him ambassador to Bonn. The final rift occurred in March the following year with the abortive uprising of Colonel 'Abdul-Wahab Shawwaf in Mosul, which was openly backed by the United Arab Republic and the Arab nationalists. Its failure marked the resumption of the Cairo-Baghdad rivalry and the end of all hope for a united Arab front, including both Egypt and Iraq under Nasser's leadership. For Arab nationalism the collapse of the hope of unity between the Arab world's two strongest revolutionary regimes constituted perhaps the most serious setback in the postwar period.

The attempt to assassinate Qasim in October, 1959, led to the persecution of the nationalist in Iraq. Those leaders who were not already “in exile, in prison, or in the grave” were now rounded up to stand trial and long internment. The Communists, who had participated with ruthless ferocity in quelling the Mosul rebellion, in which at least two thousand lost their lives, and had taken savage vengeance against their nationalist rivals in Baghdad and Kirkuk, reached the zenith of their power toward the end of 1959. Indeed, Qasim's final break with the nationalists seemed to signify an almost total Communist ascendancy in Iraq. Leading positions in the government were already in Communist hands; the Popular Resistance Forces (people's militia) were under Communist leadership; and the workers' and peasants' associations, formed after the *coup d'état*, were under Communist control. The press was muzzled and all opposition was silenced. A real reign of terror seemed to shroud Iraq.

Communist strength, however, derived more from the political vacuum created by the destruction of the extremist national forces (especially the small Iraqi Ba'th party) and the lack of any other

strong opposing movement than from its numbers or genuine popular backing.¹⁶ It was primarily Qasim's need to crush the immediate threat of the nationalists that led him to tolerate and even encourage the Communists. He was also mindful of the Kurdish position which was in harmony with that of the Communists in their fear of a union in which they would lose all power. But no sooner did he feel sure of his strength than he began curbing Communist influence, first by verbal admonition then by gradual action. The Popular Resistance Forces were disarmed, key positions were purged of Communist influence, and anti-Communist groups encouraged to attack the Communists. Reshuffling his cabinet, he removed Dr. Naziha al-Dulaimi, a known Communist, from her cabinet post and introduced more moderate elements. The sensitive Ministry of Education, which had been subjected to systematic infiltration by the Communists, was also purged and placed under the direction of Isma'il al-'Arif, a moderate nationalist and close friend of Qasim. The final blow against Communist influence was dealt in January, 1960, when the *Ittihad al-Sha'b* (Peoples' Union) party, under the leadership of the veteran Iraqi Communist, 'Abdul-Qadir Isma'il al-Bustani, was refused legal recognition under the new law permitting the formation of political parties. Permission was given to a splinter Communist group led by Da'ud Sayegh to represent the Communist movement in Iraq. This maneuver, which prompted the international Communist press to criticize Qasim, caused a serious rift within the Communist movement and led to the decline of Communist influence in Iraq. The other two major political parties which were allowed to function under the new law of public association were the National Democratic party and the Kurdish Democratic party. The law prohibited all members of the armed forces, the higher civil servants, and secondary school students from joining political organizations. The "balance of forces" which Qasim strove to achieve at the beginning of his rule was now achieved. Both extreme groups were eliminated and only pliant political forces, wholly subservient to the regime, were retained.

As Iraq approached the third anniversary of the *coup d'état*, its system of government had solidified into a military hegemony based on centralized power and personal leadership. As under Nuri al-Sa'id, the gulf between ruler and ruled became wide, perhaps reflecting not so much the desire of the new leadership to maintain dictatorial control as the inherent deficiencies in Iraq's political development.

That Iraq now played much the same role in the Arab world as it did under the former regime could be attributed more to the competitive pressures of the intrinsic balance of power in the Arab world between Cairo and Baghdad than to an arbitrary policy by the revolutionary regime to oppose Arab nationalism and the yearning for Arab unity. Iraq's orbit always lay within the Fertile Crescent, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with Hashimite Jordan in 1960 recognized this fact. Similarly it was the objective reality of Iraq's economic situation that led its military leadership to maintain the oil policy of the previous regime, which was based on preserving control in the hands of the Western-owned oil company, and to retain its basic pattern of economic development on revenues from oil. Perhaps the only important change which the revolution effected in Iraq's foreign policy was the abandonment of its exclusive commitments to a pro-Western position and its adherence to a neutralist policy based on cooperation with both camps.

Thus neither Iraq's internal pattern of political life nor its Arab and international policies have really undergone a radical transformation since the transition from the conservative Hashimite monarchy to the revolutionary republican regime. In the Middle East, and indeed throughout the world, the reality of political power, which often conflicted with long-desired popular aspirations and expectations, was the major factor to determine the nature and form of government and the kinds and purpose of policies. *Coups d'état* may be successfully carried out overnight, but genuine revolutions take long to reach their goals. In Iraq as well as in Egypt, the military *coups* of the 1950's introduced the beginning of revolution, which on the psychological level succeeded in restoring self-respect and confidence to a long-suppressed people. But the concrete political, social, and economic goals had still to be realized.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWELVE

1. See above, Chap. Eight, p. 95; also see Robert F. Zeitner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraqi Government," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (January, 1959), pp. 24-31.

2. Cf. two outstanding works, Philip W. Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* (New York, 1938) and Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq, 1932-1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics* (2nd ed., London, 1960).

3. See Khadduri, *ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

4. See below, Chap. Fourteen, pp. 188-189.

5. See below, Chap. Twenty, pp. 273-274.

6. For a brief analysis of the Communist movement in Iraq, see Khadduri, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-364.

7. Article 19. For the text of the constitution, see Helen Davies, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*, (Durham, N.C., 1953), 2d. ed., pp. 107-132.

8. See below, Chap. Sixteen, p. 214.

9. See below, Chap. Fifteen, pp. 200.

10. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 39.

11. Cmd. 2120 (1924), 453.

12. Text of treaty and annexure in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 56.

13. See below, Chap. Nineteen, n. 3.

14. Text in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 108.

15. Text in *Oriente Moderno* (August-September, 1958), pp. 665-666.

16. See Khadduri, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-364.

Israel

“Dans la clameur où nous vivons, l’amour est impossible et la justice ne suffit pas.”

Camus, Retour à Tipasa

Both as a state and as a cultural community Israel is unique. It is the only country in the world which is nationally characterized by “a race, a language and a religion, none of which nationally characterizes any other state.”¹ One of the most heterogeneous states in the Middle East, it is the most united. Its Jewish population of 650,000 in 1948 increased during the following decade by over one million Jewish immigrants—44.6 per cent from Europe, 29.9 per cent from the Middle East and Asia, 24.6 per cent from North Africa and 0.9 per cent from North and South America—and is now estimated at two million. It has the highest proportion of teachers in the world—one to every 160 residents (U.S., one to 234)—and it publishes the greatest number of books in relation to its population—591 titles per million residents (France, 252 per million).

Like Jordan, the state of Israel was created within the stretch of coastal land called Palestine, which throughout the centuries was claimed by one empire after another. Identified until Byzantine times only by the names of provinces within the area, such as Canaan, Israel, Judah, and Philistia (from which the Greeks got the name Palestine), under the Roman and Ottoman empires the entire area of Palestine was governed as part of the province of Syria. After the Arab conquest in the seventh century, it was populated mainly by Arabs, but a small Jewish community has always been there. When Turkey was divested of Syria after the First World War, the Supreme Allied Council divided the Syrian mandate between Britain and France, giving Britain the mandate for Palestine, which then included Transjordan.

Israel, also like the other progeny of the Palestine mandate, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, is not a viable state and has had to depend for its existence on external support. Only one half of the

state's national budget is derived from taxation; for industrial development, settlement of immigrants, and national defense, Israel relies heavily on external financial assistance, mostly from the United States. It is expected that the state will face serious difficulties in 1964, when the West German reparation payments (of about \$130 million annually since 1952) come to an end. Also in that year Israel will have to start redeeming the first issues of State of Israel bonds, with initial payments estimated at \$20 million. According to Israeli forecasts, however, the gross productive capacity of the state will continue to increase at such a high rate that by 1970 the state should become self-sufficient.

ORIGINS OF THE STATE

The state of Israel, proclaimed on May 14, 1948, owes its existence to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which the Allied Powers incorporated in the text of the British mandate for Palestine, giving Britain the responsibility for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." The real origin of the state dates back to the latter part of the nineteenth century when antisemitism in Russia and the Dreyfus trial in France gave impetus to a Zionist movement in Europe which, under the leadership of Theodor Herzl, held an international congress in Basel in 1897 and agreed to work toward the creation of a Jewish home in Palestine. The Jewish National Fund, supported by voluntary contributions from all over the world, and Baron Edmond de Rothschild, purchased land in Palestine for Jewish settlers, some of whom had already begun to emigrate from Russia in the 1880's. In 1908 a Zionist agency was established in Jaffa, and by 1914 the Jews in Palestine had increased to about 10 per cent of the total population.

By the time of the First World War the Zionist organization had expanded considerably in numbers and effectiveness, and Dr. Chaim Weizmann headed a group which approached the British government with the proposal that the peace settlement provided for the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. The idea was accepted by Arthur Balfour, then British foreign secretary, and by the British government, and it was approved by all the Allies in the form of the Balfour Declaration. At the San Remo conference in 1920, the Allies formulated the mandate to include the Balfour Declaration, recognized the Zionist organization as the Jewish representative body in

Palestine, and directed the British government to encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine. By 1922 the total population of Palestine was 757,182, of whom about 673,000 were Arabs and 84,000 Jews. By 1927 the Jewish population had risen to 159,000. To the Arabs, outraged by the gratuitous creation of a Jewish home in what they regarded as Arab homeland and alarmed by its rapid expansion, the immigrants seemed invaders. Riots and "incidents" began in Palestine immediately after the mandate was established, and they did not cease until the Arab defeat in 1948.

The embodiment of the Balfour Declaration in the Palestine mandate, which was for the Zionists the realization of their dreams, was regarded by the Arabs as a betrayal of their rights, as well as a violation of formal agreements and verbal understandings reached with the British during the waging of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Britain's efforts in the course of nearly thirty years to reconcile its promises to the Zionists and the Arabs ended with failure in 1947, when the British labor government decided to abandon the mandate and to turn Palestine over to the United Nations.² The war which broke out between the Arabs and the Jews following the United Nations resolution in November, 1947,³ to partition Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state was the inevitable outcome of the conflicting aspirations of two nationalistic movements arising in disputed territory, predicted as early as in 1905 by the Arab nationalist, Negib Azoury, in his *Awakening of the Arab Nation*. "These two movements are destined to combat each other . . . until one of them takes over [Palestine] from the other . . ." ⁴ The war resulted in the Jewish occupation of most of Palestine. (The state of Israel now occupies 77 per cent [7,900 square miles of Palestine], although its boundaries, according to the terms of the armistice in 1949, are not "political" or "territorial" but provisional until a final peace treaty is concluded.)

The Arab defeat, formally admitted by the signing of the armistice agreements at Rhodes, had begun long before 1948. Though they were in the majority throughout the period of the mandate (in 1948 the Jews still accounted for only about 30 per cent of the total population), the Arabs were unable to organize politically or to use effectively the sheer weight and logic of their numbers. By their intransigence and disunity they constantly lost ground, refusing to compromise to accept any settlement, then falling back to positions they had rejected before, regrouping too late in the face of new and

more drastic *faits accomplis*. Convinced of the justice of their cause, irreconcilable and impractical, embittered by their powerlessness, their attitude was a poor defense against the realities, once the British government had adopted the Balfour Declaration as a policy aim and the Allies had incorporated it within the mandate—and against the zeal and industry of the Zionists, whose organization of energies was overwhelming in the Arab arena of disunity. It should be noted in assessing the practicality of Arab and Jewish reactions to the mandate that the mandate itself was not, to put it mildly, practical; as some of the British and various commissions sent to the area recognized, it created a situation of irreconcilable discord which was bound to make the exercise of force inevitable. The Jewish response was clear and eminently practical—to establish as quickly and effectively as possible a Jewish “home” in Palestine, the bigger the better. The Arab response could only be one of obstructionism and appeal against an edict that directed aliens in large numbers to enter Palestine with newly established claims that could only mean eventual dispossession for the majority of the land’s inhabitants.

Concurrently, the clash between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine was between two societies, two cultures that became profoundly antithetical to one another. The developing Jewish community was essentially European in outlook and technique, the Arab semifederal, conservative, caught at the critical moment of national awakening. The Arab defeat in 1948, experienced not only by the Arabs of Palestine but by all the surrounding Arab countries, was thus more than a military or a political defeat. It represented the final and most drastic encroachment by the West on Arab society and served to spark the radical postwar revolution in the Arab world which is still going on.

CREATION OF THE STATE

Under the mandate the Arabs received little training in local government and self-rule partly because of their own refusal to cooperate with the mandatory and partly because Britain was unable to carry out any lasting reforms in the mounting crises of the Arab-Jewish conflict. When the British administration had ceased to function, months before the formal termination of the mandate in May, 1948, and the management of government was left in the hands of the inhabitants of Palestine, the Arab community proved itself utterly incapable of taking over the functions of government, and a

total collapse of law and order ensued.⁵ The Arabs' civic disintegration preceded their military collapse.

The Jewish community, on the other hand, was fully prepared to take over the reins of government, for during the mandate the Jews were highly organized along lines that approached internal autonomy. The Elected Assembly (*Asefat Haniuharim*) represented all the parties and groups within the community and acted as a legislative body, and executive functions were carried out by the National Council (*Va'ad Leumi*), which enjoyed the recognition and cooperation of the mandatory government. The Jewish Agency, the parallel governing body, established in accordance with Article 4 of the mandate and financed by the World Zionist Organization, was a government within a government, lacking only the attribute of sovereignty. It had its own budget, its own bureaucracy, and its own secret army, the *Haganah*, which was founded as a small sentry force in the 1920's, augmented during the Arab rebellion in the 1930's, and organized after 1945 as a regular fighting force of thousands of fully trained men and women.

Zionist leadership in Palestine began its actual preparations for taking over the functions of the mandatory government early in 1947, when Great Britain's intention of abandoning the mandate became known. In October, 1947, a Joint Emergency Commission was formed, and in February, 1948, a complete blueprint of the administrative structure was ready; during March and April a Provisional State Council with 37 members was established, and a legal code and a draft constitution were completed.⁶ "Before the mandate ended, the Israel administration was functioning."⁷ When on May 14 the state was proclaimed, the transition to a provincial government was automatic: David Ben Gurion, executive chairman of the Jewish Agency, became prime minister, and the heads of the various executive departments became members of the provisional cabinet. "Every department had its budget planned on paper for the first year. . . . Some of the high officials knew ahead of time which office in which house was awaiting them, and where the furniture stood ready for delivery."⁸

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

The functions of the Provisional State Council came to an end when the constituent assembly convened on February 14, 1949. The assembly, which later declared itself the first parliament (Knesset),

was a unicameral chamber composed of 120 members representing twelve of the twenty-four parties that ran for elections in January, 1949. Over 90 per cent of all members were born outside Israel; eight members were women and three were Arabs.

The first act of the assembly was to enact a "Transition Law"⁹ which became the basis of constitutional life in the state. It was decided that:

. . . the Constitution will be constructed chapter by chapter in such a way that every one of them will constitute a law by itself. The chapters will be brought before the Knesset as and when the [constitution] Committee completes its work and will together be confirmed into the Constitution of the State.¹⁰

Administrative and executive procedures were based on a combination of past experience in self-government, on new legislation, and on elements taken over from the former mandatory structure. According to the "Transition Law," or "Small Constitution," Israel was established as a republic, with a weak president and a strong executive cabinet and parliament. The judiciary, embodied in a supreme court composed of nine judges appointed for life, was separated from the legislative and executive branches and had no direct jurisdiction over parliamentary legislation. With the second Knesset (1951), the practice of electing parliament for a maximum of a four-year term was established. Elections were carried out on a national rather than a single-constituency level, and the ballot was secret and directly exercised by all male and female citizens over eighteen years of age.

The most prominent feature of Israel's political life was the multi-party system which has shaped Israeli politics since statehood. The principle of proportional representation, which had its roots in the history of the Zionist movement, was adopted in the first elections of 1949 and became the basis of the multiple party system in the state. In the Knesset, since no party can win a majority, all governments have to be formed by a coalition headed by the strongest party, the *Mapai*, which has been able to maintain over 30 per cent of seats in all Knessets since 1949. The coalition system resulted in the establishment of bargaining over the allocation of positions and distribution of power, both in the government and the higher levels of the administration, which became an accepted procedure without which no coalition government could be formed. The inevitable

clash of interests and the persistence of partisan loyalties implicit in this procedure have limited governmental flexibility and to a certain extent reduced the efficiency of the administrative machinery.¹¹ Since members of the Knesset do not represent any specific constituency and depend for their election on party backing, their attitude and actions have tended to be motivated more by party considerations than by the general will.

PARTY STRUCTURE

Israel's extreme multiplicity of political parties is partly due to the country's cultural heterogeneity and partly to the longstanding political divisions within the Zionist movement itself. The difference between secularist and orthodox standpoints also enhances political diversity. To understand the issues of doctrinal conflict and the variations of approach of most Israeli parties, it is important, as Sir Isaiah Berlin has pointed out, to go back to "Russian Westernism, Russian liberal enlightenment, the ideas and aspirations which united the entire opposition to Czarist oppression."¹² The experience of German and central European Jews may have contributed to the infusion of fascist and authoritarian ideas and methods, as in Israel's second-largest party, *Herut*, while Jews influenced by the West European democracies, the Progressive party and to a lesser degree the General Zionists, have stood for liberalism and private free enterprise.

Since the beginning of parliamentary life, Knesset membership has represented eleven of Israel's some twenty-four parties. As already mentioned, in all five Knessets the largest number of seats went to *Mapai*, Israel's moderate left labor party, which also held a controlling influence in the country's powerful labor federation, *Histadrut*. To the extreme left are to be found the Communist party, with minor representation in each Knesset, and *Mapam* (split in 1954 into *Mapam* and *Ahdut Ha'avoda*), which is the dominant Kibbutz party with strong Marxist-Zionist ideology. The right has been represented since 1949 by *Herut*, a revisionist, ultranationalist party which has called for preventive war against the Arabs and for the establishment of Eretz Israel in its "historic entirety," i.e., to include all Palestine and Transjordan. Of the remaining two secular parties wealthy-conservative General Zionists have since 1955 cooperated closely with *Herut* and therefore lean toward the right; the Progressive party, Israel's "liberal" party, belongs neither to the right nor to the left

but to a center moderate position. In April, 1961, the General Zionists and Progressive parties merged into a single Liberal party, which aspired to gain a dominant position in the Knesset.

The major religious parties have tended to the right, except for the largest, *Hapoel Hamizrahi*, which is similar to *Mapai* in its labor leanings. *Hapoel Hamizrahi* has joined with *Mizrachi*, a strictly religious group, to form the National Religious party or front. The other two main religious groups, *Agudat Israel*, and *Poalei Agudat Israel*, are ultraconservative, ultrareligious parties that advocate the establishment of a theocratic state; they have united to form the Torah Religious Front. Smaller groups, such as the *Sephardim* and the Yemenites, have either been absorbed into other groups (the *Sephardim* into the General Zionists) or have disintegrated into insignificant splinter parties. The Arab groups, controlled by *Mapai* and the Communists, have no genuine political organization.

In the fourth Knesset (1959-1961), the center, consisting of *Mapai*, the Progressives, and *Hapoel Hamizrahi*, commanded between 75 and 80 of the 120 seats. The secular right, *Herut*, backed by the General Zionists, occupied 25 seats. The Torah Religious Front had only six seats (the two religious blocs combined occupied 18 seats); while the extreme Marxists left won 16 and the Communists 3 seats.

The elections of summer 1961, held two years before time, introduced only minor changes in the distribution of seats among the

PARTY REPRESENTATION SINCE 1949

Party	First Knesset (1949- 1951)	Second Knesset (1951- 1955)	Third Knesset (1955- 1959)	Fourth Knesset (1959- 1961)	Fifth Knesset (1961-)	
<i>Mapai</i>	46	45	40	47	42	
<i>Herut</i>	14	8	15	17	17	
General Zionists	7	} 20	13	8	} 17	
Progressives	5		5	6		
<i>Mapam</i>	} 19	} 15	9	9	9	
<i>Ahdut Ha'avoda</i>			10	7	8	
<i>Hapoel Hamizrahi</i>	} 16	} 8	} 11	} 12	} 12	
<i>Hamizrahi</i>						2
<i>Aguda</i>			3	} 6		} 6
<i>Poalei Aguda</i>	2	3	2			
Communists	4	5	6	3	5	
<i>Sephardim</i> ,	} 7	} 3	} 5	} 5	} 4	
Yemenites, etc.						
Arab parties	2	5	5	5	4	

various parties. Mapai again emerged as the strongest party, though it lost 5 of the 47 seats it held in the former Knesset; also its affiliated Arab lists lost one of the 5 seats they formerly occupied. The new Liberal party won 17 seats, representing a gain of 3 seats over the combined seats held by the General Zionists and Progressives in 1959. Herut maintained its 17 seats, thus sharing second position with the Liberals. Ahdut Ha'avoda, with 8 seats, gained one additional seat; and the Communists increased their strength to 5 seats; Agudat Israel won 4 seats and Poalei Aguda two; the National Religious party and Mapam remained stable at 12 and 9 seats respectively.

In spite of its political fragmentation and cultural and linguistic heterogeneity, Israel has been welded into strong unity by firm governmental control under a genuine parliamentary democracy. Zionism as a common unifying ideal and the will to survive in the face of tremendous difficulties have greatly contributed to the state's growing sense of national unity. But on the empirical level, what has held the state together and made possible its vast accomplishments is the core of political and administrative leadership which had existed within the Jewish community before statehood and which has continued to direct it since independence. The "Establishment," as one observer¹³ calls it, consists mainly of about 120 *Mapai* members under the leadership of David Ben Gurion. This core is to be found in all the state's key positions: "in important ministries; in the Jewish Agency . . . among the heads of institutions; in significant embassies; and in sensitive posts of the bureaucracy."¹⁴ Conflict within the higher circles of this group has not been uncommon, as shown by the split between Ben Gurion and Sharett in 1954 and the Lavon affair in 1960-1961;¹⁵ but strong personal leadership, exemplified in the almost uninterrupted premiership of Ben Gurion between 1948 and 1961, have exerted sufficient unifying force to maintain the solidarity of the "Establishment" and to preserve its power unimpaired. Included in the rising elite of this group, upon whom the future leadership of the "Establishment" will devolve, are such of Ben Gurion's protégés as Moshe Dayan, former Chief of Staff, Abba Eban, former ambassador to Washington and representative to the United Nations, Simon Peres, deputy minister of defense, and Ehud Avriel, former ambassador to Ghana (all of whom in 1961 were under fifty years of age). Unlike most armies in the Middle East, the Israeli army, whose leadership is controlled by the "Establishment," is subject to

civilian authority and poses no threat to the hegemony of the "Establishment" or the continued democratic system of government.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL

Secular Parties (56 per cent)

Mapam: (founded in 1948, extreme social democratic, once associated with the Communists).

Achdut Ha'avoda: (founded in 1954, social democratic but more accommodating than *Mapam*).

Mapai: (founded in 1930, center left, increasingly a pluralistic party, the dominant mass grouping).

Progressives: (founded in 1948, a liberal constitutionalist party, of the center).

General Zionists: (founded in 1948, a "liberal" party in a nineteenth century European tradition).

Extremist Parties (16 per cent)

Communists: (founded in 1948, totalitarian, appealing usually to the Arab protest).

Herut: (founded in 1948, an expansionist, revisionist haven for the frustrated with fascistic and demagogic ideas).

Religious Parties (15 per cent)

Hamizrahi: (founded by splinter mergers in 1956, mildly socialist but religiously orthodox).

Aguda: (founded in 1912, but has added later groups, ultraorthodox, seeks a theocratic state).

Special Jewish Interests (6 per cent)

Likud: (North African immigrants).

Haole Hechadash: (Eastern European immigrants).

War Invalids, Nazi Victims: (European splinter group).

Third Force: (splinter of Communists, "Trotskyite").

National Union: (independent Sephardic group).

Yemenites: (ethnic protest group).

Bund: (American sponsored anti-Zionist group).

National Sephardic: (special ethnic interest).

Arab Parties (7 per cent)

Agriculture and Development: (*Mapai* affiliated, Arab-oriented generally).

Cooperation and Fraternity: (*Mapai* affiliated, Druze-oriented).

Progress and Construction: (*Mapai* affiliated, Moslem-Christian, Arab-oriented particularly in Arab center of Nazareth).

Independent Arab: (an *ad hoc* private party).

Arab-Israel Labor: (*Achdut Ha'avoda* affiliated).

Progress and Work: (an independent Arab-Druze list).

Source: E. A. Bayne, "The Israeli Elections, 1959," [American Universities Field Staff] *Southwest Asia Series*, vol. III, No. 2.

PATTERN OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Once established as a state, Israel was immediately recognized by the powers and warmly welcomed into the international community of nations (United Nations membership, May 11, 1949). After 1942, when the center of World Zionism was transferred to the United States, Zionism's strongest support came from the United States. The Soviet Union, which in 1947-1948 played a major role in the creation of Israel by backing the United Nations partition plan and allowing the airlift of Czechoslovak arms to Israel during the Palestine war, emerged as the new state's other major ally. Soviet-Israeli relations remained cordial until the Jewish doctor's trials in the U.S.S.R. in 1953, which alienated Israel's sympathies and drove her closer toward the Western camp. With Great Britain friendly relations were re-established after the statehood, and the bitter resentments of the last years of the mandate, when Britain was trying to compromise between the irreconcilable claims of Arab and Jew, were forgotten. Though the delicate balance in Israeli relations with East and West continued to be maintained with great skill, the Soviet shift toward a pro-Arab policy in 1955 caused a serious deterioration of Israel's relations with the Communist bloc countries.


Israeli diplomacy scored its greatest triumphs in Europe, from whence during the fifties she secured her largest economic and military support. With West Germany Israel negotiated in 1952 the German reparations agreement which assured her of massive economic and technical aid for twelve years. With France Israel was able to conclude a military alliance which provided her with such tremendous aid, including assistance in nuclear research, as to enable her to maintain military superiority over all the Arab states combined, despite the Arabs' massive military aid from the Communist bloc.

Though eminently successful in her foreign relations, Israel was unable to move forward in her regional policy. Instead of a final peace settlement with her Arab neighbors and a gradual return to normalcy in the Middle East, the armistice *status quo* was solidified, an Arab economic and diplomatic blockade was established, and a general boycott isolating Israel from her Afro-Asian environment was successfully carried out. Though Israel succeeded in establishing economic and diplomatic relations with some African and Asian countries, such as Burma, Ghana, Mali, Liberia, and Ethiopia, she re-



Burt Glinn-Magnum, courtesy Life

Prime Minister Ben Gurion of Israel.



United Nations

Egyptian President Gamal 'Abdul Nasser with late U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld.



United Nations

Nasser and Nehru at the fifteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly.

mained largely isolated. In January, 1961, she was branded as an "imperialist" country by a conference of neutralist African countries, which included Ghana and Mali. Her full participation in Afro-Asian affairs remained dependent on her relations with the Arab states.

The image of Israel in Europe and America depicted the new state as a bastion of democracy in the Middle East and a reservoir of scientific and technical skill, which in conditions of peace were to bring new life and well-being to the entire region. Israel's Arab neighbors, however, whose image of Israel was quite different, have declined to avail themselves of these benefits and refused even to conclude peace with Israel. Any settlement, according to the Arab's official position, was to be preceded by Israel's compliance with three United Nations resolutions: repatriation of the Arab refugees and restitution for their properties; adjustment of the armistice provisional boundaries on the basis of the 1947 partition plan; and the internationalization of Jerusalem. Israel, on her part, maintained that she was incapable of accepting a mass return of the Arab refugees to their homes (already occupied by Jewish immigrants), if only on economic and security grounds; as for the boundary problem, she adamantly insisted on the territorial inviolability of the state; and Jerusalem had been the official capital of the state since 1950.

Israel ultimately developed her Arab policy on the principle that toughness rather than the spirit of compromise was to regulate her relations with her Arab neighbors. The frustration of dealing with Arab intransigence over the years convinced the Israelis that the best position from which to deal with the Arabs was that of force. This attitude was manifested not only in its diplomatic and politic ramifications, but mainly in the Israeli reaction to incidents along its borders.¹⁶ Infiltration and raids into Israel were requited with exemplary severity, by massive reprisals carried out in force by regular army units. Between 1953 and 1956 scores of Jordanians, Palestinians, Egyptians, and Syrians were killed by Israeli army attacks on Kibya, Nahalin, Tiberius, Qalqilia, Khan Yunis, and other border points. The effectiveness of this policy was confirmed by the failure of the Arab states to respond by similar military action and by the Arab people's fear and respect for Jewish arms.

After 1955 Gamal 'Abdul Nasser represented the single greatest threat to Israel's security in the Middle East. The theory of preventive war, which had been openly advocated in Israel by *Herut* and

other groups since the armistice of 1949, was now put to the test. The Israeli army, with French air and sea support, invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956. Israel's immediate objectives were to depose Nasser, defeat his Russian-equipped army in battle, and open the Gulf of Akaba and the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. It hoped thus to realize at one stroke all the objectives of Israel's Arab policy: impose a final peace settlement, settle the refugee problem, and break the Arab economic and diplomatic blockade.

Though a great military success, the Sinai invasion failed to achieve these objectives. The pressure of world opinion, the reaction of the United Nations, Bulganin's threat "to crush the aggressors and restore peace," and Eisenhower's insistence that no gain should be achieved by aggression led to Israel's unconditional withdrawal from Egyptian territory.¹⁷ Her military victory over Egypt was overshadowed by French and British intervention in the Suez Canal, and her only gain was the informal assurance by the United States to open free passage through the Gulf of Akaba—established by the passage of an American oil tanker to Eilat in April, 1957.

The Israelis' resort to all-out war in 1956 backfired. Israel was shown to the world as an aggressor, confirming Arab accusations of Israeli "expansionist" designs; Arab hatred and hostility doubled, and Gamal 'Abdul Nasser emerged stronger than before. The deadlock that had existed before October, 1956, continued unabated, and Arab-Israeli peace seemed more remote than ever.

The Arab states have not only refused to make peace with the state of Israel but also to recognize its existence. Arab unanimity with regard to Israel is due to the fact that the Arabs view the "Palestine problem" more as a moral problem involving right and wrong than as a political problem to be solved by realism and compromise. They refuse to accept the *fait accompli* of a Jewish state in Palestine and do not accept any justification presented in terms of the Jews' suffering in Europe and their aspirations for a national home. They point out that the imposed solution for Jewish refugees has in turn created almost a million Arab refugees living in United Nations settlements and elsewhere in Palestine. The "Jewish problem," the Arabs argue, is a European-American-Russian problem which they, the Arabs, did not create and for the solution of which they are not willing to renounce their rights to their own homeland. And indeed, major roles in the Palestine tragedy were played by the British who

propounded the Balfour Declaration; the Allied Powers who accepted it as part of the mandate; the United States whose support of Israel, particularly after Hitler's pogroms and the Second World War, intensified it; the United Nations, which have allowed Israel to flout U.N. resolutions; and Britain and France whose military action with Israel against Egypt in 1956 justified the Arabs' worst fears.

Arab leaders have refused to conclude peace with Israel not only because of an outraged sense of justice but also on the basis of political advantage. They believe that they themselves have little to gain by recognizing the state of Israel. They realize full well that all the Arab refugees can no longer be readmitted into Israel, that no Israeli government will accept a major readjustment of the existing boundaries, and that the Israeli capital will not be internationalized. They believe that, on the other hand, Israel has everything to gain and very little to lose by a peace settlement, even at the price of a generous compromise. For the Arabs are fearfully aware that an Israel, released from her present Ghetto-like existence to become part of her geographic, economic, and human environment, would be a dominant nation in the Middle East. So as the decade of the 1960's began, the original irreconcilability between Zionism and Arab nationalism still remained strong as ever, constituting the most potent force of disruption in the Middle East.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1. Charles Malik, "The Near East: The Search for Truth," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1952), p. 244.
2. For some of the major documents relating to the British mandate, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945* (London, 1946); also see Alan R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel* (New York, 1958).
3. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 88.
4. *Le réveil de la nation arabe* (Paris, 1905), p. 48.
5. Cf. Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* (Washington, 1958), pp. 6-8.
6. Marvin H. Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel: The Decade of Statehood* (Princeton, 1957), p. 37.
7. Hal Lehrman, *Israel: The Beginning and Tomorrow* (New York, 1951), p. 47.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Text in *State of Israel Yearbook, 1950* (Jerusalem, 1950), pp. 259-260.
10. *The Israel Yearbook, 1960* (Jerusalem [?], 1960), p. 33.
11. Cf. Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
12. Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), *The Middle East in Transition* (New York, 1958), p. 206.

13. E. A. Bayne, "The Israeli Elections, 1959," [American Universities Field Staff] *Southwest Asia Series*, vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 14.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *New York Times*, January 13, 1961, p. 1.
16. See E. H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce* (New York, 1956).
17. For pertinent documents on the Suez Crisis, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1956* (London, 1959), pp. 73-354; for documents pertaining to the Israeli withdrawal, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1957* (London, 1960), pp. 185-214.

Jordan

"The future holds for each his destined sorrows."
Menander, *Monosticha*

AMIR 'ABDULLAH AND GREAT BRITAIN

Glubb Pasha, the former commander of the Arab Legion, has said that until the Palestine war Transjordan was "one of the happiest little countries in the world."¹ While this may be an overstatement, the fact remains that when Transjordan, partitioned from Syria after the First World War, became the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan after the Palestine War, it lost its integrity. It became, like its neighboring state carved from Syrian Palestine—Israel—a country of refugees and displaced persons. In order to exist it has had to depend, also like Israel, almost entirely on financial and political support from the West.

Until 1948 Transjordan was a small patriarchy with a population of about 400,000 living in the arid semidesert land stretching along the eastern bank of the Jordan river from the Syrian border to the Gulf of Akaba. It came into existence in 1921 almost by accident, the result of a bargain between Amir 'Abdullah, Faisal's brother, and Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 'Abdullah was marching up from the Hejaz at the head of a small army to restore Syria from the French, and Churchill had arrived in Cairo to preside over a conference on Middle Eastern affairs. To dissuade 'Abdullah from his plan, he offered him an Amirate over the Transjordan under the supervision of the British High Commissioner in Palestine. Churchill also promised to use his government's good offices in influencing the French to reinstate the kingdom of Damascus with 'Abdullah at its head. 'Abdullah never forgot this promise and till the end of his life worked to achieve the Syrian throne. He accepted Churchill's offer and in April, 1921, set up his first administration in Amman, the Amirate's new capital. Great Britain accordingly inserted Article 25 into the text of the mandate, excluding the "territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary

of Palestine" from the area designated for the establishment of the Jewish National Home,² and on May 26, 1923, the Amirate of Transjordan was declared an autonomous state under mandatory jurisdiction.³ On February 20, 1928, a treaty was signed between Transjordan and the United Kingdom⁴ which recognized Transjordan's "independence" while leaving financial control and conduct of foreign relations in British hands. An Organic Law⁵ was promulgated the same year, giving Transjordan a legislative council with advisory powers and an executive council responsible to the Amir. In the early 1930's the nucleus of the Transjordanian army, the renowned Arab Legion,⁶ was formed, and by a modification of the Anglo-Transjordanian treaty, Amir 'Abdullah acquired the right to send consular representatives to the neighboring countries.

'Abdullah used his prestige, established during the Second World War, in an attempt to attain the throne of a united kingdom of "Greater Syria." Allying himself firmly with the British in 1941, he had sent his Arab Legion to fight the pro-Axis Rashid 'Ali government in Iraq⁷ and later the Vichy regime in Syria. He reminded Churchill of his promises and pressed for Britain's adoption of the "Greater Syria" plan. But his hopes were dissipated after the war, when full independence was achieved by Syria and Lebanon and the two countries stood adamantly opposed to his "Greater Syria" plan.

The formation of the Arab League in 1945 under Egypt's leadership served to deprive 'Abdullah of any last chance of realizing his ambitions. Though not unsympathetic with 'Abdullah's aspirations, Britain could reward him only by revoking the treaty of 1928, making him the head of an independent and sovereign Transjordan. The new "Treaty of Alliance," signed on March 22, 1946,⁸ recognized Transjordan as a "fully independent State and His Highness The Amir as the sovereign thereof"; provisions were included, however, giving Britain the right to station forces in Transjordan and to continue her supervision over the Arab Legion. The Amirate of Transjordan was declared the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan, and a few months later (February 1, 1947) a constitution was promulgated, which replaced the Organic Law of 1928 and introduced a parliamentary system of government. Amir—now King—'Abdullah's powers, however, remained practically intact, for the parliament had limited legislative power and no control over the executive cabinet, which was responsible to 'Abdullah.

A few weeks before the termination of the British mandate in

Palestine (March 15, 1948) a new treaty was signed between Transjordan and Great Britain,⁹ which replaced that of 1946 and limited the stationing of British forces in Transjordan to two bases, Amman and Mafrak. Britain was to come to the aid of Transjordan if attacked and British subsidies were to be continued for the duration of the treaty (1968).

The Palestine war was the turning point in 'Abdullah's career. Always a realist, he thought it useless to oppose the United Nations resolution to partition Palestine (November 29, 1947) which all the Arab states vigorously rejected. Nevertheless he complied with the Arab Leagues' decision to prevent by force the application of the resolution and sent his Arab Legion into Palestine. At the end of the hostilities, which won for the Israelis even more territory than the United Nations had allowed them, the little bit of Palestine that remained in Arab hands was held by Jordan's Arab Legion, except for the Gaza Strip in the south which remained under Egyptian control. Three weeks after the armistice agreement between Transjordan and Israel was signed (April 26, 1949), 'Abdullah annexed Arab Palestine to Transjordan and officially proclaimed the union the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. Britain's recognition of the new state in 1950 automatically extended her obligation to defend the kingdom's new frontiers.

The end of 'Abdullah and his patriarchy came as a result of his pragmatic position on the Palestine problem and his disregard of the attitude of the Arab peoples and states toward Israel. His approach was based on the same principles and methods which the Hashimites had followed since 1918: negotiation and compromise based largely on recognition of the *status quo*. With Egypt's initiative, an attempt was made to oust Jordan from the Arab League, but Lebanon's opposition frustrated the attempt. By his annexation of the West Bank of the Jordan, 'Abdullah had acquired new subjects who did not share the Transjordanians' loyalty to their king and who were bitterly determined to serve any cause that seemed to offer them hopes of reparation for their losses to Israel. 'Abdullah died at the hands of a Palestinian refugee who shot him on July 20, 1951, as he entered the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem to perform the Friday prayers.

PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT

With King 'Abdullah's death the Jordanian patriarchal system broke down and a new phase began, in which the country's political

life was dominated by three main forces: the palace, the army, and the Palestinian nationalists.

The first shift in the locus of power was in favor of the "palace group," which was composed of those elements that had supported 'Abdullah and were identified with the Hashimite regime; it included such leading politicians as Tawfiq Abu'l-Huda, Ibrahim Hashim, Sa'id al-Mufti, Fawzi al-Mulqi, and Hazza' al-Majali. Of particular importance during this period was the influence exerted by the Queen Mother, Zain, whose role in Jordan corresponded to that of Abdul Ilah in Iraq. For a short period during the reign of Talal (1951-1952), 'Abdullah's eldest son and successor, the palace group was partially eclipsed. But a sick man when he came to the throne, Talal proved incapable of maintaining power and was forced to resign in favor of his seventeen-year-old son Hussein. The palace group again held the reins of government until Hussein reached his majority in 1953. From then on it maintained much the same position as that of the palace group in Iraq, withdrawing into the background only when the nationalists gained the ascendancy.

Parliamentary life in Jordan remained ceremonial and artificial until the elections of 1956, in which a nationalist majority was brought to parliament. Under the new constitution,¹⁰ promulgated in 1952 during Talal's reign—a synthesis of King 'Abdullah's constitution of 1947 and the liberal Syrian constitution of 1950—the National Assembly (*majlis al-umma*) was composed, as in Iraq, of a senate (*majlis al-a'yan*) and a house of representatives (*majlis al-nuwab*), with forty seats divided equally between the East Bank (Transjordan) and the West Bank (Palestine). According to the constitution, effective power was vested in the cabinet, which was no longer responsible directly to the king but to parliament, and which, moreover, had the power to dissolve parliament without itself having to resign. In 1954, although the elections resulted in a conservative, progovernment parliament, a constitutional amendment was passed, which reduced the vote of confidence needed to effect the resignation of the cabinet from a two-thirds majority to a simple majority and made it obligatory for the cabinet to resign when parliament was dissolved. This increased the power of parliament, as became apparent after the elections of 1956. It also became evident that when parliament used its powers effectively and when it was supported by a sympathetic cabinet, the *de facto* authority of the king was seriously challenged, a fact which the palace group was very quick to grasp.

THE ARMY

In Jordan, as in almost every other Arab country, the strength as well as the weakness of the established regime lay with the army. Until 'Abdullah's death the loyalty of the Arab Legion to the Hashimite regime was firm, but with the dislocation of power after 1951 the army was sucked into the political struggle.

Originally a small force of about five thousand, recruited mostly from among the Bedouin tribes of Transjordan and led by a select group of British army officers, the Legion had grown into a regular army of twenty-five thousand men, to which were later attached fifteen thousand auxiliaries (National Guard) composed mostly of Palestinian refugees. As Palestinians were absorbed in large numbers into its officer corps, British control diminished. In March, 1956, King Hussein, impelled by popular opinion in his uneasy kingdom, dismissed the British commanding officer of the army, Lt. General John Bagot Glubb, and with him the remaining British officers. With the departure of the British the army fell under the control of a group of young, ambitious officers who, though devoted to the person of the king, were hostile to the palace group and in sympathy with the nationalists. There were, however, two other elements in the army, the Bedouins and the Circassians, whose allegiance was wholly devoted to the king and the regime, and which formed the nucleus of the palace power within the army.

After the rise of Nasser to the leadership of Arab nationalism, popular allegiance to the Hashimite regime was determined by one factor alone: Jordan's relationship with Egypt. King Hussein enjoyed the full support of the army and his subjects as long as he maintained strong and close relations with Nasser. After his break with the Egyptian camp in April, 1957, the regime was exposed to continuous attempts at a military *coup d'état*, which led to extensive purges in the officer corps and to a serious decline in the army's military effectiveness.

THE OPPOSITION

The central issue around which the opposition in Jordan centered was not freedom or justice but Palestine. Two-thirds of Jordan's population consisted of Palestinians, whose only hope was to retrieve their homeland and to avenge themselves against Israel. To them Nasser represented the only leader in the Arab world capable of

mustering the necessary force to "solve" the Palestine problem, and they responded to his call with fanaticism.

Two exterior events in 1955 served to bring into sharp focus the fundamental forces at play in Jordan's political life and to crystallize the issues on which the political structure of the Hashimite state rested: the Baghdad Pact and the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal. These two events gave a new form to the Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry for leadership in the Arab world, and they presented the Arab countries with the choice between commitment to the West or "positive neutrality" based on cooperation with the Communist bloc.

For about a year and a half Jordan wavered between the two positions, with the government first inclined, under the influence of the palace group and its Hashimite ties, to lean toward the Baghdad Pact, and then during the nationalist ascendancy which brought the Nabulsi government to power, to swing toward the opposite extreme. King Hussein's popularity soared when in December, 1955, he rejected General Templer's invitation to join the Baghdad Pact and again when he dismissed General Glubb from his command of the Arab Legion.

He reached accord with Egypt, Syria, and Sa'udi Arabia; relations with Hashimite Iraq grew weak, and the palace group was forced to withdraw into the background. On October 24, 1956, Hussein signed a military agreement with Egypt which practically put Jordan's Arab Legion under Egypt's command.

The nationalist pro-Egyptian wave in Jordan reached its zenith in the autumn of 1956. The October elections, hitherto the only free elections in the country's parliamentary experience, resulted in a crushing defeat for the traditionalist palace-group candidates and in a distinct victory for the pro-Nasser nationalists. The latter consisted of the Ba'th party, which was under indirect control of the Ba'th leadership in Damascus; the National Socialist party, actually a nationalist group with its center in Nablus under the leadership of the Palestinian pro-Nasser politician, Sulaiman al-Nabulsi; and the small Palestinian-dominated Palestine Arab bloc. The Communists, who as elsewhere in the Arab world were small in number but effective in organization and leadership, ran in a front-organization called the National Bloc. Under the influence of the close cooperation in Syria between the Ba'th and the Communists, the Jordanian Ba'th party and the other nationalist groups also tended to cooperate with Commu-

nist and leftist elements, with the result that three Communists were able to win seats in Parliament.

ELECTIONS OF 1954 AND 1956

<i>1954</i>	<i>1956</i>
Independents	Independents
36	13
National Party	Constitutional Party
1	4
Liberation Party	National Socialist Party
1	11
National Democratic Party	Ba'th Party
1	2
Syrian Social National Party	Muslim Brothers
1	5
	Palestine Arab Bloc
	2
	National Bloc
	3
Total	Total
40	40

As leader of the strongest party in parliament, Nabulsi was charged with the formation of the cabinet, which was composed of nationalist elements, and for over five months he followed a strictly pro-Egyptian, anti-Western policy. When the Nabulsi government was dismissed (April 10, 1957), it had already abrogated the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948, concluded an agreement with Egypt, Syria, and Sa'udi Arabia whereby the British financial subsidy was to be replaced by an annual payment of \$36 million by the three Arab states, and made preparations for establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and for receiving aid from the Communist bloc. On several occasions Prime Minister Nabulsi had declared that Jordan could not exist as a separate entity and called for its federation with sister Arab states.

It was just as the nationalist wave was about to sweep everything before it that King Hussein, backed by the palace group, dismissed Nabulsi and ordered pro-nationalist General Abu Nuwwar, who had replaced General Glubb as commander-in-chief of the army, arrested, charging him with conspiring to overthrow the monarchy. A state of emergency was declared and hundreds of nationalists and Communist leaders were arrested. Political parties were banned and any kind of public demonstration was prohibited. The army was subjected to a systematic purge, and the palace group regained control.

The political climate in the Arab world had by the spring of 1957 undergone significant changes: the Egyptian army, instead of crushing Israel, had been forced to evacuate the Sinai peninsula with heavy losses in men and armament; King Sa'ud, Egypt's strong ally, returned from his state visit to the United States in January, 1957, with new ambitions for leadership in the Arab world and with his rela-

tions with Egypt considerably weakened; and Hashimite Iraq, receiving American and British military aid, appeared stronger than ever as a result of the Baghdad Pact. After the April, 1957, crisis in Jordan, which King Hussein believed to be incited with Egyptian and Syrian support, plus Communist backing, relations between Jordan and Egypt were increasingly worse and the lines between monarchies and republic more clearly drawn. King Hussein, though refusing to subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine which pledged American support to any state threatened by international Communism, proceeded to strengthen his relations with Iraq and to reestablish his contact with the West, particularly with the United States.

HASHIMITE RESTORATION

Although the aspirations and final objectives of the national movement which the Egyptians and their supporters propagated were essentially the same as those which the Hashimites and their supporters called for, the nationalist wave which Nasser created in the Arab world included revolutionary implications which were basically anti-monarchical and anti-Hashimite. The Hashimites stood opposed to Egypt not on the grounds of the theory of Arab nationalism but on concrete political issues, which emerged only with the actual unfolding of events.

In 1944, just when Egypt was becoming aware of Arab nationalism and of the larger entity called the Arab world, King 'Abdullah had foreseen the Egyptian threat to Hashimite leadership and had called upon Baghdad to stand firm with Amman in a "united Hashimite policy [to prevent] any attempt to dissociate the Arab cause from the principles of the first Arab revolt."¹¹ The Hashimite position based itself on the principle of the Arab *revolt* of 1916 with its association of the modern Arab's first triumphs under the leadership of the Hashimites as the Prophet's descendants, while the Ba'ith-inspired Egyptian position under Nasser based itself on the principle of the Arab *revolution*, with its commitment to radical social and political reform. If the two positions could share common ground in terms of general premises regarding the ultimate goals of Arab nationalism, on the practical level of doctrinal application they were irreconcilable. The schism declared itself in February, 1958, in the formation of the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation.¹² Egypt's and Syria's union was republican, revolutionary, and socialist in form; the Iraq-Jordan union was monarchical, traditionalist, and conservative.

The Hashimite federation represented the old school of nationalists, with its Islamic tradition and its refusal to accept those changes that have transformed Arab nationalism since 1920; the Syrian-Egyptian union, on the other hand, represented the new nationalist generation, with its belief in radical change and the necessity for transforming the social and political fabric of Arab society. Thus what King 'Abdullah feared in 1944 did actually happen within less than a decade; the dissociation between the early nationalist movement of the Arab revolt and that of the younger generation was complete.

King Hussein instinctively believed in the revolutionary Arab nationalism of his generation and identified himself with it. But to save his throne and to protect the state which his grandfather had built, he was forced to revert to the nationalism of his grandfather's generation. Jordan federated with Iraq on February 14, 1958.

Whereas: the Great Arab Revolt led by His Majesty the great savior Al Hussein Ibn Ali was a proclamation of a new dawn for the Arab nation. . . .

Whereas: the mission of the Arab Revolt, for which its leader has striven, passed to the sons and grandsons and was inherited by generation after generation. . . .

Therefore: the two Hashimite states decide to form a federation between themselves. . . .

.
The Arab Revolt Flag will be the flag of the Union. . . .¹³

The Iraqi-Jordanian federation lasted exactly five months. The Iraqi military *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958, not only put an end to the Hashimite federation but also threatened the very existence of Jordan. King Hussein's appeal for Western protection, promptly extended by the United States and Britain, threw Jordan back to complete dependence on the West. By 1961 United States aid alone amounted to about fifty million dollars annually. Thus the last stronghold of the Hashimites went back to its original status, a Western-protected patriarchy, with no soul of its own.


NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1. Sir John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (New York, 1957), p. 26.
2. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 38.
3. Text of announcement in *Survey of International Affairs, 1925* (London, 1927), vol. I, p. 362.

4. Text in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 52.
5. Text in Davies, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East* (Durham, N.C., 1947), 1st ed., pp. 303-314.
6. Cf. John Bagot Glubb, *The Story of the Arab Legion* (London, 1948).
7. See Chap. Twelve, p. 157, above.
8. Text in Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-340.
9. Text in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 89.
10. Text in *Oriente Moderno* (November-December, 1952), pp. 284-287.
11. King 'Abdullah, *Memoirs* (New York, 1950), p. 250.
12. See pertinent documents in Arab Information Center, *Basic Documents of the Arab Unifications* (New York, 1958).
13. Text in *ibid.*, pp. 7-9.



PART FIVE:

Egypt 



Egypt under the Monarchy

*"We do not hate the English, but the conqueror
as conqueror even though he were closest to us."*

Mustafa Kamil, Speech (March 3, 1896)

BRITISH OCCUPATION, 1882-1922

Egypt, the most populous and one of the most important countries of the modern Middle East, was the first to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire and to experience systematic modernization under Mehmet Ali (1805-1849); it was also the first country in the Middle East to fall under foreign domination (1882) and one of the last to regain its complete sovereignty (1954). Egypt's political decline and Britain's political and economic ascendancy in Egypt, which was to last until the middle of the twentieth century, may be said to have begun with the European Powers' action in 1841, forcing Mehmet Ali to withdraw his forces from Ottoman Asia and Crete and putting a stop to his ambitions to build an Egyptian empire in the Middle East. In 1882 Britain's indirect economic and financial control was replaced by direct occupation and "protection"; partial independence followed in 1922, which was increased in 1936, but it did not become complete until the military *coup d'état* of 1952 and the formal signing of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954. Britain's position throughout this period, as Hourani points out, "had no basis except that of power, and this fact moulded the attitude both of those who possessed the power and those against whom it had been used."¹

From a juridical point of view, sovereignty over Egypt belonged to Turkey until she renounced her claims to the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. But Britain did not automatically gain thereby the right of sovereignty over Egypt, and her position until the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 rested on *de facto* presence rather than on any principle of international law.

The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 started as a limited military operation intended to protect British lives and capital threatened

by the military uprising of Colonel 'Arabi. It was established on the ruins of the first nationalist revolution in the modern Middle East which, although directed mainly against foreign interference and the alien rule of Mehmet Ali's dynasty, was a genuine Egyptian movement and an expression of Egyptian national sentiment. The development of Egyptian nationalism in the following seventy years was deeply influenced by this initial experience, and from Colonel 'Arabi's movement in 1882 to Colonel Nasser's *coup d'état* in 1952, one can discern the direct link of a completed cycle.

Much has been said in favor of Britain's contribution to Egypt's political stability and economic prosperity during the occupation. But as H. A. R. Gibb wrote in 1951, Britain's "whole attitude is coloured by the delusion that we have been disinterested benefactors, that in our relationship to Egypt we did all the giving and Egypt all the receiving, and ungraciously at that." ²

Under Cromer, Egypt did, in fact, enjoy the benefits of perhaps the most honest and efficient administration it had known in its entire history. Better irrigation, reduction of taxes, and abolition of the *corvée* (forced labor) improved the Egyptian peasant's lot; and the size of the cotton crop, Egypt's most valuable export, increased from 3,100,000 cantars in 1879 to 7,700,000 in 1918. The chief beneficiaries, however, were not the Egyptians but foreign debtors, the Turko-Egyptian landlords, and the foreign communities living in Egypt.

Egyptian industry, which under Mehmet Ali had been developed on a relatively wide scale, showed almost no progress during the occupation. Moreover, no indigenous commercial or industrial middle class was allowed to develop during this period, for foreigners controlled not only large-scale finance, industry, and commerce but also petty trade and industry. By 1907 the number of these foreigners had reached 147,000—63,000 Greeks, 35,000 Italians, 21,000 British, 15,000 French, with the remainder consisting of semi-Egyptianized communities of Jews, Armenians, and Syrians.³

Meanwhile, the population increased from 6,800,000 in 1882 to 12,750,000 in 1917; but education was seriously neglected. During the first twenty years of the occupation only £2 million (\$8 million), or 1.5 per cent of the administration's total expenditure, was spent on education and health.⁴ The Egyptian University, the largest in the Middle East, was founded in 1907 by purely Egyptian endeavor and was supported by private donations. In government and administra-

tion, Egyptian participation was limited to a minimum. In 1905 less than one third of the higher posts were occupied by Egyptians, while over 42 per cent were occupied by Englishmen; by 1920 the proportion of Egyptians had declined to 23 per cent, and that of the British had risen to almost 60 per cent.⁵

British reforms in Egypt belonged almost exclusively to the sphere of administrative action; social and political problems were almost totally ignored. During the early years of the occupation, purely consultative bodies were created in accordance with the Organic Law of 1883: provincial councils, a legislative council, and a general assembly, with no direct influence on the government's policy or its executive measures. In 1913 Lord Kitchener, the third British consul-general in Egypt, inaugurated a phase which, given time to mature, might have contributed to the development of parliamentary self-government. He introduced a new constitution which gave the legislative council and the general assembly more say in government affairs and invested the provincial councils with more powers of local government. Though the general assembly had only the power to initiate and suspend legislation, it could, by making its debates public, influence public opinion by the issues it raised and the measures it recommended. But war broke out, and any chance of further development was destroyed.

Throughout this period, the British showed surprisingly little understanding of the mounting nationalist agitation and discontent, especially among the rising urban and educated middle classes. To Cromer, as to most British administrators in Egypt, the Egyptian nationalists were merely "agitators," "religious fanatics," and "political intriguers." In his valedictory address in 1904, Cromer expressed the official British attitude toward the nationalists' demand for independence and parliamentary self-government:

I shall deprecate any brisk change and any violent new departure. More especially, should it be necessary, I shall urge that this wholly spurious and manufactured movement in favour of a rigid development of parliamentary institutions should be treated for what it is worth; and, gentlemen, let me add that it is worth very little.

REVOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE, 1919-1922

The "spurious and manufactured" nationalist movement emerged after the First World War as the strongest single force in Egyptian

life, and, after three years of strikes, bloodshed, and passive resistance, it was able to undermine British control and to achieve a significant measure of national independence. The unity and strength of the nationalist movement were brought about by the common experiences of the war and the new hopes which the war raised. Between 1914 and 1918 all levels of Egyptian society had suffered: the landowners from the restriction of cotton acreage; the urban middle classes from the doubling of prices; and the peasants, the chief victims, from forced "contributions" to the Red Cross and from enlistment in the Camel Corps and Labor Groups attached to the British army in Palestine, Gallipoli, and France. To material loss had been added the feeling of national humiliation caused by the presence of large bodies of troops in the cities and towns, the increase of British officials in public posts, and the sense of being a "protected" nation exploited in the interest of a war in which she had no real stake.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Egypt should awake at the end of the war to find herself behind barricades. All the elements making for revolution were present. On November 13, 1918, a delegation (*Wafd*) of nationalist leaders headed by Sa'd Zaghloul appeared before the British High Commissioner, General Sir Reginald Wingate, and formally asked for Egypt's independence and the right to send representatives to the Paris Peace Conference on an equal footing with Hejaz, Persia, and Ethiopia. The British government categorically refused, and the leading members of the delegation were promptly arrested and deported to Malta. The national uprising which followed (March, 1919) marked the beginning of a new phase in Egypt's political history, one of its major accomplishments being the welding of all classes and elements of Egyptian society. "Now," wrote the London *Daily News* (April 3, 1919), "the fellahin [peasants] are united with the students and intelligentsia against us." The revolution also consolidated the various branches of the nationalist movement as never before (or since) and brought about the rise of the *Wafd* party which was to dominate the Egyptian political scene for the next thirty years.

Although Zaghloul and his colleagues were released and allowed to go to Paris, no immediate results ensued. The Treaty of Versailles confirmed Britain's protection of Egypt, and the United States gave it formal recognition in April, 1919. Egyptian resistance continued unabated.

Great Britain was faced with the alternative of either holding

Egypt by force or granting it a measure of independence. The fact-finding mission sent to Egypt in December, 1919, under Lord Milner, favored the latter alternative and recommended that the protectorate be replaced by a "perpetual alliance" between Great Britain and Egypt.⁶ When negotiations with the nationalists ended in deadlock, however, the British government decided to take independent action. On February 28, 1922, Great Britain unilaterally proclaimed the termination of the protectorate,⁷ established in 1914 when Turkey entered the war, and declared Egypt "an independent sovereign state," leaving to the discretion of His Majesty's Government the following points:

1. The security of the British Empire's communications in Egypt
2. The defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect
3. The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of the minorities
4. The Sudan

Immediately following the proclamation, a Foreign Office circular distributed to British diplomatic missions in the world's capitals made clear that the termination of the protectorate involved "no change in the *status quo* as regards the position of other Powers in Egypt itself" and emphasized the fact that Great Britain "will not admit [her] rights and interests [in Egypt] to be questioned or discussed by any other Power."

Reactions to the proclamation were mixed. To the old-guard imperialists, it was nothing short of catastrophic: "The deadliest gale blowing from the Arctic ice-caps could hardly have struck more chill into the bones and hearts of most of those who had given their lives to the work of realizing Lord Cromer's ideals."⁸ Lord Lloyd, who in 1925 became High Commissioner to Egypt, held that the end of the protectorate gave Egypt a "qualified independence, an independence which was subjected to certain definite reservations [which] were an absolutely vital part of [the] declaration." To the nationalists, the proclamation was no more acceptable than had been the recommendations of the Milner Mission on which it was based. The conditions which they set, expressing the demands of the 1919 revolution, were not changed then or during the next thirty years of intermittent Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. In summary, these demands were:⁹

1. The withdrawal of all British forces from Egyptian soil and of the financial and juridical advisers from the administration which should then be entirely free of British control
2. The abandonment of British claims to protect foreigners and minorities and to share in the protection of the Suez Canal
3. The withdrawal of the notification to foreign powers of March 15, 1922, that His Majesty's Government would regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another power
4. The reduction of the status of the High Commissioner to that of the representatives of all other foreign powers
5. Sovereignty over the Sudan

It was clear that although Egypt was declared "independent" in 1922, she did not actually become independent. Toynbee described the designation as a "diplomatic fiction."¹⁰ "The 'sovereign independence' of Egypt," he wrote, "like that of the neighbouring Arab states under 'A' mandates, was not a present fact but a formula which expressed the future intentions, in certain contingencies, of another party."¹¹ Nevertheless, with the granting of limited independence, a new chapter of political development began in Egypt.

THE MONARCHY AND THE WAFD

The introduction of parliamentary government after the formal termination of the protectorate did not lead to the growth of democratic institutions in Egypt, but served to consolidate the position of the landed aristocracy and to concentrate political power in the hands of the Pashas and the king. Parliament never attained sufficient weight to control, or even to challenge, the executive and remained throughout a façade behind which virtually dictatorial powers were exercised. As we have seen,¹² only in Turkey did dictatorship succeed in using parliamentary forms to further the development of democratic habits and procedures that finally gave rise to a genuine two-party system of government. In Egypt as elsewhere in the Middle East, experience with parliamentary governments eventually resulted either in the complete collapse of the parliamentary system (in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq), or in its reduction to an artificial system of autocratic rule (e.g., Jordan and Iran).

The Egyptian constitution,¹³ promulgated by a royal prescript on April 19, 1923, was modeled after the Belgian constitution (as the Lebanese and the Syrian were after the French, and the Iraqi after

the British) and proclaimed Egypt a "sovereign, free, and independent state" with a hereditary monarchy and a representative form of government (Article 1). Islam was declared the religion of the state and Arabic its official language (Article 49). All the traditional liberties and rights of the individual were guaranteed by law (Articles 3-22). But the king was given wide powers. He exercised legislative power "concurrently" with the senate and the chamber of deputies (Article 24). He appointed two fifths of the Senate, the other three fifths were elected (Article 74). The chamber of deputies was to be elected by universal male suffrage (Article 82), and the king had the right to dissolve and adjourn it (Article 38, 39). Executive power was to be exercised by a cabinet of ministers appointed by the king, who had the right to dismiss it (Article 49). The cabinet, however, was made responsible, not to the king, but to the chamber of deputies (Article 61).¹⁴ The throne was made hereditary in the dynasty of Mehmet Ali (Article 32), and the king was declared the "Supreme Head of the State" (Article 33), "Commander in Chief of the land and sea forces" (Article 46), and his person was pronounced "inviolable" (Article 33).

With the beginning of parliamentary government, the unity of the nationalist movement, achieved during the preceding years of stress and strain, was broken. Only the Wafd party emerged as representative of popular sentiment, and Egypt's political life almost immediately concentrated around the struggle between the king and the Wafd. For the next thirty years, Egypt was never again to be sufficiently united really to challenge British hegemony in Egypt.

The first national elections took place in December, 1923—January, 1924 and resulted in a sweeping majority for the Wafd. From that time on, every *free* election resulted in a Wafdist victory, and when this happened (as in May, 1926, December, 1929, May, 1936, March, 1942, January, 1950), it usually led to conflicts with the king, which in turn resulted in either the dismissal or resignation of the Wafd government and the king's dissolution of parliament (as in December, 1924, July, 1928, February, 1938, October, 1944, January, 1952). It is not surprising, therefore, that although the Wafd occupied the center of the stage for thirty years, it held power for not more than a total of eight years.

During King Fu'ad's reign (1922-1936), no session of parliament under the 1923 constitution ever completed its normal term, and the constitution was suspended three times. Indeed, between 1923 and

1930, Egypt was governed more without the constitution than with it. In 1930 the king revoked the 1923 constitution and promulgated a new, modified constitution and electoral law designed to strengthen royal prerogatives further. The dictatorship of the Palace was unchallenged until 1935, when the deteriorating situation resulting from the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the king's illness induced him to re-establish the original constitution and allow new elections to take place. King Farouk, who succeeded to the throne in 1937, followed in his father's footsteps. He dissolved the Wafd-dominated parliament (elected in 1936) and ordered new elections, which were manipulated to prevent the Wafd's return to power. Until his abdication fifteen years later, Farouk maintained the struggle with the Wafd, except for a brief spell in 1950-1951 when, shortly before the crisis of 1952 that toppled the entire monarchical regime, an understanding took place between the Palace and Wafd.

It was, perhaps, Egypt's greatest misfortune to have been exposed to this continuous conflict between the two centers of power in the country. The king could have rendered the highest service to Egypt by limiting himself to exercising a balancing effect on Egyptian political life, but neither Fu'ad nor Farouk were by temperament or ambition capable of playing that role. The Wafd leadership was equally responsible, for both Zaghloul and Nahas (who succeeded Zaghloul in 1928) were subject to personal limitations that rendered compromise and understanding with the king almost impossible. The two kings, as Hourani observed, "in addition to some virtues which the world did not perhaps know [possessed] the weakness of their dynasty—love of money and the determination to rule despotically"; the two Wafd leaders, on the other hand, "possessed the tortuous obstinacy, the easily kindled vanity, and the ultimate weakness of the Egyptian peasant."¹⁵ The "barren, negative, and unreal quality" of Egypt's political life during this period was the inevitable outcome of Egypt's internal situation and the personalities of the leaders who controlled it.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, 1936-1951

Until the signing of the 1953 and 1954 agreements (regarding the Sudan and the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal zone), Anglo-Egyptian negotiations continued with occasional interruptions throughout most of the interwar and immediate postwar periods. The first and only treaty to be freely negotiated between Great

Britain and Egypt during the entire period from 1882 to 1953 was that concluded in 1936. This treaty of "Preferential Alliance" ¹⁶ was not welcomed in its entirety by all factions of Egyptian opinion, and after the war it was unilaterally abrogated by the Egyptian government. At the time, however, it represented to many an important step toward complete independence, serving to set Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis that gave official recognition to Egypt's role in the Sudan and acknowledged her right in the Suez Canal, defined in the Treaty as "an integral part of Egypt."

The treaty declared British occupation of Egypt at an end and restricted the number of British troops that could be stationed in the Canal zone to 10,000. Britain undertook to sponsor Egypt's membership in the League of Nations and to speed the end of capitulations (extraterritorial privileges). On May 26, 1937, Egypt was admitted to the League, becoming the only Arab state (Iraq was admitted in 1933) to join the international organization. At the Montreux Conference of the Powers in April and May, 1937, the capitulations were officially terminated, with the provision that the final transference of jurisdiction to Egyptian national courts would be completed by 1949. The treaty was to be valid until 1956 and subject to reconsideration ten years after its signing.

Britain's influence on Egypt's internal affairs did not end with the ratification of the 1936 treaty. During the following decade, the war clauses were implemented rather than those increasing Egypt's independence. Though the British High Commissioner was replaced by an ambassador, the latter wielded effectively as much power as the High Commissioner had before the treaty. As in all other cases in the system of "Preferential Alliance" developed by Britain and France in the Middle East, "alliance" really meant the replacement of direct domination by indirect control. This perhaps explains the reluctance of most nationalist governments in the postwar Middle East to commit themselves to any alliance with a major power, for unrestricted sovereignty became the sole condition that constituted true national independence.

The end of the Second World War found British troops still occupying Cairo and Alexandria as well as the Suez Canal zone. The Egyptian government requested that negotiations be renewed to revise the 1936 treaty and publicly declared its policy as based on the principle: "Evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian Crown."

As in the past, negotiations were long and, on the whole, fruitless. By the summer of 1947, when no agreement was in sight, Egypt took its case to the United Nations Security Council, but the Council took no action other than recommending continued bilateral negotiations. When in 1950 the Wafd again came into power, the political atmosphere had reached a state of tension equalled only by that prevailing during the 1919-1921 crisis. Even had the government been willing to compromise, it could not by now divorce itself from the principle calling for total evacuation and sovereignty over the Sudan. Talks with the British collapsed in June, 1951, and on the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the treaty (August 26), rioting broke out in Cairo. On October 8, a defiant Egyptian parliament voted the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 treaty, the abolition of the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement over the Sudan, and proclaimed Farouk "King of Egypt and the Sudan." To the monarchial regime, instead of being the beginning of a new phase, this was the beginning of the end.

DISINTEGRATION OF THE WAFD

The regime of the monarchy in Egypt was characterized by social inequality, economic decline, and political disintegration. It derived its strength from four social groups: ¹⁷ the army, which was small and inefficient but loyal to the established order and adequate for dealing with internal unrest; the police force, well trained and effective in maintaining law and order and equally loyal to the regime; the ulema, who, scattered all over Egypt, nourished the conservative spirit of the lower classes of the population and backed the existing order; and, finally, the large and expanding bureaucracy, which was dependent upon and subservient to the established form of government.

Economically, Egypt's national income, which since the first quarter of the nineteenth century had continuously increased, began in 1925 to decline, while the growth of population maintained an upward trend. This resulted in a decided decrease in Egypt's per capita income and the widening of the already huge gap between the poor and the wealthy. On the whole, the landowners, the higher professional classes, and the commercial and industrial middle class prospered during this period, while the major part of the population, the fellaheen and urban classes, moved closer to a bare subsistence level. Instead of creating a movement of social change and economic re-

form, political action during this period only increased the common man's misery and sharpened his sense of impotence. During its terms in office, the Wafd paid little attention to the affairs and everyday administration of a government which was one of the most corrupt and inefficient in the entire Middle East. However, though the Wafd represented a conservative force that drew its strength from the landowners and the Pasha class, it enjoyed the backing of the Egyptian masses whom it held, at least until 1942, in a kind of "mass narcissism." Partly because it was born out of the 1919 revolution, partly because it was Sa'd Zaghloul's party, it remained during the interwar period the largest mass party of its kind in the Middle East and politically one of the most effective. Apart from the "doctrinal" parties which emerged in the 1930's (e.g., the Muslim Brothers, Young Egypt, the Communist party), only two political organizations had their origin outside the Wafd—the National party, founded by Mustafa Kamil in 1908, and the small Constitutional Liberal party, founded in 1925. The rest, which can hardly be called "parties" in the strict sense of the word (e.g., the Sa'dists, the Kutla), were the result of splits within the Wafd which took place every few years. The Wafd's disintegration may be attributed not so much to its conservatism, its doctrinal vagueness, and its shapeless political machine as to its internal corruption, the moral (as well as physical) flabbiness of its leadership, and the changed times to which it had not the stamina to adjust itself. The beginning of its downfall may be said to coincide with its coming to power in February, 1942, when the British Ambassador compelled King Farouk under threat of force to ask Nahas Pasha to form the government. As a British writer¹⁸ later observed, this incident had three results: "It destroyed Farouk to himself and, eventually, his people; it ruined Nahas as a popular leader; and it convinced the Egyptians that behind an Atlantic Charter façade, the British were as domineering as they had been under Queen Victoria." After 1942, the Wafd may be said to have lost its hold over the Egyptian mind and to have become in fact, if not in appearance, "just one more party struggling for office."¹⁹

BREAKDOWN OF THE MONARCHIAL REGIME

The situation in Egypt after the Second World War was very similar to that after 1918: British troops were stationed in the country; unemployment was widespread; and the standard of living was

at its lowest ebb since the middle 1920's. The nation was ready for an upheaval.

But unlike 1919, there was no unity in 1945 within the nationalist movement. The Wafd had been morally discredited, and the king had lost the popularity and respect which he had previously enjoyed. The sources of the masses' frustration now lay, not merely in the British, but also in Egypt's national leadership and ruling class. As the postwar period progressed, the situation worsened. By 1949 the new hopes awakened by the establishment of the Arab League under Egypt's leadership were dispelled with the Palestine war (1948-1949), which demonstrated the real disunity of the Arabs and revealed the humiliating weakness of the Egyptian army. The Palestine war also contributed to the rise of anger and hate caused by the "munitions scandal" involving the Palace, high army officers, and some leading politicians.

By 1945 the situation differed from that of 1919 in still another important respect. A new generation had arisen in Egypt which entertained political views and held social beliefs that had little in common with those of the established order. During the 1930's a number of political organizations and groups had been formed which manifested themselves in political parties and youth organizations altogether different in organization and political motivations from the old political parties and groups. Some of these organizations, like many similar organizations throughout the Middle East, were clearly influenced by fascist as well as by socialist ideologies and had little esteem for the European type of parliamentary democracy. Those which survived the war period and emerged after 1945 as effective political and social forces in Egypt were mainly three: the Muslim Brothers, the leftist groups, and the clandestine army "Free Officers" movement. Each of these movements contributed to the transformation of political and social thought in postwar Egypt and to the final collapse of the monarchical regime. The Free Officers group, with the least ideological content and a minimum of political readiness, was the one to seize power in Egypt, destroying both the leftist organizations and the Muslim Brothers,²⁰ and to prepare the ground for a new revolution in the entire Arab Middle East.

The Muslim Brothers were in some respects the most significant political movement that appeared in Egypt in the second quarter of the twentieth century, for it represented perhaps the last major effort on the part of a militant Islam to stem the tide of Westernization and

to re-establish the doctrine and practice of the *shari'a* within the framework of a new theocratic state. The movement was founded and led by its "Supreme Guide," Sheikh Hassan al-Banna, one of the truly great political leaders of the modern Middle East. By 1945 the Muslim Brothers were the largest single party in Egypt, reportedly with over 2 million members, tightly organized and fanatically devoted to their principles and leader. A great number of the ulema who had backed the established order were attracted to the Muslim Brothers, and many became active members. Banna's professed goal was to seize power by force and to establish a new order in Egypt based on the political and social teachings of Islam, with the Koran as its constitution. Although the movement was concentrated in Egypt, the Arab and Muslim worlds were regarded as natural spheres for Muslim Brothers activity, and branches were founded in major centers from Morocco to Iraq. The assassination of Banna in 1949 dealt a heavy blow to his organization but did not destroy it altogether. It remained a real force in Egypt until 1954 when, after an attempt on Colonel Nasser's life had been made by one of its members, a total campaign was waged against it that ended with its dissolution and removal from the political scene as an effective political force.

The Communists and the socialists were never really strong in Egypt, even after the Second World War when Communist sympathizers and fellow travelers increased in number and effectiveness with the rise of the prestige and influence of the U.S.S.R. The weight of Egypt's leftist movement was felt most strongly after the war among the disgruntled intellectuals, the urban workers, and the university students. The ideas of social justice, of the equitable distribution of wealth, and of the rights of the masses received full articulation by these groups. By making use of Egyptian nationalism, they were able to infuse a new element into the political thinking of the postwar generation and to bring into focus some of the real issues underlying Egypt's social and economic ills.²¹ The Communist wing of this leftist movement, while not completely crushed by the Nasser government, was rendered politically inactive in 1959.

The Free Officers movement,²² which since its successful *coup d'état* in 1952 had completely transformed the political structure of Egypt and initiated a new phase of internal and regional development in the Middle East, began as a small secret society in the late 1930's and did not become an extensive and well-organized clandestine movement until after the Palestine war. There is evidence that at the time

close relations were established with the Muslim Brothers as well as with individuals and groups belonging to the Egyptian political left. The movement was composed of young officers of the rank of colonel and major with a common middle-class background who had no clearly thought-out political or social program. They aimed simply to rid Egypt of its corrupt and inefficient leadership and to regain for the nation and the army their "dignity" and "self-respect." Even after seizing power in 1952, the "Free Officers" seemed uncertain as to what course to take in reforming the political and social state of affairs in the country.

The decision to seize power seems to have been made by Gamal 'Abdul Nasser and his fellow conspirators after the "burning" of Cairo on January 26, 1952, which resulted in the dismissal of the Wafd government and the worst political crisis in a generation.

The *coup d'état*, however, was not carried out until the night of July 22-23, 1952. On the morning of July 23, the people awoke to the news that the army had taken over the government and that the country was under its full control. The news was received first with dumb disbelief, followed by frenzied jubilation throughout Egypt.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIFTEEN

1. Albert Hourani, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement: Some Causes and Implications," *Middle East Journal* (Summer, 1955), p. 241.
2. "Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Revaluation," *International Affairs* (October, 1951), p. 446.
3. See Charles Issawi, *Egypt at Mid-Century: An Economic Survey* (Oxford, 1954), p. 43.
4. See Tom Little, *Egypt* (London, 1958), p. 95.
5. See Issawi, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
6. [Milner Report] *Report of the Special Mission to Egypt*, Cmd. 1131 (1921).
7. Cmd. 1592 (1922).
8. H. Wood Jarvis, *Pharaoh to Farouk* (London, 1955), p. 263.
9. Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Egypt* (London, 1952), p. 11.
10. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925* (Oxford, 1927), p. 125.
11. *Ibid.*, 197.
12. See Chap. Five, pp. 47-48, above.
13. Text in Davies, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East* (Durham, N.C., 1953), 2d ed., pp. 26-46.
14. But no cabinet was ever removed from office by a vote of nonconfidence.
15. "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement," p. 246.
16. See text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 61.
17. See Issawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-260.

18. Desmond Stewart, *Young Egypt* (1958), p. 116.

19. Little, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

20. The best study in English is Ishak Musa Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren* (Beirut, 1956).

21. See "Program of Action of the Communist Party of Egypt," *Middle East Journal* (Autumn, 1956), pp. 427-437.

22. See Anwar al Sadat, *Revolt on the Nile* (New York, 1957).

Egypt under Nasser

“Le pouvoir, s’il est amour de la domination, je le juge ambition stupide. Mais s’il est createur . . .” De Saint-Exupéry, La Citadelle

THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME

The achievements of the Egyptian revolution of 1952 in many respects resembled those of the Turkish revolution of Mustafa Kemal. In Egypt, as in Turkey, the revolution chose the republican form of government, established a personal dictatorship, and adopted the single-party system. Yet in Egypt the parliamentary forms which were introduced after a three-year period of transition served to limit rather than to strengthen the parliamentary system and thereby to perpetuate authoritarian government. Moreover, the Egyptian revolution’s political and administrative systems were established and maintained by the army, in this respect following Reza Khan’s example, as in Persia parliamentary institutions represented a façade for personal rule and the army acted as the bulwark of the regime.

When the Egyptian *coup d’état* took place on July 23, 1952, its military leaders did not aim at effecting a total revolution but sought merely to “put an end to political corruption” and restore “decent” government to the country. Though King Farouk was forced to abdicate, the monarchy was preserved; and though the government was overthrown, the new government was headed by an independent politician, Ali Mahir; elections and normal political activity within six months were promised. The two leading political parties, the Wafd and the Muslim Brothers, established close contact with the army revolutionary committee and were confident of their place in the new regime.

It took the military junta a few months of experiencing absolute political control to realize that it had become the sole repository of power in Egypt. The *coup d’état* had completely destroyed the old order. Egypt lacked the institutional and parliamentary bases that would have allowed the army to return to its barracks and hand over




Wide World Photos

Arab chiefs of state at Beirut. From left: King Faisal II, King Hussein, President Quwwatly, King Sa'ud, and President Cham'oun.

Islam's most holy shrine: The Ka'bah at Mecca.

Arabian American Oil Company





Arab Information Center

Prince Saif al-Islam al-Hassan of Yemen at U.N.



Arabian American Oil Company

H. M. King Sa'ud Ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz al Sa'ud.

the reins of government to the politicians. A political vacuum had been created which only the army could fill.

Lacking a definite doctrine, the Free Officers acted by rule of thumb. With the vast popular support of the masses they proceeded to destroy the last vestiges of the old regime. In December, 1952, the constitution of 1923 was abolished, and in January, 1953, a three-year transition period was declared, during which the country was to be ruled by the military committee. This marked the beginning of the new order in Egypt.

Power was now formally concentrated in the hands of the group of officers who had led the *coup d'état*. A provisional charter was promulgated, giving executive and legislative power to a chief of state (General Muhammad Naguib) and a Revolutionary Command Council composed of thirteen officers. All political parties were dissolved and the Liberation Rally, a single party intended to unite mass support behind the new leadership, was established. In June, 1953, the monarchy was abolished and a republic was proclaimed.

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

The period of transition did not lead to the restoration of free political activity; it produced on the contrary a tight centralized government unwilling to give up its powers and prerogatives. The promised republican constitution¹ (promulgated on January 16, 1956), though ushering in a new "era of social justice," contained certain restrictive measures which were designed to protect the achievements of the revolution and assure the complete realization of its ultimate goals. Egypt was considered not ready for free parliamentary democracy, and political parties were still not allowed to function. Instead, a new organization, the National Union (*al-ittihad al-qawmi*), replacing the ineffective Liberation Rally, was established to represent all the elements of the population and perform the functions of political parties. According to Article 192 of the constitution, all members of the National Assembly (*majlis al-umma*), the unicameral parliament of the republic, were to be nominated from the National Union, which in turn was to be organized by a special decree issued by the president of the republic. Unlike the Turkish constitution of 1924, which placed the power in parliament and limited the prerogatives of the executive, the new Egyptian constitution gave major power to the president and, by the system of electing the assembly, made parliament almost wholly subordinate

to him. Though the constitution was abolished in February, 1958, with the union of Egypt and Syria, all its major provisions were preserved in the structural pattern of the United Arab Republic.

The first popular vote after the *coup d'état* was cast in a referendum on June 13, 1956, in which the people answered a virtually unanimous "yes" to two "yes or no" questions: Do you approve the constitution? Do you approve of Gamal 'Abdul Nasser as president? Elections of the National Assembly took place on July 3, 1957. Of 2,528 candidates, over a thousand were disqualified by a special committee headed by President Nasser. All cabinet members and army officers ran unopposed in their districts. Two women won seats in the Assembly, the first women to be elected to an Arab parliament. The life of the first National Assembly was short, lasting a little over seven months. Its major action was to approve on February 5, 1958, the union between Egypt and Syria and adopt a seventeen-point provisional charter based on the 1956 constitution to replace the Egyptian and Syrian constitutions. The assembly also nominated Nasser President of the union.

The establishment of the United Arab Republic introduced little change in the fundamental structure and method of government adopted by Egypt. The union and Nasser's presidency were approved by another referendum (February 21, 1958) held in both countries. In Egypt 99.9 per cent of the voters cast their ballot in favor of the union headed by Nasser; in Syria the vote was 99.8 per cent in favor. On March 5 President Nasser promulgated a provisional charter,² which preserved the powers and rights which the chief executive had enjoyed under the 1956 Egyptian constitution: to appoint and dismiss the ministers and vice presidents; to enact administrative regulations and initiate legislation; to convoke and close the National Assembly; to declare a state of emergency and dissolve the assembly; and to conduct foreign relations.

The elections of the National Assembly of the United Arab Republic, which took place in July, 1960, resulted in a parliament similar to that of Egypt in 1957. It was composed of 600 members (200 representing the Syrian region, 400 the Egyptian region), all of whom belonged to the National Union. These elections were the final stage in a series of local and regional elections within the National Union that culminated in two assemblies, an Egyptian general assembly of 3,814 members (2,650 elected and 1,164 appointed) and a Syrian general assembly of 1,800 (1,440 elected and 360 ap-

pointed) members, from which the members of the U.A.R. National Assembly were finally elected.

STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL UNION

President	
Supreme Executive Committee	
General Committee of the General Assembly	
General Assembly	
of the National Union for the U.A.R.	
<i>Syrian Region</i>	<i>Egyptian Region</i>
Executive Committee	Executive Committee
General Committee	General Committee
General Assembly	General Assembly

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The system of government that emerged from direct military rule, first in Egypt, then in its application to the United Arab Republic, adhered to the principle of personal leadership in its executive structure and to the idea of corporate rather than democratic representation in its parliamentary organization. On the administrative level the general bureaucratic structure was preserved with only minor modifications and adjustments in both Egypt and Syria. In practice, the most radical change was in the replacement of the old ruling class by a new military class.

The army held not only the political leadership but also penetrated into every key position in the state—"into the banks and into the reformatory schools, into the 'higher committee for cultural development,' into the sports clubs, the day nurseries, unions, casinos, the frontiers."³ Inexperienced in most of the fields they now controlled but full of energy and zeal to carry out the objectives of the revolution, the members of this new ruling class represented a wide assortment of qualifications and capabilities—some were "plodding, some fanatical, some honest, some shady, some charming, some extremist to the point of eccentricity . . ." ⁴ But they gave the country a new spirit and set it on a totally new road of development.

The most characteristic feature of Egypt's—and to a lesser extent Syria's—political structure is to be found in the disparity between the actual political dominance of the army and the intended civilian participation in the government by the National Union. For in reality the political functions of the state have been discharged by

the military establishment, which has come to fulfill all the functions of a sole political party, while the National Union which was intended to become the regime's political organization has been subordinated to a secondary role with hardly any real participation in political power. Thus, in contrast to Mustafa Kemal's Republican Peoples' party in Turkey, which during Kemal's life controlled the administration and government of the state with complete independence from the military, in Egypt it was the army and not the regime's political party which dominated the state and controlled political life. In the Arab world it was Shishakli, not Nasser, who came closest to the Kemalist example by his attempt in 1953-1954 to base his regime on the single-party principle (Movement of Arab Liberation), which excluded military participation in the political affairs of the state and aimed at establishing a strictly civilian governmental structure in Syria.

Thus the gap between theory and practice in the structure of government in Egypt was not bridged by the establishment of the National Union nor by the creation of a parliamentary system of government. Neither the parliamentary machinery, with its system of restricted referendums and indirect elections, nor the principle of "guided democracy," which prohibits party activity and bases political representation on the corporate principle, have succeeded in changing the character of Egypt's military control.

The sweeping economic and political reforms introduced on the ninth anniversary of the revolution (July-August, 1961) served to complete the process of socialization and to concentrate political power in the hands of the central government. According to the new economic decrees all banks and insurance companies were nationalized; all major companies and firms were taken over by the state; maximum landholding, formerly limited to 200 acres, was halved; maximum individual income was limited, through a surtax system, to 15,000 Egyptian pounds (about \$40,000) a year; a quarter of the profits of all concerns and businesses was to be distributed to employees, either directly or by way of social services; and work was limited to seven hours a day in order to reduce unemployment. On the political level the separation between the federal and regional governments was eliminated and a centralized government with 37 executive ministers (of whom 16 were Syrian) was established; the seat of the government was Cairo but a provision was later made stipulating that four months a year the government would meet in

Damascus. Thus in 1961 a new impetus was given to the revolution; however, together with the enthusiasm it created among the masses a bitter antagonism was engendered among the propertied and middle classes, which brought a new base of opposition to the regime.

Though far from being a police state in the European sense, the United Arab Republic under President Nasser's revolutionary regime has lacked many of the liberties of a democratic state. The powerful Egyptian press has been subjected to severe censorship, and in May, 1960, Cairo's major newspapers and publishing houses were nationalized. The "enemies" of the regime and any individual or group suspected of opposition to it have suffered imprisonment without hearing or immediate trial. The secret police in both Egypt and Syria have become one of the most effective instruments of state control and repression in the Arab world. Yet there seems little doubt that the regime, at least in Egypt, enjoys full popular backing. Compared with the former Wafd administration, the revolutionary government of Nasser has already achieved impressive reforms on all levels of social and economic endeavor. Administrative efficiency has increased, corruption has been reduced to a minimum, and a new class of civil servants has been developed. While it is true that the compelling central force of the new order is still the personal leadership of President Nasser and that the problem of succession still constitutes a major threat to the stability and continued growth of the regime, the institutional transformation and the psychological impact achieved by the revolution have been sufficiently profound to render impossible any return to the old order.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SETTLEMENT

For Egypt, more than for any other country in the Middle East, there is little separation between her internal affairs and her relations with the outside world. By her geographic position—being at once part of the Arab, the African, and the Muslim worlds—Egypt has always been extraordinarily subject to external influences. Her fate in modern times has been either to be dominated by an external power or to try to attain a dominant position in her immediate surroundings. Under 'Abdul Nasser, as under Mehmet Ali, Egypt's internal reforms and her external policies have stemmed from the same effort of warding off foreign domination by extending her own sway. In her decade of revolutionary government Egypt's foreign relations may be summarized by the following major foreign policy

attitudes and steps: liquidation of the Sudan problem; the Suez agreement and the British evacuation; the Bandung conference and positive neutrality; purchase of Soviet arms; nationalization of the Suez Canal Company; union with Syria; and involvement in African affairs. All these topics have received extensive treatment by Western journalists and scholars⁵ and will not be analyzed here. Only the general pattern underlying Egypt's foreign relations will be discussed.

As long as Britain maintained a foothold on Egyptian soil, the major national issue for any Egyptian government was to seek British evacuation. Until its deposition in 1952, the Wafd government had utilized the deadlock in negotiations with the British as a major means of distracting public opinion from its own internal corruption and inefficiency and of maintaining itself in power. The first task of the revolutionary government was simultaneously to liquidate the old ruling clique and to effect Britain's evacuation from the Sudan and the Suez Canal.

With regard to both the Sudan and the Suez Canal the revolutionary government adopted an approach radically different from that taken by the various governments of the former regime. The key to a settlement was the Sudan. The revolutionary government was now willing to allow the Sudanese to determine for themselves whether they wished to federate with Egypt or be independent. An Anglo-Egyptian agreement was concluded on February 12, 1953,⁶ ending the Anglo-Egyptian condominium of 1899 and giving the Sudan the right of self-determination and self-government.

This step led to the resumption of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, which, because of the good offices of the United States and the favorable attitude of Great Britain toward the new regime, finally resulted in the conclusion on October 19, 1954, of the agreement on the Suez Canal,⁷ superseding the agreement of 1936 (unilaterally abrogated by the Wafd government in 1951), and for the first time in seventy-five years set the relations between the two countries on an equitable level. Britain agreed to evacuate the canal base within a period of twenty months after the signature of the agreement (Article 1), and on her part Egypt agreed to allow Britain to reoccupy the base if Egypt, any other Arab state, or Turkey were attacked by an outside power (Article 4). British evacuation proceeded smoothly and was completed ahead of schedule on June 18, 1956.

One week after the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement an

attempt was made by a member of the Muslim Brothers to assassinate Colonel Nasser (October 26, 1954). This episode marked the beginning of Nasser's overt pre-eminence in the government and precipitated the destruction of the last serious threat to the unity of the military regime. The Muslim Brothers, the only powerful political group remaining in Egypt, was liquidated, and, what was more, Nasser's rival, General Naguib, who seemed to have been vaguely implicated in the Muslim Brothers' plot to overthrow the government, was deposed. With Nasser's emergence to open leadership of the revolution, a new phase in Egypt's relations with the outside world began.

POSITIVE NEUTRALITY

Though the military regime, including Colonel Nasser, was favorably inclined to the West, once Britain had agreed to withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory, Egypt's relations with the Western powers—and particularly with the United States—nevertheless began to deteriorate rapidly, and within a year after the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement it had reached the breaking point. The breakdown of Egyptian-American relations may be attributed to two central issues, the Western-sponsored Middle East defense plan and Israel.

Under the newly elected Republican administration the United States had been attempting to bring Egypt into the military scheme for defending the Middle East against possible Soviet aggression; American promises of economic and military aid to Egypt now hinged upon Egypt's willingness to participate in the Western-sponsored plan. When the revolutionary regime resisted commitment to the Western alliance, the northern-tier concept of Secretary of State Dulles was put into effect. The signing of the Iraqi-Turkish agreement in February, 1955,⁸ was taken by Egypt as a deliberate attempt to isolate her and to block her efforts to build up the Arab defensive alliance, based on the Arab defense pact of 1950.⁹ On February 28, 1955, Israel carried out a major raid against an Egyptian military post in the Gaza Strip, in which over fifty Egyptian officers and men were killed. President Nasser appealed to the United States to sell arms to Egypt, but opposition in the Senate together with Mr. Dulles' growing hostility to Nasser led to prolonged negotiations which ended inconclusively. On September 27, 1955, President Nasser announced the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal.

This marked a turning point in the international relations of the Middle East. Russia, through Czechoslovakia, had finally been able to establish a firm foothold in a major Arab country. From 1955 on, the Soviet Union became a Middle Eastern power challenging the West's supremacy in the region. Not since the Russo-Turkish agreement of Unkiar-Skelessi¹⁰ in 1833 had Russia achieved such a position in the Middle East.

Perhaps the strongest element in the Russian approach to Egypt was that they required nothing more of Egypt than that she become "neutral" in her relations with the great powers. This achievement in itself secured for the Soviet Union a significant victory in the cold war, for Egypt had for decades been the center of defense for the entire Middle East. The Russians, moreover, treated Egypt with special consideration and care, correctly estimating the extent of Egypt's influence in the surrounding Arab countries and also in the rising nations of Africa. Egypt's special position was not properly appreciated by Dulles, who in 1955 sought to uphold Iraq as the leading power in the Arab world and in 1957 to back King Sa'ud in his bid to take over Nasser's leadership of the Arab countries. Furthermore, the unwillingness of the United States to sell arms to Egypt in 1955 and the withdrawal of the offer of financial assistance for the Aswan Dam in 1956 were regarded by the Arabs as results of internal politics in the U.S., whereby the Jewish constituency represented Israel's cause to the detriment of the Arabs'. Meanwhile, any and all contradictions in the United States' approach to the problems of the Middle East were being adroitly exploited by the consistent and increasingly successful Soviet policy. It is against this background that the decline of Western influence and the rise of Soviet power in the Middle East should be investigated.

Egypt's adoption of "positive neutrality" was not due only to the West's attitude toward Egypt or to the Soviet Union's unconditional assistance, but also to the new regime's conviction that to preserve Egyptian sovereignty and independence and to play her proper role in the Arab world and Africa Egypt should refrain from any commitment to either camp. This position was strengthened by President Nasser's participation in the Bandung conference in April, 1955, and it was further crystallized by his intimate contact with Prime Minister Nehru and President Tito, with whom he henceforth maintained close association.

The crucial test, to which Egypt's policies were exposed, was Suez

in 1956, when Egypt defied the Western powers and was exposed to direct military action by Britain and France. The fact that Egypt was militarily defeated and yet able to emerge victorious from the battle proved two things to the world's newer nations: that a small nation could exercise complete national sovereignty, and that in the existing world climate the military superiority of the former colonial powers of the West would not be used as an instrument of policy against the smaller nations. In Africa and Asia this outcome of the Suez crisis marked another era of international relations, and Egypt became the model of the rising nations of the world.

ARAB UNITY

In his *Philosophy of the Revolution*,¹¹ a confused and disjointed statement of the intentions and aims of the revolution, Nasser conceives of Egypt's role as spiraling in "three circles," the Arab, the African, and the Muslim. As he gained world stature, the Egyptian president set forth to play this triple role in these three worlds. His success here was considerably less than with the great powers. Egypt's most serious drawback lay in the fact that her attempt to identify herself with Arabism and African nationalism was rooted in her own national political interests; and her right to acknowledged leadership of the Muslim world was not unanimously accepted. Her relations with her immediate environment have, since Mehmet Ali, been tinged with self-interest and a tendency toward expansionism and exploitation. In acting on Nasser's wish to establish Egypt's relations with her neighbors on a new level of mutual benefit and respect, Egyptian policy in all three circles appeared unmistakably political in character and domineering in approach.

A number of Arab Muslims were wary of the attempt to revive Islamic ties. By its very nature the revolution was secular and in many of its political and social reforms it disregarded or went counter to strict Islamic dogma. Moreover, Islam as a political force had already begun to wane somewhat in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and after the First World War—in which Muslims fought against the Ottoman Caliphate—its impact had weakened. In the Middle East the two non-Arab Muslim states, Turkey and Iran, had discarded Islam from political life and were not prevented by Islamic ties with the Arab countries from recognizing the state of Israel. Egypt's Islamic revival was meant primarily for Muslim sub-Saharan Africa, where Islam still represented a potent political force. By combining

the two factors of religion and nationalism, the Egyptian revolution succeeded to some extent in spreading its influence in those predominantly Muslim regions of black Africa. But again, the force of Muslim brotherhood has proved too frail to withstand political and economic interests, as seen by the willingness of African Muslims to cooperate with Israel.

Perhaps the most severe blow to Nasser's hopes in Africa was dealt by the Sudan's refusal to unite with Egypt. Like Egypt, the Sudan is Arab, Muslim as well as African. It was in the Sudan, the country in which Egypt's triple-circle policy most probably could be realized, that Egypt met its gravest disappointment.

The most persistent efforts of the revolution were concentrated in the sphere of Arab nationalism. To Egyptians the concept of Arab nationalism was of minor importance until the Second World War, and Egypt's role in the formation of the Arab League was motivated by political rather than ideological considerations.¹² In fact, until 1955 the revolution was strictly Egyptian in character and orientation; it represented the final phase of the Egyptian nationalist movement which had its origins in Colonel 'Arabi's revolt against the Khedive and the British in 1881-1882 and in Mustafa Kamil's (d. 1908) struggle for Egyptian independence.¹³

It can be said that the leadership of Arab nationalism was in fact bestowed upon Nasser before he energetically assumed it. The act which brought Nasser the feverish acclaim of the masses throughout the Arab world was the Czechoslovak arms deal in September, 1955. Almost overnight Nasser, holding a newly realized power to exercise on behalf of Arab aspirations, emerged as the new Saladin of the Arab world. As one of his biographers put it:

In their excitement [the Arabs] convinced themselves that shortly their problems would vanish. Palestine would be reoccupied by the Arabs. The Jews would disappear. The simpler Arabs even believed that somehow this would mean more food, better housing, good clothes, and salvation for everyone.¹⁴

It is from that time on that Nasser and his colleagues began to speak in terms of Arab nationalism and Arab unity.¹⁵ The rise to power during 1955-1956 of the Arab Resurrection (Ba'th) party in Syria and its whole-hearted support of Nasser was a major factor leading to the formation of the Egyptian-Syrian alliance and, gradually, to the

adoption by the Egyptian revolution of the Damascene ideology of Arab nationalism.

The most surprising result of Egypt's efforts to achieve Arab unity was its unexpected success in persuading Yemen, the most isolated and backward of all the Arab countries, to enter the vague federation of the United Arab States.¹⁶ As it was later revealed by a member of the former Revolutionary Command Council,¹⁷ the federation plan was originally designed as the basis of an Egyptian-Sudanese federation, which was to become the nucleus of the larger unity of the Nile valley and the center of power in the Arab world and Africa.

Ironically, the year 1958 which saw the near-realization of Arab unity under Egyptian leadership—with the formation of the United Arab Republic and the overthrow of the Hashimites in Iraq by the Iraqi military *coup d'état*—also marked the beginning of a new rivalry between Egypt and Iraq, the strongest revolutionary regimes in the Arab world, and the deadlock of the Arab unity movement. With the solidification of Arab resistance to Egyptian leadership created by Iraq's attitude, Nasser's following began to decline. The pro-Nasser nationalists in Lebanon, Jordan, and Sa'udi Arabia, frustrated by too many failures—unfruitful demonstrations, rebellions, attempts at *coups d'état*, assassinations—began to lose their pro-Egyptian fervor and to reconcile themselves to the *status quo*. The Ba'ath party, Nasser's original supporter and source of his ideological inspiration, abandoned him and joined the forces of Egyptian opposition.¹⁸ By the beginning of the 1960's the flood tide of the Egyptian-sponsored movement for Arab unity was already in its ebb, and a mood of bitterness and frustration hung over the Arab world. Egypt turned her attention to industrialization and the Aswan Dam and slowly began to look toward Africa.

IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTION

By its successes as well as by its failures the Egyptian revolution has changed the face of the Arab Middle East. By overflowing Egypt's frontiers into the surrounding Arab countries, the revolution has shaken the remaining traditional structures of Arab society and speeded the process of social and political transformation. Though the movement toward Arab unity has received a severe setback as a result of Egypt's Arab policies, Egypt's efforts in the Arab world have immeasurably enhanced the mass awakening. And though the revolution has more firmly established the principle of authoritarian gov-

ernment in the Arab countries, it has also implanted the concept and reality of the welfare state.

By uniting with Syria Egypt became the strongest state in the Arab world and the most influential country in the Middle East. It includes half of the population and occupies almost half of the territory of the Arab Middle East. Internally as well as in its foreign and regional relations, every development in the United Arab Republic has direct bearing on the surrounding Arab states and their relations with the outside world. No Middle Eastern problem can have a lasting solution without U.A.R. participation.

Paradoxically, the aspects which have given the revolution its strength have also proved to be its shortcomings. Internally, by putting the fate of the state into the hands of one man, the revolution curtailed liberty; by prohibiting party activity and distorting parliamentary representation in order to prevent disintegration, it stunted the growth of a politically mature and responsible generation. In its relations with other Arab states, the revolution's shortcomings were clearer: by relying on propaganda as a means of shaping mass opinion and on violence as an instrument of political action, it created an atmosphere of intimidation and mistrust in the Arab world, in which right and wrong, truth and falsehood, could no longer be distinguished.

Yet 'Abdul Nasser's leadership has given rise to a new hope in the Arab world. By personal example he has shown that honesty, dedication, and courage can be attributes of government in the Arab world. His disappearance from the political scene could never undo the deep impression that he has already made on Egyptian and Arab political life. To Egypt he restored a sense of dignity and national pride; he re-established contact between ruler and ruled and revived the people's faith in the mission of the government. He was the first chief of state in the Arab world to set up social justice as the goal of government and to embark on social and economic reforms which have become the model of all Middle Eastern states. In all its aspects—good and bad—Egypt's revolutionary movement illustrates, as no other movement in the Middle East does, all the conditions of the painful but fruitful change which the peoples and states of the Middle East experienced in the postwar era of revolution and reform.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1. Text in *Oriente Moderno* (May, 1956), pp. 289-300; also see Curtis F. Jones, "The Egyptian Constitution," *Middle East Journal* (Summer, 1956), pp. 300-306.
2. Text in *ibid.* (March, 1958), pp. 207-210.
3. Cf. Jean and Simonne Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* (New York, 1958), p. 195.
4. Cf. James Morris, *Islam Inflamed* (New York, 1957), p. 28.
5. E.g., A. H. Hourani, "The Middle East and the Crisis of 1956," in St. Anthony's Papers, *Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 1* (London, 1958), pp. 9-42; Lacouture, *op. cit.*, pp. 543-544; Keith Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis* (New York, 1960), pp. 228-276; Robert St. John, *The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser* (New York, 1960), pp. 185-298.
6. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. I, Doc. 99.
7. *Ibid.*, Doc. 105. The treaty was unilaterally abrogated by Egypt in November, 1956, during the Anglo-French invasion of Suez.
8. See above, Chap. Twelve, p. 158.
9. Text in Hurewitz, vol. II, Doc. 93.
10. Text in *ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 41.
11. Cairo, 1954.
12. Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes toward pan-Arabism," *Middle East Journal* (Summer, 1957), pp. 253-263.
13. Cf. Desmond Stewart, *Young Egypt* (London, 1958), pp. 78-114.
14. St. John, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-211.
15. Contrast his tone in the *Philosophy of the Revolution*, p. 12.
16. See text in Arab Information Center, *Basic Documents of Arab Unifications* (New York, 1958), pp. 21-25.
17. Salah Salim, *al-Sha'b* (Cairo), June 30, 1956.
18. See above, Chap. Ten, pp. 132-133.



PART SIX:

Arabian Peninsula ❦



Sa'udi Arabia

"La propriété c'est le vol."

Proudhon, Qu'est-ce que la Propriété?

WAHHABISM AND THE RISE OF THE HOUSE OF SA'UD

Sa'udi Arabia, one of the richest oil-producing countries in the world, represents one of the last patriarchal states in the world. As in old patriarchal societies, all power in Sa'udi Arabia is concentrated in the person of the king, who is subject only to the law of God. Every act of government whether legislative, administrative, or executive, must have the king's sanction; and whatever authority the officials of government—from prime minister to lowest functionary—possess, it is by virtue of the king's delegation, which he may restrict or withdraw at will. Strictly speaking, government and civil service in the Western sense of these terms do not exist in Sa'udi Arabia; rather it is a household administrative organization, composed of assistants and servants whose duty is absolute compliance to the king's will.

Local government is practically unknown, except for the "municipal councils" of Mecca, Medina, and Jidda, which are composed of religious figures and notables appointed by the king and have strictly advisory powers. The four regions of the kingdom are under regional governors who are personal representatives of the king. The official constitution of state is the Koran, and the entire judicial system is based on the *shari'a*. There are three levels of law courts which handle all legal cases from petty larceny to homicide: "courts of urgent matters" that deal with misdemeanors and minor infringements of the law; "high courts of the *shari'a*," concerned with civil suits, criminal matters, and cases relating to marriage, divorce, and inheritance; and "courts of appeal."

The distinctive feature of the Sa'udi state is its Wahhabism, the Sunni Muslim creed which was established in the eighteenth century by the Arabian preacher and reformer Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab (d. 1792). With the fanaticism and intransigence of a Savonarola, Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab sought singlehandedly to reform eighteenth-

century Islam and to bring back the community of believers to the "straight path" prescribed by the Koran. Toynbee and other historians of the Middle East consider the Wahhabi movement as the first reformist movement of modern Islam. Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab aimed, in fact, not so much at extending the faith to the world of unbelievers as at fighting those Muslims who have sinned against the true faith and "strayed from the straight path of the law."

Wahhabism is, in essence, a simple, puritanical, and iconoclastic unitarianism. It prescribes a spartan ethic of simple living, strict adherence to the literal commandments of God, and a return to the purity of early Islam. Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab condemned the worship of saints and branded all innovations of the various Islamic schools as heretical. It was Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab's good fortune to be able early in his career to convert to his teachings the house of Sa'ud, the local emirs of Dar'ya in central Arabia. With their support, the Wahhabi movement gained a militant, political character and within half a century succeeded in extending its sway over the greater part of Arabia, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the Hejaz. By occupying and "purifying" the holy places, the Sa'udi Wahhabis attracted the attention of the Muslim world and incurred the wrath of the Ottoman sultan-caliph, who, as defender of the faith, ordered Mehmet Ali of Egypt to subdue the rebellious sect and to free the holy places. By 1818 the Hejaz was reconquered and the Sa'udi center of Dar'ya razed to the ground. Sa'udi power, though greatly reduced, did not wholly die out. Its eclipse lasted nearly a century, until 1902 when young 'Abdul 'Aziz al Sa'ud (1902-1953) occupied Riyadh, the kingdom's present capital, reestablished Sa'udi hegemony in central Arabia, and laid the foundations for the modern state of Sa'udi Arabia.

In the course of the first quarter of the present century, Ibn Sa'ud (as 'Abdul 'Aziz later became known) was able to found, through force, diplomacy, and political maneuvering, one of the largest states of the modern Middle East and the greatest in Arabia since the days of Muhammad. Before the outbreak of the First World War, Arabia was divided, as it had been since the disintegration of the Umayyad empire in the eighth century, into a number of principalities, sultanates, and sheikhdoms. Apart from Wahhabi Nejd, the main divisions before 1914 were: (1) the Hejaz, along the western coast of Arabia on the Red Sea, under the *sherifs* of Mecca and part of the Ottoman empire; (2) 'Asir, on the Red Sea between the Hejaz and

Yemen, under the rule of the Idrissi dynasty, also part of the Ottoman empire; (3) northern Arabia under the Rashid dynasty of Ha'il and a tributary to the Ottoman empire; (4) Hassa, along the Persian Gulf between Kuwait and the Trucial coast, a province of the Ottoman empire; (5) Yemen, under the Zaidi Imams of San'a and part of the Ottoman empire; and (6) the Persian Gulf and south Arabian principalities, sultanates, and sheikhdoms (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Trucial coast, Musqat and Oman, Hadhramaut, and Aden), all under British protection.

Of these, only Yemen and the British-protected areas did not eventually fall under Sa'udi rule. Hassa was the first to be annexed in 1913. Shortly after the war (1919), the Hejaz, a Hashimite kingdom since 1916, was attacked but not fully occupied until December, 1925. 'Asir was made a Sa'udi protectorate in 1926 and assimilated a few years later. Ha'il and northern Arabia fell in 1921, bringing to an end the rule of the Rashid dynasty, the age-long enemies of the house of Sa'ud. When on January 29, 1927, Ibn Sa'ud formally proclaimed himself "King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies," his kingdom stretched from the Persian Gulf in the east to the Red Sea in the west and from the Syrian Desert in the north to the southern expanses of the Empty Quarter in the south, an area of about 900,000 square miles, or three times the size of Texas.

The importance of the transformation of Arabia under Ibn Sa'ud in the postwar Middle East was not fully realized until the late 1920's. Even Great Britain, the power most involved in Arabia and the Middle East, failed to appreciate the significance of these developments, and her representative in Jidda held until 1927 no higher rank than that of vice-consul. The British-Sa'udi treaty,¹ concluded in 1915, placed Ibn Sa'ud on the same level as the "protected" lesser "Gulf chiefs"; although Britain acknowledged Ibn Sa'ud's independence in Nejd and recognized his acquisition of Hassa, he was bound by the treaty, like the sheikhs of Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Trucial coast, not to enter into "any correspondence, agreement, or treaty" with any foreign power and not to "cede, sell, mortgage . . . or grant concessions" to any foreign power or its nationals. By 1925 this treaty had naturally become obsolete, in view of postwar developments in Arabia, but it was not readjusted until 1927, after Soviet Russia, taking precedence over other European powers, recognized Ibn Sa'ud and established the first foreign legation in Jidda. France and the Netherlands followed suit; Great Britain, after a decent wait, raised

its consulate to legation and, on May 20, 1927, signed a new treaty² with the Sa'udi monarch which acknowledged the "complete and absolute independence of the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies" and recognized the new *status quo* in Arabia.

KING IBN SA'UD

Arab history since Muhammed shows that Arab empires could be speedily built by sheer religious fervor, but when religious zeal subsided and political leadership replaced religious guidance, the ephemeral structure of empire crumbled and the state reverted to the disunity and factionalism of primitive Arabian tribalism. In modern times the kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia (as Ibn Sa'ud officially renamed his empire in 1932) proved a signal exception to this rule. This was due partly to the favorable pattern of political change in the Middle East during the first quarter of the twentieth century and partly to Ibn Sa'ud's leadership and political foresight.

One of his most original political moves was the creation in 1912 of the Wahhabi *Ikhwan* (brotherhood) settlements in Nejd. By transforming the Nejdi tribesmen from warring *badu* (nomads) into settled *fellahin* (agriculturalists), he replaced tribal allegiance by religious fervor and created within the Wahhabi community a spiritual and military elite that rendered Sa'udi leadership practically impregnable. The *Ikhwan* presented the strongest military striking force in the Arabian peninsula and were able to win for Ibn Sa'ud every battle in which they were engaged between 1913 and 1927. After the conquest of the Hejaz, however, when the *Ikhwan* became a threat to Ibn Sa'ud, he did not hesitate to destroy the organization. The *Ikhwan* clamored for more *jihad* against Syria and Iraq, and opposed all toleration toward non-Wahhabis as irreligion, and denounced all material progress as corruption. Ibn Sa'ud became the target of their discontent, and some of their leaders actually revolted, but by 1929 these leaders were eliminated and the entire realm was pacified.

Ibn Sa'ud was a despot with deep religious convictions. He was the last of the truly great patriarchs. He never doubted that God showed direct interest in him and guided all his actions.

We believe [he once said] that Allah the Exalted One uses us as His instrument. As long as we serve Him we will succeed; no power can check us and no enemy will be able to kill us. Should we become

a useless weapon in His hands then He will throw us aside—and we shall praise Him.

Although an absolute monarch, Ibn Sa'ud was genuinely responsive to his people's will. Any of his subjects could have an audience with him at almost any time. He was fond of repeating the dictum that "he who rules by the will of the people has nothing to fear, while he who rules despotically in their despite goes ever in dread." It never occurred to him that he himself could be viewed as a despot. Autocratic by nature, he was never able to delegate authority, even in the smallest matters. None of his government officials, not even his sons and personal representatives, had any real power in the state. At the Arab League meetings, the Sa'udi delegates could not make any decision without first receiving the King's approval. Their standing instructions were to "vote with the majority when possible . . . [or] with the anti-Hashimite bloc." ³

Ibn Sa'ud never traveled abroad; during his lifetime he left Arabia only twice, once to go to Basra and another time to visit Egypt. Although he showed keen interest in world political events and was somewhat curious about life in the outside world, he never seriously concerned himself with its social or intellectual problems. St. John Philby, the English Muslim who was his friend and adviser for nearly twenty-five years, reports that once, while explaining to members of the court that the earth was round, the King interrupted him by saying, "Philby, Allah's word says that the world is flat, and thus it is!"

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The transformation of Ibn Sa'ud's tiny sultanate of Nejd into the greatest Arabian kingdom since the days of the Prophet resulted in the transformation of the old paternal theocracy of the Wahhabi sect into the complex bureaucracy of an absolute monarchy. At first the change was slow and gradual, and the innovations few and far apart; but with the discovery of oil, the last remnants of the old ways and habits crumbled, and sudden affluence swept before it, as Philby put it, "every barrier of reason, religion, and morality."

Ibn Sa'ud effected the first serious departure from the old pattern of tribal organization when in 1926, he established, a separate administrative system for the urban and more advanced province of the Hejaz, as embodied in the so-called "Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hejaz." ⁴ Although never fully implemented, this "constitu-

tion" nevertheless provided the future groundwork for the political and administrative changes in the entire kingdom. Ibn Sa'ud also introduced some Western innovations, such as the car, the wireless, and the telephone. The Wahhabis in Nejd viewed with great misgivings these departures from established customs. At a conference held in Riyadh in 1927, the Wahhabi notables insisted that taxation was unlawful and contrary to the *shari'a* and that the Ottoman *qanun*⁵ in the Hejaz should be abolished and replaced by the *shari'a*. The telephone and the radio were subjected to prolonged and complicated debates. As to airplanes, those who flew in them were regarded as "flying in the face of Providence." The car was viewed as the instrument of the devil. (The first lorry to enter the town of Hauta was burned publicly in the market place, and the driver nearly shared its fate.) By compromise, persuasion, and force, Ibn Sa'ud's will eventually prevailed. The ulemas succumbed, and again it was shown that in Wahhabism, as in the other schools of Islam, it was possible for the Imam to combine "diplomacy with the role of a Puritan divine" without being denounced as a heretic.

In government, the first council of ministers was set up in 1931, but only two ministries were actually created—the ministry of finance and the ministry for foreign affairs. From the start, the ministry of finance proved the most important agency in the government and the one capable of exercising a measure of independent authority. The King, however, still reserved for himself the last decision in financial as well as in all other matters. The first few years after the Second World War, during which money from oil started coming in, saw the gradual breakdown of the old administrative system. Its weaknesses, resulting from total dependence upon the King in all matters, became increasingly evident but could not be remedied by merely expanding the existing administrative organs within the patriarchal framework. The establishment of various new departments and directorates only served to glut the bureaucratic machinery and create new fiefs for independent chiefs who were accountable to no authority other than the King, already overloaded with work beyond the endurance of any single individual. Coordination between these departments did not exist, since there was no government to supervise their functioning. The ministry of finance under Abdullah Al-Sulayman, its original and aging head, became more and more the controlling center of the administration and was now run as a practically

separate institution in the state. It is not surprising, therefore, that despite the enormous wealth accruing to Sa'udi Arabia after 1945, the government not only failed to build its reserves but ran a public debt which amounted to many millions of dollars.

In 1944 a ministry of defense was created, and during the last three years of Ibn Sa'ud's reign, five new ministries were added: interior, communications, education, agriculture, and commerce. A number of new agencies were also created, including the department of labor, the directorate general of petroleum and mineral affairs, and the directorate general of broadcasting, press, and publications.

Shortly before his death in 1953, when his sight had almost completely failed and his various maladies kept him confined to a wheel chair, Ibn Sa'ud ordered the formation of a council of ministers composed of all the ministers of state under the presidency of his eldest son, Crown Prince Sa'ud.⁶ But before the council was actually formed, the King died and a new political phase in Sa'udi Arabia began.

Before he died, Ibn Sa'ud saw the country he had brought into being change beyond recognition. The change was not merely due to the reforms he introduced but to the sudden wealth from oil. Before the First World War, Ibn Sa'ud's yearly income did not exceed \$200,000; in the interwar period it rose to an average of about \$10 million; after 1945 it increased breathlessly: \$60 million in 1948, \$160 million in 1951, and in the year Ibn Sa'ud died, it reached \$250 million. By that time Wahhabi puritanism had all but succumbed to the many temptations of money.

One by one [Philby writes], at first furtively and later more brazenly, the inhibitions of the old Wahhabi regime went by the board. In the name of military efficiency, the once forbidden charms of music were openly paraded on the palace square. . . . The forbidden cinema reared its ogling screens in scores of princely palaces and wealthy mansions to flaunt the less respectable products of Hollywood before audiences which would have blushed or shuddered at the sight but ten or fifteen years ago. Liquor and drugs have penetrated, more or less discreetly, into quarters where, in the old days, people had been slain at sight for the crime of smoking tobacco, which has become now a substantial source of State revenue. Even the seclusion of women has been tempered to the prevailing breeze of modernism; and the motor-car provides facilities for visits to some beach or desert pleasance where they dance or frolic to the

tunes of a gramophone (another prohibited article) in the latest summer frocks from Paris, or dine *alfresco* in strapless bodices.⁷

Van der Meulen, a noted Dutch Arabist and a friend of Ibn Sa'ud summarized the achievements of the Arabian King as follows:

He was a great desert warrior, he could understand and lead men, he was even a statesman with understanding of world politics, but he was no real spiritual leader, and he failed to guide his people in the present-day problems of Islam. But it is only fair to add that where he failed no one else throughout the whole world of Islam succeeded. The spiritual rebirth of Islam is yet to come.⁸

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

On May 11, 1958, a royal decree⁹ was promulgated by the second king of modern Sa'udi Arabia, Sa'ud Ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz al Sa'ud (1953-), that represents the first serious attempt to give Sa'udi Arabia an organized form of government. Though mostly limited to executive and administrative matters, the decree initiated a process of development that held promise of further progress and reform.

The most important feature of the decree lay in its clearly defining the duties and functions of the council of ministers (created by Ibn Sa'ud in 1953), in prescribing the rules and procedures of administrative and legislative action, and in establishing the framework for future legislative developments. Although the king still possessed final authority in all executive and legislative matters, a beginning was nevertheless made in achieving a smoother meshing of governmental and administrative machinery.

The council was defined as consisting of the prime minister (president of the council), a vice-president, the departmental ministers and ministers of state, and such advisers of the king as were appointed by royal command (Article 11). The functions of the council were to:

. . . draw up the policy of the State, internal and external, financial and economic, educational and defense, and in all public affairs; and [to] supervise its execution; [it has] legislative authority and executive authority and administrative authority. . . International treaties and agreements shall not be regarded as effective, except after its approval. . . (Article 18).

The decisions of the council were described as "final," except those which "require the issue of a royal command or decree" (Article 18).

In executive and administrative matters, the council was given supreme authority "to take any action which it considers in the interest of the country" (Articles 25 and 26). The prime minister was charged with ensuring "the direction and ordering and cooperation between the various ministries," supervising "the uniformity and unity of operations of the Council of Ministers," and directing "the general policy of the State" (Article 44).

In legislative matters "every Minister has the right to present to the Council a project of law within the scope of his Ministry . . . and the Council may agree thereto or reject it" (Article 22). Moreover, members had the right "to propose any matter which [they] may consider expedient for discussion in the Council" (Article 22). Final approval of all legislative decrees, however, rested with the king. Article 23, dealing with the king's power to withhold approval, stated that:

. . . if His Majesty the King does not approve of any decree or order put forward to him for his signature, it will be returned to the Council, with a statement of the reasons leading thereto, for discussion thereof. And, if the decree or order is not returned by the secretariat of His Majesty the King to the Council of Ministers within thirty days of the date of its receipt, the President of the Council shall take such action as he may think appropriate: informing the Council thereof.

Financial affairs were given special attention. The Council of Ministers was made the source of final authority for the financial affairs of the State (Article 28). Taxes and duties, the sale or lease of state property, the grant of monopolies and concessions were made subject to special statutes (Articles 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33). Every contract entered into by the government was to be in accordance with the "rules of the budget," and all receipts of the state were to be handed over to a "unified public treasury" (Articles 34, 35, and 36). A state budget, "comprising estimates of the receipts and disbursements for that year," was to be drawn up every year by the council and submitted to the King for approval (Article 37).

The decree included special provisions which excluded non-Sa'udi nationals from membership in the council (i.e., from holding ministerial office), prohibited combining membership in the council with any other government office, and forbade council members from engaging, "either directly or through an intermediary," in financial or

commercial deals with the government or any of its agencies (Articles 3, 5, and 6).

Despite its shortcomings and many ambiguities, the 1958 decree represents the most important advance made in the political life of Sa'udi Arabia in half a century. The fact remains, however, that the gap between theory and practice is wide, particularly in a country where an orderly institutional tradition is completely lacking. Indeed, the first violation of the decree of 1958 occurred on the very day of its promulgation, when it appeared bearing only the King's signature without that of the prime minister as required by Article 47 of the decree.

The realities of political authority and executive power in Sa'udi Arabia were not expected to be greatly affected by assigning the council of ministers wide and extensive powers. When King Sa'ud succeeded to the throne in 1953, he inherited his father's patriarchal absolutism, and as long as he continued to receive the backing of the leading Sa'udi princes (his brothers and uncles), and especially of Crown Prince Faisal, his authority remained absolute, regardless of any theoretical limitations set upon it, as in the 1958 decree.

It should also be remembered that in Sa'udi Arabia there exist no political parties of any kind, nor are there any leading families or political leaders who can effectively contest Sa'udi leadership in the state. All key positions of the government are held by the Sa'udi princes ("of whom there is perhaps one to every 5,000 souls of Sa'udi Arabian population" [Philby]), or by individuals of unquestioned loyalty to the royal family. The army, which represents the sole potential threat to the regime, is kept small (13,000) and widely dispersed throughout the country; while the royal bodyguard, the so-called "White Army" recruited from among the remnants of the Wahhabi *Ikhwan*, is poised against any threat to the *status quo*.

The reorganization of government and administration by the decree of 1958 was not the result of a spontaneous desire for reform but rather the outcome of two separate events: the financial crisis of 1958, which brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy, and King Sa'ud's implication in the conspiracy to assassinate President Nasser.¹⁰ Crown Prince Faisal, who had taken up residence in Cairo a few years earlier, was recalled to take actual charge of government. Two camps were now clearly defined within the royal family, that of the King and that of the Crown Prince. The major factor determining the balance between the two centers of power was the body of

leading princes who gave their backing to one or the other, depending upon the advantages which they received from each.

It is quite obvious that although wide possibilities exist for further modernization and advancement of Sa'udi government and administration, the actual concentration of authority in the existing patriarchal system not only limits the efficacy of any future progress but also precludes the possibility of orderly and peaceful advancement toward a democratic or constitutional form of government.

OIL WEALTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE

A fact which often goes unnoticed but which should always be kept in mind is that Sa'udi Arabia, like Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, is a *depressed*, not an *underdeveloped*, country. The single rich resource of Sa'udi Arabia, as well as that of the three oil-producing sheikhdoms, has been subjected to the fullest and most advanced form of exploitation. Lacking other rich natural resources, including irrigable and cultivable land, these countries are *naturally* poor and incapable of economic development beyond a certain point which, even under the best conditions, cannot sustain a tolerable standard of life.

Since 1945, it is true, material progress in Sa'udi Arabia has been tremendous, despite fearful waste in planning and expenditure. Hospitals, schools, farms, and palaces were built; electricity, fresh-water supplies, and sanitation were introduced; and a modern system of railroads and airports was built. During this period, population sharply increased, not only because of the great number of Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese, Egyptians, and Yemenis who came to Sa'udi Arabia to work, but also because of the new sanitation and health protection which lowered infantile mortality and limited the spread of epidemics and contagious diseases. The population of the chief cities of Jidda, Mecca, and Riyadh increased by over 400 per cent, and villages like Dahran, Hufuf, Khobar, and Dammam in eastern Arabia became large and populous towns. The most reliable estimates put Sa'udi Arabia's population in 1959 at 8 million.

Over 90 per cent of Sa'udi Arabian income comes from oil. Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1938, but production in sizable quantities (as well as extensive construction, exploration, and drilling) did not start until the end of the Second World War. In 1945 an average of 58,000 barrels per day was produced; by 1961 production had risen to almost a million and a half barrels a day. The

country's reserves of crude oil have been estimated at about 20 per cent of the free world's total; production in 1958 accounted for 6.5 per cent of the total crude oil production in the free world. The first concession to exploit Sa'udi Arabian oil was granted in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of California, which in 1936 sold a half interest to the Texas Company, with which it was jointly renamed, in 1944, the "Arabian American Oil Company" (Aramco). In 1948 shareholdings in Aramco were redistributed among the following companies: Standard of California (30 per cent), Texas (30 per cent), Standard of New Jersey (30 per cent) and Socony Mobil (10 per cent). In 1949 another concession was granted to the Pacific Western Oil Corporation (J. Paul Getty, 100 per cent), covering all Sa'udi Arabia's half-interest in the Sa'udi Arabian-Kuwait Neutral Zone. In 1950 the agreement with the Aramco group was revised, increasing Sa'udi Arabia's share to 50 per cent of the total profits. A new departure from the regular pattern of the Middle East's "fifty-fifty" profit-sharing agreements was made when in 1957 Sa'udi Arabia gave a third concession to a Japanese company covering the offshore area of Sa'udi Arabia's half interest in the Neutral Zone. According to this agreement, Sa'udi Arabia received 56 per cent of *all* profits, including those derived from refining, transportation, and marketing operations. Since 1945 Sa'udi Arabia's total income from oil has been estimated at over 1.5 billion dollars.

✓ The chief problem of wealth in Sa'udi Arabia (as in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar) was that no real distinction existed between the finances of the state and those of the ruling family. In the first detailed budget (for the year 1958-1959) published since the reorganization of the government, an attempt was made to solve this problem. The royal household was assigned a total sum of 65 million dollars, or 17 per cent of the budget, to be spent at the discretion of the King. Whether this sum includes grants to tribal chiefs (amounting to about 20 million dollars annually), expenditures on palace building and maintenance, and on royal trips abroad was not made clear. It seems more likely that the royal expenses account for 35 to 40 per cent of the country's national income. The highest single allocation, according to this budget, amounted to 89 million dollars, or 24 per cent of the national income, and was made for "defense and aviation." Education and communications were allotted 29 million and 27 million dollars, respectively. The second highest sum, 72 million dollars, was entered under "other expenditures." The total national income

was given at 373 million dollars. Little change was made in the budget for 1959-1960. For 1960-1961, in which the total national income was set at \$396.6 million, two new items appeared: "expansion of mosques and new religious projects," and "general debts," with an allocation of \$64.40 million and \$50.40 million respectively, amounting to nearly 30 per cent of the total revenue.

No real opposition to the *status quo* exists in Sa'udi Arabia. This is partly because Sa'udi Arabian society is composed of only two classes, the very rich and the very poor, and partly because the poor are as powerless as they are inarticulate, while the rich are happy and well satisfied. Yet, there are factors at work that render the social situation in Sa'udi Arabia somewhat flexible: the increase in elementary and secondary education; the impact resulting from contact with foreigners and socially more advanced Arabs; the infiltration of some of the oil wealth into the lower layers of society; the rise of a small but compact labor class in the oil-producing regions; and the emergence of a Sa'udi intelligentsia. Tight government control, however, together with severe censorship and security measures, has made almost impossible the free dissemination of ideas and blocked the formation of any type of political or cultural organizations. In the last two decades, material advance has so outstripped social and political progress that it is hard to find a society more formless and contradictory. One cannot help but conclude that socially as well as economically the future of Sa'udi Arabia remains bleak.

SA'UDI ARABIA EXPENDITURE, 1958-1959

	(millions of dollars*)	(%)
Royal household	65	17.2
Council of ministers	4	1.3
Foreign affairs	4	1.3
Defense and aviation	89	23.7
Interior	25	6.6
Education	29	7.8
Communications	27	7.6
Agriculture	5	1.5
Finance and national economy ...	10	2.7
Health	17	4.2
Commerce	1	0.2
Chief justices and religious groups ..	11	2.9
Public works	14	3.9
Other expenditure	72	19.1
Total	373	100

* \$1.00 = SR3.75.

SA'UDI ARABIA REVENUE, 1958-1959

	(millions of dollars*)	(%)
Income tax, <i>zakat</i> and services	228	60
Oil revenues	78	20
Customs	32	8.51
Stamps, licenses, and taxes	8	2.28
Railroads	6	1.77
Airways	6	1.70
Telegraph, post, and telephone	2	0.39
Pension deductions	2	0.56
Sundries	11	3.11
Total	373	100

* \$1.00 = SR3.75.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

After its territorial unification in 1926, Sa'udi Arabia sought to achieve four goals in her relations with the outside world: (1) the consolidation and preservation of the Sa'udi domain within its 1926 frontiers against encroachments from within and from without; (2) the establishment of friendly relations with the surrounding Arab and Muslim countries of the Middle East, for the purpose of maintaining a regional balance that would guarantee her territorial integrity and prevent the formation of a strong Hashimite block hostile to Sa'udi Arabia; (3) the maintenance of an attitude of correct friendship with the Western powers, especially those having special interests in the Middle East; and (4) a guarantee at any price of the continuous flow of Sa'udi oil.

In the 1920's, King Ibn Sa'ud was most concerned about his relations with Great Britain, the major power in the Middle East whose interests impinged upon his. After the signing of the Treaty of Jidda,¹¹ however, not only was the Anglo-Sa'udi treaty of 1915¹² annulled, but full recognition was given to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new kingdom, and new prestige was bestowed upon Ibn Sa'ud. He was now recognized by all the major Western powers, as well as by the independent states of the Middle East. In the late 1930's, Italy and Germany tried to woo Ibn Sa'ud into closer relations, but he preferred to maintain good relations with Great Britain. When war broke out, Sa'udi Arabia was the only independent country in the Middle East to take a friendly attitude toward the Allies, a fact which was recognized by both the United States and Great Britain in terms of financial assistance and political backing in the Arab world. Ibn Sa'ud's prestige reached its highest

peak in 1945 when he met formally with President Roosevelt on board the cruiser "Quincey" in the Suez Canal and with Prime Minister Churchill in Egypt near Cairo.

Until the end of the Second World War, Ibn Sa'ud considered friendship with Great Britain the cornerstone of his foreign and Middle Eastern policy. During the immediate postwar years, however, when the United States emerged as a Middle Eastern power with vital economic and strategic interests in Sa'udi Arabia, Britain's position began gradually to decline. In 1947 the British military mission was withdrawn, and American officers undertook the training of the Sa'udi army. In 1953 Anglo-Sa'udi relations almost reached the breaking point as a result of a dispute over Buraimi, an oasis in southeastern Arabia claimed by Sa'udi Arabia. The Suez crisis in 1956 brought about the final rift between the two countries that culminated in a complete break in diplomatic relations. At that time United States power in Sa'udi Arabia had reached its highest point since 1945.

With regard to the neighboring Arab countries, Ibn Sa'ud followed at first a policy based on "Islamic brotherhood and Arab union," which aimed at bringing closer together Sa'udi Arabia and the other three independent Arab states of Yemen, Iraq, and Egypt. This tendency toward closer ties on both the cultural and political planes gravitated, as Toynbee pointed out in 1936,¹³ around two poles, one negative and the other positive. The negative pole was concerned with the fate of Palestine and fear of the establishment of a Jewish national home in the heart of the Arab world. The positive pole was rooted in the growing sentiment of Arab nationalism and the desire for some kind of Arab unity.

In April, 1936, a Sa'udi-Iraq treaty¹⁴ was signed, which was based on a previous treaty concluded between Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen in 1934 and significantly called the "Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance." The treaty provided for the exchange of missions between the two countries to unify their military systems and to strengthen Arab and Muslim cultural ties between them (Article 7). Article 6 left the door open for "any other independent Arab state" to adhere to the treaty. Yemen joined the alliance a few months later. In May, 1936, another treaty was concluded between Sa'udi Arabia and Egypt¹⁵ in which Egypt for the first time recognized Sa'udi Arabia's sovereignty and independence and agreed to the exchange of consular and diplomatic representatives. Thirty-three Sa'udi Arabian

students, the first of hundreds sent to Egypt during the following years, were accepted in Egyptian schools and universities.

When, in 1944 and 1945, the League of Arab States was being organized, Ibn Sa'ud's attitude toward Arab "unity and brotherhood" took a different turn. His fear of a strong Hashimite bloc within the league, his apprehension of interference in Sa'udi Arabia's internal affairs, and his unwillingness to share Sa'udi Arabia's oil revenues with anyone else made him extremely reluctant to favor close unity among the now seven independent Arab countries. At the start, Sa'udi Arabia would not even participate as a full member in the deliberations that preceded the signing of the Arab League pact. Ibn Sa'ud finally consented to sign only after the introduction of an amendment to the text which emphasized the "independence and sovereignty" of the member states and the addition of a provision which stated that "every member state . . . shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other States . . . and recognize [it] as one of the rights of those states . . . and pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form."¹⁶ A great part of the responsibility for the emergence in 1945 of a weak and loosely joined Arab League must be attributed to Ibn Sa'ud's position regarding Arab unity.

With regard to the Palestine question, Ibn Sa'ud felt, as Philby put it, "but a remote concern" during the mandate and was in favor of "some form of partition" during the United Nations deliberations of the problem in 1947. The really effective action which Sa'udi Arabia could have taken in 1948, in the form of cancellation or suspension of the American oil concessions, was "never considered seriously, or [was] considered only to be rejected out of hand as prejudicial to the economic interests of the country." In fact, any gain for the Palestine Arabs in 1948 would have meant a gain to King 'Abdullah of Jordan, Ibn Sa'ud's most bitter Hashimite enemy.

After the death of the old king in 1953, his son and successor, King Sa'ud, introduced two new elements into Sa'udi Arabian policy: he committed Sa'udi Arabia to an active position in Arab affairs and made a serious bid for leadership in the Arab world—two roles which the former King Ibn Sa'ud had consistently refused to play.

The first step was taken in October, 1955, when King Sa'ud agreed to enter into a five-year mutual defense pact¹⁷ with Egypt and Syria and to declare publically his opposition to the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Great

Britain.¹⁸ In December, 1955, the Sa'udi Arabian army, together with the Syrian army, was put under joint command headed by an Egyptian commander in chief. The Suez crisis of 1956 put the Egyptian-led alliance to a severe test. Neither Syria nor Sa'udi Arabia was consulted concerning the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The tripartite invasion of Egypt in October-November, 1956, not only disrupted for many months the flow of oil through the canal but demonstrated the consequences of Sa'udi Arabia's acceptance of Egypt's leadership. In 1957, taking advantage of Egypt's post-Suez troubles and the generally fluid situation in the Middle East, King Sa'ud tried to disengage himself from too close association with Egyptian policy and to assume, with United States backing, the role of detached arbiter in Arab and Middle Eastern affairs.

In January, 1957, King Sa'ud paid a state visit to the United States and was personally received by President Eisenhower on arriving at Washington's National Airport. During his stay in the United States, the Sa'udi monarch agreed to the renewal of the Sa'udi-American agreement regarding the strategic air command base at Dhahran (terminating in April, 1962) and declared his general support of United States policy in the Middle East as expressed in the Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged the readiness of the United States to help any Middle Eastern country threatened by international communism. But the weakness of the Eisenhower Doctrine as a strong instrument of policy, the re-emergence in 1957 of President Nasser as an Arab hero and a figure of international stature in world politics, together with King Sa'ud's lack of the real qualities of leadership combined to deprive the Sa'udi monarch of the opportunity to play the role of leader in the Middle East. His attempt to act as moderator in the Syrian-Turkish crisis of August, 1957, failed; in January, 1958, when he tried underhandedly to prevent the Egyptian-Syrian merger, his attempt not only failed but resulted in a political crisis that almost cost him his throne.

The 1958 crisis forced King Sa'ud to give up the initiative he had assumed in 1955 and to call upon his brother Faisal, heir apparent, to assume executive powers in the state. With the coming of Faisal to power, Sa'udi Arabian policy reverted to the basic lines drawn by former King Ibn Sa'ud—cautious friendship with Egypt and the other Arab states, little involvement in Arab affairs, and correct relations with the Western powers.

There is little cause for surprise and no reason to doubt that the

Sa'udi ruling family finally came to realize that leadership in the Arab world means a contest between two centers of power, Cairo and Baghdad, in which Sa'udi Arabia can play only a side role and that, with the removal of the Hashimites from Baghdad, Sa'udi Arabia's best interests lay not in destroying the existing balance of power, but rather in preserving it. So long as the balance of power lasted, it provided the Sa'udi regime with its best chances of continued internal stability, guaranteed its independence and territorial integrity, and promised peaceful enjoyment of its oil wealth.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

1. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 9.
2. Text in *ibid.*, Doc. 49.
3. H. St. John Philby, *Arabian Jubilee* (London, 1952), p. 229.
4. See text in Helen Davies, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of the States in the Near and Middle East* (Durham, N.C., 1953), 2d. ed., pp. 374-383.
5. See Chap. Two p. 17, above.
6. See Charles W. Harrington, "The Sa'udi Arabian Council of Ministers," *Middle East Journal* (Winter, 1958), pp. 1-19.
7. H. St. John B. Philby, *Saudi Arabia* (London, 1955), p. xiii.
8. D. van der Meulen, *The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud* (New York, 1957), p. 113.
9. See text in H. St. John B. Philby, "Saudi Arabia: The New Statute of the Council of Ministers," *Middle East Journal* (Summer, 1958), pp. 320-323.
10. See p. 241, below.
11. See p. 227, above.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs 1936* (London, 1937), p. 783.
14. See text in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs 1937* (London, 1939), pp. 522-526.
15. See text in *ibid.*, pp. 528-530.
16. Arab Information Center, *Pact of the League of Arab States* (New York, 1958), Articles 2 and 8.
17. See text in *Middle East Journal* (Winter, 1956), pp. 77-79.
18. See Chap. Twelve above.

Yemen

“Dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres.”
Voltaire, *Candide*

YEMENI SOCIETY

Travelers who have visited Yemen agree that it is one of the most beautiful countries in the Middle East. Except for the narrow coastal strip of the Tihama along the Red Sea, it is generously endowed by nature with lush highlands of undulating, terraced hills and high plateaus surrounding green valleys that remind one of the mountain fastnesses of Lebanon; a pleasant, invigorating climate; heavy rain-falls and extremely fertile soil that produces luxuriant vegetation. Called *Arabia felix* by the Romans, *al-yamam al-sa'id* (happy Yemen) by the Arabs, Yemen, nevertheless, is not a happy land.

Few countries in the world, including Tibet, have been so isolated and so unknown to the outside world. Between the visit of Cristen Niebuhr, father of the famous Danish historian, in the eighteenth century and the arrival of foreign technicians in 1955, perhaps not more than two dozen Christians have succeeded in entering Yemen. And none of these, including the most recent, have been allowed to travel freely in the country or to mix with its people. The population, according to United Nations statistics, is estimated at about 5 million, divided almost equally between Zaidis (Shi'is) and Shafi'is (Sunnis). Some authorities on Yemen put the Zaidis at 55 per cent of the total population, but in the absence of reliable figures, the claim of the Shafi'is that they are in the majority might very well be true. There is an Isma'ili¹ minority of about 50,000, concentrated mostly in the south and until 1949 there was a Jewish community of about 100,000, which has since emigrated to Israel.

The tribes in Yemen, which are mostly settled, play an important role in the political life of the country. Of the seventy-four major tribes, forty are Zaidis and the rest belong to the Shafi'i sect. When Imam Yahya was assassinated in 1948, Crown Prince Ahmad (the

present Imam) succeeded in seizing the imamate only after the tribes had rallied around him and made it possible to wrest San'a, the capital, from rebel hands. The Shafi'is have always tended to oppose the Zaidi imamate, backing any movement which promised to give them a share in government.

Socially, Yemen may be divided into three main classes: the *Sayyids*, descendants of the family of the Prophet, who normally hold the highest positions in the state; the *Qadis* (an honorific rather than a professional designation), who are functionaries of the state and belong to the upper socio-economic strata of urban society; and the *'ammah*, the common people of the towns and countryside who constitute the bulk of the population. In normal times, despite heavy taxation by the Imam, the lot of the *'ammah* in Yemen, especially in the more fertile highlands, is comparatively tolerable; disease, however, is prevalent and famine not infrequent, mainly because of communication difficulties. Until recently, the only roads in Yemen were those connecting the seaport of Hodeidah with San'a, and the Aden protectorate with the towns in southern Yemen. Telephone and radio communication within the country has been introduced only recently and is still inadequate.

Administratively, the country follows the Ottoman pattern, having six main divisions (*liwa'*)—San'a, Ibb, Ta'izz, Hodeidah, Hajjah, and Sa'dah—each of which is governed by a representative of the Imam (*na'ib* or *hakim*); subdivisions—districts (*qada*) and countries (*nahiya*)—are under district governors (*'amils*). Local justice is administered by *shari'a* judges (*qadis*), appointed, like the other functionaries, directly by the Imam.

Education in Yemen is even more primitive than it is in Sa'udi Arabia. The few schools established by the Turks prior to the First World War were closed following the Turks' evacuation after the war, and for a generation nothing was taught in Yemen except the Koran and the Zaidi texts. Most Yemenis are illiterate and do not seem to mind not having a daily press or any kind of printed information. The library of the former Imam Yahya, however, was said to have contained many thousands of valuable Arabic manuscripts, including a unique copy of *al-ikhlil*, the ten-volume Islamic classic.

To visitors Yemeni social life is wearisome and drab. There is no entertainment of any kind—no music, no movies, no games, no cafés. Not only is freedom of expression totally nonexistent, but freedom of movement within the country is severely restricted. Yemenis them-

selves find compensation in a national tranquilizer to which the entire nation is addicted: a drug called *ghat* (*Catha edulis forsk*), which when chewed acts upon the cerebrum and spinal cord, producing a sense of happiness and physical well-being similar to that caused by hashish or marijuana. *Ghat* is grown in large quantities in Yemen; although most of it is consumed locally, enough of it is exported to nearby areas to rank it among the country's largest cash products. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire population of Yemen—from Imam to poorest peasant—is under the influence of *ghat* every day between the hours of two and six. It is perhaps true, as a British Arabist observed, that "a company of American 'leathernecks' [could] take over the whole country during the siesta when literally the entire population is chewing *qat* and is out of action."² No study has yet been made of this astonishing social phenomenon, but there seems little doubt that addiction to *ghat* exercises a deep psychological, economic, and political influence on Yemeni life.

GOVERNMENT OF THE IMAM

As in Sa'udi Arabia, the government in Yemen is patriarchal. But while in the last two decades Sa'udi Arabia has undergone changes in administrative organization and political structures that have transformed, in part at least, the primitive Wahhabi patriarchy into a kind of modern absolute monarchy, Yemen has preserved its primitive structures and maintained almost intact the social habits and political institutions of medieval society.

The Imam is in theory as well as in fact the center of all executive, administrative, and judicial power. He still literally wields the power of life and death over his subjects. No action, however small, can be taken by any official without the Imam's explicit sanction. No Yemeni is allowed to leave the country or even to move from one town to another without the Imam's written permission. The present Imam represents the last living remnant of Islamic medieval absolutism, and he belongs to the oldest ruling dynasty in the world today.

As noted earlier,³ the principal feature which distinguishes the Zaidi theory of the Imamate from that of the other Shi'i sects, is its insistence on the *immanent* rather than on the *hidden* Imam. Zaidism was established in Yemen in the ninth century by al-Qasim al-Rassi (d. 860) who, shortly before his death, was proclaimed the first Zaidi Imam of Yemen. The Imamate, not being hereditary, was contested during the following centuries by members of the *Sayyid* class

outside the Rassi dynasty to which the present Imam belongs. This gave rise to differences within Zaidism which, while evading fundamental questions of faith and doctrine, resulted in impassioned controversies over such questions as whether or not the first two Orthodox caliphs (Abu Bakr and Omar) were to be cursed by the true believers; one school enjoined cursing them, another not, while a third held that "silence is best." The political differences which these innocent theoretical disagreements engendered were quite serious, often leading to civil war and bloodshed.

In principle, the Zaidi imamate is elective. "The imamate, after Hassan and Hussain [the Prophet's grandchildren], is the heritage of their offspring by *council among them*, and he of them who draws the sword to uphold the faith, and is learned and pious, is the expected Imam." More precisely, in order to be eligible for the office of Imam, one must fulfill fourteen conditions: he must be (1) a descendant of the Prophet (i.e., a *Sayyid*), (2) of the line of Fatima (the Prophet's daughter), (3) of the male sex, (4) freeborn, (5) a taxpayer, (6) sound in body, (7) sound in mind, (8) sound in his "extremities (i.e., his feet and hands), (9) just, (10) pious, (11) generous, (12) of administrative ability, (13) learned, and (14) brave.

In actual practice, the imamate was never really bestowed by "council" but was almost always the spoil of victory. Once a contender attained the imamate by force, he held it by threat or by the use of force, which accounts for the continual state of terror in the political life of Yemen and the evolution of the complex system of permanent hostages, perfected by Imam Yahya (1904-1948). By holding as hostages the eldest sons or close relatives of all the leading figures in the country, the Imam forced total compliance upon his subjects. Opposition went underground, and no one was above suspicion, not even the "swords of Islam" (*suyuf al-Islam*), the Imam's sons, who often conspired against one another. It is not surprising that an air of conspiracy and strain constantly hangs over Yemen, making fear and political tension the normal condition of everyday life.

Yemen, again like Sa'udi Arabia, is governed by the *shari'a*. Justice is administered according to the prescriptions of the *shari'a* and according to Zaidi precedent and custom. The Imam, in his capacity as temporal and spiritual head of the community, is supreme judge. In practice, his suspicion is sufficient to bring any Yemeni to trial, which is usually an open-air affair. Capital punishment—public

beheading by the sword—is common; slander is punishable by cutting out the tongue; theft, by chopping off the hand or arm; and adultery, by stoning to death.

The office of Imam is the most lucrative in the state, for, according to Zaidi practice, the *zakat* (Muslim tax) is payable to the Imam's private treasury. This includes tithes collected in kind (cereals, coffee, and other nonperishable goods), in cash for perishable products (e.g., *ghat*) and for commerce and industry. There are also a special "*zakat* of the body," paid during the month of fasting, a special "*zakat* of jewels," imposed on women, and a special "*zakat* of the *jihad*," when holy war is proclaimed. In addition, there is an "income tax" of 2.5 per cent. It has been estimated that the income of Imam Ahmad is about 15 million dollars annually. As the Imam's purse is completely separate from that of the state, government expenditure is met with revenues accruing from two sources: custom duties on imports and taxes on caravans passing through Yemen.

IMAM YAHYA, 1904-1948

Like Turkey and Sa'udi Arabia, modern Yemen is mostly the work of one man. Yahya Ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din al-Rassi came to power in 1904, two years after the capture of Riyadh by the youthful Ibn Sa'ud and fifteen years before Mustafa Kemal embarked upon his fateful journey to Anatolia. Until 1918, Yemen formed part of the Ottoman Empire. It was first conquered by the Turks in 1527 but was evacuated, except for the coastal area, the following century. During the nineteenth century—in 1849 and 1872—Yemen was reconquered, but during the last decade of the century the Zaidis, under al-Mansour, Yahya's grandfather, revolted again. After Yahya succeeded to the imamate in 1904, the revolt was continued until 1911, when a settlement was reached which recognized Yahya as Imam, giving him internal autonomy, and acknowledged Turkey's political sovereignty over Yemen.

Following the defeat of Turkey in 1918, Yahya moved to San'a and declared Yemen a sovereign and independent kingdom. His actual possessions extended over the highlands, but the coastal plain, including the port of Hodeidah, was under the neighboring Idrissi ruler of Asir. Yahya now laid claim not only to this territory, but also to northern Tihama and Najran and to the entire region south of the Empty Quarter from Oman to the Red Sea. He considered British possessions in south Arabia, acquired during the nineteenth century,

as usurpation, and looked upon all agreements between Britain and Turkey and between Britain and the local Arab chiefs as legally invalid. He denounced with particular vigor the Anglo-Turkish boundary agreement of 1905 which delineated the frontier between Yemen and the British-protected areas in the south—to this day the focal point of British-Yemeni dispute.

From his declaration of independence until his assassination thirty years later, Imam Yahya followed a strange policy that consumed all his energy at home and controlled all his dealings with the outside world: a policy compounded of expansion and rigorous, self-conscious isolationism.

After declaring Yemen's independence, Yahya had to deal with three powerful neighbors: Great Britain, which sought to protect its sphere of influence in south Arabia and to confine Yahya to the Yemeni highlands by absorbing him in its system of "preferential" treaties and on an equal footing with the semiautonomous sultans and sheikhs of the region; Italy, now firmly established in nearby Eritrea and bent on building an Italian empire in order to gain a foothold in Arabia and to break Britain's exclusive dominance there; and Ibn Sa'ud, ruler of the most powerful kingdom in Arabia, who, though entertaining no designs on Yemen, stood firmly opposed to Yemeni aggrandizement in south Arabia, especially in the direction of 'Asir and Najran, which he considered part of his kingdom.

Since 1918 Yemen's political life has been dominated by its relationship with Great Britain in the south and around the Red Sea. Immediately following the war, after failing to induce a response from President Wilson "to extend [his] influence . . . to establish the rights of the imamate" in the British-protected south, Imam Yahya proceeded to "invade" these areas. Intermittent fighting still continues in these areas, and Yemen is still determined to retrieve its "southern territories." In 1925 and 1926 Britain made two attempts to reach a settlement with Yemen, but to no avail. Yahya would not compromise what he considered his just and legitimate claim, and the British were not prepared to treat him on terms of equality. Shortly after the departure of the second British mission from San'a in 1926, the Imam suddenly signed a treaty of "amity and commerce" with Italy,⁴ the first treaty concluded between Yemen and a major European power.

Fighting against the British along the southern frontier was now resumed and continued unabated until the summer of 1928. In an

effort to subdue the Imam, Britain carried out a concentrated aerial attack which, with devastating effect, subjected Ta'izz and other Yemeni towns to heavy bombardment. The Imam was forced to submit; he ordered his forces to withdraw beyond the 1905 frontier. As in 1926, British pressure now led the Imam to seek aid from another power hostile to Great Britain. On November 1, 1928, he signed a treaty of "friendship and commerce" with the Soviet Union.⁵ The Soviet government recognized, as did Italy in 1926, the "complete and absolute independence" of Yemen and of its king, "His Majesty the Imam Yahya."

It now became clear to the British that the Imam would never accept a "preferential" treaty agreement with Great Britain. Even when an Anglo-Yemeni settlement was finally reached in 1934, it was conditional and did not solve the outstanding causes of dispute. Nevertheless, by the terms of that treaty, of "friendship and mutual cooperation,"⁶ signed on February 11, 1934, Britain recognized the "complete and absolute" independence of the Imam "in all affairs of whatsoever kind." With regard to the question of frontiers, the two countries agreed to "maintain the situation existing . . . on the date of the signature of [the] treaty" until a final agreement could be reached through negotiations, which were to take place "before the expiry of the period of the . . . treaty." The treaty was to be valid for forty years (until 1974). In 1937, less than three years later, however, Yemen accused Great Britain of violating the treaty by creating the "Aden Colony and Protectorate" which embraced the entire area claimed by Yemen. The interpretation given by Yemen to the term "frontiers" referred not only to the limits separating Yemen from the British-controlled area, but also to those between the different zones inside that area. Nevertheless, this treaty until the end of the Second World War served to put Anglo-Yemeni relations on a nonbelligerent basis.

Imam Yahya never accepted the occupation of Hodeidah and the coastal area along the Red Sea, which Great Britain handed over in 1918 to the Idrisi of 'Asir, who a few years later became the ward of Ibn Sa'ud. Taking advantage of Ibn Sa'ud's preoccupation with the Hashimites in 1925, the Imam attacked the Idrissi and drove him out of Hodeidah and the entire Tihama region. Ibn Sa'ud acquiesced, since the area was properly part of Yemen. But when the Imam tried to push northward in 1931, Ibn Sa'ud took a firm stand. Hostilities between the two Arab countries began early in 1931 and continued

on a small scale until 1934, when Ibn Sa'ud decided to resolve the issue by major action. He sent the Imam an ultimatum, which was refused, and then resorted to force. The opposing armies were led by two crown princes, Prince Ahmad, now Imam of Yemen, and Prince Sa'ud, now King of Sa'udi Arabia. In less than seven weeks, the Sa'udis were able to defeat the Yemenis and to occupy Hodeidah and the Tihama coastal plain, but they refrained from pushing farther into the highlands.

The outcome of this first—and, so far, only—war in modern times between two sovereign Arab states was the “Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Arab Brotherhood,”⁷ which set a new pattern of relations between these Arab countries. Not only were their differences most amicably settled—Hodeidah was handed back to Yemen, and Yemen recognized Sa'udi sovereignty over Najran—but the two countries pledged themselves to maintain “perpetual peace” with each other, to refrain from the use of force in settling future disputes, by resorting instead to negotiations and arbitration (Article 5). They recognized each other's complete independence and sovereignty (Article 1) and pledged themselves to “establish concord in the Arab Muslim people, to raise its dignity, and to safeguard its honor and independence” (preamble). The treaty was to remain in effect for twenty years (Article 22).

Between the two wars Imam Yahya's closest relations among the European powers were with Italy. In 1927 the first Yemeni mission to Europe was received in Italy by the King and Mussolini; its head, the second son of Imam Yahya, was regally entertained. Military aid, doctors, and technicians were sent to Yemen. Their success there, however, was meager. The doctors could not practice properly among the Yemenis and soon disappeared, one after the other. The technicians fared worse: half-open crates with Italian lettering can still be seen strewn along the road from Hodeidah to San'a; an airplane crashed near San'a, killing a member of the royal house, and the Imam prohibited flying. By the end of the interwar period, Italy realized that the progress she had made in Yemen was indeed negligible.

Though maintaining a policy of isolation during this period, the Imam did not hesitate to establish relations with most of the independent states of the Middle East and to conclude economic and commercial agreements with Holland (1933), France (1936), and

Belgium (1936). Relations with the United States were not established until 1945.

During the Second World War, the Imam followed a policy of pro-Axis "neutrality" until 1943, when he agreed to intern Axis nationals in Yemen. In 1945 Yemen declared war on the Axis powers and joined the United Nations. Toward the Arab League the Imam took an even more cautious attitude than Ibn Sa'ud. The Yemeni delegation agreed to sign the Arab League Pact only after Sa'udi reservations were included,⁸ but Yemeni participation in the League's activities was limited, following a course of careful adherence to Egypt.

IMAM AHMAD

After the war, Yemen's isolation did not end, as was expected, with her joining the Arab League and later the United Nations. Now an old and a sick man, Imam Yahya would not recognize the changed world around him. He persisted in keeping Yemen shut off from the outside world and pursued his policy of absolute control based on the "hostage" system and severe, summary justice. Discontented Yemenis escaped the country in large numbers, and centers of political opposition were established in various Arab countries, especially in nearby Aden and in Cairo. The "Free Yemenis," as the Aden group called itself, made formal demands for social and political reform. In the so-called "National Pact," this group called for a Yemeni constitution and a monarchy limited by a representative assembly. The opposition was considerably strengthened by the defection of one of the Imam's sons, Ibrahim, who joined the Free Yemenis in Aden.

On February 17, 1948, Imam Yahya was assassinated while driving his car near San'a. His assassination and the *coup d'état* that followed marked the beginning of a decade (1949-1959) of upheaval in the Arab world. Had it not been for the unfortunate development in events following the Imam's assassination, the rebellion supported by the Free Yemenis in Aden might have succeeded in introducing a new political and social order in Yemen. But within a few weeks the rebel government was brought down by Prince Ahmad, the present Imam, who, by rallying the tribes, was able to attack San'a and take it by storm, pillaging the city and "taking all the women captive." Many of the rebels were able to escape into Aden, but those who were captured were ruthlessly executed, and Yemen was restored to a

new and more vigorous absolutism. One should note that the downfall of the rebel regime was largely due to Ibn Sa'ud's refusal to grant it recognition and to his role in delaying the Arab League committee which was sent via Sa'udi Arabia to investigate the Yemeni situation. This provided Ahmad with enough time to carry out his counter-revolution and to reinstate the supremacy of the Hamid al-Din family in the country.

As the new Imam, Ahmad introduced little change into the pattern of government established by his father during the latter's forty-year reign. Indeed, Ahmad's policy was even more extreme: starting in bloodshed and terror, he was forced to pursue a policy of constant repression. He wielded almost hypnotic power over his subjects, and his fearlessness in the face of physical danger gave him the reputation of being indestructible. When in 1955 an attempt was made at rebellion, he subdued the main insurgent regiment by charging against it singlehandedly, brandishing a sword and ordering the soldiers to surrender. Between 1948 and 1955 he put most of his potential enemies to death, including most of his brothers. Although a sick man in 1961, he still maintained total control over Yemen.

In both his Arab and foreign policies, Imam Ahmad followed closely in his father's footsteps. Like his father, he devoted all his energies to the conflict with Great Britain in south Arabia, the area which Imam Ahmad now referred to as "southern Yemen." In 1949, taking advantage of recent disturbances and the change of regime in Yemen, Britain declared the Island of Kamaran, off the coast of Yemen, where oil was believed to exist, a British possession. This step Imam Ahmad considered another violation of the Anglo-Yemeni agreement of 1934 and retaliated by renewing armed attacks on the Aden Protectorate. After prolonged talks, a *modus vivendi* agreement⁹ was reached between the two countries which resulted, however, in little beyond the establishment of diplomatic relations and the creation of a Yemeni legation in London and a British legation in Ta'izz.

The deterioration of Anglo-Yemeni relations since 1951 resulted mostly from Yemen's resurgent claims to "southern Yemen," on the one hand, and, on the other, from Britain's refusal to compromise her position in south Arabia, her last firm foothold in the Middle East. Imam Ahmad believed that his position had become stronger with the recession of British power in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq and with the emergence after 1952 of a new militant Arab nationalism

under Egypt's leadership. In 1955, after Egypt had successfully concluded an arms deal with the Soviet bloc, Imam Ahmad appeared convinced that the only way to face up to Great Britain was to align himself closely with Egypt and to procure aid from the Communist countries. Britain's efforts in 1954 and 1955 to establish a semiautonomous federation of the southern Arabian sheikhdoms and principalities under British hegemony served to further arouse the Imam's anger and to push him toward Egypt and a policy of "neutrality" and cooperation with the Soviet bloc.

On October 31, 1955, the Russo-Yemeni treaty of friendship of 1928 was revived;¹⁰ it was to be valid for five years and was to be automatically renewed for another five. In March, 1956, a commercial treaty¹¹ was signed between the two countries which was to be valid for two years and was to continue in operation beyond that time until either party requested its modification or termination.

On January 13, 1958, a Chinese—Yemeni agreement was signed in Peking during the visit of Crown Prince Muhammed al-Badr. It provided for extensive economic aid and technical assistance to Yemen, including the construction of a modern highway between Hodeidah (where the Russians were building a new port—completed in 1961) and San'a and the installment of a textile mill with 10,000 spindles. An interest-free credit of 17 million dollars was given to the Yemenis, payable in ten yearly installments in cash or in goods. Both the Russian and Chinese technicians sent to Yemen achieved considerable success, not only in fulfilling the major part of their economic commitments, but also in dealing with the people and the government of Yemen.

The failure of the Germans and Americans to achieve similar results stands out in clear contrast. In 1953 the West German firm of C. Deilmann Begban, G.M.B.H., Bentheim, concluded an agreement with the Imam to search for oil in the Tihama on a joint-expense, profit-sharing basis (Yemen 75 per cent). The agreement was to be valid for five years, after which, if oil was not found in commercial quantities, it was to be automatically annulled in 1958. A similar agreement was signed in 1955 with an American concern, the Yemen Development Corporation, to survey the Yemeni highlands, but its results were equally unsatisfactory. By the time the Russians and the Chinese started to arrive in Yemen, the Germans and Americans were getting ready to leave.

In his Arab policy, the Imam took a decisive step in April, 1956,

by joining the Arab mutual defense pact led by Egypt and aimed against the newly formed Baghdad pact alliance. Backed by Egypt, the Imam formally declared the island of Kamaran as inalienable Yemeni territory and the entire Aden Protectorate as an inherent part of Yemen, which should be united under the Zaidi crown. In February, 1958, though balking at complete unity with Egypt and Syria in the "United Arab Republic," the Imam agreed to join with the U.A.R. in establishing the "United Arab States." On March 8, 1958, Yemen signed the U.A.S. charter,¹² which provided for a supreme federal council composed of the heads of the member states and charged with such matters as the unification of foreign policy and of the armed forces and the coordination of economic, social, cultural, and educational policies. The Imam's power remained secure in that, according to the charter, he had veto power over all decisions affecting Yemen.

Yemen has already entered upon the road of social and economic change. As long as the present Imam lives, the political *status quo* will be maintained. But Imam Ahmad is old and very sick, and his reign is coming to an end. With his death, civil war seems likely, unless Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr succeeds in rallying sufficient tribal support, which seems doubtful. But whatever follows upon the present Imam's death, Yemen is destined finally to emerge from her medieval slumber.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

1. See pp. 14-15, Chap. Two above.
2. J. Heyworth-Dunne, "The Yemen," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (February, 1958), p. 56.
3. See pp. 14-15, Chap. Two above.
4. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J. 1956), vol. II, Doc. 47.
5. Text in *ibid.*, Doc. 55.
6. Text in *ibid.*, Doc. 59.
7. Text in *Documents of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), pp. 458-464.
8. See p. 240, Chap. Seventeen above.
9. Text in *Cmd.*, 8567 (January 20, 1951).
10. Arabic text in Ahmad Fakhri, *Yemen: Its Past and Present* (Cairo, 1957), pp. 218-220.
11. Arabic text in *ibid.*, pp. 221-224.
12. Text in *Basic Documents of the Arab Unifications* [Arab Information Center] (New York, 1958), pp. 21-25.

The Persian Gulf and South Arabia

*"Now would I give a thousand furlongs of sea for
an acre of barren ground."*

Shakespeare, The Tempest

PERSIAN GULF OIL

The Persian Gulf is vitally important to the free world because it is the richest oil center in the world: "whoever controls [it] may control the main sources of energy of the world until atomic energy becomes available."¹ Practically all Middle Eastern oil is produced in this area²—in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Sa'udi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. Over 85 per cent of the oil interests in the Persian Gulf are owned by American and British companies, and the remaining interests by Dutch, French, Italian, and Japanese companies.³ At the end of the Second World War the American share was less than 35 per cent and the British share about 50 per cent; a decade later the American share rose to 58 per cent, while the British share went down to 35 per cent. Oil production, however, for the same period increased by about 400 per cent.

In the six oil-producing countries around the Persian Gulf American and British interests are divided as follows: American companies hold 100 per cent interest in Sa'udi Arabia and Bahrain, 50 per cent in Kuwait, 23.75 per cent in the Iraq Petroleum Company (operating in Iraq, Qatar, Trucial Coast, and Oman), and 40 per cent in the international Consortium operating in Iran. British companies own 50 per cent interest in Kuwait, 23.75 in IPC and 100 per cent in the other three oil companies operating in Iraq, and 40 per cent in the international Consortium in Iran. In the Trucial Sheikhdoms, Muscat and Oman, and the Aden Protectorate, where oil has not yet been found, British interests predominate. Before the American-Sa'udi agreement for equal sharing of oil profits, signed in December, 1950,⁴ fixed royalties of as low as seventy cents per ton were paid to

the sheikhdoms. The Sa'udi agreement and the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran led to new agreements with the Gulf states based on the "fifty-fifty" sharing of profit or, roughly, royalty payments of about six dollars per ton. By the end of the 1950's the total royalties paid annually to the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf amounted to about \$1.5 billion.

BRITISH POSITION


The Persian Gulf, or the Arab Gulf as it is called by the Arabs, is an almost landlocked sea about 500 miles long from Shatt al-Arab in the north to the Straits of Hormuz in the south and about 100 miles wide on the average. From the natural and human viewpoint it is an exceedingly depressed and depressing area. Apart from oil, nature has bestowed very little on it. Except for the northern part and the tiny island of Bahrain, the Gulf area consists of hot, damp, and waterless wastes, where human habitation is difficult and scarce. Along the Arab coast from Fao to Ras al-Khaima—through Kuwait, al-Hasa (Sa'udi Arabia), Bahrain, Qatar, and Trucial Oman—there lives a mixed population consisting mostly of Arabs and including Indians, Pakistanis, Persians, Europeans, and one of the largest American communities outside the United States. The vast majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, with Shi'ite minorities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Dubai. Except in Sa'udi Arabia, Christianity is tolerated throughout the area. In Bahrain, for instance, there is a Catholic Church and a Church of England, a Jewish synagogue, and a number of Hindu temples. Kuwait has a Catholic Bishop and the entire region is part of the diocese of the Catholic Bishop of Aden.

British supremacy in the Persian Gulf and South Arabia dates to the middle of the eighteenth century, when the headquarters of the East India Company were established at Bushire on the Persian side of the Gulf.⁵ For the course of the nineteenth century British influence spread from Aden to Kuwait; by the First World War the entire region had come under British protection through a series of special agreements, the first of which was concluded in 1798 between the East India Company and the Imam of Musqat⁶ and the last in 1916 between the British government and the Sheikh of Qatar.⁷ Aden was occupied in 1839 and firmly held by an agreement with the Sultan of Lahaj in 1843.⁸ The Trucial Coast, which had been brought under "Trucial agreements" in 1820 and 1835, was "forevermore" pacified under a "Perpetual Maritime Truce" in 1853.⁹ With the emergence

of Germany as a Middle Eastern power in the 1890's and with Russia's increasing pressure toward the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, Britain followed a clearly outlined policy aimed at preserving her exclusive position in the Persian Gulf and preventing any outside interference in the area. The so-called "exclusive" agreements were now concluded with Muscat (1891),¹⁰ Bahrain (1892),¹¹ and Kuwait (1899).¹² According to these covenants the Sheikhs, in exchange for British protection, agreed to surrender their external sovereignty and not to "cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part" of their territories without Britain's approval.¹³ The fundamental provisions of one such agreement (Bahrain) read as follows:

1st.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2nd.—That without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.



PERSIAN GULF

3rd.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.

With the discovery of oil in Persia during the first decade of this century, Britain induced the Sheikhs to agree not to grant any oil concession to foreign powers or to nationals of foreign powers without her approval, "in order," as a former British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf put it, "to prevent [their] exploitation by adventurers and to ensure them a fair deal."¹⁴

BRITISH CONTROL

British control of the Persian Gulf and South Arabia was always indirect, based on practices and institutions that evolved gradually over the years. The type of administrative structure which Britain now applies in the area includes the colonial (Aden), the "protectorate" (Western and Eastern Aden Protectorates), that called "external protection" (Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms), and the special treaty relationship (Sultanate of Musqat and Oman).

The ten Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, (the oil-producing Sheikhdoms), Abu Dhabi (oil recently discovered), Dubai, Sharja, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujaira (the Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms)—are thus not "protectorates" but autonomous "British-protected states." The subjects of these Sheikhdoms are "British-protected persons" and as such may obtain British passports. By becoming "independent" in 1961, Kuwait began building her own diplomatic and consular services. Entry visas to the rest of the Sheikhdoms are given, except in the Arab states, by British consular representatives throughout the world.

British influence over the Sheikhs' internal affairs and over their attitudes toward one another and other Arab countries is exercised indirectly and unofficially through British "advisers" to the Sheikhs, through British technical experts directing the various departments of the local governments, and through British army officers commanding local forces. The highest official representative of the British Government in the Persian Gulf is the British Political Resident, who has the rank of ambassador and derives his authority directly from the Foreign Secretary. His official function is to represent the British Government in the Persian Gulf and to protect British interests there. The office of Political Resident evolved from that of

the representative of the East India Company, established in 1763 at Bushire. Though by 1800 the Resident's function had ceased to be strictly commercial and had already become political, the term Political Resident did not come into use until 1862. In Persia the Political Resident's official status was British Consul General for the southern provinces, but his actual powers (until the rise of Reza Shah) far exceeded those of a consular representative. The base for the British naval forces in the Persian Gulf was located at Bushire until 1935, when Reza Shah forced its transfer to Bahrain. The Residency itself, however, was not moved to Bahrain until 1946.

Subordinate to the Political Resident are the Political Agents stationed in Bahrain, Qatar, Dubai and the British Consul in Kuwait (the British Consul at Muscat is also under the Political Resident). The Resident himself does not intervene directly in administrative matters but limits himself to supervising the application of general policies and to attending functions and ceremonies. The Political Agents perform their duties according to a long-established tradition of unobtrusive control based on personal contact with the Sheikh. State affairs are usually carried out informally: "a hint dropped here and there in the course of casual conversation is often more effective than formal advice. . . ." ¹⁵ In the various Sheikhdoms British representatives enjoy certain extraterritorial privileges, not by formal agreement, but implicitly as a result of long practice. In Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar they have jurisdiction over all foreigners, except subjects of Muslim states outside the British Commonwealth.¹⁶ It is worth noting that Britain pays no direct subsidies to any of the Sheikhs, including the poorest of the Trucial Coast; on the other hand, British personnel working for the local governments are paid by these governments themselves and not by Britain. All payments made to the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms consist of either rentals (airfields and other facilities), annual sums paid on oil concessions (as in the Trucial Coast), or royalties (as in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar).

Near the British Residency at Jufair in Bahrain is a British naval base under the command of a commodore with the official title of "Commodore, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf." Bahrain is also the base of Britain's air and land forces in the Gulf. The Royal Air Force is represented by a senior officer, commanding squadrons of the RAF stationed in Bahrain, Sharja, and by special agreement with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, on Masirah Island in the Gulf of Oman

and at Salalah in Dhofar. Since 1951 a senior army officer has been stationed in Bahrain, commanding a regiment in Bahrain and a detachment stationed in Sharja. All operations in the Persian Gulf area are conducted by a "Defense Committee" consisting of the senior officers of the three services under the chairmanship of the Political Resident. Final control of all military operations, however, rests with "Headquarters, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula" in Aden. A small force of the American navy (three destroyers and other smaller craft) also operates in the Persian Gulf under the command of a rear admiral based at Jufair.

THE SHEIKHS' GOVERNMENT

The structure of government of all ten Sheikhdoms is, by definition, patriarchal. The *shari'a* is the basis of law and the only limit to the Sheikh's power, which is in all practical matters absolute. Succession, which is not hereditary but by selection, poses a difficult problem. To the British the death of a ruling Sheikh is always accompanied by suspense and usually calls for "the standby of a warship, until a successor has assumed power with the support of the ruling family."¹⁷ Only in the three oil-producing Sheikhdoms, in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, is there any administrative system of government; and this is usually run by British advisors and staffed by Arabs from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt and by Indians, Pakistanis, and Persians. The various departments (health, education, and security) are usually headed by members of the ruling family.

In the Trucial Coast there exists hardly any kind of administration. The population of the seven Sheikhdoms is estimated at 100,000, composed mostly of Bedouin tribes living at a bare subsistence level. The only town along the 400-mile coast is Dubai, whose inhabitants account for about one-fourth of the Trucial Coast's total population. Oil has not yet been found, but explorations continue on land and offshore. The boundaries of these Sheikhdoms with Sa'udi Arabia and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman have not been demarcated, a fact which provides ample grounds for Sa'udi expansionist claims. It is to be noted that, since the signing of the agreement of "perpetual" peace over a century ago, the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast and their descendants have been recognized by the British government as "Independent Rulers of States."

Of the three oil-producing Sheikhdoms, Bahrain, whose production started in 1934, is the most advanced. It is the smallest producer

of oil in the Persian Gulf, with an annual income since 1950 of about \$10 million. The ruling Khalifah family has been in power in Bahrain since 1783.¹⁸ Its present ruler is Sheikh Isa Ibn Sulman al-Khalifah.

The "incredibly ugly" peninsula of Qatar is the latest member of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. Production started in 1950, and by the end of the decade it had reached six million tons a year with an income of over \$30 million annually. Its present ruler is Sheikh Ahmad Ibn Ali Ibn Abdullah al-Thani. Qatar was recognized by Britain in 1916 as an "independent" state.

By far the most important Sheikhdom in the Persian Gulf is Kuwait, the biggest oil-producer in the Middle East and one of the biggest in the world. The Sheikh's income from oil is estimated at about \$400 million a year. Kuwait's ruler is Sheikh Sir Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, K.C.M.G., C.I.E. (b. 1890). The ruling al-Sabah family which is related to the Sa'udi family of Sa'udi Arabia and to the al-Khalifah family of Bahrain, seized power in Kuwait in 1716. To Britain, which has a 50 per cent share in the oil concession, Kuwait represents the "mainstay of the sterling area." Over one billion dollars of the Sheikh's savings are invested in Great Britain and various parts of the commonwealth.

ESTIMATED OIL REVENUES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
(INCLUDING ROYALTIES, RENTS, FEES, INCOME TAXES, AND BACK PAYMENTS)

	1950	1955	1960
Iran	45	91	285
Iraq	15	206	275
Kuwait	12	282	385
Sa'udi Arabia	113	275	335

The termination in June, 1961, of the Anglo-Kuwait agreement of 1899 and the emergence of Kuwait as a "sovereign" and "independent" state created a crisis in the Middle East. Iraq laid formal claim to the Sheikhdom, and Great Britain, upon the ruler's request, landed troops in Kuwait. Although the Sheikhdom's independence was preserved, the crisis over Kuwait introduced a new element of conflict in the Arab world, which intensified the traditional rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad and raised the problem of collective Arab right to the oil revenues of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. Arab solidarity received a further setback as a result of Egypt's opposition to Kuwait's

union with Iraq and Egyptian and Sa'udi alignment with Britain's policy in the Persian Gulf.

From the economic, and to a lesser extent from the strategic, point of view the Persian Gulf is vital to the West. As the decade of the 1960's opened, a chief concern of the West was how to keep this area within its sphere of influence. The political and economic situation of the Persian Gulf is one of the most explosive, figuratively as well as literally, in the world. Apart from the continuous tension between the companies and the producer states, there are the ambitions and claims to parts or to all of the Persian Gulf by four Middle Eastern states. Not only does Iraq claim Kuwait, but also Iran Bahrain, and Sa'udi Arabia parts of Qatar and Oman, while the United Arab Republic seeks to extend her influence over the whole region. The spirit of Arab nationalism has already penetrated Bahrain and Kuwait, and the rebels in Oman enjoy the support of Arab nationalists throughout the Arab world.

Within the Sheikhdoms questions are raised as to the legitimacy of the Sheikhs' monopoly of the oil wealth and the justice of the existing type of rule. Although communism has not succeeded in making much headway among the Arab oil workers, the beginning of political organizations is already perceptible, guided and supported by Cairo, Baghdad, and Riyadh.

Britain still adheres to her traditional, legalistic system of control on the principles of "protection" and "exclusive agreement," which are considered by many as outmoded and inadequate under the prevailing conditions. Britain's position in the Persian Gulf, however, remains strong, not only because of America's full political backing in the area but mainly because the Arab states, especially Sa'udi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Republic have so far failed to achieve a united front in the Persian Gulf and to pursue a coordinated policy. Britain's strongest natural allies are the ruling Sheikhs, who know full well that their wealth and their personal survival depends on Britain's continued supremacy. Therefore, as long as these rulers maintain themselves in power, Britain's as well as the West's interests in the Persian Gulf would seem secure.

DIRECT RULE: ADEN COLONY

Britain's hegemony in South Arabia extends from the Straits of Bab al-Mandab at the mouth of the Red Sea to the Straits of Hormuz at the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Here it is exercised in three


types of rule: direct rule in Aden Colony, indirect rule in the Aden Protectorate, and partial control of Muscat and Oman.

The seaport of Aden, which rates second only to New York in the number of ships and amount of tonnage it handles, is the last crown colony of Great Britain in the Middle East. It is one of Britain's major sea, air, and land bases and the site of a large oil refinery, built at the cost of \$130 million after the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. Over the eighty-square-mile expanse of the Crown Colony of Aden (including Perim Island at the entrance of the Red Sea and the Kuria Muria Islands off the Muscat coast in the Arabian Sea) Britain exercises complete and undivided sovereignty. The Aden Colony is considered British territory and its inhabitants British subjects. The total population is about 150,000, of which over 80 per cent are Arabs and the rest Indians, Somalis, and Europeans.

Aden has perhaps the most efficient administration in the Middle East. When it became a Crown Colony in 1937, it fell into the traditional pattern of British colonial administration. The chief administrative officer is the governor of Aden and the Aden Protectorate, who is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The governor is assisted by an executive council,¹⁹ composed of three British officials and other nominated persons, of whom two are Arabs. In 1944 a partly elected Legislative Council was established to discuss and vote upon legislation (except taxation) enacted for the Colony; the governor, however, as its president has an absolute veto over any decision it passes. In 1955 and again in 1958 the Council was expanded to include twenty-three members, twelve elected, six nominated, and five *ex-officio* (the chief secretary, the assistant chief secretary, the financial secretary, the attorney general, and the commanding air officer).

To strengthen her position in Aden, Britain has in recent years carried out extensive economic and political reforms. The Colony's predominantly Arab population has, however, shown itself increasingly dissatisfied with the political structure of the Colony, and strong nationalist movements have emerged in favor of independence and unity with the surrounding Arab lands. The most powerful movement is the Arab Trades Union Congress, which was formed in 1956 and claims a membership of 16,000. It is one of the best-organized and most effective labor movements in the Middle East. Though originally nonpolitical in character, the ATUC now plays a major role in the political life of Aden. Its leadership is strongly national-

istic with socialistic tendencies. The motto of its weekly newspaper, *al-'Amil*, is "Unity, Freedom and Socialism." Nevertheless, whatever the pressure for independence, Britain, while willing to grant more political liberty, seemed determined not to relinquish her complete and direct control over the Aden Colony.



SOUTH ARABIA

INDIRECT RULE: ADEN PROTECTORATE

The Aden Protectorate forms the immediate hinterland of the Aden Colony and is valuable to Great Britain primarily as a buffer zone protecting Aden and Britain's position at the entrance of the Red Sea. But here again Arab nationalism has already penetrated the tribal areas and Radio Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" has proved most effective in subverting British influence. A more direct role is played by the Imam of Yemen, who claims the entire Aden Protectorate as part of "southern" Yemen.

The Protectorate is divided administratively into the Western Protectorate (population 430,000) and the Eastern Protectorate (population 350,000). Unlike the Colony, the two parts of the Protectorate are ruled indirectly through two Political Agencies and special advisors responsible to the Protectorate Secretary. Between 1937 and 1954 a series of "advisory" treaties were concluded with the various Sultans, Amirs, and Sheikhs of the two parts of the Protectorate,

which strengthened British control with minimum use of British personnel.²⁰

The office of the British Political Agent for the Western Protectorate is located in Aden, that for the Eastern Protectorate at Mukalla in the Hadhramaut; political officers and unofficial advisors are assigned to the rulers to assist in administrative and economic matters. Security and defense are entrusted to three main forces, the Federal National Guards (formerly the Government Guards), the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion (patterned after the Transjordan Arab Legion), and the Aden Protectorate Levies, under the operational control of the Royal Air Force. In cases where the ground forces are unable to enforce the law, the RAF follows an old pattern of strategic bombing that has thus far resulted in subduing serious risings and in restoring order. Some of the rulers have small local forces commanded by British officers.

To protect the Aden Colony from further Yemeni incursion and at the same time to satisfy demands for autonomy and unity among the Protectorate Arabs, Britain in 1954 proposed the establishment of an autonomous Arab Federation, to include the various Sultanates, Amirates, and Sheikhdoms of the Protectorate. The scheme, which envisaged the Federation as an independent Arab state destined to attain Dominion status in the British Commonwealth, was attacked by Yemen as violating Article 3 of the Anglo-Yemeni treaty of 1934. The scheme was not adopted until 1958, after Yemen had joined the United Arab Republic in the union called United Arab States.

The "Federation of the Arab Amirates of the South," which came into being in 1959, consisted of six Amirates of the Western Protectorate (the Eastern Protectorate refused to join) and was joined in 1960 by two more Amirates. Britain concluded an exclusive agreement with the Federation, whereby defense and foreign affairs remained in British hands. According to the Federal constitution, the new government was to have a Federal Council with each Amirate represented by six ministers elected from the Federal Council. All executive and legislative power was invested in the Supreme Council, which has the power to initiate laws and to execute them. The function of Federal Council consisted in discussing and voting upon laws presented by the Supreme Council. Thus a pattern of government very much like that existing in the Aden Colony was applied in the Western Protectorate, with the Supreme Council performing most of the Governor's functions and the Federal Council those of

the Legislative Council. It should be noted that the Federal constitution makes no provision for a legal branch of government, nor does it provide the executive branch with the means of enforcing the law or of levying and collecting taxes. Since, according to the agreement between Britain and the Federation, all treaties concluded between any member of the Federation and Britain were to remain in force, British influence in the Protectorate was preserved almost intact.

PARTIAL CONTROL: MUSCAT AND OMAN

Although the West established relations with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman as early as 1798, the Sultanate at the middle of the twentieth century still was one of the least known regions, not only of the Middle East but of the entire world. In the zone of British influence stretching from Aden to Kuwait, it is the area over which Britain wields the least control. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman is formally, and to a certain extent actually, the head of an independent and sovereign state.

Physically, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is in many respects one of the most interesting, though not the most inviting, parts of the Arab world. It has a coastline of about 1,000 miles and an area of 82,000 square miles divided into four quite distinct regions; the hot and rocky coastal littoral along the Arabian Sea, the mountainous and partly fertile region of Oman, the interior plateau stretching into the Empty Quarter, and the monsoon-touched southern province of Dhofar. The population, which is predominantly Arab but also includes elements of Persian, Indian, and African origin, is estimated at about 500,000. Ibadī Islam²¹ is the official religion of the State and that of the majority of the population. The capital is the picturesque, but for six months a year practically uninhabitable, port of Muscat. Salalah, a coastal town in the province of Dhofar, is the seat of the Sultan during the hot months.

Sultan Sir Sa'īd Ibn Taimur (b. 1910), the only English-speaking chief of state in southern Arabia, is the descendant of the imperial family of al-bu Sa'īd, founded in the eighteenth century by Imam Ahmad Ibn Sa'īd. The title of Sultan was acquired in 1861 to emphasize the temporal character of the sovereign. Sultan Sa'īd, like the neighboring Sheikhs, Sultans, Amirs, and Kings in Arabia, wields absolute power over his subjects. The administration is basically medieval in structure, the actual power and extent of the Sultan's rule being founded on personal allegiance to him. In recent years the

following "departments" were established to modernize the Sultan's administration: foreign affairs, interior, finance, military affairs and development, and a directorate general of customs. Local governors (*walis*) are appointed by the Sultan and act as his personal representatives, assisted by provincial judges (*qadis*). In the interior autonomy was granted to the Imam of Oman in 1920 by the treaty of Sib after a seven-year revolt. The Sultan's small army, the Muscat and Oman Field Force, is commanded by British officers, and other smaller forces recruited by the Sultan in the Batinah region and Dhofar are also under British command.

The Sultan has no representatives abroad; Britain, upon his request, acts on his behalf in consular and diplomatic matters. Besides Britain, only India has a consulate general at Muscat. In 1958 the United States concluded with the Sultan a "Treaty of Economic Relations and Consular Rights,"²² which gave the American Consul General in Aden the right to act as consular representative of the United States in Muscat.

If and when oil is discovered in Muscat and Oman, the Sultanate will inevitably be drawn into the whirlpool of Arab politics. With the death of Imam Abdullah al-Khalil of Oman in 1954, the new Imam Ghalib, backed by Sa'udi Arabia and Egypt, embarked upon a separatist movement that resulted in the military occupation of Oman by the Sultan (with British assistance) in 1955. The problem of the Buraimi oasis along the undemarcated boundaries of Oman, Abu Dhabi, and Sa'udi Arabia became an international issue at the United Nations and the International Court. The cause of Oman's independence has been adopted by Arab nationalists as a symbol of the Arabs' struggle against British imperialism in South Arabia.

In the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, as in the Persian Gulf and Aden, the British adhere to a policy of entrenchment based on Britain's legal right and obligations in the area. In the vast region lying between Yemen and the Trucial Coast, Britain has established a virtual monopoly over oil concessions²³ which she is not likely to forfeit easily. But if in the Persian Gulf Britain has based her position on a policy of "Kuwait first," in South Arabia the emphasis seems on the Aden Colony rather than on Muscat and Oman. There is little doubt, in fact, that Kuwait and Aden constitute Britain's last economic and strategic footholds in the Middle East. To relinquish them would mean to surrender her interests in Arabia.

BRITISH CONNECTIONS IN ARABIA

<i>State</i>	<i>Basis of connection</i>	<i>British representative</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Basis of connection</i>	<i>British Representative</i>
Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia	Treaty of Jiddah 1927	Diplomatic relations broken off in 1956	Busi Haushabi Sultanate	Protectorate Treaty 1954 Engagement 1839 Protectorate Treaty 1895
Kingdom of Yemen	Treaty of San'a 1934	Chargé d'Affaires, Legation in Taizz	Alawa Sheikhdom	Protectorate Treaty 1895
Aden Colony	Occupied 1839 Crown Colony 1937	Governor appointed by the Colonial Office	Eastern Aden Protectorate	British Agent and Resident in Mukalla
Perim Island Kamaran Island	Occupied 1799 Taken from Turkey 1915	Qaiti State of Shihr and Mukalla	Engagements 1863, 1862 Protectorate Treaties 1882, 1888 Advisory Treaty 1937
Kuria Muria Islands	Gift to Queen Victoria from Sultan of Muscat 1854	Controlled by Persian Gulf Resident for Governor of Aden	Kathiri State	Agreement 1918 Advisory Treaty 1939
Aden Protectorate	Governor of Aden			
Western Aden Protectorate	British Agent and Resident			
Federation of Arab Amirates of the South Fadhli Sultanate	Engagement 1839 Protectorate Treaty 1888 Advisory Treaty 1945 Federation Treaty 1959 Treaty 1903 Advisory Treaty 1952 Federation Treaty 1959	Adviser, in Khormaksar	Mahri Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra Wahidi Sultanate of Bir Ali Wahidi Sultanate of Balhaf Sultanate of Muscat and Oman	Agreement 1834 Protectorate Treaty 1886 Advisory Treaty 1954 Protectorate Treaties 1888, 1895 Protectorate Treaty 1888 Advisory Treaty 1949 Treaties 1798, 1873, 1891, 1921, 1923, 1951, 1958
Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom	 Consul General

<i>State</i>	<i>Basis of connection</i>	<i>British representative</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Basis of connection</i>	<i>British representative</i>
Lower Aulaqi Sultanate	Engagement 1855 Protectorate Treaty 1888 Advisory Treaty 1945 Federation Treaty 1959	The Persian Gulf	Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain
Amirate of Beihan	Treaty 1903 Advisory Treaty 1945 Federation Treaty 1959	The Persian Gulf States: Sheikhdom of Bahrain Sheikhdom of Kuwait Sheikhdom of Qatar	Agreements 1820, 1847, 1861, 1880, 1892, 1914 Agreement 1899 Letter 1914 Engagement 1868 Treaty 1916	Political Agent " "
Lower Yafai Sultanate	Engagement 1839 Protectorate Treaty 1895 Advisory Treaty 1945 Federation Treaty 1959	The Trucial States: Sheikhdom of Dubai	Agreements 1820, 1853, 1892, 1902, 1922	Political Agent for Trucial Coast Political Officer
Dhala Amirate	Agreement 1880 Advisory Treaty 1945 Federation Treaty 1959	Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi Sheikhdom of Sharjah Sheikhdom of Rasal-Khaimah Sheikhdom of Umm al-Quwain	Agreements 1820, 1853, 1892, 1902, 1922 Agreements 1820, 1853, 1892, 1902 Agreements 1820, 1853, 1892 Agreements 1820, 1853, 1892, 1902	Political Agent for Trucial Coast Political Officer
Abdali Sultanate of Lahej Aqrabi Sheikhdom	Treaties 1802, 1839, 1843, 1849, 1952 Engagement 1839 Protectorate Treaty 1888 Treaty 1904	Political Officer	Sheikhdom of Umm al-Quwain Sheikhdom of Ajman Sheikhdom of Fujaira	Agreements 1820, 1853, 1892, 1902 Agreements 1820, 1853, 1892, 1902, 1922 Recognized as independent Sheikhdom 1952	Political Officer
Upper Aulaqi Sultanate Upper Yafai Sultanate Upper Yafai Sheikhdoms: Marshatta Dhubi Maffahi Hadrami Shaib	Treaties 1895 Protectorate Treaties 1903			


source: *The Economist*, October 10, 1959.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER NINETEEN

1. Cited by James Morris, *Sultan in Oman* (London, 1957), p. 24.
 2. Excepting Egypt and Turkey, whose total production of oil amounts to less than 2 per cent of the total Middle East production.
 3. Royal Dutch Shell owns 23.75 per cent interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company, 14 per cent in the Iranian Oil Exploration and Producing Company (International Consortium), and 100 per cent in the Shell Company of Qatar (offshore areas only); Compagnie Française des Pétroles owns 23.75 per cent interest in IPC, 6 per cent in IOEPC, 33.3 per cent in Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd. (offshore areas only), and 33.3 per cent in Dubai Marine Areas Ltd. (offshore areas only); Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli Mineralia owns 50 per cent interest in Société Irano-Italienne des Pétroles; and the Sekiu Company owns 50 per cent of the Japan Petroleum Trading Company Ltd. (Offshore, Neutral Zone).
 4. Text in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy of the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. II, Doc. 94.
 5. See "Grant of Special Privileges at Bushire. . . ." in *ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 20.
 6. Text in *ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 24.
 7. Qatar fell under direct Ottoman domination in 1871 together with al-Hasa, occupied by Ibn Sa'ud in 1913. For text of agreement, see *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 11.
 8. Text in *ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 55.
 9. *Ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 61.
 10. *Ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 96.
 11. *Ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 97.
 12. *Ibid.*, vol. I, Doc. 100.
 13. The secret "Muscati Nonalienation Bond Given to the United Kingdom" (March 20, 1891) restricted but did not eliminate the external sovereignty of the Imam.
 14. Sir Rupert Hays, *The Persian Gulf States* (Washington, 1959), p. 16.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 16. The United States has consular representation in Kuwait by special agreement with Great Britain.
 17. Hays, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
 18. It was seized from Persia, which still claims sovereignty over Bahrain; see J. B. Kelly, "The Persian Claim to Bahrain," *International Affairs* (January, 1957).
 19. See Herbert F. Liebesny, "International Relations of Arabia," *Middle East Journal* (February, 1947), p. 52.
 20. See *Treaties, Agreements, and Bonds of the Aden Protectorate* (Aden, 1955).
 21. Remnant of the Kharijite sect, see Chap. Two, p. 15, above.
 22. This treaty replaced the "Treaty of Amity and Commerce: The United States and Masqat" * of September 21, 1833; text in Hurewitz, vol. I, Doc. 43.
 23. With the exception of the Dhofar province under exploration by Cities Service.
- * Variant spelling of Muscat.



PART SEVEN:

*Democracy versus
Autocracy* 



Parliamentary Government and Autocracy *

"Democracy passes into despotism."

Plato, Republic

As we have seen, in none of the Middle Eastern states, including Turkey, has the introduction of universal suffrage and the administrative machinery of the democratic system led to the establishment of truly stable and free democratic governments like those of the West. At the middle of this century it became generally evident that transplantation of the parliamentary form of government, instead of giving rise to functioning democracies, had served to crystallize the personalization of power and to pave the way for the centralized state. Elections were, and still are, mostly external rites lending an appearance of democracy; plebiscites and referendums were, and still are, employed to bestow legitimacy where previously only a *fatwa* (religious pronouncement) was needed to invoke the Islamic principle of political quietism. The major factors contributing to the failure of the parliamentary system in the Middle East are inherent in the structure and development of the political parties that came into existence with the establishment of the nation states after the First World War and with the failure to develop a system of checks and balances under which an equitable distribution of power could be achieved.

BLOC PARTIES

The first step in party organization under the newly introduced parliamentary system in the Middle East was the "parliamentary bloc," formed as a political party. This type of party was usually composed of notables and professional politicians bound together by social, economic, and political interests. Bloc parties had no formal system of membership; their members usually consisted of supporters

* The main substance of this chapter was published in *Orbis* (Fall, 1960), vol. IV, No. 3.

who owed allegiance not to a particular ideology or program but rather to the handful of leaders who formed the party. Such supporters were hard to count and assessment of a party's strength was reckoned in terms of villages, regions, or city quarters where the leading members of the party exercised political control or commanded some kind of personal loyalty. The social basis of the bloc parties was thus always semi-feudal in nature.

Occasional attempts by professional politicians to form popular political movements generally resulted in the establishment not of parties but of factions possessing a limited following and no genuine representation of mass sentiment. In such attempts, even before programs and goals were thought out and presented, the question of leadership usually became the overruling consideration, so that in most cases all the political parties of the traditional type were in reality no more than names given to small groups headed by "known" personalities.¹ The bloc party in this sense may be characterized by its political conservatism, by its feudal or sectarian structure, and by the implicit cleavage it admitted and strengthened between a rich aristocratic minority which ruled and a poor oppressed majority which was ruled. Forming, disrupting, and regrouping coalitions, in parliament the parties maneuvered against one another over issues that rarely related to the real problems of the country but usually to the struggle for distribution of government offices and positions of prestige and power.

Within the parliamentary structure this system of multi-bloc parties still predominated in 1960 in Iran, Jordan, and Lebanon.² Two of these states are conservative monarchies, deeply rooted in the established social and political *status quo*; the third, Lebanon, though republican in structure, shares similar attributes by reason of the peculiar religious and sectarian composition of its population. In these countries parliamentary power belongs to the inorganic and unstable formations of bloc parties, which are by their very structure intermediate and overlapping, and which represent in the Middle East a transitional phase of political development that the other countries in the region have already experienced.

SINGLE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP

The single-party regime is as integral a part of political development in the Middle East as the conservative bloc-party system. The introduction of one-party rule, first in Turkey and more recently in

the United Arab Republic, aimed primarily at displacing the "corrupt and backward" socio-political monopoly of the old ruling class—the feudal lords, the pashas, the rich merchants, the religious hierarchy—and establishing a new regime of "modernism, progress, and reform." Neither the Kemalist nor the Nasserist dictatorship based itself on the *doctrine* of the single party; in both cases the dictatorship phase is regarded as a temporary but unavoidable necessity. The *de facto* monopoly of power assumed by Mustafa Kemal's Republican People's party must be viewed as the result of a special political situation, and Mustafa Kemal's attempts to establish an opposition party in 1924-1925 and in 1930 indicated his preference for the European type of pluralist system. Moreover, his party's organization itself precluded its having the totalitarian characteristics of the single party as seen in contemporary Germany, Italy, and Russia. Although the election of party leaders was usually manipulated, the electoral principle was always present, and ideological and doctrinal differences did not result in purges, nor did factions representing divergent views run the risk of being eventually "liquidated."

To a certain extent the Egyptian revolution developed according to the pattern of the Kemalist revolution. The abolishment of all political parties in Egypt was followed by the founding of a single party, the National Union, intended to remain the uncontested political organization in the country until the "transition phase" has been completed and normal political life becomes possible. Yet, although both the Kemalist and the Egyptian revolutions are pragmatic and generally nondoctrinal in structure, they differ in their basic motivations and goals. Mustafa Kemal, because of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, adhered to principles of retrenchment and concentration of strength within the limits of Turkey itself, and he frankly utilized the state to effect a total "westernization" of all aspects of life, positing Western parliamentary democracy as the goal of the revolution. Nasser, on the other hand, has sought to carry the revolution beyond the frontiers of Egypt, replacing at least temporarily the primacy of the internal political and social objectives of the revolution by the more extended ideals of Pan-Arab unity, African solidarity, and Islamic cooperation.

TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

In Turkey orderly evolution toward the parliamentary system was made possible not only by Mustafa Kemal's radical political reforms

but also by the revolutionary social and economic changes which he introduced during the first ten years of his regime. As a result, by the 1950's a new generation had arisen in Turkey, dominated by a new liberal middle class and an educated public opinion which, though limited in comparison to its Western prototype, constituted a new phenomenon in the Muslim society of the Middle East.

The emergence of the two-party system in Turkey after the 1950 elections introduced little change into the basic political and social principles of Kemalism. The Democratic party started as a splinter group within the Republican People's party and was headed by a former prime minister and close associate of Mustafa Kemal. It should be again pointed out, however, that the bloodless revolution of the 1950 elections was not exclusively the work of the Democrats; it was in part the result of the Republicans' decision in 1945 to end their monopoly of political life and to allow the formation of organized political opposition.

Until 1960, when the army ousted Menderes' Democrats, Turkey had the only two-party system in the Middle East, although the Sudan (which is not included in our definition of the Middle East) had also been evolving such a system which was likewise abolished by the Sudanese military *coup d'état* of 1958. Since the first Sudanese elections in December, 1953, parliament had been dominated by the two major parties, the National Unionist party and the Nation party. Even before the organization of political parties, political life in the Sudan had been controlled by two politico-religious movements, the Mahdiyya and the Khatimiyya, whose political division rested on the question of whether the Sudan was to be united with Egypt or to be independent. The Nation and the Unionist parties had been organized around this issue since their foundation in 1942, the Nation backed by the Mahdists who favored independence, and the Unionists by the Khatimists who stood for union with Egypt.³

A factor contributing to the liberal character of Sudan's political life before the *coup d'état* lies in the social and economic structure of Sudanese society, with its equitable distribution of wealth and its almost complete lack of the feudal control common to other countries of the Arab Middle East. Moreover, fifty years of direct rule by Britain left its stamp on the administrative and judicial institutions of the country, which are still among the most advanced in the Middle East.

SECTARIAN AND DOCTRINAL PARTIES

Finally, there has arisen in the Middle East a separate class of parties which we might call "minority parties," divided into two main categories, the sectarian and the doctrinal.

Sectarian parties correspond to those sections of the population that are differentiated on religious, racial, or linguistic grounds and express the interests, aspirations, and fears of these minority groups. Political organization in such groups is not very common; for example, the Kurds in Turkey and Iran, the Assyrians in Iraq, the Druze, the Jews, and the shi'i Muslims in Syria and Lebanon are not politically organized; they nevertheless play an important role on the electoral plane, frequently tipping the scale of votes. Other sectarian groups, however, especially in Lebanon, are politically quite well organized.⁴ Whether or not they have parliamentary representation, such parties are very strong locally and in most cases wield considerable control in their communities.

Doctrinal parties are, on the other hand, minority parties only in the ideological sense, not in the religious, racial, or linguistic sense, for they all aim at mass recruitment and the eventual seizure of power in the state. Membership in doctrinal parties, unlike that in all other parties in the Middle East, has been based on vigorous, wholehearted participation and recruitment, but supporting non-members and sympathizers have also played an important part in determining their strength. Both membership and active backing generally came from among the three politically most active groups in the Middle East: the students, the clergy, and the army. The role and significance of doctrinal parties in the political life of the Middle East have varied from country to country and have been largely determined by circumstances and the unpredictable development of events. The Muslim Brothers, for example, though ideologically a minority party, was one of the two mass movements in the Middle East, whose fate was determined more by certain developments after the Second World War than by its actual strength and appeal to the mass of the population. The same is true of the Tudeh party in Iran, the other mass movement of the area, which was dissolved in Iran when it had almost secured the overthrow of the existing regime; its relegation since 1953 to the status of an ineffective minority group is due to factors and developments that had slight bearing on its political stature and strength. Another evidence of the volatility of

Middle Eastern political life and its effect occurred in Syria, when the unexpected intrusion of the army into politics in 1949 suddenly made possible the active political participation of three of the country's minority doctrinal parties, the Syrian Social National party, the Arab Resurrection Socialist (*Ba'th*) party, and the Syrian Communist party.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DOCTRINAL PARTIES

The formation of doctrinal parties constituted an important landmark in the political development of the Middle East. To a greater or lesser degree, all these parties strove to elucidate a comprehensive view of man and society and to base their doctrines on all-embracing philosophies that explain and justify their strivings and goals. They all shared in the same type of rigid party organization, the same militancy of spirit, the same Jacobin extremism, and they were all masters of clandestine activity, not only because they were the object of suppression and persecution, but also because they had inherited the conspiratorial tradition of secret societies from the old-generation nationalists. It must be added that, apart from the Communist party, the general totalitarian character of these parties should be attributed less to their deliberate espousal of the principles of totalitarianism than to their bitter and frustrating experience with parliamentary democracy as the Middle East has known it since the early 1920's. When elections and parliamentary procedures are emptied of meaning, all effort to influence or persuade the electorate becomes futile; and when the habit of continuous suppression of political opposition renders ineffective all means and practices of democratic action, recourse to force and violence becomes inevitable. Consequently, the peculiar predilection of these parties in the Middle East to agitation, violence, and bloodshed ends by seeming almost natural.

Leadership in the doctrinal as well as in other types of parties in the Middle East was oligarchic, even under the most elaborate elective systems. Yet the real power of leadership depended more on the degree of party centralization of power and regimentation of members than on the theoretical functions assigned to the leader or executive group.

The centralized organization of doctrinal parties was based on the hierarchial system, which was best suited for unity of command and for secret and underground activity. Of course, the most tightly knit form of organization belonged to the Communist party, based on the

cell structure and divided according to occupational and geographical distribution. In Iran, Iraq, and Syria the Communists succeeded best in establishing indigenous organizations attuned to local conditions yet in harmony with the principles of international Communist procedure. While other doctrinal parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ba'ath, and the Syrian Social National party, relied chiefly on the branch and regional type of organization, they also employed the cell system, especially in times of persecution and underground work. They all had some kind of militia organization, and all actively strove to acquire and store firearms.

The future of doctrinal parties, particularly that of the Communist party, depends in large part on the development of the rising Middle Eastern proletariat, the peasant and labor classes which have emerged as a potent political force in the Middle East since the Second World War. It might be pointed out that in this respect the present state of flux in the Middle East bears a remarkable resemblance to that prevailing in China before its communization in 1949. If in that nationalist, tradition-bound peasant society the family could be destroyed, traditional values displaced, and a proletarian state established, there would seem to be no reason why the same transformation could not take place in the Muslim, nationalist, and predominantly agricultural society of the Middle East. In this sense, a Communist triumph in the Middle East is not only conceivable but, given the requisite circumstances, theoretically quite possible.

IDEOLOGY VERSUS ACTUALITY

The process of disintegration of parliamentary government and the rise of military autocracy in the Middle East started in the period immediately following the end of the Second World War. The overflowing of the Egyptian revolutionary experience beyond Egypt's boundaries, even into Turkey by 1960, demonstrates that not only had the attempted "institutionalization" of the parliamentary form of government been partially destroyed but a new process of "personalization" of authority and power had also been established in the Middle East.

It is now clear that this social and political upheaval has already almost completely transformed the closed-in Muslim community into a new kind of twentieth-century collectivity, in which the aspirations and demands of the downtrodden masses, supplanting the traditional rights and privileges of the feudal aristocracy, constitute

the valuational scheme of social, economic, and political action. If the Middle Eastern masses have not yet chosen the path of revolution to redress the injustices and inequalities to which they have so long been subjected, it is only because their awakening has not yet been translated into the self-consciousness of an articulate proletariat. Articulation and leadership come from the middle-class intelligentsia, to which the masses have begun actively to respond. On one hand, the psychological docility of the awakened but still illiterate masses contributes to the rise and power of the new leadership; but on the other, it holds it captive, and both leader and led remain bound by a reciprocity that is the only medium by which the identity and self-recognition of each can be attained.

Perhaps the most salient feature of the political life of the Middle East in the middle of the twentieth century is the dichotomy which exists between the traditional nationalism of the old-guard nationalists and the new post-Second World War revolutionary brand of nationalism. Again, though it may be inexact to apply the terms "right" and "left" to the Middle East situation without certain basic qualifications, it could nevertheless be safely said that the old traditional school of thought, with its nineteenth-century European background of conservative evolutionary democracy and its instinctive reliance on the institutional and legal processes, constitutes the conservative right, while the new revolutionary school, with its conception of the welfare state and its pragmatic socialist activism, forms the liberal left, i.e., the Communists, the independent socialists, and the Arab nationalist socialists.

The dilemma of the leftist intellectual in the Arab Middle East consists in a growing political alienation from the West, on one hand, and in an increasing intellectual and cultural attraction to it on the other. For while socialism, which after all is a European concept, may serve to draw him toward the Communist political orbit, at the same time it keeps him riveted to the European sources of his intellectual and cultural leftism. This psychological polarity has given rise in recent years to an impassioned movement toward political and cultural emancipation from both East and West, expressed in the idea of positive neutralism on the political level and in the theory of a self-sufficient national culture, based on Arab history and Islam.

In the realm of actualities, however, this dilemma is pushed into the background, and political action becomes subject to exigent considerations that have little relation to ideological standpoints. As

Professor Gibb has pointed out, all "imagination and effort [become] concentrated upon an immediate objective—the removal of something that can no longer be borne. What is to follow is left to the future to decide."⁵ In the Middle East this should be attributed partly to the intellectual's failure to grasp the limits that action always sets upon thought and partly to the common man's incapacity to face facts and his propensity to surrender to rhetorical exaggerations and the literary imagination.⁶

MILITARY AUTOCRACY

In the Middle East there has always been little relationship between party activity and the principle of the distribution of power, except under the two-party system as it existed in Turkey between 1946 and 1960. The political triumph of the Egyptian revolution and its adoption of the Damascene brand of Arab nationalism has introduced a new factor into the political life of the Middle East: the principle of *de facto* control of the state by the military establishment.

The tendency toward military control is not hard to explain against the background of recent history in the Middle East. In all the Middle Eastern countries that have experienced military *coup d'état* since the Second World War, the shift has not been from democracy to dictatorship, but simply from one form of nondemocratic rule to another. In Iraq, for example, the government of Nuri as-Sa'id could not in the true sense be described as democratic, although in structure it was based on the parliamentary system. The Iraqi army's *coup* merely replaced Nuri's civilian autocracy with a military one. In the Sudan, where the two-party system seemed to have the best chance for development in the Arab world, the political balance suddenly snapped, and a military government emerged overnight. Even in Turkey, where the parliamentary regime seemed most secure, the intervention of the army in 1960 put an end to the dual-party system and set Turkey on a new course of political development.

In the last hundred years or so the entire non-Western world has been transformed socially, economically, and politically in varying degrees under the impact of the technology and institutions of the West. As we have seen, one of the most important consequences of westernization has been the deterioration of the traditional way of life and the collapse of the social and political structures of every single one of these countries. The one institution that was preserved and invigorated was the army. And it is not surprising that the im-

pact of westernization always manifested itself first in the military establishment. In fact, the first act of modernization along Western lines in the non-Western world occurred in Turkey in 1789, when Sultan Selim III, having been defeated by Catherine the Great of Russia, decided to introduce what he called the *new order* which consisted of reorganizing the Ottoman military establishment with the help of European instruction and re-equipping it with Western arms. It was the modernized military forces of Japan which over a century later (1905) proved to the world that an Asian nation could defeat a major Western power through the adoption of Western ideas and techniques. Here it is worth noting that both in stimulating the movement of westernization in Asia and in bringing about the beginning of the end of Asian inferiority vis-à-vis the West, it was Russia that primarily represented the West, first as a formidable foe to emulate and later as an equal to challenge and overcome.

THE MILITARY *Coup d'état*

During the last half-century (since the Young Turk *coup d'état* of 1908) it has become increasingly evident that in the Middle East the only effective agency of political action lay not in the slow functioning of political organizations and groups but in the physical might of the military establishment. Neither the weight of established law nor the pressure of public opinion could hope to match the force and pragmatic effectiveness of the coercive arm of the state. Since the first successful *coup d'état* in 1908, Middle Eastern politics have not been able to abandon violence as an indispensable means of political action, and the basic formula adopted by all parties and groups striving to seize power has been "infiltrate the army." In the dozen or so major military *coups d'état* that took place in the Middle East between 1908 and 1960—the Turkish in 1908 and 1960, the Persian in 1921, the Iraqi in 1936, 1941 and 1958, the Syrian in 1949 and 1951, the Egyptian in 1952, the Sudanese in 1958—a neat pattern has emerged which has followed this formula of action:

1. When infiltrating the military, concentrate on the officer corps, choosing those officers who possess at least three of the following qualifications: *a*) dissatisfaction with the political state of affairs; *b*) personal ambition; *c*) youth; *d*) sensitive position (e.g., in command of mechanized units stationed in or near the capital); *e*) nationalistic sympathies.

2. Organize officer membership in secret societies, making sure

that the identity of members and that of the leadership circle are not known.

3. Wait until the political situation deteriorates; if the situation permits, incite mass chaos, precipitating crisis, or else wait for the opportune moment to strike.

4. In a few hours three objectives must be accomplished: *a)* the government and members of the opposition must be arrested; *b)* government offices, centers of communications, and key installations must be occupied; *c)* announcements must be broadcast that the *peaceful* and *bloodless* change of government in the people's name has been made, assuring the nation and the world that complete control now rests firmly in the hands of the new regime.

5. Declare martial law and establish a provisional government including known and respected political figures; announce objectives of radical social, economic, and political reforms; complete the apprehension of known and suspected enemies of the regime.

6. Obtain international recognition abroad and proceed firmly to stabilize the regime at home by: *a)* declaring a period of political transition after which free elections are to take place; *b)* dissolving or suppressing all political parties; *c)* reshuffling major commands in the army; *d)* purging the civil and diplomatic services; and *e)* initiating long public trials of leading members of the former regime.

This in a simplified form is the technique of the *coup d'état* which in the Middle East has been the true instrument of political change. But a *coup d'état* may not be judged successful merely by seizure of power. Inherent in usurpation is the real task not simply of possessing power but of consolidating and strengthening it. After the stabilization of external control, when the first flush of victory and excitement have abated, there follows a phase of internal struggle within the new leadership which usually results, if the regime does not collapse, in the defeat of the civilian political members of the new leadership and their subordination to the military, the elimination of rival factions, and the emergence of the leader of the winning group as the head of state. Only after this inevitable internal revolution, which follows in one form or another upon every *coup d'état*, has taken its course and the locus of absolute power in the new regime has been unmistakably determined, may the stability and security of the new government be said to have been established.

Military dictatorships, like other forms of dictatorship, are of course never fully secure, nor do they last forever. But this is due

more to the accidents and hazards of solitary power than to the illegitimacy of dictatorship or to the "ultimate triumph of democracy and freedom." One fact, however, seems certain: once a *coup d'état* is successfully executed, the older order is definitively destroyed and cannot be resuscitated.

It is futile to argue against the valid claim that the new revolutionary dictatorships in the Middle East have been more effective and more efficient than the previous "democratic" governments they have replaced. In a sense there seems more genuine popular backing, a truer representation of the people's hopes and aspirations in revolutionary governments than in any of the old parliamentary regimes. It is perhaps equally futile to hope that, after a period of "guided democracy," the prevailing authoritarian tendency in the Middle East will in the near future necessarily lead to the establishment of democratic governments. As the decade of the 1960's opened, it was clear that one phase of political development in the Middle East had come to an end and a new phase was beginning.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWENTY

1. See Marcel Colombe, "Réflexions sur les origines et le fonctionnement du régime représentatif et parlementaire en Turquie et dans les états arabes du Moyen-Orient," *Die Welt des Islams* (1953), pp. 256-257.

2. Egypt belonged to this group of states before the revolution of July, 1952, as did Syria before its amalgamation with Egypt in February, 1958, and Iraq before the *coup d'état* of July, 1958.

3. See P. M. Holt, "Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination," *MEJ* (Spring, Summer, 1956), pp. 239-247, 368-378.

4. For example, the Lebanese Phalanges (Maronite) and the Najjadah (Sunni Muslim) parties, which play a significant role in local Lebanese politics.

5. H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1947), p. 113.

6. See Hisham Sharabi, "The Crisis of the Intelligentsia in the Middle East," *The Muslim World* (July, 1957), pp. 187-193.



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
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The result, in one pre-publication reviewer's opinion, is an "admirably objective and well-balanced appraisal" of the politics and governments of the contemporary Middle East.

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